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Abstract
In the past thirty years, International Criminal Law (ICL) has established itself
as an influential framework through which claims for justice in relation to the
past can be mediated. This thesis offers a critique of the particular way in
which ICL links history, law and justice. To this end, it contrasts a transitional
justice perspective on trials in response to state crime, with one that looks at
such trials as sites of competing politics of time. While the former focuses on
the stabilisation of political authority, the later privileges its destabilisation.
This perspective is then brought to bear on two sets of trials. These are, on
the one hand, the trials of German industrialists conducted by the Allies in
the wake of World War II (1939-1945) and, on the other hand,the ongoing
trials in Argentina which seek to address the economic dimensions of the last
Argentinian dictatorship (1976-1983).
Through the reading of these trials, ICL is shown to be a liberal concept of
historical justice, not (merely) because it focuses on individual responsibility
or because it seeks to foster the liberal rule of law, but, more importantly,
because it understands the economic dimensions of state crime according to
the ontological separation of the state and the economic which is inherited
from political liberalism. As a consequence, ICL tends to authorise a liberal
democratic order, while sidelining other political imaginaries and related claims
to justice, especially those that would involve a reshaping of the political
economy on which liberalism rests.
This argument is developed in two parts. The first part, consisting of three
chapters, contrasts what has become the predominant perspective from which
to study trials in response to state crime, namely transitional justice, with a
theoretical framework inspired by the work of Walter Benjamin – in particular,
his philosophy of history and his critique of violence. The central difference
between these approaches, this thesis will argue, lies with the way in which
each conceives of the promise of justice that comes with the memory of past
violence. Transitional justice literature links the duty to remember past
violence to the promise of fostering a particular juridico-political order, namely
the liberal rule of law. Walter Benjamin, by contrast, is interested in the past’s
ability to expose the foundational violence of the present juridico-political
order. Against this backdrop, the promise of trials in response to state crime
can be located only at the place, where they unearth ‘rags of history’ that, if
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read, expose not only the the violence of the past, but also that of the present,
thereby opening it anew for contestation.
Chapters Four, Five and Six put this theoretical framework to work in close
readings of several criminal trials which deal with the economic dimensions
of state crime conducted in post-World War II Germany and contemporary
Argentina. These readings bring into relief the way in which the ontological
underpinnings of political liberalism – such as the separation of the economic
from the political, and the categorisation of violence according to sanctioned
and non-sanctioned manifestations – structures the way that ICL makes sense
of the economic dimensions of state crime.
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Prelude
In the past thirty years, International Criminal Law (ICL) has established itself
as an influential language and conceptual framework through which claims
for justice in relation to the past are mediated.1 This turn to criminal law to
address past violence is connected to the broader phenomenon of ‘transitional
justice’, a mode of political practice and a site of academic inquiry which
emerged towards the end of the 1980s.2 The term refers to a set of juridico-
political procedures and practices that seek to both account for a previous
regime’s crimes and secure the existence of a democratic order developed in its
stead.3 Those who stress the importance of criminal prosecutions in response
to systematic state violence refer to the capacity of criminal trials to establish
an account of the past violence, offer retribution and, in acknowledging and
judging the violence exercised in the name of the state, contribute towards
liberalising political and social change.
This thesis conceives of criminal trials in response to state crime as sites in
which the meaning of the past, and its relevance for the present, are negotiated.
It is interested in ICL as a concept of historical justice and looks at the way
in which criminal trials reproduce and enact a conglomerate of assumptions
about the causal and normative nexus between past, present and future. It
1A note on terminology: the ‘international’ in ICL refers to the international dimension of
the respective crimes. A crime, according to ICL theory, is an international crime when
it amounts to a violation of presumed core values of the international community. Im-
portantly, ICL has extensively been applied and developed by national courts in order
to establish individual accountability. Therefore, it might be more accurate to speak of
‘transnational’ criminal law. However, I use the term ICL in order to avoid confusion with
other areas of transnational criminal law such as corruption or organised crime. On the
‘international’ in ICL and the concept of core crimes in international law, see M. Cherif
Bassiouni. ‘International Crimes: Ius Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’. In: Law and
Contemporary Problems 59.4 (1997), pp. 63–74, p. 69; M. Cherif Bassiouni. International
Criminal Law. Sources, Subjects, and Contents. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009,
p. 130; Gerhard Werle. Principles of International Criminal Law. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005, p. 28; On the role of national courts in developing ICL see, Andreas
Fischer-Lescano. Globalverfassung. Die Geltungsbegründung der Menschenrechte. Weiler-
swist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2005; Kathryn Sikkink. The Justice Cascade. How Human
Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics. New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2011;
Jessica Almqvist and Carlos D. Espósito, eds. The Role of Courts in Transitional Justice.
Voices from Latin America and Spain. London: Routledge, 2012.
2See Paige Arthur. ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of
Transitional Justice’. In: Human Rights Quarterly 31.2 (2009), pp. 321–367, for a detailed
discussion of the term, see Chapter Two.
3For a detailed description, see Ruti G. Teitel. ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’. In: Harvard
Human Rights Journal 16 (2003), pp. 69–94, pp. 78-84.
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understands criminal law as one particular way of framing justice claims in
relation to past violence. To be more specific: it is concerned with the politics
of ICL as a concept of historical justice – that is, the participation of ICL and
related trials in the process of grounding and ungrounding a political order.4
the question
This research interest originated from the observation of a temporal coincidence
of the proliferation of criminal trials as a means to deal with systematic state-
backed violence and the end of the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. This particular historical moment famously was celebrated by some
as the chance for a ‘liberal revolution’5 or indeed the ‘end of history’.6 Such
readings of the events of the late 1980s claim that after the collapse of socialist
societies, liberal democracy and market economy have proven to be the only
legitimate option for societal organisation. As Jacques Derrida put it:
The incantation repeats and ritualizes itself, it holds forth and holds to
formulas, like any animistic magic. To the rhythm of a cadenced march,
it proclaims: Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead, and along
with it its hope, its discourse, its theories, and its practices. It says: long
live capitalism, long live the market, here’s to the survival of economic
and political liberalism.7
While this claim remained by no means politically or intellectually uncon-
tested, it came to inform the foreign policy of Western countries, international
governmental institutions and think tanks.
It also found its way into academia. The supposition of the end of history
appeared in the form of the thesis of a democratic norm in international
law, liberal peace theories and comparative democratisation studies.8 In the
scholarship on ICL and transitional justice, the fostering of a liberal democratic
order following authoritarian rule or state socialism became the justifying
rationale for trials. What this literature has in common and I will return to
this point in Chapter Two is that it mostly lacks any effort to justify the very
aim of the process of transition, the liberal democratic state.
The championing of political democracy following the end of the Cold War, as
Derrida’s quote reminds us, was accompanied by the championing of economic
4I will expound my notion of politics in more detail in Chapter Three. Suffice it to say for now
that in line with post-foundational political thought, I conceive of politics as the ongoing,
failure-prone attempt to ground a political order and, by implication, a particular way of
relating the juridico-political to the social or the economic.
5Bruce Ackerman. The Future of Liberal Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.
6Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.
7Jacques Derrida. Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New
International. New York and London: Routledge, 1994, p. 64.
8See Susan Marks. The Riddle of all Constitutions. International Law, Democracy and the
Critique of Ideology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, especially pp. 33-37; Nicolas
Guilhot. The Democracy Makers. Human Rights & International Order. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005; David Chandler. ‘The Uncritical Critique of “Liberal Peace”’. In:
Review of International Studies 36.1 (2010), pp. 137–155.
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liberalism especially in its neo-liberal variant. If ICL as a concept of historical
justice is historically indebted to a liberal project in so far as it seeks to endow
liberalising social change with a claim to justice, what promise does it hold for
those whose suffering is not redeemed by the liberal rule of law and market
economy? More specifically, what does it hold for those who were subjected to
state violence because they fought against the structural violence inflicted by
capitalist society?
This is the overarching question that stood at the beginning of this thesis,
and it is two-dimensional. The first question is of an analytical nature: What
does it mean to speak of (international) criminal law as a liberal concept
of historical justice? The second dimension of the question picks up law’s
claim on the idea of justice. What is the underlying promise of justice in
(international) criminal law? Is it possible to think of a promise of justice from
trials in response to state crime that is not attached to fostering the liberal
rule of law?
In order to answer these questions, I looked at several criminal trials that
deal with economic dimensions of state crime which were and are conducted
in post-World War II Germany and contemporary Argentina. I also engaged
with philosophical writings on history, historical time and law, most notably
the work of Walter Benjamin.9
the thesis
If we understand liberalism as a logic of government characterised by the
‘management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free’,10
a logic that takes its clues from political economy and which evolves around
the question of how to limit government in relation to society (and its econ-
omy), then the trials dealing with the responsibility of economic actors for
state-backed violence constitute a privileged site of inquiry for my research
question.11 Trials in response to state crime in general are concerned with the
9The trials in Argentina are the first systematic attempt to legally assess the responsibil-
ity of economic actors in state crime since the so-called Industrialists Trials conducted in
post-World War II Germany. There have been a few odd cases against businessmen at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, as well as trials on the domestic level; for an overview, see: Grietje
Baars. ‘Law(yers) Congealing Capitalism: On the (Im)possibility of Restraining Business in
Conflict through International Criminal Law’. PhD thesis. London: University College Lon-
don, 2012, pp. 255-281; contributions in Sabine Michalowski, ed. Corporate Accountability
in the Context of Transitional Justice. Milton Park: Routledge, 2013; On the ‘Industrialists
trials’ in Germany, see: Allison M. Danner. ‘The Nuremberg Industrialist Prosecutions and
Aggressive War’. In: Virginia Journal of International Law 46 (2006), pp. 651–676; and
contributions in Kim Christian Priemel and Alexa Stiller, eds. NMT. Die Nürnberger Militär-
tribunale zwischen Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit und Rechtschöpfung. Hamburg: Hamburger
Edition, 2013.
10Michel Foucault. The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79. Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 63.
11Foucault develops his analysis of liberalism and neo-liberalism in his lectures on the Birth
of Biopolitics, held in 1979. I will engage with this work more extensively in Chapter Four
of this thesis. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics.
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excesses of the state, the omnipresence of the state apparatus and the suspen-
sion of individual liberties. They are intended to perform a break between a
violent past and a democratic present.
In this thesis I will argue that in trials dealing with the responsibility of
economic actors, the lines that demarcate the difference between the ‘evil’
predecessor state and the new ‘good’ state are twofold. They not only mark the
opposition between arbitrary state violence and a democratic rule of law, but
also distinguish those interactions between the economy and the state which
are considered acceptable from those thought to be conducive towards violence.
As we will see in the course of this thesis, what is at stake in the attempt to
determine the responsibility of economic actors in the crimes committed by the
Nazi state and under the authoritarian regime in Argentina is the definition of
inadequate and adequate interactions between the state and the economy –
those resulting in uncontrolled state violence and those enhancing political
and economic liberty.
ICL – and this is my response to the first, analytical part of the question
outlined above – is a liberal concept of historical justice, not merely because
it focuses on individual responsibility or because it seeks to foster the liberal
rule of law, but because of the way in which it distinguishes inadequate
(criminalised) from adequate (acceptable) interactions of the state and economic
actors. The place attributed to the economic in state crime, I will argue, is
circumscribed by liberal theories of the state which are deeply inscribed in
the way (international) criminal law imagines the criminal state and which
continue to pervade most of the recent literature on socio-economic dimensions
of state crime.
As a result, ICL and the corresponding jurisprudence tend to reproduce
two central blind spots they inherit from political liberalism: first, in positing
the democratic rule of law as the just answer to arbitrary state violence, the
violence that characterises the rule of law itself is rendered invisible. Second,
when deciding about the responsibility of economic actors, the trials eventually
reintroduce the distinction between the state as the realm of politics on the one
hand and society as the realm of the economy on the other. This distinction,
as we will see, carries with it several implications, one being that state violence
is disconnected from any economic rationale.
Moving on to the second dimension of the question, does this analysis
imply that there is no hope for those who became victims of (physical) state
violence while struggling for a society in which democracy would be linked
not only to political but also to economic equality and self-determination? For
those concerned with the permissive violence that is inscribed in the liberal
imaginary?12 Indeed, this seems to be the conclusion drawn by the few existing
12On the role of the liberal state in creating spaces of permissive violence, see Ives Winter.
‘Beyond Blood and Coercion: A Study of Violence in Machiavelli and Marx’. PhD thesis.
Berkeley: University of California, 2009.
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studies that link the longstanding neglect of economic violence and justice to
the very structure of (international) criminal law itself. Identifying law with the
law of the capitalist state, these contributions argue that the respective trials
can only cloud the structural violence that comes with capitalism.13
This thesis puts forward a different conclusion. It will argue that the trials
investigating the responsibility of economic actors for state crimes produce
material that exposes the very operations through which the lines between the
state and the economy and between past and present are drawn. It is in the
moment of exposure of that which is excluded by the history written in the
trial, of those links that cannot be accommodated by the constructions of legal
responsibility, where the promise of justice of these trials lies. Here, history –
invoked but not controlled by the trials – becomes a source of rupture which
has the potential to open the present anew for contestation.
the theory
I will be making sense of this double movement of the authorisation and
destabilisation of liberal democracy at work in the trials by conceiving this
answer within a theoretical framework of a politics of time. As indicated above,
Walter Benjamin has been my main ally in this endeavour. I will draw on
a selection of his writings, in particular the fragment Capitalism as Religion
(Capitalism), dated 1921, his essay Critique of Violence (Critique), published in
1921, and his later writings on history, such as the Theses on the Philosophy
of History (Theses) and the Arcades Project.14 Read in constellation, these
texts will allow me to develop a theoretical framework that offers an analytical
perspective on trials without abandoning the central problem posed by law,
namely its ties with both violence and justice.
Such a perspective differs from the study of criminal trials as a means of
transitional justice in that it does not define their contribution to historical
justice in terms of their ability to contribute towards historical truth finding or
to foster the liberal rule of law. While with Benjamin, the role of historiograph-
ical representation in trials remains a potential source of justice, this promise
of justice is not linked to either the adequate representation of history or the
authorisation of a particular juridico-political order.
Instead, it would be tied to the disruptive force with which the images of
the past that are unearthed by the legal proceedings destabilise the present-
13See Baars, ‘Law(yers) Congealing Capitalism: On the (Im)possibility of Restraining Business
in Conflict through International Criminal Law’; Tor Krever. ‘Unveiling (and Veiling) Politics
in International Criminal Trials’. In: Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law. Ed.
by Christine Schwöbel. New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 117–137.
14Walter Benjamin. ‘Capitalism as Religion’. In: Selected Writings. Ed. by Marcus Bullock
and Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1996, pp. 288–291;
Walter Benjamin. ‘Critique of Violence’. In: Reflections. New York: Schocken Books, 1978,
pp. 277–300; Walter Benjamin. ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’. In: Illuminations.
Ed. by Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968, pp. 255–266; Walter
Benjamin. The Arcades Project. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1999.
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day juridico-political. In other words, it would lie where history makes itself
present in what Benjamin calls the ‘time of the now’, or Jetztzeit, suspending
the law for an instance by exposing the violence on which it hinges. From
such a perspective history, potentially, enters trials in different temporalities.
Because depending on these temporalities, the past participates either in the
grounding or ungrounding of a societal order, I speak of a competing politics
of time at work in criminal trials.
To summarise: the argument I will present in this thesis operates on two
different levels. On a general level, I propose a framework for the study of
trials in response to state crimes. This framework conceives of trials as a
place of competing politics of time and should be understood as a counter-
perspective to what I identify as dominant approach in contemporary literature
which analyses trials in their capacity to contribute to liberalising change.
With regard to the existing literature on ICL, criminal trials and historical
justice, this means that we have to expand the focus from the problem of
adequate representation of history in trials and orient our gaze towards the
temporalisation of history. Viewed from this perspective, and now moving on
to a more concrete level of analysis, I argue that the trials studied here allow
us to formulate a critique of criminal law as a liberal concept of historical
justice. This is because they expose the ways in which they participate in the
definition of the place of the economic in relation to the state.
It is the aim of the following first chapter to make the link between these two
levels more palpable. To this end, I will engage in a reading of a collage made by
the Argentinian artist León Ferrari. The image allows me to show why I think
it is necessary to engage with both the representation and temporalisation of
history in trials in order to critique ICL as a liberal concept of historical justice.
The chapter will also offer some reflections on the methodology underlying this
thesis; to close, it will present the reader with an outline of the rest of the
chapters.
1 | ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’
‘The first stage in this undertaking
will be to carry over the principle of
montage into history.’
— Walter Benjamin
The Arcades Project
As indicated in the prelude, in this chapter I wish to establish the link
between the two distinct yet interrelated threads of the argument that I will
develop throughout the thesis. These threads were announced to operate on
two levels. On a general level, I propose a framework for the study of trials in
response to state crimes. This framework draws heavily on Walter Benjamin’s
philosophy of history and his writing on the relationship between law and
violence, and will be introduced as a counter-perspective to the literature that
analyses trials as a means of transitional justice, that is, in their capacity to
contribute towards liberalising change. I will introduce both approaches in
detail over the next two chapters.
For the purpose of this chapter, I will limit myself to introducing what I
consider to be the central implications of this change in perspective. With
Benjamin, trials can be understood as a site of a competing politics of time in
which past and present relate to each other in two fundamentally different,
politically relevant, ways. Images of the past, I will be arguing, are either
invoked as negative reference in order to authorise the present order, or appear
in trials in a way that sheds light on the continuities between past and present,
thereby destabilising the claim of the present order to be the non-violent
answer to the violent past.
In line with the first temporal relationship, transitional justice literature
on International Criminal Law (ICL) invokes the ability of trials to contribute
towards establishing a truthful account of past violence and thereby help foster
liberal institutions. With Benjamin, on the contrary, the promise of justice
would lie in the instances in which the past exposes the foundational violence
of the present order.
Through this change in perspective – and this will be the second thread of
the argument to be developed in the thesis – I will be able to advance a critique
of criminal law as a liberal concept of historical justice. In focusing on the
17
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ruptures, on that which cannot be translated into the established language
of ICL, we will be able to identify that which is simply posited, the decision
that cannot be accounted for. I will be arguing that ICL is not (merely) liberal
because it focuses on individual responsibility or seeks to authorise liberal
institutions. Rather, it is liberal in the way it conceives of the relationship
between law and violence on the one hand, and the state and the economy on
the other.
I wish to establish the link between these two threads through the reading
of a collage made by Argentine artist León Ferrari. It will allow me to introduce
the reader to the principle of the montage – central to Benjamin’s philosophy
of history – as well as to the problem of defining the relationship between state
violence and the economy that will be at stake in the trails I will be examining
(1.1). My discussion of the collage will lead to a section in which I relate the
reading of the image to the reading of the trials put forward in this thesis. In
particular, I will sketch out what I conceive of the different ways of representing
the past in the trials (1.2). The two first parts concerning the overall argument
to be made in this thesis will be followed by a brief section that explains why
I look at the ‘economic cases’ in Germany and Argentina for a more general
critique of ICL (1.3). I will then conclude the chapter with an outline of the
chapters to come (1.4).
1.1 Reading the Image
‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’1 is a collage made by León Ferrari as part of a
series of over thirty collages which the Argentinian artist produced in 1995
for a new edition of the Nunca Más (Never Again) – the final report published
by the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP).2
The CONADEP was created in 1983 by then President Raúl Alfonsín with the
aim of documenting the human rights abuses committed during the ‘Process
of National Reorganisation’ (Proceso), the name given by the military junta
for the authoritarian rule which was instituted with the coup d’état on 24th
March 1976.3 Twelve years after its first publication, the daily newspaper
‘Página/12’ reprinted the Nunca Más report in fascicles which were distributed
with the paper. The item ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’ illustrates the front cover
of fascicle XVII. It is the fascicle which reproduces the report’s section H, titled
1See image 1.1 on p. 19.
2CONADEP. Nunca Más. Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas.
Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 2006.
3It is impossible to escape a politics of naming and a politics of periodisation when talking
about the state violence experienced in Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s. In terms of
naming, I mostly use the designation introduced by the military junta itself because it
reminds us that the use of state violence was linked to a wider political and societal project.
In terms of periodisation, I should note at this point that the dates 1976 and 1983 only mark
the official temporal limits of the military government, but indicate neither the beginning of
state violence nor its end.
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Figure 1.1: Martínez de Hoz and Boots
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‘Trade Unionist’ (Gremialistas).4 I will turn to the content of this particular
section – and the way the image connects – further below. Let us start, for
now, with a close look at the image itself.
The collage ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’, as the name indicates, consists
of two items. Against a black backdrop, Ferrari arranged a picture of boots,
marching lock-step, and a clipping of the upper body of a man in a suit – Juan
Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, Minister of Economic Affairs during the first eight
years of the Proceso. The head of the man, whose picture is positioned at the
bottom, slightly overlaps with the image of the boots which itself fills the top
half of the collage.
In the context of the Nunca Más series, the boots formation constitutes a
clear reference to the military regime. The boots move towards the observer.
The photograph fills the whole width of the image: there is no space that is
not reached by the authoritarian state, there is no escape from it. The boots
march in bright daylight, with no need to hide: the coup d’État coincided with
an exemplary coup de force through which the junta sought to provide its
government with legal grounds.5 Claiming its ‘constituent power’, the junta
declared itself the ‘highest body of the nation’.6
The sunlit boots, however, throw long shadows. The official military rule
produces spaces shielded from day light. The bodies and their shadows can
be taken as the visualisation of the double structure of the Proceso, which
sought to authorise itself on legal grounds while exempting certain spaces from
the application of its law.7 These spaces are most famously the clandestine
detention centres, synonyms for torture and forced disappearance.8
4Although titled ‘Trade Unionist’, this section entails subsections on individual cases which
did not fit any of the categories, namely on Alice Domon and Leonie Duquet (two French
nuns who belonged to the Institute des Missions Etrangeres, Toulouse), Adolofo Esquivel
(Nobel Peace Price winner in 1980) and Dagmar Hagelin (a Danish student). See CONADEP,
Nunca Más, Section H.
5Derrida uses the notion to highlight how in the moment of foundation of a legal order, the
performative and the constative coincide in the face of the absence of any legal grounds.
See Jacques Derrida. ‘The Force of Law’. In: Acts of Religion. Ed. by Gil Anidjar. London:
Routledge, 2002, pp. 230–297, p. 241; and Jacques Derrida. ‘Declarations of Independence’.
In: Negotiations. Ed. by Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 2002, pp. 46–54, p. 51.
6In the ‘Statute for the Process of National Reorganisation’, published on the day of the coup,
we read ‘The Military junta, in exercise of the constituent power, establishes: Art. 1° —
The Military junta . . . , highest body of the nation, ensures the normal functioning of the
other state powers’ (my translation). See ‘Estatuto para el Proceso de Reorganización Na-
cional’. In: Documentos básicos y bases políticas de las Fuerzas Armadas para el Proceso de
Reorganización Nacional. Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion, 1980, p. 23.
7On the double structure of the state that characterised the dictatorship, see Victoria Crespo.
‘Legalidad y dictadura’. In: Argentina, 1976. Ed. by Clara E. Lida, Horacio Gutiérrez Crespo,
and Pablo Yankelevich. México D.F.: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos,
2007, pp. 165–186; Enrique I. Groisman. ‘El derecho durante el “Proceso”: una relación
ambigua’. In: ¿Usted también doctor? Ed. by Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky. Buenos Aires: siglo
veintiuno editores, 2015, pp. 45–60.
8There is vast literature on the function and structure of the clandestine detention camps.
The CONADEP report impressively documents the operation of the camps and the system-
atic use of torture and physical violence. For a philosophical engagement with the phe-
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The upper body of José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, the second item in the
collage, sits at a table. His fingers rest on the edge of the table top, a glass of
water is within his reach. He wears a suit and a tie. The white skin of his face
and high forehead contrast with the black backdrop, the dark tie is clearly
visible against his white shirt. Martínez de Hoz is portrayed in his role as
minister of economic affairs. The top of his head reaches into the marching,
bodiless, boots. Martínez de Hoz, in turn, is shown without legs.
With this collage, Ferrari establishes a connection between the violent re-
pression implemented by the militarised state apparatus during the Proceso
and what I provisionally call its economic dimensions, embodied by the figure
of Martínez de Hoz. The place of the ‘economic’ in state crimes is precisely
what is at stake in the trials I will look at in this thesis, and I will talk about
the link between Ferrari’s collage and the trials in a moment. Before doing so,
however, I wish to proceed with a few reflections on the particularities of the
collage as a form of aesthetic representation. This will provide us with some
pointers for reading the image further and will also prepare the ground for a
brief introduction to Benjamin’s philosophy of history as well as its relevance
for a critique of ICL as a concept of historical justice.
montage
Ferrari himself understood his collages as ‘graphic commentary’ and ‘contem-
porary visual testimony’ which ‘actualises’ the Nunca Más report that had
initially been published ten years earlier.9 With the image of Martínez de Hoz
in the collage, Ferrari cites one of the very few sentences to be found in the
entire report that refer explicitly to the economic project of the dictatorship.
The sentence follows a short description of the repression of the workers at
the Acindar metal plant in Villa Constitución which took place before and after
the coup of 1976.10 The section reads:
The Santa Fe Delegation of the Commission on Disappeared People twice
went to the town of Villa Constitución and, in addition, carried out an
official examination of an illegal detention centre which operated on the
Premises of the Acindar company. . . . In one of the testimonies it is re-
ported that in 1975 (towards the end of the year) the Acindar company,
nomenon of disappearance in Argentina, see Claudio Martyniuk. ESMA. Fenomenología de
la desaparición. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2004.
9See interview with Ferrari published by Página/12 on the occasion of the announcement of
the new edition. ‘La Explicación de León Ferrari. »La Actualisación Gráfica«’. In: Página/12
(1995-07-09), p. 13, p. 13; Cf. also Benjamin, Arcades Project, ‘The founding concept (of
historical materialism) is not progress but actualization’, p. 460 (N2,2).
10See Victoria Basualdo. ‘La organización sindical de base en Acindar Villa Constitución en
la segunda ISI: aportes para la comprensión de sus particularidades y su significación
histórica’. In: La clase trabajadora argentina en el siglo XX. ed. by Victoria Basualdo.
Argentina: Cara o Seca, 2011; Dirección Nacional del Sistema Argentino de Información
Jurídica, ed. Responsabilidad empresarial en delitos de lesa humanidad. Represión a tra-
bajadores durante el terrorismo de Estado. Vol. 1. Buenos Aires: Editorial Ministerio de
Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Nación, 2015, pp. 221-244; José Ernesto Schulman.
Tito Martín, el villazo y la verdadera historia de Acindar. Rosario: n/a, 1996.
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which has about 5,000 workers, ordered them to get their Federal Police
identity documents and also a new factory pass, for which they were pho-
tographed again. These photos were later used by security and/or military
agents to carry out raids and abductions.
Martínez de Hoz, later to become Minister of Economic Affairs, was not
unrelated to these events; at that time he was a director of Acindar . . . .
This case provides an eloquent example of the link between the policy of
state security and economic power.11
The report resorts to a negation to establish a link between the events and
Martínez de Hoz. He, Martínez de Hoz, ‘was not unrelated’. It thereby asserts
a connection without specifying it. I suggest that the collage of ‘Martínez de
Hoz’ and ‘Boots’ offers an illustration of the ‘link between the policy of state
security and economic power’ established by the report in both content and
form. That is, the particular quality of the ‘graphic commentary’ provided
by Ferrari ten years later consists of taking up the movement of the negative
relation: it suggests a link between the interests of economic actors and state
violence without defining the exact relationship, thereby maintaining a gap
between the two.
This movement is characteristic of the form of montage as a technique
of representation. León Ferrari had been using the form of montage since
the 1960s, when he applied more abstract forms of representation. His
strategy of composition was to a great extent influenced by the European
avant-garde.12 The aesthetics of montage as introduced by the European
avant-garde towards the end of the 19th century was to break with previous
regimes of representation. Where previous artistic representations of ‘reality’
would attempt to disguise the fact that they are produced, the art of the avant-
garde presents itself as artefact. It breaks, as Peter Bürger observes, with
the ‘appearance of totality’ which is attempted in earlier ‘organic’ artworks.13
In collage, meaning is created by juxtaposition of fragments, not through
completeness. ‘For the first time in the development of art’, Theodor Adorno
writes in his Aesthetic Theory, ‘affixed debris cleaves visible scars in the work’s
meaning. . . . The negation of synthesis becomes a principle of form’.14 The
elements – fragments of reality – ‘disavow unity’ when juxtaposed but cannot
11My translation and my emphasis. The official English version translates the double nega-
tion of ‘no fue ajeno a’ with ‘he was not aware of’. The limitation to the level of knowl-
edge/awareness in the English translation does not capture the reference to an actual rela-
tion in the expression ‘no fue ajeno a’, literally translated with ‘was not alien to’. CONADEP,
Nunca Más.
12There are, of course, differences between the European avant-garde at the end of the 19th
century and the Argentinian avant-garde in the 1960s and 1970s. On the Argentinian
movement of which Ferrari formed a part, see Andrea Giunta. Avant-garde, International-
ism, and Politics. Argentine Art in the Sixties. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007, p. 258;
For a discussion of Ferrari’s work in English, see Vikki Bell. ‘Writing to the General, and
Other Aesthetic Strategies of Critique: The Art of León Ferrari as a Practice of Freedom’. In:
Journal of Latin American Cultural Studes 21.2 (2012), pp. 253–285.
13Peter Bürger. Theorie der Avantgarde. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981, p. 97.
14Theodor W. Adorno. Aesthetic Theory. London, New York: Continuum, 2002, p. 155.
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escape unity completely, for they only provoke the rupture in relation to each
other.15 He, Martínez de Hoz, ‘was not unrelated’ to the events that took place
at the Acindar metal plant.
Susan Buck-Morss highlighted the epistemological implications of the tech-
nique of montage. She stresses the difference between the montage of images
with the aim to hide the act of montage (as, for example, in the medium of film,
or – to give a more recent example – the ‘photoshopping’ of images) and the
principle of montage that guided the work of the avant-garde. She writes:
Not the medium of representation, not merely the concreteness of the
image or the montage form is crucial, but whether the construction makes
visible the gap between the sign and referent, or fuses them in a deceptive
totality so that the caption merely duplicates the semiotic content of the
image instead of setting it into questions.16
The disruptive potential of the collage, then, results from the autonomy the
individual fragments maintain as signs. Their meaning is not fixed by the
totality of the image, but remains open to external references. The formal
principle of montage is thus characterised by an epistemological instability.17
I emphasise the particular manner of representation at work in the collage
– a discussion which at first seems to be far removed from the business of
criminal trials – because it is central to Benjamin’s concept of the dialectical
image on which I will be drawing throughout the thesis. The notion of the
dialectical image condenses Benjamin’s way of conceiving the recognisability
and representation of history, and is both a critique of and answer to historicist
approaches to history.
The influence of the concept of montage, as deployed by the surrealists, on
Benjamin’s thought is easily perceivable: ‘Where thinking comes to a standstill
in a constellation saturated with tensions’, Benjamin writes in his notes for
the Arcades Project, ‘there the dialectical image appears’.18 He continues:
[The dialectical image] is the caesura in the movement of thought. Its
position is naturally not an arbitrary one. It is to be found, in a word,
where the tension between dialectical opposites is greatest.19
Just as the aesthetics of the montage break with a particular truth claim in
visual depictions of ‘reality’, Benjamin’s dialectical image challenges histori-
cism’s attempt to provide ‘the “eternal” image of the past’.20 In what Benjamin
figuratively calls ‘historicism’s bordello’, historical knowledge is conceived of
15Cf. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 145.
16Susan Buck-Morss. The Dialectics of Seeing. Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991, pp. 67-68.
17Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, p. 227. Buck-Morss develops her argument through a
discussion of the work of John Heartfield, whose work was highly influential on Benjamin.
18Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 475 (N10a,3).
19Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 475 (N10a,3).
20Benjamin, ‘Theses’, p. 264 (XVI).
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as always being readily available.21 With the dialectical image, Benjamin in
turn conceives that historiographical recognition is the result of a specific and
precarious temporal constellation. From this perspective, the task of writing
history would no longer be to (re-)present the past ‘as it really was’.22 Instead,
Benjamin suggests, true historical knowledge – knowledge that ‘leads the past
to bring the present into a critical state’ – needs to grasp a particular constella-
tion that flashes up where past and present are drawn together in a temporal
register of what Benjamin calls the Jetztzeit, the ‘time of the now’.23 The formal
principle of the dialectical image, just as the collage’s, is characterised by an
epistemological instability.
I will properly introduce the notion of the dialectical image as part of Ben-
jamin’s philosophy of history in Chapter Three. For now, I wish to illustrate
the aforementioned epistemological instability by continuing with the reading
of Ferrari’s collage. I will then bring to bear the discussion on the methodolog-
ical claim I advanced in the prelude, namely, that for a critique of ICL as a
liberal concept of historical justice (and the way it does or does not address
economic dimensions of state crime), it is necessary to engage with questions
of historiography and historical time.
economic dimensions
I had paused the reading of the image, suggesting that with the combination
of the marching boots and the upper body of Martínez de Hoz, León Ferrari
establishes a connection between the Proceso and what I had provisionally
called its economic dimensions. The discussion of the aesthetics of the montage
directs our attention to the instability produced by the juxtaposition of the
two images. Once we attempt to define the economic rationale underlying the
Proceso that is insinuated by the collage, we will realise that it is impossible
to offer one explanation of this link. Rather, the image ‘Martínez de Hoz’
can be interpreted in various ways. It gives way to manifold, and at times
contradictory, specifications of what is often reduced to one economic rationale
of the Proceso.
With this focus on the aesthetics of the collage, my reading of Ferrari’s collage
departs from the interpretation the Argentinian sociologist Emilio Crenzel puts
forward in his analysis of the political reception and resignification of the
Nunca Más report.24 According to Crenzel, what the collages add to the report
is an explanation of the horrors of the Proceso (rather than a mere description).
He argues that the human rights perspective sheds light on the systematic
21Benjamin, ‘Theses’, p. 264 (XVI).
22Benjamin, ‘Theses’, p. 255.
23Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 471 (N7a,5).
24Cf. Emilio Crenzel. ‘El Nunca Más en fascículos: el infierno resignificado’. In: Estudios
Interdisciplinarios de America Latina y el Caribe 17.2 (2006), pp. 87–106, in particular p.
93; Emilio Crenzel. La historia política del Nunca Más. La memoria de las desapariciones en
la Argentina. Buenos Aires: siglo veintiuno editores, 2008, pp. 156-162.
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repression that was implemented during the Proceso, without offering any
rationales for its implementation. Ferrari’s collages, on the contrary, hint at
various possible explanations. In addition to ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’,
the only collage to make reference to the economic dimensions of the Proceso,
the collages cite images from the Spanish inquisition, the violence against
indigenous people, Nazi Germany and the catholic Church.25 What is new
about the collages, Crenzel argues, is that Ferrari presents the Proceso not as
a break with, but precisely as a repeated experience of violence that is very
much a part of western civilisation.
This observation of Crenzel’s is important, as it allows us to understand
Ferrari’s intervention as a counter-move to a dominant narrative according
to which systematic violence is at odds with western values. However, con-
trary to Crenzel, I suggest that Ferrari does not make this intervention by
offering a counter-narrative about the past. By combining carefully chosen
images, Ferrari certainly introduces possible rationales of the Proceso. With
the arrangement of the legs of the military with the head of Martínez de Hoz,
Ferrari suggests an economic rationale behind the military state. However, the
epistemological instability inherent to the collage, indicated above, becomes
apparent once we try to explicate the possible references associated with the
figure of Martínez de Hoz. Rather than offering a counter-narrative, I suggest
it poses the link as a question. It invites us to inquire into the economic
dimensions of the Proceso. As we will see, there is not one answer, but many.
We have already encountered one possible answer, mentioned in the Nunca
Más report which Ferrari actualises in his collage: from 1968 to 1976, Martínez
de Hoz was director of the Acindar S.A. metal plant in Villa Constitución.26
In the early 1970s, Villa Constitución had been the scene of intense labour
struggles which where violently repressed in March 1975 – one year before
the coup – in a joint operation of police, military forces and the paramilitary
organisation ‘Alianza Anticomunista Argentina’ (Argentinian Anticommunist
Allience, AAA). All trade union representatives were arrested and held in a
clandestine detention centre installed on the factory premises. Against this
backdrop, the figure of de Hoz points towards the responsibility of individual
businessmen for particular crimes carried out by the state apparatus. It
furthermore questions the neat temporal demarcation between constitutional
government and dictatorship, calling into question the coup d’état as the
starting point of extra-legal state violence.
As the first minister of economic affairs of the Proceso, Martínez de Hoz
is furthermore renowned for the profound economic reform of the Argentine
economy initiated under his office. On 2 April 1976, eleven days after the coup,
25The collages are documented on Ferrari’s web page, see León Ferrari. Nunca Más. URL:
http://leonferrari.com.ar/index.php?/projects/series--series/ (visited on
09/25/2014).
26Cf. the official website in memory of Martínez de Hoz José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz. Official
Website. URL: http://www.martinezdehoz.com/ (visited on 10/06/2013).
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he announced the foundations of his economic plan on national broadcast and
television.27 Echoing a mix of classic liberal and neo-liberal economic ideas,
this plan was based on two main pillars: first, a reduction of the state except
for cases in which the required action could not be carried out by private actors
(a so-called subsidiary function of the state), and second, the opening of the
national market to the global economy.28 Effectively, the adopted measures
transformed the Argentinian economy from a production-based economy to
one that was geared towards the global financial markets; this corresponded
with a redistribution of wealth and power within the Argentinian economic
elite.29 It is furthermore estimated that as a result of the ‘liberalisation’ of the
economy, including the deregulation of the labour market, real wages dropped
by 40% within the first year of the Proceso.30
On the first anniversary of the coup on 24 March 1977, the Argentinian
writer and journalist Rodolfo Walsh published an open letter to the Military
junta linking the economic policy to the systematic physical violence. Walsh
wrote:
These events [abductions, torture and disappearances, H.F.], which have
shaken the conscience of the civilized world, are, however, not the great-
est suffering undergone by the Argentine people, nor are they the worst
violations of human rights for which you are responsible. It is in the
economic policies of this government that one finds not only the explana-
tion of your crimes, but also a greater atrocity which punishes millions of
human beings with planned misery.31
The last sentence points towards two possible ‘economic dimensions’ associated
with Martínez de Hoz in his role as Minister of Economic Affairs during the first
five years of the Proceso. First, Walsh presents the economic policies of the
Proceso as rationale behind the systematic violence carried out in the name
of the state, ‘the explanation of your crimes’. Here, the physical repression
figures as a necessary means by which the state implements an economic
project which is resisted against by a large sector of the society. Against this
backdrop, Walsh’s emphasis that the military rule can only be understood if
27José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz. El ministro de economía del Proceso de Reorganización Nacional
anuncia su plan económico por cadena nacional. Radio Speech. La Plata, 2/04/1976. URL:
http://hdl.handle.net/10915/32745 (visited on 07/01/2014).
28Martínez de Hoz exposes the basic principles of his economy in his book José Alfredo
Martínez de Hoz. Bases para una Argentina moderna, 1976-80. Buenos Aires: n/a, 1981.
29Eduardo Basualdo. ‘El legado dictatorial. El nuevo patrón de acumulación de capital, la
desindustrialización y el ocaso de los trabajadores’. In: Cuentas pendientes. Ed. by Hora-
cio Verbitzky and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky. Buenos Aires: siglo veintiuno editores, 2013,
pp. 81–100, p. 89.
30Basualdo, ‘El Legado Dictatorial’, p. 91.
31Rodolfo Walsh. A Year of Dictatorship in Argentina. March 1976 - March 1977. An Open Letter
to the Military junta from Rodolfo Walsh. Ed. by Committee to Save Rodolfo Walsh. London,
1977, pp. 8-9. Translation adapted. The Spanish original has been reprinted in Rodolfo
Walsh. Carta abierta de un escritor a la Junta Militar. 24 de Marzo de 1977. Propuestas para
trabajar en el aula. Seleccionado y comentado por Edgardo. 2010. URL: http://conti.
derhuman.jus.gov.ar/_pdf/serie_1_walsh.pdf (visited on 07/12/2014).
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it is connected to the economic project of the Proceso – the marching boots
connected to the head of Martínez de Hoz – asks for a reconsideration of the
responsibilities for the crimes committed in the clandestine detention centrers
beyond the military institution.
Second, Walsh challenges the focus on the physical violence inflicted by the
state. The economic policies themselves constitute atrocities, he claims, for
they inflict planned misery on millions of human beings. ‘Planned misery’,
Susan Marks writes in her effort to recover the concept for the analysis of
human rights violations, ‘does not denote intended or deliberately inflicted
misery’. but ‘misery that belongs with the logic of particular socio-economic
arrangements’.32 From this perspective, what is at stake is the question of
what is understood to constitute (state) violence.
There is a third association provoked by Martínez de Hoz in his position
as minister of economic affairs. By 1995, when Ferrari was working on the
collages, Argentina had undergone not only the economic reforms initiated by
Martínez de Hoz, but also the privatisations and neo-liberal policies carried out
under the presidency of Carlos Meném (in office from 1989-1999). During his
time in office, fellow economists had criticised Martínez de Hoz for carrying out
the liberalisation of the economy only halfheartedly. In the 1990s, however, he
was praised for having prepared the mental change in Argentinian society for
the more radical steps that were taken by Meném and his minister of economic
affairs, Domingo Cavallo: Martínez de Hoz, the harbinger of neo-liberalism in
Argentina.33
This is only true if we understand neoliberalism as a theory which, when
put in practice, is never pure. De Hoz, for example, can be associated as
much with the liberalisation of the economy and the financial markets as with
the nationalisation of both enterprises and debts. A case in point is the Ítalo
company, which was nationalised under Martínez de Hoz at an artificially high
price.34
Martínez de Hoz, the harbinger of neo-liberalism, also holds true in so far as
the policies adopted during the Proceso resulted in a structural change of the
Argentine economy. This change lead to a re-articulation of the relationship
of social forces that consequently enabled the implementation of the ‘proper’
32Marks takes the concept from Naomi Klein’s ‘The Schock doctrine’. Klein in turn refers to
Walsh’s letter. See Susan Marks. ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’. In: The Modern Law
Review 74.1 (2011), pp. 57–78, p. 75.
33See analysis in Daniel Fridman. ‘La creación de los consumidores en la última dictadura
argentina’. In: Apuntes 14 (2008), pp. 71–92, pp. 88-89; and Daniel Fridman. ‘A New
Mentality for a New Economy: Performing the Homo Economicus in Argentina (1976–83)’.
In: Economy and Society 39.2 (2010), pp. 271–302.
34On the Ítalo case, see Federico Delgado. ‘El pillaje organzidado’. In: Cuentas pendientes. Ed.
by Horacio Verbitzky and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky. Buenos Aires: siglo veintiuno editores,
2013, pp. 317–326, p. 318. The nationalisation of the company is discussed in more detail
in a document produced by the prosecutor for case 12 071/074 (Juzgado Federal N°4) after
it was reopened in 2007 (document on file with the author).
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monetarist policies adopted by Menem.35 As Gills, Rocamora and Wilson would
have it: the paradox of the representative democratic regimes instaurated in
the 1990s after the end of the Cold War is
that a civilised conservative regime can pursue painful and even repres-
sive social and economic policies with more impunity and with less popu-
lar resistance than can an openly authoritarian regime.36
To explore one final reference: Martínez de Hoz was a member in the Azcué-
naga group, a circle of industrialists and liberal intellectuals which met on
a regular basis to discuss political ideas and translate them into policy sug-
gestions. Some of its members would later hold positions in Martínez de
Hoz’s ministry. While much referred to in the recent debate on the economic
dimension of the Proceso, the exact structure of this group, the identity of its
members and their respective interests still remain very much in the dark.37
According to those accounts, Martínez de Hoz constitutes the linking element
between the organised interests of the economic elite and economic policies
implemented during and with the help of the Proceso. Framing this nexus in
structural terms, the figure of Martínez de Hoz comes to stand for an ‘economic
interest’ behind the Proceso in its combination of physical repression of the
labour movement, the reform of the labour law, and the economic policies
implemented by the regime.
‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’ is not about the particular relationship between
Martínez de Hoz himself and the military junta. ‘This case provides an eloquent
example of the link between the policy of state security and economic power’.38
To summarise: the image of Martínez de Hoz evokes an economic rationale
behind the authoritarian state, structural violence inflicted by the economic
policies of the regime, and the complicity of individual companies in specific
cases of abductions and torture; he stands for privatisation of state enterprises
but also for state investment; his figure points to the continuities between
the authoritarian and democratic regime – continuity, to specify, in the use
of state violence as well as in the distribution of wealth. The constellations
produced by the images of Martínez de Hoz and the boots, in sum, allow for
various readings of what could be considered the ‘economic dimension of the
Proceso’; of the ways in which the state and the economy came to relate to
and interact with each other. In this sense, the collage disrupts a reading
35Basualdo, ‘El Legado Dictatorial’, p. 89.
36Barry K. Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard A. Wilson. ‘Low Intensity Democracy’. In: Low
Intensity Democracy. Ed. by Barry K. Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson. London:
Pluto Press, 1993, pp. 3–34, pp. 8–9.
37So far, the work of the journalist Vicente Muleiro provides the most information, the sources
of which are not always disclosed. Many of the other sources refer to his book and re-
produce his account Vicente Muleiro. 1976. El Golpe Civil. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 2011;
For the intellectual outlook of the group, see Martín Alejandro Vicente. ‘Los intelectuales
liberal-conservadores argentinos y la última dictadura. El caso del grupo Azcuénaga’. In:
KAIROS. Revista de Temas Sociales. 16.26 (2012), pp. 1–17.
38CONADEP, Nunca Más, (my emphasis).
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which reduces the Proceso to its juridico-political manifestations by pointing
to its economic dimension without, however, determining how this economic
dimension should be understood.
1.2 Reading Trials
Now, contrary to the aesthetic form of the collage, the trials under scrutiny
in this thesis, like all trials, have to produce a decision.39 Where the form of
montage generates meaning by opening up a gap, the logic of legal judgment
longs for closure. The initial suspicion that the accused ‘is not unrelated’ to
the crime under investigation opens a variety of associations, only to be pinned
down to a single narrative about the past which is shaped by doctrinal forms of
criminal responsibility and intended to ground a judgment. Legal proceedings
produce an array of testimonies, documents and other evidence which are
subsequently assembled into a seemingly coherent account of the events. In
this vein, Shoshana Felman reminds us that
[a] trial is presumed to be a search for truth, but technically, it is a search
for a decision, and thus, in essence, it seeks not simply truth but a finality:
a force of resolution’.40
In the context of trials dealing with state-backed violence, this resolution
concerns not only the individual responsibility of the accused, but it is also –
to use the words of Otto Kirchheimer – a decision about where ‘to draw the
line between atrocity beyond the pale and legitimate policy’.41 ICL, as Gerry
Simpson has pointed out, ‘is revealed at its origins as a composite of collective
and individual notions of responsibility’.42 It individualises responsibility
for acts that require an organisational structure. So while ICL claims to be
concerned with the individual responsibly of the accused, trials in response
39On the ‘programmatic separation of art and law’ in modern jurisprudence cf. Costas Douz-
inas and Lynda Nead. ‘Introduction’. In: Law and the Image. Ed. by Costas Douzinas
and Lynda Nead. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 1–15, pp. 1-6. The
authors quote from Plato’s ‘The Laws’: ‘when a poet or a painter represents men with con-
trasting characters he is often obliged to contradict himself, and he does not know which
of the opposing speeches contains the truth. But for the legislator, this is impossible: he
must not let his laws say two different things on the same subject.’ (p. 6); See also Daniel
Loick. ‘Creation, Not Judgment. Response to Christoph Menke’. In: The Power of Judgment.
Ed. by Daniel Birnbaum and Isabelle Graw. Berlin and New York: Sternberg Press, 2010,
pp. 31–35, who writes: ‘Art is the domain that best represents the undecidability of cases,
and therefore the problematic character of judgment, because, unlike a murder case, an
art case admits this undecidability right from the beginning’; In a similar vein, Felman con-
trasts the logic of trials with the logic of literary texts which are, according to her, ‘a search
for meaning, for expression, for heightened significance, and for symbolic understanding,
see Shoshana Felman. The Juridical Unconscious. Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth
Century. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 55.
40Felman, Juridical Unconscious, p. 55.
41Otto Kirchheimer. Political Justice. The Use of Legal Procesdure for Political Ends. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 326.
42Gerry J. Simpson. Law, War and Crime. War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of Interna-
tional Law. Cambridge: Polity, 2007, p. 71.
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to state-backed violence inevitably engage with and pronounce themselves on
the context in which the crime took place.
founding images
In his seminal study on political trials, Kirchheimer observed that
[s]etting the new regime off from the old and sitting in judgment over the
latter’s policies and practices may belong to the constitutive acts of the
new regime.43
He suggested that for a trial to be effective as a political trial, that is to work
as a constitutive moment in the founding of political authority, it must create
one image.44 The ‘image-creating capacity’45 Kirchheimer attributes to trials
consists of their ability to translate and transform ‘fragmentary acts into a
simplified picture of political reality’.46 The image Kirchheimer thinks of is a
totalising one, it allows but one reading of the past:
In an exceptional case, such as the Nuremberg trial, the record of the
defunct regime may be so clear-cut that the image produced in court
could not but appear a reasonably truthful replica of reality.47
The academic interest in this constitutive, ‘image-creating’ dimension of
trials in response to state crime – that is to say, their role in the foundation
and legitimisation of a new political order – has changed over time. This shift
processes from an analytical interest in the ways political regimes resort to
trials in order to claim authority towards a normative framework that evaluates
trials according to their capacity to authorise a political regime, in particular
a liberal rule of law. It is already present in Kirchheimer’s work and finds
its climax in those studies that look at trials in response to state crime from
a perspective of transitional justice. Writing on political trials in general,
Kirchheimer’s interest was first and foremost of an analytical nature – why,
he asks, do political regimes even resort to law to fight political foes while
putting up with the uncertainty that this move involves?48 As Basak Ertur
highlights in her careful reading of Kirchheimer’s work, a slip occurs in the
argument when he begins to discuss what he summarises under the heading
of ‘trials by fiat of the successor regime’.49 Writing about the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, the analysis of the constitutive moment
43Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 308.
44Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 308.
45Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 430. I thank Bas¸ak Ertur for making me aware of Kirch-
heimer’s mentioning of the image-creating capacity of political trials.
46Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p.113.
47Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 423.
48For a recent overview on the genre, see Bas¸ak Ertür. ‘Spectacles and Spectres. Political
Trials, Performativity and Scenes of Sovereignty’. PhD thesis. London: Birkback College,
University of London, 2014.
49Ertür, ‘Spectacles and Spectres. Political Trials, Performativity and Scenes of Sovereignty’,
pp. 41-44; Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 308.
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at work in the trial acquires a normative quality, namely the hope that the
judgment might constitute a step towards an international order which shuns
state crime. Kirchheimer fails to account for this slip in the argument, in the
wake of which the authorisation of a juridico-political order (be it national or
international) is no longer critically examined, but somehow hoped for.
By now the ability of trials to authorise or ground a political order became
the main justification for criminal prosecutions in the academic literature that
accompanied the proliferation of ICL as a means of transitional justice over
the past 25 years. Any suspicion and uneasiness regarding the state and
state authority – even in its constitutional guise – which is still manifest in
Kirchheimer’s work on political trials and law in general, has been replaced by a
normative embracement of the liberal state to be created.50 In this context, the
‘image-creating capacity’ – that is, the ability of trials to provide ‘a reasonably
truthful replica of reality’ – has become a cornerstone of the arguments in
favour of criminal prosecution. As we will see in more detail in the next chapter,
not only are criminal trials’ contributions towards establishing historical truth
advocated as a requirement of justice in itself, but it is furthermore suggested
that in exposing and judging past violence, trials contribute towards historical
justice in that they foster a liberal democratic society.
dialectical images
Now, as Kirchheimer himself knew well enough, political trials do not nec-
essarily succeed in creating clear-cut images of the past which could pass
as ‘a truthful replica of reality’ and thus might serve to ground sovereign
claims.51 Instead, the images criminal trials produce of the violence exercised
by predecessor regimes at times evidence their arbitrary temporal, spacial and
conceptual demarcations. These legal images – recorded in the judgment –
appear to us as (failed) attempts at forgery.
This thesis is interested precisely in these moments of failure. They occur,
I will argue, where the judgment’s totalising representation of the past is
undermined by what I conceptualise – with Walter Benjamin – as ‘dialectical
images’. Above, I introduced the dialectical image as Benjamin’s way to think of
history and historiographical recognition, namely as the result of a particular
temporal constellation.
What I will be conceiving of as ‘dialectical images’ in the trials appear
where, digging into the past, the legal proceedings unearth ‘rags’ from history’s
‘refuse’ that cannot be accounted for in and by the legal order that sits in
judgment over the past.52 As a consequence, these constellations between
50See essays in Otto Kirchheimer. Politics, Law, and Social Change. Selected Essays of Otto
Kirchheimer. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969.
51See Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 118.
52‘Refuse of history’ is one of the tags Benjamin used in his notes for the Arcades Project
Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 461 (N2,6; N2,7).
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past instances of violence and the present juridico-political order expose the
political implications of the way in which legal concepts and imaginaries define
the ‘line between atrocity beyond the pale and legitimate policy’.
In my analysis of the trials, I will be focusing on these constellations. In
the prelude, I suggested that trials addressing the economic dimensions of
state crime constitute a privileged side of investigation for a critique of ICL as a
liberal concept of historical justice. This is because they gravitate around one
of liberalism’s central problems: how to best organise the relationship between
the state and the economy so that individual freedom is guaranteed.
The argument that I will gradually build up throughout the case studies is
that ICL is not merely liberal because it seeks to authorise liberal democracy or
because it focuses on individual responsibility. Rather, ICL is liberal insofar as
it reproduces two conceptual assumptions that are at the core of liberalism and
which bind the way in which the courts relate the economic to the state, and
the violence exercised in its name. The first of these assumptions is the strict
juxtaposition of the public and the private, the state and the economy, force
and liberty. The second presumption concerns the classification of violence
according to its sanctioned and its non-sanctioned manifestations.
***
It was the aim of the first two parts of the chapter to make the link between
both levels of the argument to be developed in this thesis more palpable by
engaging in a reading of León Ferrari’s collage ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’.
Through my reading of the collage, I on the one hand introduced an element
that is central to Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history, in particular to
the concept of the ‘dialectical image’. The latter, I argued, is indebted to the
technique of montage as a form of representation, namely the ability to disrupt
established content, without positing new authoritative interpretations. As we
will see in Chapter Three, which engages more thoroughly with Benjamin’s
philosophy of history and his critique of law, this idea of disposing without
positing is a recurrent theme in his writings. It will be central to the framework
I propose for the study of trials in response to state-backed violence.
On the other hand, the reading of the collage allowed me to show the
implications of adopting such a perspective. Focusing on the gap that, in
the collage, opens up between the two elements – the military ‘boots’ and
the former Minister of Economic Affairs, ‘Martínez de Hoz’ – I exposed the
myriad of ways in which that which is often summarised as the ‘economic
dimensions of state crime’ could be spelled out. In my analysis of the trials that
address the criminal responsibility of German industrialists following World
War II and of the trials that investigate the responsibility of economic actors in
Argentina (Chapters Four, Five and Six), I will focus on the fissures that appear
in the moment in which the images, documents, impressions and testimonies
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generated by the legal proceedings are translated into juridical imaginaries of
the criminal state and of individual responsibility. These fissures allow us to
formulate a critique of ICL as a liberal concept of historical justice.
The argument that I sketched out thus far results from a dialogue between
the study of trials that address economic dimensions of state crime on the one
hand, and Benjamin’s writings on history and law on the other. To develop
a critique of ICL based on a reading of two very specific sets of trials raises
the methodological question of the link between these trials and ICL. Why do I
think that these trials, which are partly conducted by national courts, can offer
insights on ICL as a concept of historical justice more generally instead of just
being relevant as case studies? I want to address this question in the following
section and will then conclude this chapter with an outline of the chapters
to come – an exercise which requires that this oscillating movement between
theory and empirical material be translated into a linear form of presentation.
1.3 Constellations
In the prelude to this thesis, I summarised the question that stood at the
beginning of this research project as follows: If ICL as a concept of historical
justice is historically indebted to a liberal project, what promise does it hold for
those whose suffering is not redeemed by the liberal rule of law and a market
economy? For those who were subjected to state violence because they fought,
among other things, against the structural violence inflicted by capitalist
society? I asked these questions against the backdrop of the observation that
the rise of ICL as a means to deal with claims to justice after state-backed
violence took place in a context in which the fostering of the liberal rule of
law and a free market economy were handled as answers to the experiences
of violence under the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and South
America.
The trials in Argentina and the trials of German industrialists are central
to finding an answer to this question because thus far, they are the only
attempts to systematically address the economic rationale of state-backed
violence through criminal law. As we will see in more detail in Chapter Five,
courts in Argentina started to investigate the link between the economic project
of the Proceso and the systematic human rights violations that were committed
in its name, only in 2010. The trials against German industrialists, held in
1947 and 1948, were the eventual crystallisation of the ‘economic case’ that
was originally brought forward at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in
Nuremberg. By prosecuting representatives of the German industrial elite,
the Allies wanted to express their conviction that the rise of the Nazi party
and the consequent waging of World War II would not have been possible
without the support of German big business. The trials against German
industrialists remind us of the fact that the investigation of the economic
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dimensions of state crime was central to the prosecutorial strategy in response
to the crimes committed by the Nazis. The ‘economic case’ was only written
out of ‘Nuremberg’ when the IMT was constructed as a foundational moment
of ICL in the 1990s. Against this backdrop, the relevance of both sets of cases
for an analysis of ICL is that, if looked at in constellation, they point us to
absence of an explicit concern with the economic dimensions of state crime in
ICL – and transitional justice more generally – at the time of the (re-)emergence
of this framework.
At the same time, these two sets of cases are central to a critique of ICL
as a concept of historical justice because in so far as they exist, they provide
us with the material that allows us to analyse the way in which criminal law
frames the economic dimension of state crime once they are addressed. As I
already stated above, it is through an analysis of these materials, and the way
the courts make sense of them, that we will be able to identify the underlying
concepts at work in ICL and their political implications.
Having said that, the project of prosecuting German industrialists for their
participation in the Nazi crimes was nearly abandoned before the Industrialist
trials started, and the trials in Argentina are running the danger of remaining
stuck at pre-trial stage. It is the precarious existence of both sets of trials from
which I will be drawing important clues about the place of the economic in ICL.
Argentina
The ‘economic cases’ in Argentina so far only exist as legal documents – criminal
complaints and carefully drafted decisions to open the trial following months of
investigations during pre-trial stage, respective appeals and revisions – waiting
to be dealt with by the judges in charge. Some of these documents have waited
for nearly thirty years. Following criminal complaints filed by the relatives of
those who were abducted, tortured and ‘disappeared’ during the dictatorship,
some prosecutors initiated legal proceedings towards the end of the Proceso in
1983. The number of proceedings increased with the trial against the members
of the first three juntas.53 However, with the amnesty laws decreed in 1986
and 1987, all cases investigating the crimes committed during the last military
dictatorship were put on hold.54
Only with the abrogation of the amnesty laws in 2001 have the investigations
been taken up again. Importantly, the court that annulled the amnesty laws
grounded its decision on the duty to prosecute crimes against humanity as
53The president Raúl Alfonsín issued a decree in December 1983 that the high military officials
should be tried by a military court Juicio a las Juntas. 13/84. Judgment. Consejo Supremo
de las Fuerzas Armadas.
54Ley Nr. 23.492. Ley de Punto Final. El Senado y la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación
Argentina. 1986-12-23. URL: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anex
os/20000-24999/21864/norma.htm (visited on 06/08/2015); Ley Nr. 23.521. Ley de
Obedencia Debida. El Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nacion Argentina Reunidos en
Congreso. 1987-06-04. URL: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/
20000-24999/21746/norma.htm (visited on 06/08/2015).
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established by ICL.55 Since then, national courts have adopted a principle
called ‘double subsumption’ to prosecute the crimes committed during the
Proceso: the individual crimes are first contextualised within a systematic
plan and subsumed under the count of ‘crimes against humanity’ as defined
by ICL to argue that they have not prescribed and that the state has a duty
to prosecute the human rights violations. However, the actual counts and
legal responsibility of the defendant are then defined and decided according to
Argentinian criminal law.56
Out of the 411 pending cases – investigating the responsibility of 2431
accused – only a small number explicitly inquire into the legal responsibility
of economic actors, the economic policies implemented during the Proceso, or
the long-term effects of the political persecution of the labour movement.57
Among the 2431 individuals investigated, there are 288 civilians in total.
According to my own investigation, the number of businessmen accused of
having collaborated with the military junta amounts to fifteen. In addition,
several individuals who held positions in the Ministry of Economic Affairs or
the National Securities and Exchange Commission have been charged.
Many of the cases that deal with the responsibility of businessmen may
never come into existence as trials. This is either because the judge at pre-trial
stage finds that there is not enough evidence to open the oral trial or because
of (at times intentional) delays in the judicial proceedings which are often
closed with the death of the accused. So far, none of the ‘economic cases’
have come to a conclusion. Those trials that are advancing remain stuck at
the pre-trial stage. One could say the crux of a trial, namely the oral hearing
and judgment deciding the criminal responsibility of the defendant, has yet
to take place. Still, extensive pre-trial decisions allow one to identify the legal
reasoning at work in order to make sense of the participation of economic
actors in the Proceso.
In this thesis, I will be looking in detail at two of these cases. Rather than
seeing their uncompleted state as an obstacle to conduct social research –
often understood as the study of that which is present – I take their precarious
existence as an invitation to think about what this incompleteness might tell
us about ICL and the trials themselves.58
55This judgment was later confirmed by the Supreme Court Simón, Julio Héctor y otros. Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación. 2005-06-14.
56See Pablo F. Parenti. ‘La jurisprudencia argentina frente a los crímenes de derecho interna-
cional’. In: Lateinamerika Analysen 3.18 (2007), pp. 61–93.
57Numbers as of December 2013, according to the statistics of the Centro de Estudios Legales
y Sociales (CELS). The statistical information provided by the CELS can be found here:
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales. Blog de Estadísticas. 2013-12. URL: http://www.
cels.org.ar/blogs/estadisticas/ (visited on 03/17/2014).
58The importance of the ‘absent’ for social research has been argued for by several authors,
see e.g. Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Toward a New Legal Common Sense. Law, Glob-
alization and Emancipation. London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002, p. 465; Boaventura
de Sousa Santos. ‘Para uma sociologia das ausêcias e uma sociologia das emergências’.
In: Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais 63 (2002), pp. 237–280; Avery F. Gordon. Ghostly
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Germany
Contrary to the Argentine trials, the trials against German industrialists are
completed. Indeed, their judgments are cited as legal precedents in the trials
investigating the criminal responsibility of businessmen in Argentina.59 For
many years, these trials were mostly studied by historians. Excluded from the
foundational narrative of ICL that reduced ‘Nuremberg’ to the IMT, these trials
were only re-discovered by ICL scholarship in the context of recent attempts to
hold corporate actors to account for human rights violations.
The prosecutorial strategies and the judgments rendered in the trials of Ger-
man industrialists reflect the controversy regarding the relationship between
capitalism and the violence inflicted by the Nazi State which accompanied the
founding of the new German State,60 a controversy which still fuels debates in
contemporary historical research. While some attributed the economic causes
of World War II to the problem of monopoly capitalism, thus calling for a truly
competitive market to guarantee a peaceful, democratic state, other voices
linked the violence of the Nazi state to capitalism as such, hence demanding a
democratisation of the economic order – a request which found its way into
many of the Länder constitutions adopted between 1945 and 1950.
I will carve out these lines of contestation and their implications for the
foundation of the German State when looking at the trials against German
industrialists. The ‘citation’ of the Industrialist Trials by the contemporary
trials in Argentina opens the door to a societal debate and struggle which
is rendered silent by accounts that insert the trials into a linear account
of corporate accountability. These are debates, societal struggles and legal
arguments about the relationship between monopoly capitalism, war and
state crime – and at the same time, about the compatibility of capitalism and
democracy.
In sum, to look at the constellation formed by these two sets of trials on
the one hand prompts us ask why an explicit engagement with economic
dimensions of state crime was nearly absent at the time when criminal justice
as a concept of historical justice became prominent in the 1990s. On the
other hand however, in so far as the trials took place, they provide us with the
material to scrutinise the way in which ICL makes sense of the participation of
economic actors in systematic state-backed violence.
Matters. Haunting and the Sociological Imagination. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2008, p. 24; Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. xviii.
59See e.g. Fiscal Federal No. 2 solicita acumulación (Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros). 296/09. Auto
de Procesamiento. Juzgado Federal de Jujuy Nr. 2. 2012-11-15, pp.107-110.
60Kim Christian Priemel. ‘Tales of Totalitarianism. Conflicting Narratives in the Industrialist
Cases at Nuremberg’. In: Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. Studies on war
and genocide. New York: Berghahn Books, 2012, pp. 161–193; Kim Christian Priemel. ‘“A
Story of Betrayal”: Conceptualizing Variants of Capitalism in the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trials’. In: The Journal of Modern History 85.1 (2013), pp. 69–108.
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1.4 Chapter Outline
The following chapter addresses the first question by linking the re-emergence
of ICL towards the end of the 1980s to the global transitional justice project
that established itself around the same time. The chapter starts by tracing
how, following the end of the Cold War, criminal law established itself as a
globalised framework for dealing with systematic state-sponsored violence. It
was only then, I will argue, that the position hold sway within international
criminal jurisprudence that the international community had not only the
possibility to try those responsible for systematic human rights violations, but
the duty to do so.
This legal imperative generally was (and is) accounted for by referring to an
alleged historiographical or pedagogical function of trials. The theories of ICL
that justify ICL with regard to these functions in turn draw on ideas about
historical change and justice established by the broader transitional justice
discourse that started to emerge towards the end of the 1980s. I will identify
two central assumptions that constitute the core of what I call a latent theory
of historical justice that is at work in ICL. The first assumption holds that
the adequate representation of truth is a demand of justice in itself and that
trials in response to systematic human rights violations are central towards
establishing historical truth. The second assumption links the truth finding to
the prospect of social change and asserts that the knowledge of past crimes in
combination with the authoritative judgment of the courts fosters the liberal
rule of law and helps preventing the repetition of violence.
I will then proceed to look in more detail at transitional justice literature.
I will argue that the initial absence of an explicit concern with the economic
dimensions of state crime from the field of ICL and transitional justice can be
explained with reference to both the conceptual boundaries of its theoretical
and philosophical informants – transition to democracy literature and political
liberalism – as well as the political practice of which it forms a part, namely
the promotion of the rule of law.
The place of the ‘economic’ in this concept of historical justice, as we will
see, is circumscribed by the very aim of a liberal rule of law. Because it
begs the separation of the political and the economic realm on which political
liberalism rests, even the literature that indicates the need to address the
socio-economic dimensions of state crime does so in a way that exempts
questions concerning redistribution and the relationship between economy
and democracy from political contestation. What is missing from most of
the contemporary literature on the economic dimensions of state violence or
corporate accountability is an engagement with the dialectical relationship
between democracy and capitalism as well as with the organization of the
economy as a problem of democracy.
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A central point I will be making throughout the chapter is that what is
characteristic of the field of ICL is that practice and academia are closely
intertwined. In this context, trials are predominantly studied as a means of
transitional justice. In positing the liberal rule of law as the aim of transition,
a transitional justice perspective on trials in response to state crime also
adopts central ontological assumptions from political liberalism, on which it
consequently fails to reflect: this is, first, the relationship between law and
violence, and, second, the separation of the political and the economic.
Chapter Three introduces an alternative framework for the study of trials
in response to state crime that draws on Walter Benjamin’s writing on history
and law. I will start by introducing Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history
as one that is concerned with the oppressed in history and set out why, for
Benjamin, a philosophy of history that wishes to side with the oppressed
must rest on the value of rupture or destabilisation.61 In doing so, I will be
offering Benjamin’s notion of remembrance (Eingedenken) as a way to think
the promise of history that radically differs from the memorial imperative
imposed by ICL and transitional justice more generally.
Against this backdrop, I will then focus on the motif of interruption or
suspension as it can be found in Benjamin’s philosophy of history and his
critique of law.62 In so doing, these sections will also contest the two pillars of
the latent theory historical justice underlying ICL that I started to delineate in
the previous chapter.
As opposed to the notion of historical truth underlying ICL, historical truth
for Benjamin does not consist of the quest for adequate representation. Instead,
truth is located in a temporal nucleus that links the past to the present, an idea
which informs Benjamins concept of the ‘dialectical image’ already introduced
in this chapter. It is in the notion of the ‘dialectical image’ that we will
encounter for the first time the idea of rupture as a gesture towards justice.
I will then expose Benjamin’s analysis of the link between law, justice and
violence, as developed in On the Critique of Violence, in order to challenge the
second pillar, namely the idea that the liberal rule of law constitutes a non-
violent answer to the past’s violence, as well as the hope that a legal judgement
could redeem past suffering. According to Benjamin any manifestation of law
is bound to be caught in the cycle of law-positing and law-maintaining violence
and only the suspension of this cycle, the Entsetzung of law, could break with
this mythical violence.63
With the discussion of Benjamin’s notion of historical truth and his critique
of law, I will have prepared the grounds for a framework for the study of trials
in response to state crime that requires us to think the promise of historical
justice in trials differently from the way it is implied in ICL’s the latent theory
61Benjamin, ‘Theses’; Benjamin, Arcades Project.
62Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’.
63Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’.
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of historical justice. Such a perspective requires us to shift the focus from the
representation of history to its temporalisation in trials and thereby allows us
to perceive trials as a site of a competing politics of time. While in ICL the
promise attached to the historiographical function of trials is the authorisation
of a juridico-political order, namely the liberal rule of law, with Benjamin the
only promise of justice could lie where images of the past bring the present
into a critical state.
If one accepts Benjamin’s philosophy of history and his critique of law as a
philosophical backdrop for the study of trials, they can be conceived of as sites
where different temporalities, and not merely different narratives of the past,
compete. The task would be no longer to examine the ability of trials to foster
the liberal rule of law, but instead to train the gaze on the ruptures which are
produced by the images of the past that are unearthed throughout the legal
proceedings.
Chapter Four is the first chapter in which I bring to bear such a perspective
on a set of criminal trials, namely the trials of German industrialists, conducted
by the US American, French and British occupying forces between 1947
and 1949. Focusing on the politics of time in the industrialists trials, I
will argue that, in addressing the responsibility of economic actors for the
crimes committed under the Third Reich, these trials also defined ‘right’ and
‘wrong’ forms of interaction between the state and the economy. Against the
collectivism, trusts, and monopolies that were identified with the German war
economy, the underlying reasoning of the judgments suggests, only a juridico-
political order based on the principle of competition could prevent history
from repeating itself. The image of the Nazi state and its economic order thus
created, came to serve as a negative reference for the West German post-war
order, namely the New Social Market Economy (Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft).
I will be exposing this authorising function of the way in which the past is
invoked by the trials by exploring the fissures that open between the evidence
put forward by the prosecution on the one hand, and the way in which the
judges attempted to make sense of the participation of economic actors in war
crimes without discrediting the capitalist economy as such. These fissures,
as we will see, appear where judges presume, ex-ante, the state’s monopoly
on violence, and the existence of a free economic sphere in order to define the
individual responsibility of the accused for aggressive war, slavery and plunder
and spoliation.
From this first case study, we will be retrieving several elements for a
critique of ICL as a liberal concept of historical justice. First, while ICL it
is often presented as breaking with the principle of state sovereignty, the
trials investigating state-sponsored violence also participate in the grounding
of sovereignty. Second, that ICL is a liberal concept not only because it
focuses on individual responsibly or because it protects individual rights,
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but because it re-introduces the liberal construction of the public and the
private when defining the economic dimensions of state crime. Third, that
the Industrialists Trials rather than judging the violent excesses of capitalism,
as it is often suggested by those who see them as an instance of corporate
accountability, participated in the positing of the aim of liberal democracy and
the free market as the just answer to excessive state violence. To be more
specific, the narratives offered by the judgments in the industrialists trials tie
in with the ordoliberal logic according to which the state derives its legitimacy
from its ability to guarantee the functioning of the free market.
If in post-World War II Germany the interventions of ordo-liberal economists
sought to establish the principle of competition as necessary correlate for
a democratic society, this argument is empirically refuted by the Argentine
‘Process of National Reorganisation’. It provides an example for the establishing
of the supposedly ‘democratic sphere of the market’ with the help of systematic,
state-sponsored violence. Chapters Five and Six will take a closer look at two
of the trials that deal with the economic dimension of the Proceso.
Chapter Five centres on a trial that poses the very question of the relationship
between the Proceso’s use of systematic state violence and its rhetoric of
economic freedom. This trial investigates the responsibility of three military
officials and one civil servant for the abduction and torture of several men
and women that were linked to the investment and financial business sector
and who were forced to sell their property. All of them had been accused of
economic crimes amounting to ‘economic subversion by the then director of the
National Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional de Valores, CNV), Alfredo
Etchebarne.64 The chapter starts by situating the trials of economic actors in
Argentina within the re-foundational project that was introduced by Nestor
Kirchner following the financial, economic, political and social crisis which
began in 2001. Kirchner conceived of the debt crisis of 2001 as the long-term
result of the neoliberal policies first introduced with the help of the dictatorial
state. In addressing the link between the human rights violations committed
during the Proceso and its neoliberal economic project in the trials, the new
government sought to establish itself as the political project that finally broke
with the dictatorial past as well as with its economic legacy.
I will argue that while these trials challenge the dichotomous, temporal divide
between dictatorship and democracy by shedding light on the economic policies
adopted during the Proceso, and their long term economic consequences, they
also produce a new periodization that tries to locate the violence that was
64As defined by the National Security Act adopted in 1974 Ley Nr. 20.840. Seguridad Nacional.
Penalidades para las actividades subversivas en todas sus manifestaciones. El Senado y
la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina. 1974-09-30. URL: http://www.in
foleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000- 74999/73268/norma.htm (visited
on 09/03/2014); D’Alessandri, Francisco Obdulio y otros s/ privación ilegal de la libertad.
8405/ 2010. Auto de procesamiento. Juzgado Criminal y Correccional Federal 3. 2013-07-
12.
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inflicted by the economic project of the Proceso in the past. In my discussion
of the trial of Etchebarne and the three military officials I will focus on two
instances in which this attempt at periodisation fails and is therefore rendered
visible. These failures are produced by images that were unearthed by the
pre-trial proceedings but which could not be accommodate in the committal
for trial order that was issued by the judge.
The first rupture emerges with regard to the possible motif for abductions
of the businessmen. I will argue that because the judge associates the Pro-
ceso with the violent implementation of a societal and economic project that
oppressed the working class, he has troubles linking the prosecution of busi-
nessmen for economic crimes to the economic rationale of the Proceso. Instead,
and against his intention, he ends up separating the prosecution and per-
secution of businessmen from the logic of the repressive state by presenting
the abduction and torture of the businessmen as the capture of the state
apparatus by private interests.
I will contrast the reading of the judge with another reading that is inspired by
the quotes that the judge cites from the economic subversion cases. Through
these materials, the prosecution and persecution of businessmen can indeed
be connected to the economic rationale of the Proceso: they show that in the
eyes of the Proceso, those threatening the stability of the financial system by
not acting responsibly constituted a threat to national security and the newly
implemented economic order. Understood in this manner, the prosecution of
businessmen by the military is not so much linked the authoritarian logic of
the Proceso, but instead directs us towards the tensions and contradictions
that are characteristic of neoliberal justifications of the free market.
I will turn to the second instance that exposes the periodization at work
in the trial. I will pick up on a line from the pre-trial decision in which the
judge describes the forced transfer of property in the clandestine detention as
instances of primitive accumulation. I will draw on Marx’s account of primitive
accumulation as well as on Benjamin’s fragment Capitalism as Religion to
distinguish primitive and capitalist accumulation analytically according to the
kind of violence that dominates the respective mode of accumulation.65
I will argue that in making the use of force in the property transactions a
central category that distinguishes the violent past from what is suggested to
be a non-violent present, the judge introduces the distinction between primitive
and capitalist accumulation as a periodisation. That is, the violence of the
primitive accumulation, associated with the Proceso, is opposed to the allegedly
non-violent rule of law. This periodisation has two effects on the present: first,
the part of Marx’s analysis that aims at revealing the violence operative in
economic forms of accumulation is thereby elided; second, instances of non-
capitalist forms of accumulation are relegated to a pre-democratic past.
65Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’.
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Through my reading of the trial, the liberal imaginary at work in the judge’s
reasoning makes itself present it two ways. First, and similar to what could be
observed in the German industrialist trials, the judge projects the ontological
assumption of the separation of state and the economic as a norm onto the
past: what is considered an undue ‘subjection of the public to private’ emerge
as central explanation for the prosecution of businessmen during the Proceso.
Second, while the judge in his description of the historical context condemns
the economic violence inflicted by the Proceso, the violence that is recognized
as such by the law are the illegal detentions. He thereby reproduces the
distinction between sanctioned and non-sanctions forms of violence that is
characteristic of the liberal rule of law.
Both distinctions are also central to the way in which the trial studied in
the final chapter makes sense of the responsibility of two businessmen for
the illegal detentions and the subsequent disappearance of several of their
workers. What I will call the ‘Ledesma Trial’ is the proceedings concerning the
legal responsibility of Juan Carlos Blaquier, owner and director of the biggest
Argentinian sugar company, Ledesma, and Alberto Lemos, a former member
of the companys executive board. They were accused as participants in crimes
against humanity committed during the Proceso.66 The case of Ledesma is one
among many in which the disappearances of workers followed labour conflicts
at factories, and is one of the few cases in which the responsibility of managers
is examined by the courts.
Paralleling the argument made in Chapter Five, I will argue that the trial
of Blaquier and Lemos exposes the way in which the image of the economic
dimension of the Proceso that is constructed in the trials is shaped by a liberal
imaginary of the state. Again, I will be focusing on two instances of such an
unintended self-subversion.
The first instance can be observed at the moment in which the judge tries
to accomodate the evidence produced throughout the pre-trial stage within
the available legal theories of participation and causation which demarcate
the limits between who is conceived of as responsible for a certain outcome
(the crime) and which interactions are considered to be legally irrelevant. The
image of the company as a state within the state that is summoned by the
testimonies and other evidence unearthed by the pre-trial proceedings, brings
into relief the fictional element of the Weberian bureaucratic state, with its
presumption of the states monopoly of power.
The second part of the chapter continues the discussion of the periodisation
from Chapter Five. It does so by contrasting two different narratives which
explain the absence of the body of Jorge Weisz, a union activist at Ledesma
who was arrested in 1974 and disappeared in 1976. In the indictment, the
continuing absence of his body, as with that of the other bodies, is explained
66Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, pp. 1-15.
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with reference to the systematic practice of disappearance carried out with the
help of the clandestine state machinery. As such, he becomes a ‘desaparecido’,
a figure closely associated with the suspension of the rule of law during the
Proceso.
At the same time, testimonies reveal that Weisz’s co-workers assumed that
he had been fed to the Familiar. According to a local legend, the Familiar is
a vicegerent of the devil who guarantees the wealth of the owner of the sugar
company. In turn, he is regularly fed a worker. As someone who was devoured
by the Familiar, the violence Weisz experienced is not merely that of the state
of exception with which the junta justified the suspension of the rule of law.
Rather, the violence he suffered is also that of a state of exception that is the
rule under the laws of capitalist accumulation. This second state of exception,
I will argue, is the one rendered permissive by the liberal rule of law.
In a brief postlude, I will return to the questions posed in the prelude.
Against the backdrop of Benjamin’s philosophy of history and his critique of
violence, the trials’ potential to expose and denounce not only the violence of
the past, but, also that of the present juridico-political order, might be the only
promise of justice these trials have to offer. It is the weak promise to produce
images that do not serve as previsions of a just future, but that are provisions
for opening the present anew for contestation.
2 | International Criminal Law,
Transitional Justice and the
Place of the Economic
In the previous chapter, I linked my object of study – the trials of German in-
dustrialists following World War II and the trials investigating the responsibility
of economic actors for crimes committed during the Argentine dictatorship – to
the object of my critique, International Criminal Law (ICL), by invoking Walter
Benjamin’s notion of the constellation. I suggested that the two sets of trials
form a constellation which prompts us to inquire into the absence of an explicit
concern with the economic dimensions of state crime when criminal trials
as response to state crime re-emerged on a broad scale in the 1990s. This
chapter offers one explanation for this absence, by contextualising ICL within
the broader discourse of transitional justice that accompanied its resurgence.
The first section of this chapter substantiates the implicit claim made above,
namely: that ICL became an important framework with which to address
claims for historical justice in the 1990s. To this end, I will start by tracing
how the development of an international obligation to prosecute international
crimes in ICL endowed the memorial imperative with a universal claim. At
the same time, as I will show, ICL was put forward as a means with which to
comply with the now universalised duty to remember past violence. In order to
justify the validity of ICL, the corresponding jurisprudence would emphasise
the so-called historiographical or pedagogical function of trials, by arguing
that establishing the truth about past crimes and judging the responsible
individual was important for fostering the liberal rule of law and necessary for
preventing the repetition of history. These theories of ICL that justify ICL with
regard to its historiographical or pedagogical function draw on ideas about
historical change and justice established by the broader transitional justice
discourse that started to emerge towards the end of the 1980s (2.1).
Once the link between ICL and transitional justice has been established,
the second section will look in more detail at transitional justice literature. I
will argue that the initial absence of concern with the economic dimensions of
state crime in transitional justice literature and practice can be explained with
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reference to both the conceptual boundaries of its theoretical and philosophical
informants – transition to democracy literature and political liberalism – as
well as the political practice of which it forms a part, namely the promotion
of the rule of law. More specifically I will argue that both the initial absence
of the economic from transitional justice literature, as well as the way it later
came to be addressed, can be attributed to the separation of the political and
the economic realms that is central to political liberalism (2.2).
Section two raises two issues that are central to the overall argument of
this thesis, both of which will be addressed in the concluding section. The
first, as already indicated, concerns the place of the economic in transitional
justice practice and literature, which, as I will argue, is circumscribed by the
aim of liberal democracy. While the latter is often considered to be politically
neutral, it in fact already exempts the economic from democratic contestation.
In equating the notion of democracy with liberal democracy, demands for
social justice or for the democratic control of the economy, that were central to
societal debates following World War II are sidelined. This raises the question of
how to conceive of ICL’s promise of justice of ICL for those who were struggling
to create a society in which social and political justice were thought together.
The second point that emerges from the discussion in this chapter concerns
transitional justice as a framework with which to study trials in response
to state crime. Because transitional justice presupposes the desirability of
liberal democracy, it cannot reflect on two of the central assumptions on which
liberalism rests. The first assumption is that the rule of law is the opposite, and
thus the adequate answer to, the arbitrary state-backed violence experienced
under an authoritarian regime. The second assumption concerns the ex-ante
separation of the public and the private, the state and the economy. Both
assumptions set boundaries for the way the economic dimensions of state
crime, as well as what might constitute acts of redemption, are thought (2.3).
In the next chapter I will present an alternative approach to the study
of trials in response to state crime, which allows us to analyse the way in
which trials participate in the definition of what is considered state violence,
as well as how the economic dimensions of state crime are defined. This
approach will draw on Benjamin’s philosophy of history along with his critique
of law. The decision to present the critical engagement with the existing
literature in this chapter, separated from my own theoretical approach in the
following chapter, is primarily based on the issue of readability. It allows me
to engage with the existing literature, and to familiarise the reader with my
material, before entering in greater depth the philosophical and theoretical
discussions introduced in Chapter One. It does not, however, reflect a linear
order of thinking. The critique of ICL and transitional justice as concepts of
historical justice presented in this chapter is already informed by my reading
of Benjamin, and I will be engaging with Benjamin in the light of my interest
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in ICL. Rather than constituting two consecutive steps in the development of
an argument, I would like to think of the first two chapters as two sides of the
same coin.
2.1 International Criminal Law
As stated in the prelude to this thesis, I am interested in ICL as a concept of
historical justice. That is, I look at it as a framework and a language through
which justice claims which relate to the past are mediated and expressed.
Criminal law was a central means through which the allies addressed the
crimes committed by the Nazi regime, and several states resorted to national
criminal trials in order to prosecute Nazi crimes.1 However, as I will be arguing
in this section, it was only following the end of the Cold War that criminal
law established itself as a globalised framework for dealing with systematic
state-backed violence. As we will see, it was only then that international
criminal jurisprudence established that the international community had not
only the ability to try those responsible for systematic human rights violations,
but the duty to do so. This legal duty to prosecute human rights violations
forms part of a wider transitional justice discourse, a discourse which ICL
helped to globalise and from which, conversely, ICL draws in order to justify
its legitimacy. Before making this argument, though, I will briefly expand on
my definition of the term ‘ICL’.
humanity’s law
With ‘ICL’ I denote the ensemble made up of the body of customary and codi-
fied law which criminalises systematic violence carried out by an institutional
structure, typically states but also organised non-state armed groups. ICL
is the law that criminalises the violence designated as violating central val-
ues of the ‘international community’, ‘humanity’ and/or as constituting a
breach of ratified international law (such as the Geneva Conventions).2 ICL
jurisprudence disagrees on whether ICL only comprises the so-called ‘core
crimes’ (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crime of aggression)
or whether it also includes torture.3 By now, the central norms of ICL are
positive law and codified by the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court (ICC).
1Most famously the Eichmann trial in Israel and the Barbie trial in France. See Hannah
Arendt. Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin,
2006; Alain Finkielkraut. Remembering in Vain. The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against
Humanity. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.
2Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes’, p. 69; Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, p. 130;
Werle, Principles, p. 28.
3Grietje Baars offers a helpful analytical summary of the different foundational narratives
in ICL jurisprudence. See Grietje Baars. ‘Making ICL History: On the Need to Move Be-
yond Prefab Critiques of ICL’. in: Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law. Ed. by
Christine Schwöbel. New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 196–218.
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This definition is largely in line with that given in the ‘leading’ text books
on ICL. The crucial difference is that, contrary to the text books, which seek
to provide arguments for the validity of law, I am not making a normative
argument about which crimes should be part of ICL. Instead, I am interested
in the foundational narrative which theses texts provide for ICL.
In this vein, I understand the ‘international’ in ICL as an element that refers
to the claim of validity, rather than to the international character of the courts
or the treaties. That is, the ‘international’ in ICL introduces the rationale
for why states should be allowed to break with one of the core principles
of international law, the principle of state sovereignty. The international is
not a reference to ICL’s legal foundations in international treaties signed by
states, but rather is a substitute for the absence of any international treaty
at the time when ICL was first enforced. It refers to a presumed international
community (‘humanity’) which is said to share certain values, the violation of
which allows the community to prosecute individuals (and thereby to break
with the principle of state sovereignty).4
With the individual responsibility established by ICL, the individual enters
the realm of international law, either as victim or as perpetrator. Not only are
human rights violations no longer considered solely the issue for the respective
state, but furthermore it is no longer possible for head of states to hide behind
the cloak of state sovereignty.5 In most of the literature on ICL, this is taken as
indicating that the international community advances from anarchy to a rule
of ‘humanity’s law’.6 Such a narrative of the history of ICL relies on a single
subject of history – humanity – and the idea of historical progress: the fact
that the international community does not tolerate massive violence any more
is taken as indicative of a process of civilisation.7
In sum, I use the phrase ICL to designate a body of criminal law built mostly
through ad-hoc jurisprudence by international tribunals and national courts
with reference to existing international law. Importantly, this body of law is
created, contested and applied by a vast array of different legal institutions
which refer to diverging legal grounds: for example, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are based on the Charter of the United Nations;
the ICC was created by the Rome Statute; and many national courts invoke
4Immi Tallgren offers an excellent analysis of the role this fiction holds in ICL. See Immi
Tallgren. ‘Who Are ‘We’ in International Criminal Law? On Critics and Membership’. In:
Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law. Ed. by Christine Schwöbel. New York:
Routledge, 2014, pp. 71–95.
5For an early version of this argument see Hans Kelsen. ‘Collective and Individual Responsi-
bility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals’. In:
California Law Review 31.5 (1943), pp. 530–571.
6For a recent example of this narrative, see Ruti G. Teitel. Humanity’s Law. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011.
7For an analysis of the idea of progress in international law, see Thomas Skouteris. The
Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse. The Hague: Cambridge University Press,
2010.
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ICL either directly emphasising the principle of universal jurisdiction or on the
basis of national legislation that regulates the application of international law
by national courts.8 Thus, while international tribunals such as the ICTY and
the ICTR may be the most visible institutions associated with ICL, the latter is
actually created and applied by a ‘global community of courts’.9
Given the transnational character of the law-making process in relation
to state crime, some authors discuss the processes I have just described
as ‘transnational criminal law’. Peer Zumbansen, for example, has called
the globalisation of criminal law in order to address state-backed violence
the ‘transnational law of post-conflict justice’.10 However, because the label
‘transnational criminal law’ is also used to refer to any criminal law dealing with
‘transnational crime’, I will be using the name ‘ICL’ to denote the body of law
that enables the criminal prosecution of systematic state-backed violence.11
international criminal law and transitional justice
The institutionalisation of ICL in the 1990s coincided with the emergence and
proliferation of the notion of transitional justice. The latter has come to denote
a ‘set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by
different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights
abuses’12 and also refers to particular ‘legal, moral and political dilemmas that
arise in holding human rights abusers accountable at the end of conflict’.13
These brief accounts of ‘transitional justice’ show us that the term has come
to denote phenomenons to be studied (such as trials and truth commissions),
but also their dominant form of theorisation, namely as means to fostering
liberalising change. We will return to this point below.
In contrast to comparative studies, which subsume a wide array of histori-
cal instances of political change under the notion of transitional justice,14 I
conceive of transitional justice as a distinctive field of knowledge and practice
8Sikkink, Justice Cascade; Almqvist and Espósito, Courts.
9Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung.
10Peer Zumbansen. ‘Transitional Justice in a Transnational World: the Ambiguous Role of
Law’. In: CLPE Research Paper Series 04.08 (2008), pp. 1–25, p. 7.
11See for example Neil Boister and Robert J. Currie, eds. Routledge Handbook of Transnational
Criminal Law. Routledge Handbooks. Milton Park: Routledge, 2015.
12International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). What is Transitional Justice? 2012.
URL: http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (visited on 04/09/2013); see also
Pablo de Greiff. ‘A Normative Conception of Transitional Justice’. In: Politorbis 50 (2010),
pp. 17–29, p. 18.
13Christine Bell, Colm Campbell, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin. ‘Justice Discourses in Transition’.
In: Social & Legal Studies 13.3 (2004), pp. 305–328, p. 305.
14For example the work of John Elster, who compares around thirty cases of ‘regime change’,
beginning with ancient Greece and defying all academic conventions for comparative analy-
sis. Jon Elster. Closing the Books. Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004; Ruti Teitel dates the ‘origin’ of transitional justice back
to post-World War II Germany and Japan. See Teitel, ‘Genealogy’; Ruti Teitel. ‘Transitional
Justice: Postwar Legacies’. In: Cardozo Law Review 27.4 (2006), pp. 1615–1631.
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that emerged in response to the downfall of the communist regimes in the late
1980s.15 It serves, as Christine Bell highlights, as a ‘cloak’ which
has been woven into a superficially coherent whole through processes of
international diffusion, similarity in institutional provision and the com-
mon language of transitional justice fieldhood [sic!] itself.16
Even though the field unites many different approaches and research inter-
ests, its core consists of a relatively coherent set of assumptions. Principally
there are two: firstly, transitions to liberal democracy are desirable; secondly,
truth commissions, trials, institutional reforms and reparations can contribute
to the fostering of the democratic rule of law and social reconciliation. Given
that these assumptions inform most transitional justice practice and scholar-
ship, it is possible to speak of a ‘mainstream’ in the field.17
The link between the re-emergence of ICL and a global transitional justice
discourse is not just a temporal coincidence. Rather, the former played a
crucial role in the proliferation of the latter. The international lawyer Diane
Orentlicher published a series of articles which were the first to argue that
states which were party to certain treaties have a legal obligation to prosecute
the human rights violations of a prior regime.18 In an article published in 1991,
Orentlicher concludes that
both the treaty and customary obligations to punish atrocious crimes are
consistent with a limited program of prosecutions, but would be breached
by wholesale impunity.19
This affirmation of a duty to prosecute certain violations of human rights
marks a qualitative shift from the possibility established at the the beginning
15For a detailed analysis of the emergence of the notion see Arthur, ‘Conceptual History’.
16Christine Bell. ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-
Field’’. In: The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009), pp. 5–27, p. 15; see
also Rosemary Nagy. ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections’. In: Third
World Quarterly 29.2 (2008), pp. 275–289.
17See e.g. UN Human Rights Council. Analytical Study on Human Rights and Transitional
Justice. Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and
Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General (A/HRC/12/18).
2009. URL: http://www.unrol.org/files/96696_A-HRC-12-18_E.pdf (visited on
11/15/2012); UN Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Pablo de Greiff. 9/08/2012.
URL: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Sess
ion21/A-HRC-21-46_en.pdf (visited on 11/25/2012); William Muck and Eric Wiebelhaus-
Brahm. Patterns of Transitional Justice Assistance Among the International Community.
Paper presented at the Sixth ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik, 2011; Hugo van der
Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, eds. Assessing the Impact of Transitional
Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research. Washington and D.C: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2009; International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), What is Transitional
Justice?; de Greiff, ‘Normative Conception’; Ruti G. Teitel. Transitional Justice. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
18Diane F. Orentlicher. ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations
of a Prior Regime’. In: Yale Law Journal 100.8 (1991), pp. 2537–2615; Orentlicher later
published a personal evaluation of her initial position, see Diane F. Orentlicher. ‘’Settling
Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency’. In: International Journal
of Transitional Justice 1.1 (2007), pp. 10–22, in particular pp. 13-15.
19Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts’, p. 2541.
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of the century that had enabled the prosecution of Nazi crimes in the wake of
World War II.
This shift was later affirmed in academic publications and the jurisprudence
of the ICTY and the ICTR.20 Furthermore, as mentioned above, transnational
litigation efforts, in particular concerning crimes committed under authori-
tarian rule in Argentina and Chile, resulted in the affirmation of an universal
duty to prosecute violations of ius cogens.21
The description of state-sponsored violence in generalised legal concepts
such as ‘crimes against humanity’, ‘war crimes’ or ‘genocide’ made it possible
to abstract from the historical particularities of each case. And although not
every country’s political elite will decide to prosecute human rights violations
(South Africa is a case in point), they will still need to ‘articulate a relationship
to the accountability standards of international law’.22 It is thus international
human rights law, and in particular ICL, which served to spread and unify the
memorial imperative established under the heading of transitional justice.
Above, I mentioned that the term transitional justice denotes not only the
institutional measures that are adopted in order to reckon with the human
rights account of a predecessor regime. Furthermore, the term implies a
specific perspective on these measures. As we will see in more detail in the
next section, transitional justice literature evaluates trials, truth commissions
and the like according to their ability of fostering liberalising change. The
alleged ability of criminal trials to contribute towards such a liberalising
change has also become central an element in ICL jurisprudence that seeks to
substantiate the validity of ICL.23
Already, at the International Military Tribunal (IMT), prosecutors and judges
emphasised the necessity of legally identifying those responsible for systematic
state-backed violence, calling upon a diffuse mix of moral and legal arguments
that concern not only the suffering of the victims but also the ability of criminal
trials to contribute to a less violent future of the international community.
Robert H. Jackson, chief United States prosecutor at the IMT in Nuremberg,
for example, established this causal nexus at the beginning of his opening
speech when he stated that
20Werle, Principles; Bassiouni, International Criminal Law.
21Naomi Roht-Arriaza. The Pinochet Effect. Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights.
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006; Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung.
22Bell, ‘The State of the ‘Field”, p. 15.
23I understand jurisprudence as both a practice of the courts and the legal theory that aims
to provide a ‘foundational and legitimising discourse for (law’s) activity’, in the words of
Costas Douzinas. Costas Douzinas, Ronnie Warrington, and Shaun McVeigh. Postmodern
Jurisprudence. The Law of Text in the Texts of Law. London: Routledge, 1991, p. 14; we
can also invoke Niklas Luhmann’s defintion of jurisprudence as ‘attempts at theory that –
despite their often critical approaches – respect the character of law, and are committed to
its corresponding normative reference.’ Niklas Luhmann. Law as a Social System. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 60.
International Criminal Law 51
[t]he wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calcu-
lated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate
their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated.24
One could be tempted to reduce the hope expressed by Jackson to the
emotions that often characterise court hearings, or to a cheap moral cover for
power politics. However, the claim that only if trials in response to large scale
violence take place, can their repetition be avoided, is at the heart of current
scholarly attempts to offer a theory of ICL.
Confronted with the obvious shortcomings of traditional penal theories
in justifying criminal prosecutions, emerging theories of ICL often draw on
what their proponents call the ‘pedagogical’, ‘expressive’ or ‘historiographical’
function of trials in response to state crime. These theories link the promise
of justice in trials to the writing of history that takes place in the court room.
For analytical purposes, we can distinguish two ways in which this link is
established.25 The first line of argument claims that establishing the truth
about the violence experienced by a society is a requirement of justice in its
own right. This claim has found its legal expression in the (individual and
collective) ‘right to truth’.26 In this context, trials are put forward as a means
to comply with the state’s duty to investigate human rights violations that are
imposed on it by the right to truth.
A second line of argument makes of the writing of history in trials a source
of justice by linking it to the promise of a better future. It holds that, by estab-
lishing an account of past abuses (‘history as it really was’) and subsequently
24Robert H. Jackson. ‘Opening Statement’. In: Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal: 1947, pp. 98–155, pp. 99.
25In the literature both elements are often combined, although authors vary in their empha-
sis. See e.g. Mark Osiel. Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law. New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997, pp. 20-22; Louise Arbour. War Crimes and the
Culture of Peace. The Senator Keith Davey Lecture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002, p. 47; Lawrence Douglas. The Memory of Judgment. Making Law and History in the
Trials of the Holocaust. Yale University Press, 2005; Mark A. Drumbl. ‘A Hard Look at
the Soft Theory of International Criminal Law’. In: The Theory and Practice of International
Criminal Law. Ed. by Leila Nadya Sadat and Michael P. Scharf. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2008, pp. 1–18, pp. 7-13; Herbert Jäger. ‘Makroverbrechen als Gegenstand des
Völkerstrafrechts. Kriminalpolitisch-kriminologische Aspekte’. In: Themenschwerpunkt:
Strafrecht und Rechtsphilosophie. Ed. by B.Sharon Byrd. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
2003, pp. 325–354, p. 339; Robert Sloane. ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Pun-
ishment. The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal
Law’. In: Stanford Journal of International Law 43 (2007), pp. 39–94; Christoph Safferling.
Internationales Strafrecht. Strafanwendungsrecht, Völkerstrafrecht, Europäisches Strafrecht.
Springer Lehrbuch. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 2011, pp. 124-129; David S. Koller.
‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’. In: New York University Journal of Interna-
tional Law & Politics 40 (2008), pp. 1019–1069, pp. 124-129.
26As developed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Castillo Páez Vs. Perú. Repara-
ciones y Costas. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 1998-11-27; and Barrios Altos Vs.
Perú. Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 2001-03-14; for the ongoing legal discussion
concerning the status of the right to truth in international law, see Yasmin Naqvi. ‘The
Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?’ In: International Review of the
Red Cross 88.862 (2006), pp. 245–273; for a critical engagement with the right to truth,
see Leora Bilsky. ‘Transitional Justice as a Modern Oedipus: The Emergence of a Right to
Truth’. In: Critical Analysis of Law 2.2 (2015), pp. 446–466.
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identifying their criminal nature (judgment), criminal trials affirm the values of
the liberal rule of law. The fostering of liberal democracy is offered as a promise
of justice in response to the violent past. I will discuss the implications of
both arguments in detail in the next chapter. For now, suffice it to note that
ICL jurisprudence merges the ‘truthful’ representation of history, the legal
judgment and the prospect of social change together into a latent theory of
historical justice. That is, the discipline has answered the turn to criminal law
in search of historical justice, with a turn to history in the search for grounds
that could justify the criminal prosecution of state crimes.
In 2006 David Luban published a review of several publications on transi-
tional justice, in which he offers this summary:
Twenty years ago the phrase ‘transitional justice’ did not exist; and al-
though none of the problems we today classify as transitional justice is-
sues is new, treating them as a single philosophical ‘kind,’ a topos, is a
product of the 1990s. The category of transitional justice did not arise
from an internal development in philosophical discourse about justice.27
This quote entails two important observations. First, while transitional justice
did not arise from an internal development in the philosophical discourse on
justice, it nonetheless draws on philosophical concepts for its own authori-
sation as it establishes itself as a model with which to deal with systematic
human rights abuses. Advocates of transitional justice make assumptions
about what constitutes a just response to state violence which are based on
ideas about the course of history and historical time – but these ideas are not
made explicit or developed as a coherent philosophical framework. Second,
the quote reminds us that this specific perspective on states’ responses to the
violence committed by a predecessor regime, emerged only in the 1990s.
The following section looks in more detail at the underlying concepts of the
transitional justice project, as well as at the political situation in response to
which it emerged. Because, as I have argued in this section, ICL draws on
basic assumptions that are put forward and fostered by transitional justice
practice and literature for its own validation, and because transitional justice
has become a widespread approach for the study of trials in response to state
crime, to look in detail at the transitional justice discourse will offer important
insights for our analysis of ICL as a concept of historical justice and of the way
in which it takes into account economic dimensions of state crime.
2.2 Transitional Justice as a Liberal Project
To claim that transitional justice is a liberal concept seems to be stating the
obvious. Most of the policy literature on transitional justice explicitly invokes
27David Luban. ‘Review of Elster, Jon. Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004’. In: Ethics & International
Affairs 116.2 (2006), pp. 409–412, p. 409.
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liberal principles so as to justify transitional justice measures. Within the
realm of academia, recent efforts to provide a normative theory of transitional
justice draw on genuine liberal constructs such as John Rawls’ ‘political
liberalism,’ or other such contractual theories.28 However, what I mean by
saying that transitional justice is a liberal project is not just that transitional
justice scholarship is – explicitly or implicitly – normatively committed to
liberalism or liberal democracy. More than this, transitional justice literature
mirrors an idea cultivated by political liberalism, namely that the normative
commitment to liberalism is politically neutral.
In this section, I will contest this presumption by arguing that the initial
exclusion of concerns for social justice from the ‘arithmetic of justice’ put
forward by transitional justice literature is owed to its conceptual ties with
political liberalism.29 Because the latter reduces the notion of democracy to
the organisation of collective decision-making under the rule of law, it can
treat questions concerning social justice or the organisation of the economy
as issues that are, in principle, not connected to the democratic organisation
of a society. I will then proceed to argue that such a de-linking of questions
concerning social and economic justice (organisation of the economy) from
those concerning political justice (democratic legitimation of state institutions)
not only made it possible to disregard the economic dimensions of the transition
processes, but also defined the ways in which concerns for economic justice
have come to be addressed in transitional justice literature over the past ten
years.
political liberalism
Ruti Teitel’s work epitomises the tendency mentioned above to conceive of the
liberal rule of law as an institutional framework which precedes, is outside of
or is at least indifferent to decisions concerning politics. On this basis, she is
able to beg the question of liberalisation. That is, rather than providing positive
arguments for them, she merely posits liberal institutional arrangements as
aim of political transitions.30 Teitel’s writings have become a central point of
reference in the academic debate and have served as an academic foundation
for transitional justice policies.31 In the introduction to her volume Transitional
Justice, she writes:
28See e.g. Kora Andrieu. ‘Political Liberalism after Mass Violence: John Rawls and a ‘Theory’
of Transitional Justice’. In: Transitional Justice Theories. Ed. by Susanne Buckley-Zistel,
Teresa Braun Christian Beck, and Friederike Mieth. London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 165–
202; de Greiff, ‘Normative Conception’.
29Vasuki Nesiah. ‘The Trials of History: Losing Justice in the Monstrous and the Banal’. In:
Law in Transition. Ed. by Ruth Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen. Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2014, pp. 289–308, p. 297.
30See Teitel, Transitional Justice; Ruti Teitel. ‘Transitional Justice in a New Era’. In: Fordham
International Law Journal 26.4 (2002), pp. 893–906; Teitel, ‘Genealogy’.
31See e.g. UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/21/4.
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The constructivist approach proposed by this book suggests a move away
from defining transitions purely in terms of democratic procedures, such
as electoral processes, toward a broader inquiry into other practices signi-
fying acceptance of liberal democracy and the rule-of-law. The inquiry un-
dertaken examines the normative understandings, beyond majority rule,
associated with liberalizing rule-of-law systems in political flux.32
Teitel’s ‘constructivist approach’ should not be confused with the ontological
perspective that is often associated with term ‘ constructivism’ and that refers
to the ‘social construction of reality’.33 Instead, her constructivism proposes
an evaluation of political practices according to their ability to bring about
liberal institutions. The qualities of transitional law, according to Teitel,
are that it enables transition through combining a ‘process of established,
measured legitimation and gradual political change’.34 Transitional justice is
imperfect and partial but, Teitel holds, this is precisely why it is valuable in
constructing liberalising change and hence should not easily be dismissed.35
She characterises transitional justice measures as ‘re-definitional’, in that they
seek to contribute to the legitimisation of the new regime by condemning past
injustices.36
While transitional justice literature presumes a consensus on liberal democ-
racy as the aim of transition, it does not provide a justification for this nor-
mative stance. Being a ‘democrat’, it seems, does not require any further
justification. What goes undetected in the respective literature is that ‘liberal’
or ‘constitutional’ democracy is by no means the only possible meaning of the
term. In this vein, Wendy Brown reminds us that
no compelling argument can be made that democracy inherently entails
representation, constitutions, deliberation, participation, free markets,
rights, universality, or even equality.37
Transitional justice’s uncritical embracing of liberal democracy as its aim
speaks of the success of political liberalism at presenting itself as post-political,
that is, as a political order that is acceptable to everyone. Certainly, recent the-
ories of liberal democracy – such as Jürgen Habermas’ account of deliberation
or Rawls’ political liberalism – present their normative framework as neutral
with regards to cultural, social and economic values and hence as potentially
universal. In this spirit, Rawls holds that the
32Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 5.
33Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the
Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor, 1967.
34Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 223.
35Teitel, Transitional Justice, pp. 225, 227.
36Teitel also uses the term ‘performative’, see Teitel, Transitional Justice, pp. 9, 221.
37Wendy Brown. ‘‘We are all Democrats Now...’’ In: Democracy, in What State? Ed. by Giorgio
Agamben. New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 44–57, p. 45;
see also the other contributions in Giorgio Agamben, ed. Democracy, in What State? New
York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2011.
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problem of political liberalism is to work out a political conception of polit-
ical justice for a (liberal) constitutional democratic regime that a plurality
of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and non-
liberal, may endorse for the right reasons.38
Defenders of political liberalism often hold that the latter is only political in
so far as it would not prescribe any decisions concerning the organisation of
the cultural, economic or social life of a political community. In what follows,
I draw from existent critiques of political liberalism to argue that political
liberalism is not only political, but already political. It already implies political
decisions because it reduces the problem of democratic legitimation to the
realm of politics, thereby barring questions concerning democratic control of
the economy from political debate and marginalising claims for social equality.
Transitional justice has to be considered part of this politics in so far as it
seeks to authorise liberal democratic institutions.39
Before I proceed, however, one clarification should be made: to say that
transitional justice is a genuinely liberal concept is not to say that some of
the assumptions on which it is based cannot also be at odds with its ideal
of liberal democracy. Cora Andrieu, for example, points to a number of
disconnections and contradictions between liberal thought and transitional
justice, such as the construction of a foundational narrative in transitional
justice, which goes against the principle of plurality upheld by liberalism.40 In
a similar vein Teitel asks, referring to the idea of ‘posthistory’: ‘Might it not be
a normative imperative of the liberal state that it allow for ongoing historical
change?’41 I suggest that these ‘contradictions’ should not be conceived of as
an incoherency of transitional justice which needs to be ‘solved’ by scholarship,
but rather that they are proper of liberalism. In this regard, Brown notes that
[e]ven in the texts of its most abstract analytic theorists, [liberalism] is
impure, hybridised, and fused to values, assumptions, and practices un-
accounted by it and unaccountable within it.42
Political liberalism, then, has managed to equate a philosophy and a cultural
form (liberalism) with a political practice (democracy).43 The post-political
38John Rawls. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. xxxix; for
a critical discussion of this claim see Wendy Brown. Regulating Aversion. Tolerance in the
Age of Identity and Empire. Cambridge Massachusetts: Princeton University Press, 2008,
p. 23.
39Carolina Olarte Olarte provides an excellent analysis of the way the liberal rule of law pre-
cludes decisions concerning the economic and how this has influenced the way transitional
justice literature has come to address the relationship between transitional and economic
justice. See Carolina Olarte Olarte. ‘Constitutionalism, Economy and the Evacuation of the
Political: Transitional Justice and Biopolitics in the Colombian Case’. PhD thesis. London:
University of London, 2013.
40Andrieu, ‘Political Liberalism’.
41Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 108.
42Brown, Regulating Aversion, p. 23.
43Brown, Regulating Aversion, p. 23; Jacques Rancière. Disagreement. Politics and Philosophy.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 97.
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conception of democracy as a consensus on basic equal rights and institutions
clouds the fact that this consensus reduces democracy to a certain state of
social relations, namely constitutional government and market economy.
Liberalism as a political ideology evaluates institutions according to their
ability to protect individual liberty. While in classical liberalism this included
the absolute protection of the inalienable right to private property, the so-
called ‘new’ or social liberalism recognises that unrestricted property rights can
constitute impediments for the realisation of political liberty.44 This tendency
is probably best exemplified by Rawls’ egalitarian liberalism, which seeks to
ensure, by its second justice principle, that social and economic inequalities
do not infringe on the exercise of equal basic rights.45 Despite this, new
liberalism also reduces democracy to a problem of political justice which
only concerns itself with the distribution of economic wealth insofar it affects
political equality.46
From a liberal position, then, neither social equality nor the democratic
control of the means of production constitute a genuine problem of democracy.
Even though some commentators have argued that, taking his own principles
of justice seriously, Rawls should be considered a socialist, his theory of justice
has mostly been read as a philosophical justification for welfare capitalism.47
Justified as a tool to foster democratic norms, transitional justice thus engages
with a specific kind of justice that is centred around liberal democratic values.
The emphasis in transitional justice on violations of civil and political rights,
institutional change, and legal reform in transitional justice is precisely the
result of assumptions made in liberal democracy theory about what constitutes
a properly political matter, and what belongs to an allegedly non-political
economic realm.48
transitology
It is against this backdrop that we can understand the exclusion of economic
dimensions of state crime from the ‘arithmetic of justice’ that underlies transi-
tional justice. This connection becomes particularly evident when we revisit
the scholarly debates on ‘transitions to democracy’ from the 1980s and 1990s
44On the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ liberalism (not to be confused with neo-liberalism)
see Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland. Liberalism. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. 2011.
URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/liberalism/ (visited
on 11/16/2012); On the relationship between the right to property and political liberty in
modern law see Christoph Menke. Kritik der Rechte. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015, pp. 175-226.
45John Rawls. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press,
2001, p. 44.
46Cf. Marks, Constitutions, pp. 71-72.
47David Schweickart. ‘Should Rawls be a Socialist? A Comparison of his Ideal Capitalism with
Worker-controlled Socialism’. In: Social Theory and Practice 5.1 (1979), pp. 1–27, p. 23;
Martin O’Neill. ‘Liberty, Equality and Property-Owning Democracy’. In: Journal of Social
Philosophy 40.3 (2009), pp. 379–396, p. 379.
48See also Zinaida Miller. ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the “Economic” in Transitional
Justice’. In: The International Journal of Transitional Justice 2.3 (2008), pp. 266–291,
pp. 267-268.
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which operated as an important conceptual ‘informant’ during the formation
of the field of transitional justice. This discussion will show that the exclusion
of economic justice from democratisation processes was at one point a con-
scious decision, but one which has subsequently been rendered invisible by
transitional justice scholarship.
In mainstream political science, scholars started studying the political
changes of the 1980s and 1990s – particularly the end of military dicta-
torships in various regions of the world, especially Latin America, and the
subsequent decomposition of the Soviet bloc and its satellites – under the
heading of ‘transition to democracy’. A three volume publication on Tran-
sitions from Authoritarian Rule edited by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe
Schmitter, set the foundation for this new line of scholarship.49 Around the
same time, in 1988, the Aspen Institute organised a conference on ‘State
Crime: Punishment or Pardon’, that was funded by the Ford Foundation. The
institute invited activists, politicians and scholars from ten countries which
had experienced state-sponsored violence.50 Several of the scholars studying
transitions to democracy were invited to this conference and also participated
in a series of follow-up conferences concerned with the dynamics of transitions
to democracy. The term ‘transitional justice’ was coined in the context of these
conferences.51 Furthermore, these ‘transitologists’ contributed to Neil Kritz’s
three volume study on transitional justice.52
The ‘transition to democracy’ literature, despite some internal differences,
shares various commonalities which distinguish it from earlier comparative
studies of democracy and democratisation. Indeed, the emergence of the
transition paradigm marks a turning point: it fundamentally altered the idea of
social change which underpinned democratisation studies. Early comparative
research concerned with the conditions for transitions from authoritarian to
democratic regimes – and vice versa – were interested in factors explaining
such transitions. Against the backdrop of regime collapses in the Southern
Cone and Eastern Europe, however, academic interest shifted towards a
‘programming of transition’.53 In a similar vein, David Chandler observed that
49Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentan-
tive Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, Md. and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986.
50Arthur, ‘Conceptual History’, p. 322. The represented countries were the United States
of America, Argentina, Chile, Haiti, Uganda, Guatemala, Korea (South), Uruguay, Brazil
and South Africa. Arthur also provides a list of the twenty-four participants and their
institutional affiliations.
51Arthur, ‘Conceptual History’, p. 324.
52See Neil J. Kritz, ed. Transitional Justice. How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former
Regimes. General Considerations. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1995, Vol. 1, especially sections two and three.
53Nicolas Guilhot. ‘‘The Transition to the Human World of Democracy’: Notes for a History
of the Concept of Transition, from Early Marxism to 1989’. In: European Journal of Social
Theory 5.2 (2002), pp. 219–242, p. 234, my italics.
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[i]n the wake of the unexpected and unpredicted collapse of the Soviet
Union, norm based, ideational approaches were advanced as a counter
to earlier rationalist and structural materialist perspectives, which were
now held to be unable to theorise transformational change.54
In his book The Democracy Makers, Nicolas Guilhot provides a detailed anal-
ysis of this change and its implications for the study of democracy.55 For the
present purpose, two interrelated observations of his are important. First, that
the shift from explaining to programming political transitions parallels a shift
in the theoretical framework of regime change. The early works of comparative
political researchers such as O’Donnell, Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead and
Adam Przworski were led by structural analyses (often inspired by Marxist
theory) that focused on the relationship between economic development and
democratisation. With the prospect of the fall of communist regimes, the
transitologists increasingly prioritised theories that emphasised the role of
individual agency in political change.56 Guilhot concludes that
[f]rom a science having as its object the evolution of societal structures,
the study of democratisation had successfully become a science of politi-
cal conflicts within the state apparatus.57
The move away from structural analysis towards a focus on agency and
institutions as the main factors for social change is central to the field of
transitional justice. This ontological shift is the precondition on which stands
the constructivist potential that transitional justice literature attributes to
criminal trials, truth commissions and institutional reforms. Only if one
assumes that social change can be engineered or steered through institutions,
does it become plausible to think of trials as a catalyst for social change.
And it is only on the basis of this presumption, paired with the normative
commitment to political democracy, that research aimed at identifying best
practice (i.e. the most effective way to carry out such engineering or steering)
becomes possible at all.
The second relevant observation to be drawn from Guilhot’s study is on the
way in which this shift in focus was accompanied by an explicit commitment
to electoral democracy that sidelined claims for social justice. O’Donnell and
Schmitter, for example, define democracy in strictly procedural terms: a secret
and universal vote, regular elections, free competition between political parties,
and the right to create associations and join them.58 In order to secure a
transition, the authors argue, it would be necessary to channel mobilisation
toward moderate goals of political equality, so that the benefits that the
54David Chandler. ‘Promoting Democratic Norms? Social Constructivism and the ‘Subjective’
Limits to Liberalism’. In: Democratization (2012), pp. 1–25, p. 3.
55Guilhot, Democracy Makers.
56Guilhot, Democracy Makers, p. 146.
57Guilhot, Democracy Makers, p. 161.
58O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, p. 22; see also Juan J. Linz. La quiebra de las democ-
racias. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996, p. 17.
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dominant classes had obtained from the authoritarian arrangement would not
be threatened.59 They argue that seeking to establish a political democracy
first is the preferable option,
even after recognizing the significant tradeoffs that its installation and
eventual consolidation can entail in terms of more effective, and more
rapid, opportunities for reducing social and economic inequities.60
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s argument in favour of a ‘low-intensity democracy’
was soon contested by Barry K Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson. In
an alternative reading of the transitologists’ preferred case studies, they argue
that, although the newly established democracies
may have formally instituted some of the trappings of Western liberal
democracies (for example, periodic elections), in a real sense these new
democracies have preserved ossified political and economic structures
from an authoritarian past.61
Low-intensity democracy, they argue, rests on the premise that, in order to
preserve stability, institutional opening has to occur gradually. Its effective-
ness, the authors hold, ‘is its ability to implement limited and carefully selected
agendas of change’.62 In practice, these ‘agendas of change’ consisted mostly
of neoliberal-inspired legal reforms for the promotion of market economies (see
the next section). The conscious postponement of social justice in transition to
democracy literature, then, ‘generated a formula for democratisation’ which
enabled precisely the implementation of neoliberal economic policies which,
as a general tendency, led to increasing social inequality in the transitioning
countries.63
We can read Robert Meister’s analysis of what he calls the ‘politics of victim-
hood’ as a reflection on the way in which the described postponement of social
justice in transition to democracy literature came to be reflected in transitional
justice.64 He points out that the focus on civil and political human rights
violations has led to a rigid distinction between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’, a
justice equation which does not include ‘beneficiaries’ of human rights abuses.
Transitional justice is characterised by the assumption that not only a ‘moral
consensus on evil is [. . . ] necessary’ but that is it also ‘sufficient to put it in the
past’.65 Victims are thereby conceded a moral victory at the expense of further
59O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, pp. 12-14.
60O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, p. 10.
61Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson, ‘Low Intensity Democracy’, p. 3.
62Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson, ‘Low Intensity Democracy’, p. 28.
63Guilhot, Democracy Makers, p. 142; on the relationship between the implementation of ne-
oliberal economic policies and social equality see Ray Kiely. ‘The World Bank and ‘Global
Poverty Reduction’: Good Policies or Bad Data?’ In: Journal of Contemporary Asia 34.1
(2004), pp. 3–20; Robert Hunter Wade. ‘Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality?’
In: World Development 32.4 (2004), pp. 567–589.
64Robert Meister. ‘Human Rights and the Politics of Victimhood’. In: Ethics & International
Affairs 16.2 (2002), pp. 91–108.
65Robert Meister. After Evil. A Politics of Human Rights. New York: Columbia University Press,
2011, p. 14 (my emphasis).
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claims for historical (social) justice.66 Meister summarises the consequences
of this arrangement as follows:
Those who benefited passively from social injustice can now comfortably
bear witness to the innocence of idealised victims whose ability to tran-
scend their suffering reveals that they were never really a threat.67
Meister contrasts transitional justice literature with revolutionary ideologies,
mainly present in Marxist thought. These pictured beneficiaries of injustice
as ‘would-be perpetrators’. Their demands for historical justice consequently
include all those who profited from the past regime. In this context, initial
victory over the perpetrators of oppression ‘would be merely a first stage in a
longer struggle against the passive beneficiaries of the old regime’.68 Insofar
as it replaces this concept of revolutionary justice, Meister characterises
transitional justice as a counterrevolutionary project.69 It substitutes historical
justice (the break with the past) for intra-societal justice.
This break between violent past and non-violent future which transitional
justice seeks to perform is restricted to the political/institutional level given
that the notion of democracy is identified with the democratic organisation
of the political realm. As a consequence, the continuity of economic policies
are not perceived as a threat to the intended break itself, nor to the alleged
democratic quality of the emerging regime. Teitel, for example, remarks that in
the Americas ‘the attempt to adhere to a Western-style economy went hand
in hand with oppression’ only to reduce the problem to be merely one of
transitions from authoritarianism to ‘a struggle over subjecting the military
to civilian rule’, thereby excluding the economic realm from the problem of
transition.70 It is only because of this exclusion that the new democratic
regimes in South America could claim legitimacy on the basis of a break with
the authoritarian past. Regarding the emblematic case of Chile, Brett Levinson
points out that
66See also Tshepo Madlingozi. ‘Good victim, bad victim: Apartheid’s beneficiaries, victims
and the struggle for social justice’. In: Law, Memory, and the Legacy of Apartheid: Ten
Years After Azapo V. President of South Africa. Ed. by Wessel Le Roux and Karin van Marle.
Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2007, pp. 107–126, p. 112.
67Meister, After Evil, p. 24.
68Meister, After Evil, p. 21.
69Meister, After Evil, p. 21.
70Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 173; see also Alexandra Barahona de Brito. ‘Truth, Justice,
Memory, and Democratization in the Southern Cone’. In: The Politics of Memory. Ed. by
Carmen González Enríquez, Alexandra Barahona de Brito, and Paloma Aguilar Fernández.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 119–160; Elster, Closing the Books; In the
political and academic discourse concerning the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe, “transition’ established a link between a liberalised, de-regulated and privatised
market economy, and a form of regulation and governance in which the state withdraws
from strong forms of economic and social regulation’. See Norman Fairclough. ‘Critical
Discourse Analysis in trans-disciplinary Research on Social Change: ‘Transition’ in Central
and Eastern Europe’. In: British and American Studies 11 (2005), pp. 9–34, p. 3.
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the imposition of the free market was the reason for Pinochet’s installa-
tion; the forgetting of this fact renders easier the adoption of free market
values as those of democracy.71
rule of law promotion
So far, I argued that the normative commitment of transitional justice practice
and literature to the fostering of political liberalism lead to an exclusion of
concerns for social-justice as well as of the economic dimensions of authori-
tarianism from the arithmetic of transitional justice. This does, however, not
imply that the proliferation of transitional justice (as practice and concept of
historical justice) does not have an economic dimension. In what follows, I will
be arguing that the latter needs to be linked to the wider liberal peace-building
and development project, in the context of which transitional justice measures
are implemented in post-conflict societies. Both liberal peace-building and
development cooperation promote the implementation of free market and trade
policies based on their respective beliefs – either that an economy which is
integrated globally according to liberal principles fosters international peace,
or that it boosts economic development. Political liberalisation and economic
liberalisation are linked through the notion of the rule of law.
The promotion of the ‘democratic rule of law’ in post-conflict societies draws
its legitimation from the ‘democratic norm’ thesis developed in different strands
of scholarship, especially those in international law and international rela-
tions.72 As Susan Marks observes, in her discussion of the work of Francis
Fukuyama and international law scholars, this thesis is based on two as-
sumptions: firstly, that a liberal revolution is under way; and secondly, that
this opens the way for a ‘democratic peace’, which needs to be actively pro-
moted by the international community.73 Scholarly work on the ‘democratic
norm’ has served as a legitimating background for the ‘democratic peace-
building’ practice, which seeks to promote low-intensity democracy through
the strengthening of state institutions, the rule of law, privatisation and the
integration of local economies in the world market.74
Under the ‘liberal peace’ label, critics have started to question this interna-
tional peace-building practice and its theoretical underpinnings. In addition to
the fact that the assumption that democracies wage less war does not stand
71Brett Levinson. ‘Dictatorship and Overexposure: Does Latin America Testify to More than
One Market?’ In: Discourse 25.1&2 (2003), pp. 98–118, p. 98.
72Anne-Marie Slaughter. ‘Revolution of the Spirit’. In: Harvard Human Rights Journal 3.1
(1990), pp. 1–11; Anne-Marie Slaughter. ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’. In:
European Journal of International Law 6 (1995), pp. 503–538.
73Marks, Constitutions, p. 33.
74For a detailed analysis of the different strands within the democratic peace-building
paradigm see John Heathershaw. ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Deviding and Merging
of Peacebuilding Discourses’. In: Millennium - Journal of International Studies 36.3 (2008),
pp. 597–622; Oliver P. Richmond. ‘A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory’. In: Pal-
grave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches. Ed. by Oliver P.
Richmond. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 14–38.
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up to scrutiny, these critics also highlight the internal contradictions of the
framework, including cultural imperialism and the top-down approach taken
in contemporary peace-building practice.75 These criticisms can be (and indeed
have been) applied to transitional justice practice as well.76
I am here particularly engaged with a further strand of critique, which con-
nects the cornerstones of liberal peace-building, namely political liberalisation
and economic liberalisation. I hold that these do not constitute separate agen-
das but are rather linked to each other via a particular take on the concept
of the rule of law, which has also become central to transitional justice in the
context of its growing attention to post-conflict scenarios. In his latest report,
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, points out that the shift from
post-authoritarian to post-conflict settings requires a change in transitional
justice practice because ‘weak institutions’ and ‘economic scarcity’ complicate
the successful implementation of transitional justice measures as we know
them from post-authoritarian settings.77 Against this background, transitional
justice processes and mechanisms are to be considered a ‘critical component
of the United Nations framework for strengthening the rule of law’ in soci-
eties emerging from conflict.78 In a similar vein, the World Development Report
2011 holds that transitional justice initiatives in post-conflict societies ‘send
powerful signals about the commitment of the new government to the rule of
law’.79
In international rule of law promotion, as opposed to the theoretical elab-
orations on the rule of law, the ‘rule of law’ has come to serve as an empty
signifier which serves to legitimise all sorts of development cooperation, es-
pecially the exportation of laws to secure property rights and of institutional
models.80 While policy-oriented literature often writes about the ‘rule of law’
as though it was an economically and politically neutral concept, several
recent academic publications have suggested that its promotion is actually
connected to the wider neoliberal economic project of the last two decades.81
Brian Tamanaha notes that the rule of law has been ‘put forth as the “front
man” in the liberal package international development organizations provide
75Richmond, ‘Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory’, pp. 26-33; see also Chandra Lekha
Sriram. ‘Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice’. In:
Global Society 21.4 (2007), pp. 579–591, 588f.
76See e.g. contributions in Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, eds. Transitional Justice from
Below. Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008.
77UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/21/4, §§ 16-18.
78Guidance Note of the Secretary-General. United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice.
2010. URL: http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf
(visited on 10/26/2012); see also UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/21/4, § 40.
79The World Bank. The World Development Report 2011. Conflict, security, and development.
Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011, p. 125.
80Stephen Humphreys. Theatre of the Rule of Law. Transnational Legal Intervention in Theory
and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 5-6.
81See Michael Pugh. ‘The Political Economy of Peace Studies: a Critical Theory Perspective’.
In: International Journal of Peace Studies 10.2 (2005), pp. 23–42, p. 25.
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for developing countries’.82 This package generally includes ‘training judges
and police, and drafting and implementing legal codes that protect property
and foreign investment’.83 As such, the rule of law
constrains, overrides, and dictates to domestic law-making in connection
with liberal economic matters (affecting property rights, tariffs, subsidies,
efforts to protect jobs).84
The notion of the rule of law advocated in policy reports and manifested,
for example, in the World Bank’s ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’ and
‘Doing Business Indicators’, is depoliticizing, as Humphreys argues, in that it
‘[naturalizes] a certain view of economy and the role of law within it’, while its
homogenizing character presents ‘the political in the guise of the technical’.85
Instead of merely serving as a framework within which debates concerning
the organisation of the economy take place and decisions are made, as it is
often claimed, the rule of law turns into a pre-condition for a particular way of
organising the economy. That is, the market is designated as the ‘dominant
organising position within capitalist societies’.86 The prominent role of the rule
of law in liberal peace-building and development assistance is a prime example
of how liberal ideas are invoked to legitimise neoliberal policies.87
Conceiving of itself as a tool for political liberalisation, most of the transitional
justice literature fails to take account of the fact that, in most post-conflict
societies, the very reconstruction of the liberal rule of law it seeks to support,
consists of a transformation of states in accordance with neoliberal ideas.88
The specific relevance of the liberal peace critique for transitional justice lies in
the connection it draws between the two pillars of liberal peace building, namely
the promotion of free markets and of the liberal rule of law. It emphasises
that, since the end of the Cold War, political and economic liberalisation have
been two sides of the same coin. To understand transitional justice merely as
a problem of political liberalisation renders invisible the fact that it is part of a
wider socio-economic project.
82Brian Tamanaha. ‘The Dark Side of the Relationship between the Rule of Law and Liberalism’.
In: New York University Journal of Law & Liberty 33 (2008), pp. 516–549, p. 547; see also
Scott Newton. ‘The Dialectics of Law and Development’. In: The New Law and Economic
Development. A Critical Appraisal. Ed. by David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 174–202.
83Tamanaha, ‘Dark Side’, p. 547; see further Newton, ‘Dialectics’, p. 191.
84Tamanaha, ‘Dark Side’, p. 546.
85Humphreys, Rule of Law, p. 148.
86Tamanaha, ‘Dark Side’, p. 546.
87Cf. Wendy Brown. ‘Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’. In: Theory & Event
7.1 (2003), \P 1–43, p. 27; Humphreys, Rule of Law, I will discuss the basic assumptions
of neoliberal thought in more detail in Chapter Four, when looking at the trials against
German industrialists and their role in the foundation of the new German state. See p. 141.
88For a theoretically rich discussion see Humphreys, Rule of Law; and Stephen Humphreys.
Are Social Rights Compatible with the Rule of Law? A Realist Inquiry. 2010. URL: htt
p://www.law.nyu.edu/global/workingpapers/2006/ECM_DLV_015760 (visited on
08/01/2010).
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including the economic
In one of the first critiques of the exclusion of the economic from transitional
justice concerns, Zinaida Miller draws attention to the coincidence (in terms of
‘correspondence in time of occurrence’) of transitional justice and neoliberal
economic reforms. She argues that current transitional justice practices ne-
glect the economic root causes of conflict, including structural socio-economic
violence, to the effect that emerging democracies come to be marked by high
social inequality, which in turn is often further aggravated by neoliberal re-
forms adopted in the contexts of transitions.89 Various publications in the
field of transitional justice have since responded to the absence of the ‘eco-
nomic’ from transitional justice that was diagnosed by Miller.90 In what seems
to be an instance of reassessment of the prospects and promises of justice
borne by transitional justice measures, transitional justice literature expresses
an increased concern with the responsibility of economic actors for human
rights violations as well as with the economic dimensions of conflicts. This
tendency can be understood as an answer to the failures of actually existing
constitutional states to deliver on the promise of equality made by political
liberalism.91
What is common to most of these contributions, however, is that they
present their demands, that the socio-economic dimensions of past conflict be
addressed, not as political claims concerning the redistribution of wealth, but
as a technical advice which should be adopted by a peace-willing community.
Louise Arbour, for instance, holds that
[t]ransitional justice having as an objective to contribute to the building,
in societies in transition, of a solid foundation for the future based on the
89Miller, ‘Effects’, p. 267.
90See e.g. the contributions in International Journal of transitional justice Vol. 2.3 and
in Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds. Transitional Justice and Development. Making
Connections. New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009; Louise Arbour. ‘Eco-
nomic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’. In: Center for Human Rights and
Global Justice Working Paper 10 (2006); Lisa J. Laplante. ‘On the Indivisibility of Rights:
Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Right to Development’. In: Yale Human Rights
& Development Law Journal 10 (2007), pp. 141–177; Lisa J. Laplante. ‘Transitional Jus-
tice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence
through a Human Rights Framework’. In: The International Journal of Transitional Justice
2.3 (2008), pp. 331–355; for a recent overview on socio-economic dimensions of transi-
tional justice see Lisa Hecht and Sabine Michalowski. The Economic and Social Dimen-
sions of Transitional Justice. 2012. URL: http://www.essex.ac.uk/tjn/documents/
TheeconomicandsocialdimensionsofTJ.pdf (visited on 11/18/2012); For a helpful dif-
ferentiation between the various strands of the debate and in particular the difference be-
tween claims for socio-economic justice and for the prosecution of social and economic
rights Evelyne Schmid and Aoife Nolan. ‘‘Do No Harm’? Exploring the Scope of Economic
and Social Rights in Transitional Justice’. In: International Journal of Transitional Justice
8.3 (2014), pp. 362–382.
91Vikki Bell identifies the capacity to promise as a ‘necessary but potentially destabilizing point’
in liberalism, see Vikki Bell. ‘The Promise of Liberalism and the Performance of Freedom’.
In: Foucault and Political Reason. Ed. by Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose.
London: UCL Press, 1996, pp. 81–97, p. 82.
Transitional Justice as a Liberal Project 65
rule of law, it is imperative to see how best to equip a country to redress
often deep-seated social and economic inequalities.92
In a similar vein, Muvingi argues that the unequal distribution of resources
and poverty is at the root of many conflicts, making socio-economic justice
in processes of transition a conditio sine qua no for reconciliation and societal
peace.93
The strand of transitional justice literature that focuses on the economic
dimensions of state crime has made an important contribution in rendering
visible the selective character of the transitional justice project. However,
from the fact that its proponents suggest the need to ‘include’ socio-economic
matters into transitional justice, makes it seem as though they assume that the
economic, up to that point, had merely been forgotten and simply needed to be
added. Above I argued that transitional justice literature adopted the normative
preference for political democracy from transition to democracy studies, but
with one important difference: in contrast with the authors of the Transitions
from Authoritarian Rulevolumes, it declares that which initially was considered
a trade-off for the sake of stability (i.e. liberal democracy) to be its goal. This
change is relevant to the ways in which transitional justice scholarship has
come to engage with the socio-economic dimensions of transition. In embracing
the notion of liberal democracy as the only possible meaning of democracy,
the literature fails to reflect on the fact that transitologists, concerned above
all with political stability, favoured this constitutional arrangement precisely
because it would not put in danger the economic interests of pre-transition
elites.
In contemporary transitional justice literature, the ontological assumption
that a rational consensus on the inclusion of social justice is possible and
desirable has trumped those analyses which focus on conflicting interests in
the moment of transition. The economic is re-inserted at the technical level.
Social justice, and the means to achieve it, enter the transitional discourse
in an already-colonised form, where questions of, for instance, economic self-
determination or the democratic organisation of the economy are not part
of what is debatable. In this vein, Carlina Olarte Olarte has observed an
‘evacuation of the political’ in transitional justice literature, in so far as it
tends to make of transition a corollary of an understanding of the po-
litical that sees economic issues, such as structural inequality or socio-
economic injustices, as alien or, at least, as an independent arena.94
92Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice’, p. 22, my italics.
93See e.g. Ismael Muvingi. ‘Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional
Societies’. In: The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009), pp. 163–182; Tony
Addison. ‘The Political Economy of the Transition from Authoritarianism’. In: Transitional
Justice and Development. Ed. by Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie. New York: Social
Science Research Council, 2009, pp. 110–140, p. 111.
94Olarte Olarte, ‘Constitutionalism, Economy and the Evacuation of the Political: Transitional
Justice and Biopolitics in the Colombian Case’, p. 150.
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With reference to the work of Emilios Christodoulidis, Olarte Olarte suggests
that what is at stake in the way transitional justice literature has not only
excluded, but also included, the economic into concepts of transitional justice
is ‘the denial of economic democracy’.95 This observation is important because,
as we will see in Chapter Four’s discussion of the trials against German
industrialists, it is in this aspect that the contemporary debate on how to
address economic dimensions of state crime or conflict differs fundamentally
from the debate that followed the defeat of Nazi Germany. As I will argue
there, the democratisation of the economy was, at least initially, a central
demand by political actors across all parties, that followed from the awareness
that German big business was central to the rise of the Nazi-party as well as
to Germany’s ability to wage war. While the German post-war political and
economic order was eventually modeled according to ordoliberal ideas which
posited the free market as guarantor of democracy, the contributions made by
all actors were permeated by an awareness that constitutional arrangements
concerning the relationship between the economy and the political were, in
themselves, highly political.
2.3 Shifting perspective
I started this chapter by invoking the constellation formed between the ‘eco-
nomic trials’ in Argentina and the post-World War II trials of German industri-
alists. This constellation, I argued, prompted me to inquire into the absence of
an explicit concern with the economic dimensions of state crime at the time
when ICL established itself as a central framework for expressing claims for
justice in response to state crime. Parts two and three of the chapter conse-
quently provided an explanation for this ‘absence’ by linking the re-emergence
of ICL towards the end of the 1980s to the global transitional justice project.
In first clarified the link between ICL and transitional justice, arguing that
on the one hand, ICL’s claim to universality was crucial in the proliferation of
the memorial imperative posited by transitional justice. On the other hand, I
argued, transitional justice offered a language through which the application
of ICL could claim its legitimacy. In this context, trials were conceived of
as a means of transitional justice that could foster liberalising change by
establishing an account of past human rights violations.
I consequently focused on the conceptual underpinnings of transitional
justice literature as well as on the wider political context in which it emerged,
in order to gain insights into the reasons why an explicit concern with the
economic dimensions of state crime and conflict had been absent from both
95Olarte Olarte, ‘Constitutionalism, Economy and the Evacuation of the Political: Transitional
Justice and Biopolitics in the Colombian Case’, p. 148; Emilios Christodoulidis. ‘Against
Substitution: The Constitutional Thinking of Dissensus’. In: The Paradox of Constitution-
alism. Ed. by Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007,
pp. 189–210, p. 199.
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ICL and transitional justice practice and scholarship in the 1990s. My central
claim was that both the initial absence, as well as the way in which the
economic dimensions of state crime and conflicts later came to be addressed,
can be attributed to the field’s normative commitment to liberal democracy.
I argued that, because it begs the separation of the political and the economic
realm on which political liberalism is based, even the literature that indicates
the need to address the socio-economic dimensions of state crime does so in
a way that exempts questions concerning redistribution and the relationship
between economy and democracy from political contestation. What is missing
from most of the contemporary literature on the economic dimensions of
state violence or corporate accountability is an engagement with the dialectical
relationship between democracy and capitalism as well as with the organisation
of the economy as a problem of democracy.96
To situate ICL within the context of transitional justice thus draws our
attention towards the fact that while it breaks with the principle of national
sovereignty in international law, it also participates in the foundation of
sovereignty: trials in response to state crime are perceived as an important
element to bring about liberalising change. From a transitional justice perspec-
tive, the promise of justice associated with trials in response to state crime is
their ability to expose and condemn the violence of the past, thereby reaffirm-
ing liberal values. As I will be arguing in more detail in the next chapter, in
ICL the violence of the past is invoked as a negative reference against which
the juridico-political order claims its own superiority.
Such an understanding of historical justice as historical change which
occurs through learning from past experiences of violence, condenses what
Reinhart Kosellek has identified as the characteristic element of the historical
time of the Neuzeit. Historical time, for Kosellek, becomes graspable where
‘past and future, or (in anthropological terms) experience and expectation’ are
differentiated.97 As for the particular historical time of the Neuzeit, he argues
that ‘Neuzeit is first understood as a neue Zeit from the time that expectations
have distanced themselves evermore from all previous experience’.98 This
temporal difference between experience and expectation, Kosellek adds, was
rendered plausible through the notion of progress:99
96For one of the most recent discussions on capitalism and social inequality see Thomas
Piketty. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge Massachusetts: Belknap Press,
2014; For an overview on the debate on the dialectical relationship between democracy
and capitalism see Sonja Buckel. ‘Demokratie und Kapitalismus heute’. In: Perspektiven
sozialer Demokratie in der Postdemokratie. Ed. by Oliver Eberl and David Salomon. Staat -
Souveränität - Nation. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016.
97Reinhart Koselleck. Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2004, p. 3.
98Reinhart Koselleck. ‘“Space of Experience” and “Horizon of Expectation”: Two Historical
Categories’. In: Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2004, pp. 255–275, p. 263.
99Koselleck, ‘“Space of Experience” and “Horizon of Expectation”: Two Historical Categories’,
p. 268.
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It became a rule that all previous experience might not count against the
possible otherness of the future. The future would be different from the
past, and better, to boot.100
Both transitional justice practice and scholarship, as I showed in this chapter,
define this promise of a better future in terms of the arrival of liberal democracy.
The liberal rule of law is posited ex-ante as the just answer to the violence
experienced in the past. As a consequence, the foundation of political authority
in and through criminal trials has become a central concern underpinning
the study of trials in transitional justice scholarship. As a consequence, this
strand of scholarship is not able to reflect on the political implications of the
ontological assumptions underlying liberalism.
This is problematic for at least two reasons. In this chapter, I emphasised
the fact that political liberalism presupposes the separation of the political
and the economic realm and that, consequently, demands for social justice
were excluded from transitional justice literature. Furthermore, I indicated,
that the political liberalisation envisioned by transitional justice went hand in
hand with economic liberalisation that, in many countries, lead to increasing
social inequality. Against this backdrop, we will have to ask to what extent the
suffering of those who were subjected to human rights violations because they
denounced the violence of capitalism or because they demanded redistributive
policies, is redeemed by the pair of liberal democracy and market economy.
The second problem that comes with the begging of liberalisation in transi-
tional justice scholarship, and I will address this aspect in more detail in the
next chapter, is that, because it posits the rule of law as the non-violent answer
to the violence of the past, transitional justice scholarship cannot account for
the role of law in defining what we perceive as violence and what not.
In the text chapter, I will be turning to the work of Benjamin in order to
recover a perspective on trials that is able to critically reflect on both these
issues. Such a perspective understands trials as moments that participate
in the grounding and un-grounding of a political order.101 With Benjamin, I
will argue in the next chapter, we need to think historical justice radically
differently from the way it is conceived of in transitional justice approaches to
criminal trials. The duty to attend to the victims of past violence and to tell
their stories in the context of criminal trials, can no longer be derived from the
wish to bring about or to authorise a particular political order – such as liberal
democracy. Linking Benjamin’s philosophy of history and critique of law, I will
suggest that the critical potential of trials instead is to be found where they
100Koselleck, ‘“Space of Experience” and “Horizon of Expectation”: Two Historical Categories’,
p. 267.
101For the study of trials as political trials, see Kirchheimer, Political Justice; See also Otto Kirch-
heimer. ‘Politics and Justice’. In: Politics, Law, and Social Change. Ed. by Frederic S. Burin
and Shell Kurt L. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 408–427;
Judith N. Shklar. Legalism. Law, Morals, and Political Trials. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1986; Arendt, Eichmann.
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expose both the violence of the past, as well as the violence that is rendered
invisible and permissive by the judging juridico-political order.
In drawing attention to the authorising and destabilising effects of the past
in relation to the present, Benjamin is one of the first thinkers to conceptualise
what can be called a politics of time. This term has, in the past twenty years,
been deployed by scholars such as Peter Osborne102 and Kathleen Davis103 to
designate the political implications of diverging forms of temporalisation and
periodisation.104 A study of ICL that seeks to take into account the politics
of time at work in criminal trials has to combine an interest in the historical
narrative which criminal trials create about the experienced violence (the
representation of the past), with an eye for how trials bring the past to bear
on the present (temporalisation). Such a shift in perspective, as we will see,
has important implications for how we think about the promise of justice that
criminal trials might have to offer for those victims of violence whose suffering
is not redeemed by the pairing of liberal democracy and the market economy.
102Peter Osborne. ‘The Politics of Time’. In: Radical Philosophy 68 (1994), pp. 3–9; Peter
Osborne. The Politics of Time. Modernity and Avant-garde. London: Verso, 1995.
103Kathleen Davis. Periodization and Sovereignty. How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization
Govern the Politics of Time. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
104Berber Bevernage also takes up this term from Osborne, see Berber Bevernage. ‘Writing the
Past Out of the Present: History and the Politics of Time in Transitional Justice’. In: History
Workshop Journal 69.1 (2010), pp. 111–131.
3 | From the Representation to
the Temporalisation of
History
In the previous chapter I argued that International Criminal Law (ICL) has
become a central framework to address justice claims that emerge in response
to systematic state-backed violence. As such it relies on a latent theory of
history on which it grounds its validity. I called it a latent theory because it is
not explicitly stated nor does it dialogue with theories of history or theories
of justice. Instead, it implicitly draws on a set of assumptions concerning the
nature of history and historical change. This latent theory of historical justice,
I showed, rests on two pillars: the alleged contribution of criminal trials in
establishing the truth about past violence, and the trials’ presumed capacity
to foster the democratic rule of law.
At the beginning of the previous chapter, I suggested to the reader that
this chapter and the previous one should be read as two sides of the same
coin. This chapter constitutes a reversal of what has been presented up to
this point, insofar as many of the insights concerning the latent theory of
history underlying ICL and transitional justice literature are gained through
my engagement with Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history and his critique
of law, which will be presented in this chapter.
We can think of Benjamin’s philosophy of history, as well as his critique
of law, as a theory of historical justice, albeit one that links historical truth,
memory, justice and political change (and the role law can play in this equation)
in a radically different way than the literature reviewed in the previous chapter.
In this chapter I will be arguing that the fundamental difference between the
latent theory of historical justice underlying ICL on the one hand, and the
philosophy of history developed by Benjamin on the other, is the political
relationship which they establish between the past and present. While the
former draws its normative claim from the authorisation of the present or of a
pre-conceived future, Benjamin links the possibility of historical justice to the
past’s ability to destabilise present societal arrangements.
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If we follow Benjamin in privileging the moment of rupture over that of
authorisation, then this also has implications for the way in which we study
trials. The central concern is no longer the ability of the trials to foster
liberalising change, but rather to critically examine the way in which these
trials participate in the grounding and ungrounding of political authority.
Analytically, such a framework does not presuppose the separation of the
public and the private, but instead looks for the ways in which the trials
participate in the construction of this binary. Similarly, the framework does
not define violence ex-ante according to its sanctioned and unsanctioned
manifestations, but instead invites us to look at the ways in which the trials
participate in drawing the line between those forms of interaction that are
rendered permissive by a juridico-political order and those that are not.
The function of this chapter within my overall thesis is thus twofold: First, it
seeks to substantiate my critique of ICL, by sketching out a counter-theory
of historical justice that draws its normative claim not from the value of
authorisation, but from the idea of rupture or destabilisation. Second, it points
out the implications of such a perspective for the study of trials in response to
state crime, which will then be put to practice in the chapters to come.
I will start by introducing Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history as one
that is concerned with the oppressed in history and set out why, for Benjamin,
a philosophy of history that wishes to side with the oppressed must rest on the
value of rupture or destabilisation. In doing so, I will be offering Benjamin’s
notion of remembrance (Eingedenken) as a way to think the promise of his-
tory that radically differs from the memorial imperative imposed by ICL and
transitional justice more generally (3.1).
Against this backdrop, the two sections that follow focus on the motif of
interruption or suspension as it appears in the Theses on the Philosophy of
History (hereafter Theses) and On the Critique of Violence (hereafter Critique)
as an answer to the problem posed by the historical temporality of capitalism.1
In so doing, these sections also contest the two pillars of the latent theory of
historical justice underlying ICL presented in the previous chapter.
I will first be taking up the link between knowledge of the past (‘historical
truth’) and the promise of justice attached to it as established in ICL and
transitional justice literature on the one hand, and Walter Benjamin on the
other. As opposed to the notion of historical truth underlying ICL, I will
be arguing, historical truth for Benjamin does not consist of the adequate
representation of the past. Instead, truth is a temporal relationship and finds
its expression in what Benjamin calls the ‘dialectical image’. It is in the notion
of the ‘dialectical image’ that we will encounter for the first time the idea of
rupture as a gesture towards justice (3.2).
1Benjamin, ‘Theses’.
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I will then examine Benjamin’s analysis of the link between law, justice and
violence, as developed in the Critique, in order to challenge the idea that the
liberal rule of law constitutes a non-violent answer to the past’s violence as
well as the hope that a legal judgement could offer historical justice. This
is because according to Benjamin any manifestation of law is bound to be
caught in the cycle of law-positing and law-maintaining violence. Here, only
the suspension of this cycle, the Entsetzung of law, could break with this
mythical violence (3.3).
The last section of this chapter proposes a perspective on trials in response
to state crime which takes into account Benjamin’s critique of historicism
and legal violence. Such a perspective requires us to shift the focus from the
representation of history to its temporalisation in trials and thereby allows us
to perceive trials as a site of a competing politics of time. While in ICL the
promise attached to historiographical function of trials is the authorisation
of a juridico-political order, namely the liberal rule of law, with Benjamin the
only promise of justice could lie where images of the past bring the present
into a critical state (3.4).
3.1 A History of the Oppressed
In the spring of 1940 Benjamin wrote in a letter to Gretel Adorno:
The war and the constellation, by which it was brought about, made me
put down some thoughts of which I can say that I kept them safe for about
twenty years, indeed, kept them safe from myself. . . . They make me think
that the problem of remembrance (and forgetting) will continue to occupy
my mind for a long time.2
In September of the same year, Benjamin committed suicide in Portbou,
Spain, as his attempt to enter the country failed. The ‘notes’ Benjamin men-
tions in the letter formed what is now known as the Theses on the Philosophy
of History3 or On the Concept of History.4
In the same letter to Gretel Adorno he cautions:
Needless to say that nothing could be further from my intentions than a
publication of these notes (not to mention the version at your hand). It
would open the floodgates for enthusiastic misunderstandings.5
Since then, five manuscripts and one typescript of the Theses have been
discovered and published, with scholars having spent a good amount of time
2Gérard Raulet. ‘Entstehungs- und Publikationsgeschichte’. In: Über den Begriff der
Geschichte. Ed. by Gérard Raulet. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010,
pp. 161–208, p. 161 (my translation).
3Benjamin, ‘Theses’.
4Walter Benjamin. ‘On the Concept of History’. In: Selected Writings. Ed. by Howard Eiland
and Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2003, pp. 389–400.
5Raulet, ‘Entstehungs- und Publikationsgeschichte’, p. 161 (my translation).
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trying to reconstruct their chronology.6 The letter gives us important clues
for a reading of the Theses. As Benjamin states, his notes form an attempt to
condense his thinking about remembrance and forgetting, two concepts that
for him are central to the problems of history and historiography. The Theses
can be read as a first attempt to formulate the theoretical scaffolding for the
Arcades Project, a historical work on the cultural history of the Paris arcades.7
In Convolute N of the Arcades Project, titled ‘Epistemology, Theory of Progress’,
Benjamin started to collect quotes, comments and thoughts which are also
found in the Theses, as well as other later writings such as Eduard Fuchs:
Collector and Historian, written in 1937, or The Image of Proust.8 The centrality
of the question of ‘remembrance and forgetting’ for Benjamin becomes clear
when he writes that the thoughts expressed in the Theses have been on his
mind for twenty years. In this vein, Stéphane Moses highlights the similarity
of key concerns in texts like The Life of Students, written as early as 1914, and
the Theses.9
Yet it is most likely that Benjamin would not have published any of the drafts
circulating under the name of the Theses. And one could say that Benjamin
has been proven right when he anticipated ‘enthusiastic misunderstandings’
of his text. Once published, the notes sparked a wide debate among his friends
and colleagues.10
Any engagement with the Theses has to keep in mind the fact that, despite
their centrality to Benjamin’s thinking, they were not intended for publication.
While beautifully written, the text is dense and at times enigmatic. Any
attempt to offer a summary must fail. The work needs unpacking rather than
condensation. And much of this unpacking has been done. Indeed, there
are countless articles, edited volumes and entire monographs on the Theses
alone, a text which in itself does not exceed ten pages.11 In this chapter I will
concentrate on what I consider to be the central impulses that we can gain
from Benjamin’s philosophy of history for a critique of ICL as a concept of
historical justice.
The cornerstone of Benjamin’s philosophy of history is the critique of an
ideology of progress. Benjamin frames his critique of progress – the idea that
6In 2010, all of them were published, together with related manuscripts, notes and correspon-
dence, see Walter Benjamin. Über den Begriff der Geschichte. Werke und Nachlaß. Kritische
Gesamtausgabe. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010.
7Benjamin, Arcades Project.
8Walter Benjamin. ‘Eduard Fuchs: Collector and Historian’. In: The Essential Frankfurt
School Reader. Ed. by Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt. New York: Continuum, 2002,
pp. 225–253; Walter Benjamin. ‘The Image of Proust’. In: Illuminations. Ed. by Hannah
Arendt. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968, pp. 203–217.
9Stéphane Mosès. The Angel of History. Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem. Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 66.
10Raulet, ‘Entstehungs- und Publikationsgeschichte’.
11For some recent engagements, see Michael Löwy. Fire Alarm. Reading Walter Benjamin’s
On the Concept of History. London: Verso, 2005; Reyes Mate. Medianoche en la historia.
Comentarios a las tesis de Walter Benjamin »Sobre el concepto de historia«. Madrid: Editorial
Trotta, 2006.
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history constitutes an automatic advancement of mankind towards a situation
of fulfillment – by linking it to the notion of catastrophe:
The concept of progress must be grounded in the idea of catastrophe. That
things are ‘status quo’ is the catastrophe. It is not an ever-present possi-
bility but what in each case is given. Thus Strindberg (in To Damascus?):
hell is not something that awaits us, but this life here and now.12
By thinking progress in terms of catastrophe, Benjamin marks a shift in per-
spective: what some label progress, by others is lived a series of catastrophes.
To understand history as a ‘pile of debris’, as recurrent violence, leads to a
necessary abandonment of the idea of an universal history of progress (and
humanity as universal subject of that history).13 This is, in part, because the
idea of a universal history of progress impedes our ability to attend to those
on whose back the supposed progress takes place:
The products of art and science owe their existence not merely to the
effort of the great geniuses that created them, but also to the unnamed
drudgery of their contemporaries. There is no document of culture which
is not at the same time a document of barbarism.14
Benjamin thus urges us to turn our gaze to those histories, inscribed within
the tales of progress, that bear witness to the violence of this process.
This alteration of the perspective sheds a different light on the ‘whig histories’
of ICL. Textbook accounts of ICL tend to identify its development with a con-
tinuous civilisation of the global order that manifests itself in an international
legal order no longer protecting the interests of states but human security.15
In this vein, the institutionalisation of ICL in itself is taken as evidence that a
process of civilisation is taking place at a global level.
Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous chapter, ICL is not only
thought to be symptomatic of the progress of humankind, but is also consid-
ered to actively participate in it, in so far as the prosecution of crimes under
ICL is claimed to contribute towards liberalising change. What in ICL literature
is presented as a history of progress, namely the legal protection of the values
presumably shared by the international community, could also be told as a
history of recurring conflict and violence that does not seem to become any
less despite the proliferation of ICL.
The insight that history presents itself very differently for victors and van-
quished of past struggles constitutes the movens of Benjamin’s thinking about
history. In a letter to Max Horkheimer, written in March 1937, he writes:
12Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 472 (N9a,1).
13Benjamin, ‘Theses’.
14Benjamin, ‘Eduard Fuchs’, p. 233.
15See for example Teitel, Humanity’s Law; Bassiouni, International Criminal Law; Antonio
Cassese. International Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; Werle, Princi-
ples.
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To me, an important question has always been how to understand the
odd figure of speech, ‘to lose a war or a court case.’ . . . Finally, I explained
it to myself thus: the events involved for a person who has lost a war or
a court case are truly concluded and thus for that person any avenue of
praxis has been lost. This is not the case for the counterpart, who is the
winner. Victory bears its fruit in a way much different from the manner
in which consequences follow defeat.16
The present is a present that has been shaped by those who won the struggles
of the past because those who lost a war or a court case also lost ‘any avenue
of praxis’. Benjamin’s philosophy of history is committed to opening anew an
avenue of praxis for those unfinished projects, curtailed by defeat.17
At the beginning of Benjamin’s philosophy of history, then, there is a po-
litical positioning, a siding with the ‘oppressed’ of history. To say it even
more strongly: the only truly historical knowledge for Benjamin is one that
adopts the perspective of those who have been oppressed in and by history.
They are the historical subject: ‘The subject of historical knowledge is the
struggling, oppressed class itself.’18 The remembrance of past struggles, of
violence experienced by those defeated, is important in so far as it opens an
avenue of practice in the present that could redeem the suffering endured by
previous generations.
At first glance ICL, with its legal obligation to investigate systematic state-
backed violence, appears to be a practice that (co)responds to Benjamin’s
appeal for remembrance. But, I will be arguing in this chapter, the memorial
imperative postulated by ICL and reinforced by transitional justice literature
differs in significant ways from what Benjamin formulates as the task of
remembrance or, as he calls it, Eingedenken.19
The problem with historicism for Benjamin, is the political effect of the
ontological claim to represent the ‘past as it really was’, a desire which ac-
cording to Benjamin necessarily results in ‘empathy with the victor’ of past
struggles.20 What historicism presents as historical ‘truth’ is shaped by the
concepts through which it is looked at. These concepts, in turn, are the
concepts coined by present relationships of power. They consequently produce
16Walter Benjamin. Briefe 2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978, p. 1338; Translation taken
from Rolf Tiedemann. ‘Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of
the Theses ‘On the Concept of History’’. In: Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History. Ed.
by Gary Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 175–209, p. 182, italics in
the original.
17This does not imply that literally all those who lost a war are to be considered to belong to
the oppressed in history. Instead, it encourages us to pay attention to potentialities not
realised in the present.
18Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 394 (Thesis XII).
19Benjamin coined the term ‘Eingedenken’, otherwise rarely used in German, to describe a
particular practice of engaging with the past. Throughout the thesis, I translate ‘Einge-
denken’ with ‘remembrance’, and use the word ‘memory’ to describe the memorial practices
demanded by transitional justice.
20Walter Benjamin. ‘Paralipomena to “On the Concept of History”’. In: Selected Writings. Ed.
by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press,
2003, pp. 401–411, p. 406.
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an image of the past that ‘invariably benefits those currently ruling’.21 The
present is a present shaped by the winners of history. This is why for Benjamin
the practice of Eingedenken needs to be linked to a ‘presentation of history
[which] leads the past to bring the present into a critical state’.22
In this chapter, I will relate Benjamin’s critique of historicism to the writing
of history in criminal trials. If we accept Benjamin’s claim that historicist
representations of the past stabilise the societal arrangements that are in
place, and if it is true that ICL’s promise of justice relies on a historicist
understanding of history, then ICL sides with the victors of history. This claim
might sound counter-intuitive given that trials in response to state crime judge
the perpetrators of massive human rights violations and, especially in the last
few years, have tried to adapt the rules of procedure and evidence to take into
account the needs of victims.23 Or, it might not sound that surprising at all,
given that trials by fiat of the successor regime have often been denounced as
victors justice by those who found themselves in the dock.
However, a Benjaminian perspective on ICL points towards something else.
While ICL addresses the violence experienced by the victims of state-backed
crime, it does so from the perspective of the present juridico-political order. As
set out in the previous chapter, transitional justice and ICL bear the theoretical
and conceptual mark of the self-declared ‘winners’ of history of the 1990s,
liberal democracy and market economy. Those considered victims of violence
are only those recognisable as such by the juridico-political order of the
present. This conceptual mark, I have argued there, is most evident, first, in
the assumption that the liberal rule of law presents a non-violent answer to the
experience of arbitrary state violence, and second, in the ontological separation
of the realm of the political and the realm of the economic. Together, as we will
be seeing in the case studies, these presumptions produce boundaries between
those acts that are considered to constitute unbearable and unacceptable
violence and those declared to merely constitute wrong policies.
Thus, the philosophical, political and historiographical problem that Ben-
jamin is concerned with is the following: how to respond to the victims of
violence in history, to redeem their suffering, without siding at the same time
with those currently ruling? For Benjamin, as we have seen above, the fun-
damental difference between the victors and oppressed in history is that with
the defeat the oppressed have lost ‘any avenue of praxis’, leaving their political
project discontinued. By definition, a history is only a history of the oppressed
if it discontinuous.
This poses a problem for historiography for how to get hold of, how to
remember, the tradition of the oppressed if it has been discontinued? Benjamin
21Benjamin, ‘Paralipomena’, p. 406.
22Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 471 (N7a,5).
23See Thorsten Bohnacker. ‘Global Victimhood: On the Charisma of the Victim in Transitional
Justice Processes’. In: World Political Science Review 9.1 (2013), pp. 97–129.
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was very much aware of this problem. In the notes to the Theses he pins down
the central challenge as follow:
Fundamental aporia: ‘The history the oppressed is a discontinuum’ – ‘The
task of history is to get hold of the tradition of the oppressed’.24
Benjamin’s answer to this aporia, as already indicated in the first chapter, is
a philosophy of history, and a corresponding historiographical method, that
breaks with a linear notion of historical time, introducing in its stead a time
which he calls the time of the now or Jetztzeit. The time of the now is, for
Benjamin, the moment in which historiographical recognition takes place.
It marks a constellation between a moment in the past and the present in
which this particular moment is recognised. The relation between these two
moments, importantly, is not one of continuity but is instead characterised by
a tension. To get hold of the tradition of the oppressed means to get hold of
a moment of the past that exposes the violence of the present. I will turn to
Benjamin’s philosophy of history and how it relates to the promise of justice
attached to the representation of history in trials in more detail in a moment.
First, however, I wish to make another point. Benjamin’s philosophy of
history is often discussed merely as a critique of historicism and of the idea
of progress, ignoring Benjamin’s – at times rather bold – statements in which
he refers to himself as a historical materialist and describes his philosophical
perspective as ‘historical materialism’. And indeed, the task he sets the
historical materialist and his vision of historical materialism have little to do
with orthodox Marxist historical materialism. It is true that, with its emphasis
on discontinuity, Benjamin’s philosophy of history gives up on an universal
historical subject (such as ‘humanity’ or ‘the working class’). Still, I would
like to take seriously the link between his critique of progress, progressive
historical time and historicism and his concern with a particular group of
oppressed in history, namely those victims who suffer the violence inflicted
by capitalist societies. This concern is evident not only in the Arcades Project,
to which the Theses are strongly connected, but also evidences itself much
earlier, for example in the fragment Capitalism as Religion.25
In this fragment, Benjamin carries over his analysis of capitalism as religion
into a structural argument about historical time and justice. Benjamin’s
critique of capitalism is both a condemnation of the specific violence inflicted
by capitalism on human beings as well as a critique of the temporal logic of
capitalism.26 He describes the history of capitalism as a history that engenders
guilt as it repeats itself through progressive historical time. Benjamin’s analysis
24Walter Benjamin. ‘Manuskripte – Entwürfe und Fassungen’. In: Über den Begriff der
Geschichte. Ed. by Gérard Raulet. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010,
pp. 217–239, p. 123 (my translation).
25Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’.
26Werner Hamacher. ‘Guilt History: Benjamin’s Sketch Capitalism as Religion’. In: Diacritics
32.3/4 (2002), pp. 81–106.
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of capitalism as religion seems to lead him to an impasse. In the fragment we
do not find indicators as to how a philosophy of history that does not reproduce
this temporal logic could be conceived of.
It is at this point that I would like to take up an argument from Sami Khatib
and suggest that it is possible to read Benjamin’s philosophy of history, with its
emphasis on discontinuity and interruption of the course of history, as a heresy
to capitalism as religion.27 That is, while Benjamin develops his philosophy
of history out of concern for the struggling, oppressed class of capitalism’s
guilt history, the philosophical position that emerges from this critique cannot
assume an universal subjecthood of the oppressed, or guarantee the identity
of the oppressed of the past and the oppressed of the present.28 It is this
argument concerning the temporality of capitalism’s history, which brings
Benjamin to develop a historiographical method that does not merely urge us
to remember different lives, stories or experiences of violence, but to remember
them differently.
I mention this connection between Benjamin’s critique of the violence of
capitalism and his philosophy of history because it parallels the reasoning
of my own argument which I summarised in the first chapter: a critique
of criminal law that is concerned with the (in)ability of ICL to address the
economic dimensions of state crime, I argued, cannot limit itself to a study
of the representation of the past in trials, but needs to take into account the
temporalisation of history.29
Benjamin’s philosophy of history, as we will see in the rest of this chapter,
is a heresy which does not offer an alternative religion or a specific promise
of redemption.30 The promise of historical justice, for Benjamin, is linked
to the ability of the past to destabilise the present relationship of forces,
thereby opening the present anew for contestation. This emphasis on rupture
as a moment of justice is fundamentally different from ICL and transitional
justice, which, as we saw in Chapter Two, link the promise of memory to the
authorisation of liberal democracy. In the next two sections I will specify the
implications of this change in perspective for the two pillars of the latent theory
27Sami R. Khatib. “Teleologie ohne Endzweck”. Walter Benjamins Ent-stellung des Messianis-
chen. Marburg: Tectum, 2013, pp. 9-19.
28In this vein also Philippe Simay. ‘Tradition as Injunction: Benjamin and the Critique of
Historicism’. In: Walter Benjamin and History. Ed. by Andrew E. Benjamin. London and
New York: Continuum, 2005, pp. 137–155.
29With this emphasis on Benjamin’s concern with the violence of capitalism, I do not wish to
revive the heated debates about whether Benjamin should properly be considered a theolo-
gian or a historical materialist, see Tiedemann, ‘Historical Materialism’; Rather, I seek the
company of some recent engagements with Benjamin which overcome the divide between
an early, theological, and a later, materialist Benjamin, such as Mosès, Angel of History;
Khatib, “Teleologie ohne Endzweck”; Matthias Fritsch. The Promise of Memory. History
and Politics in Marx, Benjamin, and Derrida. Albany: State University Of New York Press,
2005; Detlev Schöttker. ‘Kapitalismus als Religion und seine Folgen. Benjamins Deutung
der kapitalistischen Moderne zwischen Weber, Nietzsche und Blanqui’. In: Theologie und
Politik. Ed. by Bernd Witte and Mauro Ponzi. Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 2005, pp. 70–81.
30Khatib, “Teleologie ohne Endzweck”, p. 14.
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of historical justice identified in that chapter, namely the claim that justice
could be found in the adequate representation of the past and that the rule of
law enacted through the trials constitutes a non-violent answer to the violence
of the past.
3.2 Historical Truth as Justice
In my discussion of the literature on ICL in the previous chapter, I showed that
ICL jurisprudence answered the turn to criminal law in search of historical
justice with a turn to history. That is, the literature invokes the so-called
historiographical or pedagogical function of trials in order to justify the criminal
prosecution of state crimes.31 In the absence of any legal justification that
could ground the validity of ICL, practitioners and scholars alike argue that
tribunals in response to state crime are an important means of truth-finding.
In these accounts, to establish the truth about past events is either presented
as a requirement of justice in itself, or it is thought of as a precondition
necessary to guarantee the non-repetition of the events. Here, the knowledge
(and memory) of the violent events is introduced as a necessary, and sometimes
even sufficient, condition to bring about a better future.
As I have indicated in the first section of this chapter, Benjamin’s philosophy
of history, too, establishes a duty to attend to the oppressed in history. How-
ever, the way in which he ties the task of historiography to claims for justice
and societal change is totally different from the latent philosophy of history
underlying ICL. In this section, I will be contrasting the link between historical
truth and justice as it is established in ICL, with Benjamin’s philosophy of
history.
In ICL, historical truth is usually defined in terms of adequacy. Conse-
quently, the discussion around the historiographical function of trials in the
literature often focuses on their ability to represent historical events ade-
quately. For Benjamin, on the contrary, the notion of historical truth is tied to
a temporal relationship. This form of historiographical recognition and repre-
sentation is opposed by Benjamin to the quest of historicism for an adequate
reconstruction of past events. The latter’s presentation of historical events,
according to Benjamin, leads to an authorisation of the present (which, as we
have seen above, is the present shaped by the victors of history). Benjamin’s,
instead, sets the historiographer the task to invoke the past in a way that
destabilises the present. Because these two forms to think historiographical
representation hinge on different notions of historical time, I will propose to
shift the discussion of the role of history in trials from one focusing on the
representation of the past in trials to one that takes into account history’s
temporalisation.
31See above, p. 51
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court-room quality truth
In Chapter Two I already indicated that ICL practice and jurisprudence resort
to truth finding as an important aspect of criminal trials in response to state
crimes. The repeated assertion that trials in response to state crime can
and should serve as a laboratory for the writing of history has not remained
uncontested. Both lawyers and historians have insisted on the selectivity that
comes with the writing of history in courtrooms. I do not wish to revisit the
entire debate here. Rather, the point I want to make is that those who defend
the historiographical function of trials, as well as those who contest it, coincide
in a notion of historical truth as adequacy. That is, law is found either to be
able to represent the past adequately, or to be unable to do so. In accordance
with this finding, trials are thereupon considered valuable, or not, for the
process of establishing historical truth.
The position that criminal trials should participate in the writing of history
can be exemplified by quoting Louise Arbour, former Chief Prosecutor of the
UN Ad Hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In a talk given in
2002, she suggested that it would be necessary to commit the criminal process
to the exposition of the larger picture, to painting the broad and complex
historical fresco, in an effort not only to expose and record individual guilt
but to exploit the dramatic stage of the trial to construct the collective
memories that may help cleanse both victims and perpetrators, indeed
whole nations, of the brutal past.32
She later asserted that to conduct criminal trials was important because
[c]riminal prosecution is considerably more threatening than history for
populations that have already constructed collective memories in which
court-room-quality truth does not constitute a major ingredient. History
leaves room for doubt . . . Justice, in contrast, imposes irreversible conclu-
sions.33
The opposing position, namely that trials in response to state crime do not
constitute an adequate environment for the elaboration of historical explana-
tions of the events in the context of which systematic human rights violations
take place is put forward by both lawyers and historians. In his memorandum
on the ‘Approach to the Preparation of the Prosecution Against Axis Crimi-
nality’, the US chief prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal, Telford
Taylor, wrote in 1945:
It is important that the trial not become an inquiry into the causes of the
war. It cannot be established that Hitlerism was the sole cause of the war,
and there should be no effort to do this. . . . The question of causation is
important and will be discussed for many years, but it has no place in this
32Arbour, War Crimes, p. 34.
33Arbour, War Crimes, p. 35.
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trial, which must rather stick rigorously to the doctrine that planning and
launching an aggressive war is illegal, whatever may be the factors that
caused the defendants to plan and to launch. Contributing causes may
be pleaded by the defendants before the bar of history, but not before the
tribunal.34
Taylor’s concern that the court should limit itself to a decision on the criminal
responsibility of the accused is also echoed by Hannah Arendt, in her report
on the Eichman trial. She warns:
The purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the
noblest of ulterior purposes – ‘the making of a record of the Hitler regime
which would withstand the test of history,’ as Robert G. Storey, executive
trial counsel at Nuremberg, formulated the supposedly higher aims of the
Nuremberg Trials – can only detract from the law’s main business: to
weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, and
to mete out due punishment.35
While both Taylor and Arendt express the fear that the attempt to write
history would corrupt the trial, most of the sceptics on the writing of history in
the court room fear for the quality of the history written in courts.36 In this
vein, Paul Ricoeur argues that
the fit that the judgment establishes between the presumed truth of the
narrative sequence and the imputability by reason of which the accused
is held accountable – this good fit in which explanation and interpretation
come together at the moment the verdict is pronounced – operates only
within the limits traced out by the prior selection of the protagonists and
of the acts alleged.37
Ricoeur here reminds us that the ‘question of fact’ is established in the light of
the question of law, and that therefore only those moments are reconstructed
that are needed to establish the personal responsibility of an individual. Simi-
larly, the Italian historian Carlos Ginzburg observes that the judicial model
leads to a particular kind of historiography, namely, one that focuses on events
34Telford Taylor. The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials. A Personal Memoir. New York: Knopf,
1992, pp. 51-52 (italics original).
35Arendt, Eichmann, p. 372.
36See e.g. Richard J. Evans. ‘History, Memory and the Law: The Historian as Expert Witness’.
In: History and Theory 41.3 (2002), pp. 326–345, at 345; Carlo Ginzburg. ‘Checking the
Evidence: the Judge and the Historian’. In: Critical Enquiry 18.1 (1991), pp. 79–91; con-
tributions in Norbert Frei, Dirk van Laak, and Michael Stolleis, eds. Geschichte vor Gericht.
Historiker, Richter und die Suche nach Gerechtigkeit. München: Beck, 2000; Michael Stolleis.
‘Der Historiker als Richter - der Richter als Historiker’. In: Geschichte vor Gericht. Historiker,
Richter und die Suche nach Gerechtigkeit. Ed. by Norbert Frei, Dirk van Laak, and Michael
Stolleis. München: Beck, 2000, pp. 173–187; Donald Bloxham. Genocide on Trial. The
War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001, at 185-222; Douglas, Memory of Judgment; Paul Ricoeur. History,
Memory, Forgetting. London, New York: The University of Chicago Press, 2004, at 322-333;
Henry Rousso. The Haunting Past. History, Memory, and Justice in Contemporary France.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.
37Ricoeur, History, p. 320.
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that could be easily ascribed to specific actions, performed by one or more in-
dividuals, and which disregards those phenomena that resist this explanatory
framework.38 For Ginzburg, the merit of the Annales d’histoire economique
et sociale was precisely that it moved away from a ‘moralistic historiography
inspired by a judicial model’ towards one which tries to understand historical
processes.39
What distinguishes the legal structuring of memory from rules that guide
academic investigations or the conceptual design of an exhibition in a museum
is the fact that it translates a conflict into a decidable legal problem. In doing
so, it necessarily restricts ‘ambiguities regarding what the past may require of
us, in the name of the rule of law’.40 Emilios Christodoulids calls this selective
access to the past ‘law’s immemorial’. He writes:
Law’s immemorial reminds us that law cannot inhabit all these points of
observation, but inflicts upon the past a specific mode of remembering
that has to do with its function and expectational structures.41
Histories written in courts are not only selective, they are selective conform-
ing to a particular pattern. With regards to criminal trials in response to state
crime, various authors have highlighted the bias that results from the focus of
modern (criminal) law on individual responsibility. In this context, it has been
argued that histories written in state crime trials conceal the economic dimen-
sions of systematic violence because they are blind to structural violence not
attributable to individuals.42 Tor Krever, for example, concludes his analysis
of the jurisprudence produced by the ICTY by stating that
[s]ystemic forces – neoliberalism, imperialism, geopolitical rivalry, or even
simply capitalism – are thus lost from sight in the international criminal
trial.43
I do not want to challenge the claim that law and historiographical research
ask different questions about the past, and hence produce different accounts
38Ginzburg, ‘Checking the Evidence’, p. 82.
39Ginzburg, ‘Checking the Evidence’, p. 82.
40Emilios Christodoulidis. ‘Law’s Immemorial’. In: Lethe’s Law. Ed. by Emilios Christodoulidis
and Scott Veitch. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 207–227, p. 219.
41Christodoulidis, ‘Law’s Immemorial’, p. 223; similarly: Niklas Luhmann. Das Recht der
Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993, p. 118.
42Martti Koskenniemi. ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’. In: Max Planck Yearbook of
United Nations Law 6 (2002), pp. 1–35, in particular pp. 14-22; Simpson, War Crimes, in
particular chapter 3; See also contributions in Kevin Jon Heller and Gerry J. Simpson,
eds. The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013;
Tor Krever. ‘International Criminal Law: An Ideology Critique’. In: Leiden Journal of Inter-
national Law 26.03 (2013), pp. 701–723, p. 706; Baars, ‘Law(yers) Congealing Capitalism:
On the (Im)possibility of Restraining Business in Conflict through International Criminal
Law’, pp. 230-281; Raymond J. Michalowski. ‘In Search of ‘State’ and ‘Crime’ in State
Crime Studies’. In: State Crime in the Global Age. Ed. by William J. Chambliss, Raymond
J. Michalowski, and Ronald C. Kramer. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2010, pp. 13–30;
David Hoogenboom. ‘Theorizing “Transitional Justice”’. PhD thesis. Ontario: The Univer-
sity of Western Ontario, 2014.
43Krever, ‘Unveiling (and Veiling) Politics’, p. 131.
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of, for example, the economic dimensions of state-backed violence. In fact, a
substantial part of my chapters on trials addressing the economic dimensions
of state crime in post-World War II Germany and contemporary Argentina is
dedicated to pointing out the subtle ways in which legal understandings of
the state, its relation to the economy, as well as concepts of legal responsibly,
frame that which the trials can identify as the economic dimensions of state
crime. We thus will return to the question of selectivity at work in ICL.
What I do want to challenge is the way in which the attested (in)ability to
represent the past is linked to the promise of justice attributed to these trials.
Both positions define historical truth in terms of adequacy. Any critique of
ICL that merely focuses on its selective approach to the past, operates within
the same understanding of historical truth as the one that permeates ICL
jurisprudence.
Those affirming the court’s capacity to offer historical knowledge emphasise
the high standard of proof, thorough scrutiny of evidence as well as the
production of testimonies and documents, which add up to produce what
Arbour, in the quote above, labeled ‘court room quality’. Those challenging
this claim, in turn, argue that this ‘legal truth’ is not able to reflect the ‘actual’
complexity of history, thereby presupposing a privileged access to the past by
historians or social researchers which cannot be gained by the legal system. In
both cases, the writing of history is understood as the adequate representation
of the past.
With Benjamin, I would like to propose a different way of conceiving the task
of historiography, and the way it can be linked to the moral duty to attend to the
those who became victims of state-backed violence. Rather than understanding
historical truth in terms of an objective, ‘truthful’ representation of history, the
‘true’ image of the past, that is, for Benjamin, the image that seeks to rescue
the discontinuous history of the oppressed, captures a particular temporal
constellation between the past and the present.
smashing the kaleidoskope
In the Theses, Benjamin takes issue with historicism for pretending to offer an
image of the ‘past as it really was’, when in fact its gaze at the past is mediated
through those concepts and ideas which are proper to the present.44 This
present, any present, is a present that – as we saw in the first section of this
chapter – Benjamin understands as having been shaped by those who won
the struggles in the past. In a text titled Central Park Benjamin invokes the
image of the kaleidoscope – a trace from his engagement with the French writer
Charles Baudelaire – to describe the ordering function of these concepts.45 He
writes:
44Benjamin, ‘Theses’, p. 255.
45Walter Benjamin. ‘Central Park’. In: New German Critique 34 (1985), pp. 32–58, p. 34.
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The course of history as represented in the concept of catastrophe has no
more claim on the attention of the thinking than the kaleidoscope in the
hand of a child which, with each turn, collapses everything ordered into
new order. The justness of this image is well-founded. The concept of the
rulers have always been the mirror by means of which the image of an
‘order’ was established. – This kaleidoscope must be smashed.46
Bringing the image of the kaleidoscope to bear on the critique of the writing
of history in trials, one could say that legal concepts operate as mirrors within
the kaleidoscope, ordering the image of the past according to the ontological
and normative categories of the present. Importantly, though, all writing of
history, not only that which takes place in courts, is bound by the concepts of
the present. Each change in the present constellation of power coincides with
a shifting of the kaleidoscope, and thus produces a new perspective on past
events. We only get to see that which is reflected by the mirrors.
Benjamin’s image of the kaleidoscope draws attention to the situatedness
of our engagement with the past. It dialogues with Benjamin’s image of
‘historicism’s bordello’, to be found in Theses, in which the whore called “Once
upon a time”’ offers her services. Both images criticise the belief that every
moment in history is always recognisable and accessible.47 Similarly, Benjamin
demands in the Arcades Project a ‘[r]esolute refusal of the concept of “timeless
truth”’.48
Benjamin’s critique of historicism is certainly a critique of positivism. But,
as Philippe Simay rightly points out, it is more than that.49 It is a critique of
the ethical and political relationship historicism establishes between the past
and the present. Historicism, with its belief in the possibility of an adequate
presentation of the past, is problematic because it produces empathy with the
current rulers – and consequently leads to the authorisation of the present
relationship of forces. Historicist approaches combine a claim to objectivity
with the ‘causal nexus among various moments in history’50 and thereby
create a ‘narrative of continuity’ the effect of which, as Simay points out, is
twofold. Not only does it assimilate each instant into a continuum, so that
every moment of the past is considered bygone, but it also establishes the
present as the inevitable consequence of the past.51 ‘[T]he idea of progress
based on a linear and continuous vision of historical time’ Stéphane Mosès
46Benjamin, ‘Central Park’, p. 34 (translation amended).
47Benjamin, ‘Theses’, p. 264 (XVI).
48Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 453 (N3,2); On Benjamin’s casting of truth as the ultimate
fetish in the ‘Arcades Project’ see Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, p. 211; and James R.
Martel. Divine Violence. Walter Benjamin and the Eschatology of Sovereignty. Abingdon:
Routledge, 2012, p. 11.
49Simay, ‘Tradition as Injuction’, p. 137.
50Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 396 (Thesis XVII).
51Simay, ‘Tradition as Injuction’, p. 141.
Historical Truth as Justice 85
summarises Benjamin’s point, correlates ‘with a political attitude of resignation
to the present’.52
To counter these effects of a historicist philosophy of history Benjamin seeks
to develop a form of historical thinking and writing in which historical knowl-
edge expresses, as Mosès puts it, ‘a bond that is not a causal relationship’.53
Such a philosophy of history needs to rescue the history of the oppressed,
but this cannot be done using the same historiographical method, with other
words, by merely turning the kaleidoscope. Again, the task, according to Ben-
jamin, is not merely to write a different history, but to think history differently.
Hence: ‘The kaleidoscope must be smashed’. To the image of the past created
by the kaleidoscope, Benjamin responds with the ‘dialectical image’, a notion
which condenses his theory of historical recognition and historiography at
once.
the dialectical image
We have already encountered the notion of the dialectical image in Chapter
One. There, I offered a reading of the collage ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’,
emphasising the way that this form of visual representation generates meaning.
I introduced the technique of montage or collage as a form of visual repre-
sentation that, through juxtaposition, seeks to interrupt the totality of any
representation of ‘reality’. Similarly, Benjamin’s notion of the dialectical image
envisions a historiographical method that challenges totalising representations
of past as they are typically rehearsed by historicist approaches.54
I now wish to return to the concept of the dialectical image and expand
on this point by contextualising it within Benjamin’s philosophy of history.
In Benjamin’s notion of the dialectical image, true historical knowledge is
defined not in terms of adequate representation of the past, but in terms of a
temporal relation between past and present: ‘To articulate the past historically’,
Benjamin writes, ‘does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was” (Ranke).
It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger’.55
The figure of the ‘dialectical image’ can be said to compress Benjamin’s
philosophy of history.56 It is produced by a constellation of different moments
52Mosès, Angel of History, p. 66.
53Mosès, Angel of History, p. 84 (italics in the original).
54Cf. discussion of the principle of montage above, p. 21
55Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 255 (Thesis VI). I will expand on some other aspects
of the dialectical image – such as its specific ‘dialectics’ – at the beginning of the next
chapter.
56The notion of the ‘dialectical image’, despite its centrality to Benjamin’s thinking, is not fully
developed in his writings, and poses several methodological challenges for those who wish
to work with it, see Rolf Tiedemann. ‘Dialectics at a Standstill’. In: The Arcades Project.
Ed. by Rolf Tiedemann. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1999, pp. 929–945,
p. 942; On the ‘dialectical image’ in Benjamin see further Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing,
pp. 219-220; Max Pensky. Melancholy Dialectics. Walter Benjamin and the Play of Mourning.
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993, p. 212.
Historical Truth as Justice 86
in time, by a tension between ‘what-has-been’ and the ‘now’.57 According to
Benjamin, it is the task of the historical materialist to grasp ‘the constellation
which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one’.58 He writes:
Where thinking comes to a standstill in a constellation saturated with
tensions — there the dialectical image appears. It is the caesura in the
movement of thought. Its position is naturally not an arbitrary one. It is
to be found, in a word, where the tension between dialectical opposites is
greatest.59
History does not exist outside its recognisability, but ‘can be seized only as
an image that flashes up’.60 It is a moment of recognisability which can also
be missed. In the second thesis on the philosophy of history Benjamin writes:
The past carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to re-
demption. There is a secret agreement between past generations and the
present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation
that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a
power to which the past has a claim.61
Benjamin conceives of the ‘weak messianic power’ in terms of Eingedenken,
a particular form of remembrance which combines historical cognition and
political action. As Werner Hamacher observes,
this messianic power is the intentional correlate of the claim that calls
upon us from the missed possibilities of the past, not to miss them a
second time but to perceive them in every sense: cognizingly [sic!] to seize
and to actualize them’.62
As already alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, the practice of Ein-
gendenken or remembrance is distinct from memory and traditional histori-
ography. It does not demand a representation of past suffering, but rather
the actualisation of past struggles.63 That not every act of remembering the
suffering of the past can be considered an act of Eingedenken is evident in
57Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 462 (N2a,3).
58Benjamin, ‘Theses’, 265 (Thesis XVIII A); Cf. translation in Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of
History’, 397: ‘He grasps the constellation into which his own era has entered, along with
a very specific earlier one.’
59Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 475 (N10a,3).
60Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 390 (Thesis II).
61This translation is based on Hannah Arendt’s typescript of the theses, see translation in
Benjamin, ‘Theses’, p. 254, italics in the original. Benjamin later amended thesis two
slightly, see Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 390. In total, six versions of the
theses have been recovered, five of which are written German and one in French. These
typescripts and manuscripts together with changes and amendments are documented in
Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte.
62Werner Hamacher. ‘’Now’: Walter Benjamin on Historical Time’. In: Walter Benjamin and
History. Ed. by Andrew E. Benjamin. London and New York: Continuum, 2005, pp. 38–
68, p. 41; In a similar vein, Buck-Morss describes political action as link between the two
registers of time (empirical history and messianic time) in Benjamins work, Buck-Morss,
Dialectics of Seeing, p. 242.
63Cf. Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 460 (N 2, 2).
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Benjamin’s attack on Erich Kästner, who he accuses of ‘left melancholy’, that
is, of the objectification of the misery produced by capitalist society which
transforms political struggle so that it ceases to be a compelling motive for
decision and becomes an object of comfortable contemplation; it ceases to
be a means of production and becomes an article of consumption.64
As Mosès remarks, Benjamin’s notion of remembrance warns against the
apologetic temptation in the name of which the victims of history risk
freezing their own past into a ‘heritage’ destined not to be reactualised in
the struggles of the present but to become a simple object of commemora-
tion.65
When, for Benjamin, the ‘lost’ struggles of the past are lost in that they
are ‘completed’66, remembrance is the structural possibility which can ‘make
something incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the complete
(suffering) into something incomplete’.67 The ‘right of entry which the historical
moment enjoys vis-à-vis a quite distinct chamber of the past’, Benjamin notes,
‘coincides in a strict sense with political action’.68
Importantly, as I have argued in Chapter One, dialectical images are charac-
terised by an epistemological instability. They enable political action not by
offering stable grounds, but by questioning the present and exposing its lack
of foundation. It is in this vein that Susan Buck-Morss observes that these
images are ‘less pre-visions of postrevolutionary society than the necessary
pro-visions for radical social practice’.69 As a form of remembrance, they do
not project any lessons learned into the future. Instead, they shed light on the
continuing violence and thereby destabilise the present such that an avenue
of praxis is opened anew.
Let me bring this brief account of the notion of the dialectical image back
to the problem of historiography in trials before moving on to the second
dimension of ICL’s latent philosophy of history, namely that trials in response
to state crime contribute towards historical justice by fostering liberalising
change. What historicism and the literature on trials in response to state
crimes have in common, I suggested, is that they tie the promise of justice of
war crime trials to the adequate representation of history. From a Benjaminian
perspective, such a ‘court-room-quality truth’ and ‘irreversible conclusions’
64Walter Benjamin. ‘The Author as Producer’. In: Understanding Brecht. London: Verso,
1998, pp. 85–103, pp. 96–97; See also Walter Benjamin. ‘Left-Wing Melancholy. (On Erich
Kastner’s New Book of Poems)’. In: Screen 15.2 (1974), pp. 28–32, p. 29; and the discussion
of the politics of melancholy in Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics, pp. 6-12.
65Mosès, Angel of History, p. 110.
66See letter to Horkheimer above, p. 75
67Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 471 (N8,1).
68Benjamin, ‘Paralipomena’, p. 402; in a similar vein, Derrida conceives of a time that is ‘out-
of-joint’ as the condition needed in order to recognise a lack of justice. Derrida, Specters of
Marx.
69Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, p. 117.
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imposed by legal decisions would have to be qualified precisely as the ‘narcotics’
which put societies into a state of overpowering ‘conformism’.70 If this present
is a present shaped by the winners of history and indebted to the violence
of the past, a representation of past violence that wishes to side with the
oppressed and redeem their suffering would have to interrupt or destabilise
the present.
In a situation where the ‘historiographical function’ of trials is emerging as
a central justifying argument for criminal trials in response to state crime, I
wish to make two interventions by turning to Benjamin’s philosophy of history.
First, I want to draw attention to the fact that any past reconstructed in the
trials, even when investigating crimes of the powerful, is reconstructed through
the kaleidoscope representing the present relationships of power. The legal
concepts through which the court constructs both the historical events under
investigation, as well as the concepts of legal responsibility of the defendants,
constitute the mirrors of the legal kaleidoscope and set bounds to that which
is identified as violence as well as who is recognised as legally responsible for
state-backed violence.
The second intervention I want to make concerns the conclusions that we
draw from the observation that histories written through the ‘kaleidoscope’ of
ICL are selective. If we accept Benjamin’s critique, this observation cannot lead
to a demand to offer a more ‘complete’ representation of the ‘true nature’ of
the violence. Such a representation would only lead again to the authorisation
of a particular juridico-political order.
While we cannot solve the problem of a selective representation of the past
in trials with a call for a more adequate representation, this does not imply
that trials have to be given up as a site in which claims for historical justice
can be addressed. This is because, with Benjamin, we have to consider the
possibility that the images of past events unearthed by the trial enter into a
constellation with the present, and, if grasped, expose the selectivity at work
in the trials as well as the violence that characterises both past and present.
To locate the promise of justice, or the emancipatory potential of trials, in a
moment of rupture that exposes the limits of or the violence inherent to the law
is, perhaps, already a tradition within those contributions to legal scholarship
that want to respond to law’s intimate relationship with violence without giving
up on its emancipatory potential alltogether. It is probably one of the central
differences between liberal theories of law and critical legal studies that the
former present the law as the opposite to violence, while the latter foreground
the way in which law is indebted to violence itself. So far, I have merely alluded
to the link between law and violence and it is the purpose of the following
70See the statement from former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda Arbour, War Crimes.
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section to substantiate this claim by turning to Benjamin’s critique of law as
developed in his essay On the Critique of Violence.71
Benjamin’s essay has been central to the thinking about the relationship
between law and violence in contemporary critical legal studies, especially
since Jacques Derrida’s famous reading of the essay in Force of Law. The
‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’, the first part of which was presented on the
occasion of a colloquium held at the Cardozo Law School in October 1989.72
Here, I wish to bring to bear Benjamin’s text on the latent theory of historical
justice on which ICL bases its legitimacy, and specifically on the second aspect
that I identified in the previous chapter. In the context of transitional justice, I
argued there, the liberal rule of law has been posited as the aim of transition.
Law figures prominently as both the aim of transition, as well as a means
of this transition, and in both instances is cast as non-violent answer to the
state-backed violence of the predecessor regime.
Against the backdrop of Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, I will be arguing in
the next section, the rule of law and trials would need to be thought of not
as the end to an history of violence, but as part of a history characterised by
a mythical cycle of law-positing and law-maintaining violence. Similarly to
Benjamin’s critique of the historical temporality of capitalism exposed above,
such a position implies that justice can only be found in an intervention that
does not reproduce this cycle, but that interrupts it.
3.3 Historical Justice and the Law
To link trials in response to state violence to the debate about the relationship
between law and violence introduces a counter-argument to the predominant
position in the literature on ICL and transitional justice, which rehearses
modern law’s own claim to break with the violent cycle of vengeance. One of
the first examples of this reasoning famously comes from Robert H. Jackson,
in the opening address at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg:
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay
the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has
ever paid to Reason.73
Transitional justice literature, as we saw in the previous chapter, questioned
at first the suitability of trials to the fostering of peace in situations where
transitions had been negotiated. By now, though, the conviction that criminal
trials can control non-rational impulses and thereby prevent individual revenge
is much repeated in contemporary ICL jurisprudence. To provide but one
example:
71Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’.
72Derrida, ‘Force of Law’.
73Jackson, ‘Opening Statement’, p. 99.
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Criminal law aims at rendering acts of retaliation superfluous by estab-
lishing a catalogue of wrongs and expressing the injustice and the un-
acceptability of deviate behaviour in publicly pronounced judgement and
the infliction of punishment . . . Channeling the feeling of vengeance in a
public procedure and substituting retaliation with the imposition of a sen-
tence serves to establish the rule of law and to prevent individuals to take
the law into their own hands.74
Trials that respond to state-sponsored violence with law are not only con-
ceived as the rational alternative to individual revenge, but are furthermore
considered to constitute symbols of the superiority of the successor state,
which responds to the rule of violence with the rule of law.
In so far as they posit the liberal rule of law as non-violent societal order to
follow the violent past, and criminal trials as both a manifestation of and a
means to foster this particular juridico-political order, these accounts rehearse
modern law’s very own self-legitimation of its monopoly on violence. ‘A legal
judgment’, as Christoph Menke summarises the central claim of theories
of the rule of law, ‘is not an equal deed but the deed of equality’: qua the
general rule, the person who is judged by law judges himself, because the law
allegedly emanates from the legal subjects who are said to have agreed upon
it.75 Similarly, Martti Koskenniemi identifies the claim ‘that social order should
be based on the subjective consent of individuals’ as the ‘most fundamental
claim’ of the liberal tradition.76 This fundamental claim, he notes, comes with
a fundamental tension, namely, the need to determine under which conditions
the social order thus created could enforce decisions against the free will of the
individual. Liberal theory resolved this tension by arguing that ‘[a] legitimate
community was one which could be referred back to uncoerced individual
choice’.77 It follows from this liberal argument that law enforcement by the
state is thought of as self-imposed, consented-to violence, and consequently
no violence after all.
law as mythical violence
Benjamin’s essay On the Critique of Violence, published in 1921, famously
contests this claim made by liberal theories of the rule of law. Inspired by his
reading of George Sorel’s Reflections on Violence, Benjamin sets out to analyse
74Christoph Johannes Maria Safferling. International Criminal Procedure. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012, p. 65; The conviction, that international criminal law eliminates the vi-
olence of vengeance from the realm of international law can also be found in Gary Jonathan
Bass. Stay the Hand of Vengeance. The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.
75Christoph Menke. ‘Law and Violence’. In: Law and Literature 22.1 (2010), pp. 1–17, p. 4,8;
For a more detailed discussion of this question see Christoph Menke. Recht und Gewalt.
Berlin: August Verlag, 2012.
76Martti Koskenniemi. From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 74.
77Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, p. 475.
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the relationship between law, violence and justice.78 According to Benjamin,
as we will see in more detail below, the institution and implementation of law
sets in motion a cycle of mythical violence. This violence is mythical because
it is doomed to reproduce itself, in an eternal cycle of what Benjamin calls
law-positing and law-maintaining violence.
Benjamin starts his essay by arguing that for a critique of violence we cannot
just adopt the distinction between sanctioned and unsanctioned manifesta-
tions of violence made by positive law.79 Instead, in order to learn about
violence, it is necessary to ask what it is that makes the distinction between
legitimate and non-legitimate forms of violence possible in the first place:
The question that concerns us is, what light is thrown on the nature of
violence by the fact that such a criterion or distinction can be applied to
it at all, or, in other words, what is the meaning of this distinction?80
To answer this question, Benjamin proposes a ‘historico-philosophical view
of law’, which leads him to identify a cycle of law-making or law-positing
violence on the one hand and law-preserving or law-maintaining violence
on the other. It is a cycle in which modern law, for Benjamin, is inevitably
caught. I will briefly expand on the nature of the law-making violence before
summarising what Benjamin identifies as law-maintaining violence.
According to Benjamin,
The function of violence in lawmaking is twofold in the sense that law-
making pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be
established as law, but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss
violence; rather, at this very moment of lawmaking, it specifically estab-
lishes as law not an end unalloyed by violence, but one necessarily and
intimately bound to it, under the title of power. Lawmaking is power mak-
ing, and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence.81
The first function of violence in the making of law is the violence as means
with which a legal order is brought about or established, such as war or
revolution. The second function of violence comes in ‘under the title of power’
insofar as the instituting violence of the foundational act is not backed by any
law itself. Here, the function of violence is to impose ‘what is to be established
as law’.82 ‘Lawmaking is power making’ because it establishes the line between
those acts and interactions that will be considered to be violent according to
the new order and those that will, conversely, be rendered permissive. This act
is violent in that it imposes an order which is not legitimised, which cannot be
legitimised, with reference to any other rule or order.
78Georges Sorel. Reflections on Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
79Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 279.
80Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 279.
81Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 295.
82Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 295 (my italics).
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This foundational violence inherent to any legal order has prominently been
described by Jacques Derrida. In ‘The Force of Law’ he writes:
the operation that consists of founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit),
making law, would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and there-
fore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that
no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment could
guarantee or contradict or invalidate.83
Each instance of law-making violence, for Benjamin, is inevitably followed
by a second form of violence, which he identifies as law-preserving violence. It
is the reflex of every legal order to guard itself against instances of law-positing
violence which would challenge the values set as law by that order. Benjamin
names criminal law, and in particular the death-penalty, as one example of
law-preserving violence, along with the police.84 The purpose of a sentence
‘is not to punish the infringement of law but to establish new law’; in the
judgement, ‘law reaffirms itself’.85 Again for the case of the police, Benjamin
identifies a ‘spectral mixture’ of these two forms of violence.86 While merely
pretending to enforce and thus to preserve the law, there is always a moment
at which the police itself decides whether its use of violence is justified in the
interest of the preservation of the legal order, thus also positing law.
The law-preserving violence, then, is not merely to be found in the means
with which law is enforced, but also in the fact that it makes the preservation
of its authority its very purpose.87 It is in the coincidence of law-positing
and law-making violence that ‘something rotten in law is revealed’, namely
its reliance on a violence which cannot be accounted for by itself.88 Insofar
as it evidences this lack of foundation of the legal order which it seeks to
preserve, every law-preserving violence eventually destabilises the law-positing
violence. This is why, for Benjamin, every law-positing violence is doomed
to set in motion its own decay. This movement is described by Benjamin
as Schwankungsgesetz or ‘law governing [the] oscillation’ of law-making and
law-preserving violence. It rests
on the circumstance that all law-preserving violence, in its duration, in-
directly weakens the lawmaking violence represented by it, through the
suppression of hostile counter-violence. . . . This lasts until either new
83Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 241 (italics in original); This ‘coup de force’ is also excellently
analysed by Derrida in his reading of the ‘Declaration of Independence of the United States
of America’, in which he points us to the constative and performative function of the signa-
tures. Derrida, ‘Declarations of Independence’; See further discussion in Peter Fitzpatrick.
Modernism and the Grounds of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 80-
81.
84Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, pp. 285-287.
85Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 286.
86Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 286.
87In this vein see also Menke, ‘Law and Violence’, pp. 10-12.
88Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 286.
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forces or those earlier suppressed triumph over the hitherto lawmaking
violence and thus found a new law, destined in its turn to decay.89
It is against this backdrop that Benjamin’s claim that ‘[t]he critique of violence
is the philosophy of its history’ is to be understood.90 For him, the history of
historical and political change is marked by a ‘dialectical rising and falling in
the lawmaking and law-preserving formations of violence’.91
The characterisation of law’s history as a cycle of mythical violence in the
Critique of Violence poses the question of whether this cycle can somehow be
interrupted. As Bettine Menke indicates, Benjamin exposes the cycle of law-
making and law-sustaining violence that marks the fate of mythical violence
in the law with the very aim of identifying the conditions for its rupture or
cessation.92
On the breaking of this cycle maintained by mythical forms of law, on the
suspension [Entsetzung] of law with all the forces on which it depends as
they depend on it, finally therefore on the abolition of state power, a new
historical epoch is founded.93
I will re-turn to this ‘suspension of law’ envisioned by Benjamin further
below. For now, I wish to point out the implications of the discussion thus far
for a critique of ICL as a concept of historical justice.
If we understand history, with Benjamin, as a cycle of law-positing and
law-preserving violence, then criminal trials in response to state crime cannot
any longer be thought of as the non-violent answer to individual longings for
revenge, an answer that breaks with the cycle of violence by instituting the
rule of law. Rather, we would need to think of this newly instituted rule of law,
as well as of the trials, as part of this cycle of law-positing and law-preserving
violence. As I will be arguing in the last section of this chapter, from such a
perspective trials need to be understood as law-preserving violence insofar as
they participate in clouding the law-positing violence of the liberal rule of law
through the construction of the past as a negative reference.
Before developing this argument in more detail, I wish to anticipate and
respond to two objections that could be raised in response to such a position.
First, it could be demurred that a perspective that looks at history as a cycle of
violence risks putting the violence inflicted and rendered invisible by the rule
of law on the same level with the violence inflicted by authoritarian regimes.
Indeed, both the Critique and Theses have earned Benjamin criticisms that he
discarded any possibility of taking into account the differences in historical
forms of (legal) violence.
89Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 300.
90Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 299.
91Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 300.
92Bettine Menke. ‘Benjamin vor dem Gesetz: Die Kritik der Gewalt in der Lektüre Derridas’.
In: Gewalt und Gerechtigkeit. Ed. by Anselm Haverkamp. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1994, pp. 217–275, p. 219.
93Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 300.
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Michael Löwy, for example, sees the ‘great failing’ of Benjamin’s critique
of progress put forward in the Theses in the fact ‘that it does not bring out
the novelty of Fascism, particularly in its Hitlerian variant, in relation to the
old forms of domination’. He immediately excuses Benjamin for he had not
witnessed the ‘perfection’ of the destruction of human life by the Nazis.94 This
qualification, however, does not solve the general question of how to distinguish
between different forms of violence if history is reduced to a single ‘catastrophe’
that is understood to be governed by a law of oscillation between law-positing
and law-maintaining violence. In a similar vein, Bettine Menke concludes, in
her comment on the Critique, that ‘the verdict according to which no law could
possibly enable or realise justice, gives up very necessary distinctions’.95
The second criticism to which a Benjaminian perspective on trials would
have to respond is also raised by Bettine Menke. For her, the problem of
Benjamin’s critique is the ‘rigorousness of the gesture of rejection’ of any
law.96 The ‘challenge’ or indeed that which is ‘not tolerable’ in Benjamin’s
text is, she suggests, the possible consequences that follow ‘for the role of
law and its institutions in dealing with the perpetrators responsible for the
“final solution”’.97 ‘With Benjamin’, she continues, ‘there cannot be any moral
justification for the legal response, the judgment’.98 If, according to Benjamin,
law is always already violent and hence never the place of justice, what role can
trials play at all in addressing past violence of authoritarian regimes without
thereby instituting new violence?
I will respond to both criticisms in the remainder of this section. In doing so, I
argue, firstly, that Benjamin offers a critical and analytical perspective on trials
that precisely allows us to perceive both differences and continuities in the
experience of state violence in the past and in the present; and that, secondly,
the ‘rigorousness of the gesture of rejection’ of law does not necessarily mean,
that, with Benjamin, we have to discard the possibility that these trials have
anything to offer for the victims of state-backed violence. While I think that
with Benjamin the promise of justice cannot lie with the application of law or
the enforcement of the judgement, I will suggest that history enters these trials
as a source of justice. Invoking Benjamin’s philosophy of history exposed in
the last section, I will be suggesting that we can speak of a suspension of law
where the past is invoked as dialectical image, exposing the violence of the
past as well as the ‘rotten’ foundations of the present order.99
94Löwy, Fire Alarm, p. 58.
95Menke, ‘Benjamin vor dem Gesetz’, p. 258 (my translation).
96Menke, ‘Benjamin vor dem Gesetz’, p. 258.
97Menke, ‘Benjamin vor dem Gesetz’, p. 257.
98Menke, ‘Benjamin vor dem Gesetz’, p. 257 (my translation, italics in original).
99Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 286.
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exception and rule
Let me start by turning to the first potential criticism mentioned above, accord-
ing to which, with Benjamin, we would be unable to identify the particularities
of the violence of Nazi Germany or, in the context of this thesis, the Argentine
‘Process of National Reorganisation’, because he conceives of history as a
single catastrophe that is driven by the oscillation between law-positing and
law-maintaining violence and is indebted to the specific violence of capitalism.
It is important to address this criticism because a recurrent theme in the three
following chapters dedicated to the study of trials will be that, put crudely, the
trials in response to state crime invoke the violence inflicted by the predecessor
regime in a way that clouds both the foundational violence of liberal democra-
cies and the specific structural violence not recognised as such by the liberal
rule of law. I will be highlighting the implications of the liberal kaleidoscope
for the way that trials write the economic out of their definitions of how force
is applied in the name of the state, relegate excesseses of state violence to the
past and render permissive the ‘silent compulsion’ of the economic sphere here
and now.
Benjamin’s essay on the Critique of Violence has been central to critical legal
scholarship interested in the link between law and violence. In this context,
Derrida’s famous reading of the Critique in The Force of Law, already mentioned
above, has been highly influential. Derrida emphasises the unavoidable
violence in law, such as its foundational violence or the interpretative violence
inherent to any judgment.100 In line with such a reading of Benjamin’s text,
the engagement with the trials will point us to the foundational violence of
the liberal rule of law that consists in the unwarranted decisions about the
organisation of society. In the case of the liberal rule of law, this is in particular
the sanctioning of the use of force by the state, as well as the separation of
the political and the economic as organising distinction. This organising
distinction, as we have seen in the previous chapter has several implications,
such as the fact that democracy is reduced to the realm of the political.
However, unlike Derrida, I do not read Benjamin’s critique of law as merely
concerned with the foundational violence proper to any legal order. If situated
in the company of Capitalism as Religion and the Theses, Benjamin’s critique
of law can be read specifically as a critique of the law of the capitalist state.101
In the bibliographical notes under the fragment Capitalism as Religion, writ-
ten around the same time as the Critique, Benjamin also references Sorel’s
Reflections on Violence. In a note that is not further elaborated he mentions
the link between ‘Capitalism and law [Recht]’.102 The page number given by
100Jacques Derrida. ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’. In: Cardozo Law
Review 11 (1990), pp. 920–1045.
101For a critique of Derrida’s neglect of Benjamin’s critique of the ‘legal codification of the
capitalist mode of production’ see Fritsch, Promise of Memory, pp. 148–149.
102Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’, p. 290.
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Benjamin refers to Sorel’s analysis of the role of state violence in the institution
of capitalism, as well as the importance of the state’s monopoly of violence for
the functioning of capitalist accumulation.103
The claim that Benjamin was not only concerned with the violence of the
founding act of every politico-legal order but also with the specific violence
of the capitalist rule of law could also be substantiated with reference to the
eighth of Benjamin’s Theses. There, Benjamin writes that ‘[t]he tradition of
the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not
the exception but the rule.’104 The “state of emergency’ in which we live’ is a
clear reference to the emergency laws enacted by the Nazis with the so-called
Ermächtigungsgesetzt (‘Enabling Act’) in 1933.105
The remark that this exception is ‘the rule’, though, should not be read as
mere reference to the fact that at the time of writing, in 1939, the emergency
laws were still in force. If a perspective that focuses on the ‘[t]he tradition
of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live
is not the exception but the rule’, this means that the state violence and its
arbitrariness, which became evident under the Nazi rule, are experienced by
some in everyday life, even with the constitution in place.
Such a reading, again, can be supported with reference to a line from the
Critique, in which Benjamin refers to the formal equality of law ‘as mythical
ambiguity of laws’. He then paraphrases Anatole France’s famous statement
that ‘[p]oor and rich are equally forbidden to spend the night under the
bridges’.106 A similar connection between both texts is also made by Herbert
Marcuse, who writes in an epilogue to a collection of Benjamin’s essays which
features the Theses and the Critique:
The violence that is criticised by Benjamin is the violence of the status
quo, which, in the status quo, preserves the monopoly of legality, truth,
the law and within which the violent nature of the law has disappeared, in
order to come to light deathly in the so-called ‘states of exception’ (which,
in fact, are none).107
Against the backdrop of the Theses and the Critique we are urged to re-
assess the promise of justice upheld by the liberal rule of law. At present, such
an explicit critique of the violence inherent to the pair of liberal democracy and
market economy, a violence that cannot be perceived by political liberalism
itself, is often contested with the argument that this violence does not compare
103On Sorel’s text as link between ‘Capitalism as Religion’ and the ‘Critique’ see Uwe Steiner.
‘Die Grenzen des Kapitalismus. Kapitalismus, Religion und Politik in Benjamin’s Fragement
›Kapitalismus als Religion‹’. In: Kapitalismus als Religion. Ed. by Dirk Baecker. Berlin:
Kadmos, 2003, pp. 35–59, pp. 48-53.
104Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 392 (Thesis VIII).
105Wolfgang Michalka, ed. Das Dritte Reich. Dokumente zur Innen- u. Außenpolitik. München:
Dtv-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1985, p. 35.
106Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 296.
107Herbert Marcuse. ‘Nachwort’. In: Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsätze. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1978, pp. 99–107, p. 100 (my translation).
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to systematically inflicted physical violence under authoritarian rule. And
indeed, the forms of violence differ substantially. However, any perspective
that simply adopts the fundamental distinction between sanctioned and non-
sanctioned violence underlying the rule of law gives up on any criterion that
could help us to identify the very ways in which they differ. It cannot but adopt
the definition of violence provided by the law itself. While Benjamin challenges
the clear-cut distinction that opposes the arbitrary rule of violence to the rule
of law that is introduced by law itself, it does not follow from this position that
one has to set equal different experiences of violence.
Still, it means that, if one accepts Benjamin’s critique, neither the liberal
rule of law as the aim of a transition from authoritarian rule, nor criminal
trials as a means to do justice and guarantee the non-repetition of crimes, can
be said to redeem the suffering of the victims of violence.
This brings me to the second criticism expressed above, namely that with
Benjamin there cannot be any justification for the legal response to state crime.
In what follows, I want to respond to this objection by suggesting that while
the promise of justice of trials does not lie with some contribution to historical
truth or the judgment – as usually claimed – trials can still be though of as
holding a promise of justice for the victims of state-backed violence. With
Benjamin, though, this promise of justice can only lie where trials expose both
the violence of the past as well as of the present order. I wish to make this
point by linking the moment of Entsetzung or suspension of law envisioned by
Benjamin to a third use of the ‘state of emergency’ that we find in the Theses.
Both indicate that with Benjamin justice is only to be found in a moment of
rupture.
the real state of emergency
As already indicated above, Benjamin’s delineation of the law of oscillation
between law-positing and law maintaining violence is followed by a brief remark
on the possibility of the interruption of this cycle of violence. He speaks of a
‘divine violence’ necessary for law’s suspension (Entsetzung). In order to gain a
better understanding of the notion of the Entsetzung of law which, according to
Benjamin, is the only possibility with which to interrupt the cycle of mythical
violence, I want to briefly engage with a criticism put forward by Derrida in
his reading of Critique. Towards the end of his reading of the Critique, Derrida
writes:
What I find, in conclusion the most redoubtable, indeed (perhaps, almost)
intolerable in this text, . . . is a temptation that it would leave open, and
leave open notably to the survivors or the victims of the final solution,
of its past, present or potential victims. Which temptation? The temp-
tation to think the holocaust as an interpretable manifestation of divine
violence insofar as this divine violence would be at the same time nihilat-
ing, expiatory and bloodless, says Benjamin, a divine violence that would
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destroy current law through a bloodless process that strikes and causes
to expiate.108
Derrida fears that the state of exception of the Nazi rule, with its state ap-
paratus aimed at the murder of millions of people, could be interpreted as
a manifestation of the divine violence which interrupts the mythical cycle of
violence by suspending the law.
Derrida’s gesture, to relate Benjamin’s ‘divine violence’ to a Schmittian state
of exception, becomes untenable if we read the ‘suspension of law’ against
the backdrop of the Theses.109 Benjamin’s observation in the Theses that
“the state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule’ is
followed by the demand for a ‘conception of history that is in keeping with this
insight’.110 Only then, he continues, shall we ‘clearly realize that it is our task
to bring about a real state of emergency’.111 It is this ‘real state of emergency’
envisioned by Benjamin in the Theses, I would like to suggest, that parallels
Benjamin’s demand in the Critique for a Entsetzung or suspension of law.
From the Theses it emerges clearly that the ‘real state of emergency’ is not
the same as the “‘state of emergency’ in which we live’, that is, the state of
exception declared by the Nazi party and famously theorised and justified by
Carl Schmitt.112 I want to focus here on the fundamentally distinct temporality
that underlies the state of exception that characterised both the Nazi state
and the Argentine Proceso from the ‘real state of emergency’ envisioned by
Benjamin. Through this distinction we gain better understanding of the
temporality of this particular form of the suspension of law.
The fundamentally distinct temporality that distinguishes the Schmittian
state of exception from the ‘real state of exception’ envisioned by Benjamin
has been pointed out by the Spanish theologian Reyes Mate.113 In Schmitt’s
‘secularised gnosticism’, Mate argues, the state of exception becomes a strategy
of the katechon, that is, of the postponement of total chaos.114 The suspension
of the law is justified with the aim of avoiding a collapse of the state. Histor-
ically, not only the Nazi Party, but also the Argentine junta made use of the
argumentative figure of the suspension of the constitution for the purpose of
108Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 1044.
109For further challenges to Derrida’s interpretation see Cornelia Vismann. ‘Das Gesetz »DER
Dekonstruktion«’. In: Rechtshistorisches Journal 11 (1992), pp. 250–264, p. 259.
110Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 392 (Thesis VIII).
111Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 392 (Thesis VIII); For a detailed distinction of the
violence that characterises the different states of exception, albeit in a different context see
Daniel Loick. Kritik der Souveränität. Frankfurt/M: Campus-Verlag, 2012, p. 215.
112Carl Schmitt. Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985.
113Reyes Mate. ‘Retrasar o acelerar el final. Occidente y sus teologías políticas’. In: Nuevas
teologías políticas. Ed. by Reyes Mate and José A. Zamora. Rubí: Anthropos Editorial, 2006,
pp. 27–64.
114See Mate, ‘Retrasar o acelerar el final’, pp. 47-48.
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rescuing the democratic state in the face of total chaos.115 This link between
the logic of the katechon and the state of exception as the prevention of chaos
– the collapse of the state or the coming of the Antichrist – is also captured by
Argentine legal philosopher Claudio Martyniuk, when he writes, commenting
on the rhetoric of the Argenine military junta:
Rhetoric: in the face of anarchy, in order to reestablish the public order,
in the name of the values of civilisation, barrier against communism and
dissolution, katechon.116
If the purpose of the state of exception in Schmitt’s political theology is to
prevent the coming of the end, in Benjamin’s political messianism the task
of bringing about the ‘real state of exception’ is the task of accelerating the
coming of the ‘end’ – where that ‘end’ is understood as the redemption of past
suffering. If we bring the discussion of Benjamin’s political messianism in the
last section to bear on the notion of Entsetzung, then suspension must not
be read as a state that follows in time, but rather as an intervention out-of-
time.117 It does not denote a condition or state that comes after mythical law,
but its rupture.
If the time of the now (Jetztzeit) is ‘the small gateway in time through which
the Messiah might enter’ every second, then Entsetzung is the structural
possibility within law for suspending the cycle of mythical law and exposing
its violence.118 Werner Hamacher draws attention to this temporality of Ben-
jamin’s Entsetzung when he links it to the idea of the afformative.119 Hamacher
introduces the notion of the afformative in order to describe the function of
‘depositing’ in relation to the positing of every performative (and one could say
law-making) act: ‘afformations allow something to happen without making it
happen’.120 The ‘pure violence’ aimed at the depositing of law can be said to
open up a gap; that is, it deposes without positing. From this vantage, the
only promise of justice from the trials could lie with acts of suspension, with
interventions out-of-time.
115See Hannah Franzki. ‘A modo de (in)conclusión: Entre complicidad judicial y violencia
jurídica’. In: ¿Usted también doctor? Ed. by Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky. Buenos Aires: siglo
veintiuno editores, 2015, pp. 415–426.
116Claudio Martyniuk. Estética del nihilismo. Filosofía y desaparición. Lanús: Ediciones La
Cebra, 2014, p. 191 (my translation, italics in the original).
117On the notion of ‘out-of-time’ (‘Unzeit’ or ‘contretemps’) see Werner Hamacher. ‘Des Contrees
de Temps’. In: Zeit-Zeichen. Ed. by G. Christoph Tholen and Michael O. Scholl. Weinheim:
VCH, 1990, pp. 29–36.
118Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, p. 397 (Thesis B)..
119See in particular explanations provided in endnote 12 in Werner Hamacher. ‘Afformative,
Strike. Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’’. In: Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy. Ed. by Andrew
E. Benjamin and Peter Osborne. Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000, pp. 108–136, p. 125-
127.
120Hamacher, ‘Afformative, Strike’, p. 125 (endnote 12); See also Menke, ‘Benjamin vor dem
Gesetz’, p. 224.
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3.4 Politics of Time
In this final section of the chapter, I will be bringing together Benjamin’s
philosophy of history and his critique of law to set out a framework for the
study of trials in the chapters to come. With Benjamin, I will be arguing, trials
in response to state crime appear to us as a site where different temporalities,
and not merely different narratives of the past, compete.
trials as law preserving violence
Such a perspective constitutes, as mentioned before, a critique of and alter-
native to the transitional justice approach to trials which I discussed in the
previous chapter. With the proliferation of ICL as an element of transitional
justice, I have argued, the trials’ constitutive function of political authority
was put forward as an argument in their favour. In this context, the trials’
contribution to the writing of history was put forward as a central element
through which trials could contribute towards liberalising political change.
Ruti Teitel, for example, writes in the conclusion of her book on Transitional
Justice:
These rituals of collective history-making are part of what constructs the
transition and so divides political time, creating a ‘before’ and an ‘after.’
The turn to law means that historical claims are made in the language
of justice, in shared terms relating to rights and responsibilities for past
wrongs.121
What could be read as mere analysis of the historiographical functions of trials
appears in Teitel’s account as a normative statement. Teitel’s claim is part
of her appeal for transitional justice to be recognised as a particular form of
(incomplete) justice which will eventually help to foster the democratic rule of
law — a political order that, according to her, would constitute the just answer
to the atrocities that have been experienced.122 In making the rule of law the
answer to and the opposite of violence, transitional justice literature on ICL
reproduces the law’s amnesia concerning its own relationship with violence.
Every politico-legal order, I argued with Benjamin in the previous section,
is based on a violence that cannot be justified by preexisting laws. In or-
der to claim its legitimacy, modern law needs to cloud this lack of ultimate
foundation.123 With the words of Derrida:
A ‘successful’ revolution, the ‘successful foundation of a state’ (in some-
what the same sense that one speaks of a ‘felicitous performative speech
121Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 116.
122See discussion above in Chapter Two
123On the unrelenting attempts to find ways to contain his absence of an ultimate foundation
in legal theory see Marie Theres Fögen. Das Lied vom Gesetz. München: Carl Friedrich von
Siemens Stiftung, 2007.
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act’) will produce after the fact [après coup] what it was destined in ad-
vance to produce, namely, proper interpretative models to read in return,
to give sense, necessity and above all legitimacy to the violence that has
produced, among others, the interpretative model in question, that is, the
discourse of its self-legitimation.124
Law-preserving violence, Cornelia Vismann argued in her reading of Derrida’s
text, translates the instituting violence of the new politico-legal order into a
language of justice.125 In the context of regime change, trials in response to
state crime offer such a language of justice. It is a language of historical,
‘transitional’, justice that seeks to endow liberalising change with legitimacy.
To contextualise, with Benjamin, trials in response to state crime within the
cycle of mythical violence, would require that the trials’ role in constituting
political authority be looked at with suspicion. From such a perspective
Teitel’s statement on the historiographical function of trials still appears as
an adequate description, but the performative act which she describes would
need to be problematised rather than endorsed.
We can do so by paying attention to the politics of time at work in trials. On
a general level, to speak of a ‘politics of time’, borrowing from Peter Osborne,
is to acknowledge that
alternative temporalizations of “history”. . . articulate the relations between
“past”, “present” and “future” in politically significantly different ways.126
If we understand ‘the political’ as the ‘moment of institution of society’ which
itself lacks any ground, then to speak of a politics of time refers to the effect
of alternative temporalisations in relation to this absent ground.127 The way
in which the past is brought to bear on the present can either work towards
grounding a particular juridico-political order, or it can expose the absence of
the ground on which a juridico-political order claims to rest. If we take into
account the political implications of temporalisation, we have to pay attention
not only to which story about the past is told in trials, but also how past and
present are related to each other.128
If the concept of ‘transitional justice’ endorses the performative dimension of
the historiographical function of trials, the notion of periodisation, a concept
which I take from Kathleen Davis, can help us to gain a critical understanding
124Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 270.
125Vismann, ‘Das Gesetz “DER Dekonstruktion”’, p. 251; see also discussion in Fritsch, Promise
of Memory, p. 120.
126Osborne, The Politics of Time. Modernity and Avant-Garde, p. 200 (my emphasis); see also
Osborne, ‘Politics of Time’.
127On post-foundational understandings of the political in political theory, see Oliver Marchart.
Post-foundational Political Thought. Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008, p. 8.
128Berber Bevernage makes a similar argument for the institution of truth commissions, see
Berber Bevernage. History, Memory, and State-Pponsored Violence. Time and Justice. Lon-
don: Routledge, 2012.
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of the role history acquires in the foundation of political authority.129 Davis,
herself a medievalist, develops the concept of periodisation in order to account
for the role of the ‘medieval’ in the constitution of the ‘modern’. It describes a
sequencing of world history in which the Middle Ages and Modernity appear as
two consecutive periods. Such a periodisation, she argues, authorises secular
politics and modern law by constructing the modern as a self-contained epoch.
The medieval, posited as the other of the modern, effectively works as a
substitute for the absent foundation of sovereignty in modern law.130 If we
understand sovereignty as ‘underived power’, Davis argues with reference to
Carl Schmitt, then periodisation functions as ‘sovereign decision’.131 Thus
understood, the notion of periodisation
does not refer to a mere back-description that divides history into seg-
ments, but to a fundamental political technique – a way to moderate, di-
vide, and regulate – always rendering its services now.132
Periodisation is a technique through which the violence of the foundational
act, in the Derridean sense referred to above, is hidden. In this vein, Peter
Fitzpatrick described, albeit in a different context, the operation of periodisa-
tion as a ‘game’ of the ‘universal negative reference’. Through the universal
negative reference, he writes,
a positive transcendent reference is avoided by delimiting a targeted pe-
riod and by ascribing content to it. A supervening period is constituted
thence as the opposite of that content. Bluntly, it becomes positively what
the other egregiously is not. . . . A positive revelation of the inevitably par-
ticular content of the supervening period is thereby avoided.133
In the context of trials by fiat of the successor regime, periodisation does
not organise epochs (Middle Ages/Modernity) but rather performs a break
through which the violent ancién regime becomes the Other against which the
new order claims its authority. This periodisation rests on two moments: the
historical narrative established by the court joins forces with the authorising
moment of judgment, of re-claiming, claiming anew, the authority of the law.
With regards to the first moment, the writing of history in trials, I exposed in
section three, above, that the investigative character of criminal trials dovetails
both with the truth claim and the temporal structure underlying historicism.134
The legal inquiry re-presents the crime, makes it present again, by means
of its reconstruction. But the very need to ‘reconstruct’ the crime through
129Davis, Periodization; Kathleen Davis. ‘The Sense of an Epoch. Periodization, Sovereignty,
and the Limits of Secularization’. In: The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages. Ed. by Andrew
Cole and D. Vance Smith. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 39.
130This particular argument is developed in the book’s third chapter Davis, Periodization, p. 80.
131Davis, Periodization, p. 80.
132Davis, Periodization, p. 5 (emphasis in original).
133Peter Fitzpatrick. ‘Imperial Ends’. In: The Ends of History. Ed. by Amy Swiffen and Joshua
Nichols. Milton Park: Routledge, 2013, pp. 44–63, p. 46.
134See above, p. 100.
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testimonies and documents, locates the criminal act in the past. Foucault
reminds us that the inquiry as a form of establishing the truth substitutes
the ‘flagrant délit’.135 The crime is made present as past. Similarly, Otto
Kirchheimer remarks on law’s work of temporalisation:
But fortunately for the criminal judge and the community which he serves,
conflict situations have been narrowed down and treated as history before
being submitted to him. They pertain to past segments of a still present
conflict, allowing him to disregard its present elements and treat it exclu-
sively as a past event.136
In judging crimes of the predecessor state, the second moment of the periodi-
sation, the legal institutions declare those crimes past, not part of the new
order.
Through this movement, the historical account of the crimes committed by
the earlier regime comes to function as a negative reference for the present
juridico-political order. Trials provide après coup an interpretative framework
that legitimises the newly instaurated rule of law – and the violence, on which
it is based. In so far as trials in response to state-backed violence make the
preservation of the foundational violence (here, the liberal rule of law) their
own end, trials are a manifestation of law-preserving violence.
the dialectical image as law’s entsetzung
If we conceive of law as inherently violent, does this mean that, following
Benjamin, criminal trials in response to state crime cannot offer anything to
those who became victims of state-backed violence and who lost their struggles
in the past? I already advanced in the very first chapter that my answer to this
question is twofold.
Indeed, with Benjamin the promise of justice attached to trials in response
to state crime could not be found in their contribution to establishing some
sort of ‘historical truth’ nor in any legal judgment on the responsibility of the
accused. As we have seen in section two of this chapter, any attempt to show
the past ‘as it really was’ tends to authorise present conditions of power. And
these are, Benjamin holds, shaped by the victors of history. Furthermore, as
we have seen in the last section, for Benjamin law can never be just as it is
inevitably caught in the cycle of law-positing and law-maintaining violence.
But, as I have highlighted in both sections, for Benjamin the memory of
past violence still holds a promise of justice and similarly he considers the
possibility to break the cycle of mythical violence. In both his philosophy of
history as well as his critique of law this weak possibility of justice is located
135Michel Foucault. ‘La verité et les formes juridiques’. In: Dits et écrits I, 1954-1988. Ed. by
Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Jacques Lagrange. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, pp. 1406–
1514, p. 1452.
136Kirchheimer, Political Justice, p. 111.
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in the idea of rupture or cessation – either in the ‘dialectical image’ or in law’s
‘Entsetzung’.
As we have seen, Benjamin’s dialectical image presents itself in a temporal
register which Benjamin calls the ‘time of the now’, Jetztzeit, a time that is
not a transition to a pre-defined order but which interrupts the continuum
of time. Similarly, I have argued, the Entsetzung of law should be thought of
not as a historical state that follows the cycle of mythical violence, but as an
intervention out of time. If we think both concepts together, the only possibility
to think the promise of justice in trials is there were they expose the violence
of the past as well as of the present political order, without positing a new law.
If we accept Benjamin’s philosophy of history and his critique of law as our
philosophical backdrop, this has implications for how we study trials. The
task would be no longer to examine their ability to foster the liberal rule of law,
but instead train our gaze on the ruptures which are produced by the rags
of history unearthed throughout the legal proceedings. In the first chapter
of this thesis, I already indicated that while the trials intend to invoke the
past in order to produce closure and authorise the present juridico-political
order as just answer to the past, they do not fully succeed in doing so. There
are instances throughout a trial in which images of the past and testimonies,
unearthed by the legal proceedings, enter into a constellation with the present,
in a way that exposes the contingency of the legal decision.
With Benjamin, we can think of these instances of rupture as ‘dialectical
images’. They are not intentional, but could rather be described as moments
of unintended self-subversion. If captured, they expose the violence of the
legal decision, and of the foundational moment which the decision repeats and
reinvigorates:
The image that is read – which is to say, the image in the now of its
recognizability – bears to the highest degree the imprint of the perilous
critical moment on which all reading is founded.’137
These images are perilous because they allow us to get a glimpse of law’s
‘rotten’, unstable, foundations.138 The act of depositing reveals ‘that the legal
ends and political goals of a power are always posited and never natural or
pregiven’.139
With this emphasis on rupture, Benjamin’s philosophy of history, condensed
in the notion of dialectical image, counters the ‘structural conformity of all
forms of experience’140 with a ‘social production of possibility’.141 That is, the
critical force of history in trials is to be found not where it authorises the
present relationships of power, but where ‘testimonial narrative gathers the
137Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 462 (N3,1).
138Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 286: ‘There is something rotten (morsch) in law.’
139Fritsch, Promise of Memory, p. 126.
140Hamacher, ‘Now’, p. 47.
141Osborne, ‘Politics of Time’, p. 7 (italics in the original).
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novelty of political action and expands political emancipation’.142 Only thereby
can we hope to open anew the avenue of praxis for those who lost the struggles
of the past.
In my reading of León Ferrari’s collage ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’ I sug-
gested that the collage ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’ can be read as a comment
on a sentence from the Nunca Más report, which stated that the case of
Martínez de Hoz provides an eloquent example of the link between the policy
of state security and economic power. His figure, I pointed out, evokes an
economic rationale behind the authoritarian state, structural violence inflicted
by the economic policies of the regime, and the complicity of individual compa-
nies in specific cases of abduction and torture; he stands for privatisation of
state enterprises but also for state investments and points to the continuities
between the authoritarian and democratic regime, continuities, to specify, in
the use of state violence as well as in the distribution of wealth.
In my discussion of the collage, I emphasised the way in which this form
of representation generates meaning. It challenges the established narratives
about the Proceso – those that exclude economic dimensions altogether and
those that relegate the economic to the sphere of the private – but does not
offer one alternative narrative. Benjamin’s dialectical image translates the
technique of the collage into a concept of historical recognisability. It is a form
of what Daniel Loick, in a different context, has described as aesthetic critique:
This deconstructive way of judging is, in the case of art, more an ‘opening
statement’ than an ‘opinion of the court’: Instead of closing, concluding,
or completing a discourse with one final verdict, it exposes the contradic-
tions, tensions, and ambivalence the judge faces during the process of
judging.143
A reading of trials that focuses on the ‘dialectical images’ produced by the
trials, on the fissures that emerge in the legal narratives, seeks to shed light on
the role of the trials in founding political authority, without however offering
an alternative diagnosis of the ‘economic dimension of conflict’ or a vision of a
societal arrangement in which past violence would have found its redemption.
The following three chapters will adopt such an approach for the study of
the trials that address the criminal responsibility of German industrialists
following World War II (Chapter Four) and of the trials that investigate the
responsibility of economic actors in Argentina (Chapters Five and Six). In my
reading of the trials, I will focus on the fissures that appear in the moment in
which the images, documents, impressions and testimonies generated by the
legal proceedings are translated into juridical imaginaries of the criminal state
142Bethania Assy and Florian Hoffmann. ‘The Faithfulness to the Real: the Heritage of the
Losers of History, Narrative, Memory and Justice’. In: Direitos Humanos. Ed. by Bethania
Assy et al. Rio de Janeiro: Eidtora Lumen Juris, 2011, pp. 9–29, p. 27.
143Loick, ‘Creation, Not Judgment’, p. 33.
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and of individual responsibility. These fissures will allow us to formulate a
critique of ICL as a liberal concept of historical justice.
4 | Instituting the Capitalist
State
With the ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal’ (IMT) still ongoing, the Allied Control Council – the governing body
of the occupying powers in post-World War II Germany – already set the
legal basis for further trials against war criminals.1 One month after the
formal opening of the IMT, on 20th December 1945, it passed Control Council
Law N° 10 in order ‘to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the
prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders’.2 Control Council Law
N° 10 enabled the Allies to conduct trials in their respective zones for crimes
against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanities and the membership
in organisation declared criminal by the IMT. As such, it provided the legal
grounds for the trials of German industrialists that were conducted by the
US American, French and British occupying forces between 1947 and 1949
(hereafter ‘Industrialist Trials’).
In this chapter, I turn to the Industrialist Trials as a source of critique. I will
be arguing that if read as part of a historical constellation, the Industrialist
Trials allow us to identify some of the historical and conceptual instances
that qualify International Criminal Law (ICL) as a liberal concept of historical
justice.3 In order to substantiate this link between the object of study – the
Industrialist Trials – and the object of my critique – ICL – the first section
expands on some of the methodological issues that were briefly introduced in
Chapter One. To this end, I will return to the work of Walter Benjamin; this
1On the IMT, see Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal:
Proceedings Volumes (The Blue Set). 1947.
2Law Nr. 10 (Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against
Humanity). Control Council. 1945-12-20.
3Among the individuals tried by the Soviet Union on German grounds there was not a single
businessmen. Instead, they focused on expropriation measures taken against big firms
that had collaborated with the Nazis and did not pursue a single criminal trial against a
representative of the German war economy, see Jörg Osterloh and Clemens Vollnhals, eds.
NS-Prozesse und deutsche Öffentlichkeit. Besatzungszeit, frühe Bundesrepublik und DDR.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011, p. 128; Mortiz Vormbaum. ‘An “Indispensable
Component of the Elimination of Fascism”: War Crimes Trials and International Criminal
Law in the German Democratic Republic’. In: Historical Origins of International Criminal
Law: ed. by Morten Bergsmo et al. Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014,
pp. 397–410.
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time, however, not in order to think through the role of history and historical
time in war crime trials, but to get some clues for my own historiographical
approach to the Industrialist Trials. As opposed to those historiographical
accounts that look at the Industrialists Trials as legal precedent for contempo-
rary cases of corporate accountability, I will be retrieving Benjamin’s idea of
the historical citation to propose a perspective that is interested in the capacity
of the past to destabilise the present (4.1).
In the material Benjamin collected for his own (unfinished) historiographical
project, later published as the Arcades Projekt, Benjamin notes that in order
to rescue the critical force of a historical event, one has to focus on the fore-
and after-history as they enter the historical object on a reduced scale.4 In
this spirit, the introduction to the Industrialist Trials in section two presents
the trials as they emerge in a force field between their fore- and after-history.
I argue that their coming into existence – the fact that they were held at all
– owes itself to the widespread impression among the four Allies that World
War II and the destruction that came with it would not have been possible
without the support of German big business for the war plans. That the trials
eventually only came to exist in a pared down scale, however, testifies to the
after-history – that is, the arising competition between East and West, and
connected hereto, the fear that trials of German industrialists might appear to
be anti-capitalistic (4.2).
Section three looks at what with Benjamin I call the ‘bowels’ of the In-
dustrialist Trials, namely the arguments concerning the industrialists’ legal
responsibility for the crimes of plunder, forced labour and aggression of which
they were accused.5 Behind seemingly technical legal reasoning, liberal on-
tological assumptions concerning the nature of the state and the relation
between the political and the economic will be emerging. These assumptions, I
argue, structure the way in which the sentences issued by the tribunals depict
the political and economic order under Nazi rule, allowing it to operate as a
negative reference for a liberal and market-based German post-war order (4.3).
For a large part of my analysis of the Industrialist Trials, I will be able to
draw on research that has been published over the past few years, especially
on the work of the legal scholars Grietje Baars and Dooren Lustig as well as
the historians S. Jonathan Wiesen and Kim Christan Priemel.6 Baars and
Priemel bring into the picture the international context of that time, most
4Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 470 (N7a,1).
5Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 475 (N10,3).
6S. Jonathan Wiesen. West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past. 1945 -
1955. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2001; Priemel, ‘“A Story of Betrayal”’;
Doreen Lustig. Doing Business, Fighting a War. Non-State Actors and the Non-State: the
Industrialist Cases at Nuremberg. IILJ Colloquium Paper. 2011. URL: http://www.iilj.
org/courses/documents/2011Colloquium.Lustig.pdf (visited on 03/21/2011); Grietje
Baars. ‘Capitalism’s Victors Justice? The Hidden Story of the Prosecution of Industrialists
Post-WWll’. In: The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials. Ed. by Kevin Jon Heller and
Gerry J. Simpson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 163–192.
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importantly the creation of the international economic order. In their works,
both authors trace the ways in which this context has influenced the positions
of the Allies towards the trials and the construction of the legal responsibility
of the accused. Wiesen, in his important study on West German industry
between 1945 and 1955, showed how the Industrialist Trials forced West
German industrialists to position themselves as caring entrepreneurs. Doreen
Lustig brings to bear political theory on the legal findings of the Industrialist
Trials in order to highlight implicit assumptions on the nature of the state at
work in the conceptions of criminal responsibility.
My research on the Industrialist Trials is indebted to these studies and
tries to take the analysis one step further by looking not primarily at the
international, but at the German context. In line with the theoretical framework
introduced in the previous chapter, I will be focusing on the role of the trials
in the foundation of the German juridico-political order following the end of
the war. ‘To get the legality of the state from the veridiction of the market: this
is the German miracle,’ Michel Foucault wrote in The Birth of Biopolitics, and
I will be drawing on Foucault’s analysis of the foundational process of West
Germany to show how the image of the past produced by the Industrialist
Trials ties in with that which was construed by the ordoliberal economist in
order to put forward the Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy) as
the lesson to be learned from the past. Against this backdrop, the Industrialist
Trials cannot be considered the first attempt to set bounds to the violence of
capitalism, as the corporate accountability discourse suggests, but instead
need to be understood as an important element in the salvation of capitalism’s
reputation (4.4).
The point of my reading of the trials that emphasises their role in the
authorisation of the German social market economy, and the contingency
of that order, is not to suggest that other conclusions should have been
drawn from the experience of World War II. Rather, as mentioned above, I am
interested in the trials as a historical object that can inform a critique of ICL as
a concept of historical justice. In the concluding section, I will therefore point
out how the analysis of the Industrialist Trials put forward in this chapter
destabilises some central assumptions that are prevalent in the field of ICL
and transitional justice (4.5).
4.1 The Industrialist Trials as a Historical Object
Contemporary scholarship in international law and transitional justice usually
looks at the Industrialist Trials as a first instance of corporate accountability
for human rights violations. In doing so, it frames an event that took place in
the 1940s in the terms of an academic and political discourse that only emerges
in the 1990s. In this section, I wish to problematise such a perspective. I want
to suggest that this research mistakes a legal temporality – namely the logic of
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precedent – for a historical one. As a result of this, it connects past and present
by establishing a linear, temporal connection between the Industrialist Trials
and present approaches to the study of economic dimensions of state crime.
I will be turning, one more time, to the work of Walter Benjamin to propose
a historiographical approach that looks at the trials of German industrialists
not as legal precedent, but as part of a constellation. Such a perspective, I
argue, rescues the critical potential of the trials of German industrialists.
precedent
The trials of German industrialists following World War II have been re-
discovered only fairly recently. Focusing exclusively on the IMT, the literature
on the historical origins of ICL from the 1990s often limited ‘Nuremberg’ as
a foundational moment to the criminal persecution of military and political
representatives of the Nazi rule, thereby sidelining the trials of other groups
such as the industrialists.
‘Law looks to the past as it speaks to present needs’, Austin Sarat and
Thomas R. Kearns write in the introduction to the edited volume History,
Memory, and the Law.7 Indeed, the renewed interest in the Industrialist Trials
can be linked to the civil litigation efforts which have been presented under the
US American ‘Alien Torts Statute’ (ATS) since the 1990s. In this vein, Doreen
Lustig argues that the civil litigation cases presented under the ATS cited the
post-World War II jurisprudence concerning the responsibility of German big
business, in order to illuminate the questions of legal subjectivity of corporate
actors under international law.8
Today, a heterogeneous set of actors and institutions seeks civil and criminal
responsibility of businessmen and corporations for human rights abuses under
the heading of ‘business and human rights’ and ‘corporate accountability’, and
the trials of German industrialists have become a central point of reference in
this debate.9 In 2008, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) published
a report comprising three volumes that identifies the relevance of the Indus-
trialist Trials for corporate criminal accountability.10 The ICJ report, which
7Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns. ‘Writing History and Registering Memory in Legal
Decisions and Legal Practices: An Introduction’. In: History, Memory, and the Law. Ed. by
Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999, pp. 1–
24, p. 3.
8Doreen Lustig. ‘Three Paradigms of Corporate Responsibility in International Law. The
Kiobel Moment’. In: Journal of International Criminal Justice 12.3 (2014), pp. 593–614,
p. 599.
9United Nations. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Implementing the United
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. 2011. URL: http://www.ohchr.
org / Documents / Publications / GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR _ EN . pdf (visited on
05/17/2015); The Business & Human Rights report centre seeks to promote account-
ability through publishing information on alleged human rights violations committed by
corporations, see Business & Human Rights Recourse Centre. URL: http://business-
humanrights.org/ (visited on 05/17/2015).
10International Commission of Jurists. Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability. Facing the
Facts and Charting a Legal Path. Report of the International Commission of Jurists Expert
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contrary to the judgments of the German Industrialist Trials is available in
Spanish, has also become an authoritative voice and central reference in the
currently ongoing trials in Argentina that I will turn to in the last two chapters.
In the context of legal corporate accountability disputes, the reference to
the Industrialist Trials serves to support the claim that non-state actors
can be subject to international law, thereby challenging a focus on state
institutions when prosecuting systematic human rights violations. In these
disputes, the backward-facing logic of legal precedent is turned into a narrative
of historical continuity in order to sustain a particular legal argument: the
criminal responsibility of businessmen, it suggests, was always already part of
ICL. The citation of the past in the form of a legal precedent follows a logic of
authorisation.
The scholarly interest in the Industrialist trials follows the rediscovery of
these trials as legal precedent. Perhaps as a result of this, most of the legal
scholarship on the trials inadvertently adopt the temporal logic that underlies
the legal citation of the past as precedent. These texts present a connection that
results from a backward reference as a progressive, continuous development,
thus converting the temporality of the legal citation into one of historical
development.11 Just as case law cites the past to authorise a particular legal
opinion, the historiographical accounts reduce the Industrialist Trials to a first
instance of corporate accountability.
In doing so, they reproduce some of the problems of historicist approaches
to historiography that I discussed in the previous chapter.12 I argued that just
like historicism, ICL jurisprudence holds the task of historiography to consist
of the adequate representation of the past. With reference to Benjamin’s
critique of historicism, I suggested that this understanding of truth in terms
of adequacy is not only ontologically dubious, but that it is also politically
Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity. Vol. 1. Geneva: International Commission of Jurists,
2008; International Commission of Jurists. Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability.
Criminal Law and International Crimes. Report of the International Commission of Jurists
Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes. Vol. 2. Geneva: In-
ternational Commission of Jurists, 2008; International Commission of Jurists. Corporate
Complicity and Legal Accountability. Civil Remedies. Report of the International Commission
of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes. Vol. 3. Geneva:
International Commission of Jurists, 2008.
11See for example Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Veerle Openhaffen. ‘The Past and Present of
Corporate Complicity: Financing the Argentinean Dictatorship’. In: Harvard Human Rights
Journal 23.1 (2010), pp. 157–203, pp. 159-163; Wolfgang Kaleck and Miriam Saage-Maaß.
‘Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes.
The Status Quo and its Challenges’. In: Journal of International Criminal Justice 8.3 (2010),
pp. 699–724; Florian Jessberger. ‘On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility un-
der International Law for Business Activity. IG Farben on Trial’. In: Journal of International
Criminal Justice 8.3 (2010), pp. 783–802; Jonathan A. Bush. ‘The Prehistory of Corpora-
tions and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said’. In:
Columbia Law Review 109.5 (2009), pp. 1094–1262; Contributions in Michalowski, Corpo-
rate Accountability; on the notion of progress in historical accounts of International Law,
see Skouteris, The Notion of Progress, Chapter One.
12As often the case, the exception confirms the rule, see Baars, ‘Law(yers) Congealing Cap-
italism: On the (Im)possibility of Restraining Business in Conflict through International
Criminal Law’; Lustig, ‘Three Paradigms’.
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problematic. Because such an understanding of history denies the fact that
each representation of the past is already shaped by the interests and concepts
– the kaleidoscope – of the present, the historical narratives thus produced
stabilise the present relationships of power. The present, cast as the result of
a linear, continuous development, is presented as the inevitable consequence
of the past.
What I discussed in the previous chapter for the histories written in trials
is equally pertinent to the literature in international law on the Industrialist
Trials. It looks at the trials through the kaleidoscope of the contemporary
corporate accountability discourse. As a consequence, they are not able to
take into account the differences between the legal and political discussions
that surrounded the prosecution of economic actors after World War II on the
one hand, and the contemporary debate on corporate accountability on the
other. In this chapter, I suggest they rob the Industrialist Trials of their critical
potential – that is, of their ability to help us understand the particularities and
contingency of present ways to consider the responsibility of economic actors
for state-backed violence.
citations
For the purpose of my own engagement with the Industrialist Trials, I propose
to read the legal citation of the Industrialist Trials by contemporary trials as
a historical citation, an idea which permeates Walter Benjamin’s philosophy
of history. I thereby wish to acknowledge the connection that is created by
the legal citations of the Industrialist Trials in contemporary trials, without
however constructing this link as one of continuous development.
Contrary to the legal citation that invokes a precedent with the aim to au-
thorise a legal opinion, Benjamin is interested in the destructive, destabilising
dimension of a citation. Citations in his work, he declares in one of the entries
in One Way Street, are ‘wayside robbers who leap out armed and relieve the idle
stroller of his conviction’.13 It is the citation’s irritating, disturbing effect on the
reader that Benjamin is concerned with. We encountered this emphasis on the
desirability of a disruptive effect already in the previous chapter, when looking
at Benjamin’s philosophy of historiography and the notion of the ‘dialectical
image’. Indeed, the notion of the ‘dialectical image’ can be taken to translate
the critical impetus of the act of citation into a philosophy of history.14
Here, I wish to return to the notion of the dialectical image, this time not
in order to write about history and historiography in trials, but to explicate
my own methodological approach when looking at the Industrialist Trials as
an historical object. As mentioned before, Benjamin developed his philosophy
of history in the context of his work on the Arcades Project, which he never
13Walter Benjamin. ‘One-way Street’. In: One-way Street and Other Writings. London: Penguin,
2009, pp. 45–106, p. 95, translation amended.
14See above, p. 85
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completed. We are thus left to make our own sense of the scattered comments
on a historiographical methodology that would correspond to what he envi-
sioned as the dialectical image.15 I do not attempt to reconstruct or complete a
definitive account of the dialectical image, but instead attend to those pointers
in Benjamin’s work that can orient a historiographical approach.16 In particu-
lar, I wish to return to the notion of citation as it helps us to illuminate the
‘dialectics’ of the dialectical image.
For his own historiographical work on the Paris Arcades in the 19th century,
Benjamin wanted to ‘develop to the highest degree the art of citing without
quotation marks.’17 A longer entry from the Convolut N of the Arcades Project
can serve as a starting point to explore what this ‘art of citation’ as a historio-
graphical method might entail:
The events surrounding the historian, and in which he himself takes part,
will underlie his presentation in the form of a text written in invisible ink.
The history which he lays before the reader comprises, as it were, the
citations occurring in this text, and it is only these citations that occur in
a manner legible to all. To write history thus means to cite history.18
According to this quote, to write history, to write about a moment in the past
– that is, to construct an historical object – means to cite it, that is to take it
out of the past and insert it into the present. The implications of perceiving
historiography as citation, history as text, have been explored by Bettine
Menke.19 Her essay Das Nach-Leben im Zitat. Benjamins Gedächtnis der Texte
construes the citation as a ‘model and schemata of remembrance’ by rescuing
Benjamin’s remarks on the notion of citation across his writings and bringing
them to bear on his philosophy of history.20
15For recent works in legal history and legal theory that draw on Walter Benjamin for their
own methodology, see Christopher Tomlins. ‘The Strait Gate: The Past, History, and Legal
Scholarship’. In: Law, Culture and the Humanities 5.1 (2009), pp. 11–42; Christopher Tom-
lins. ‘After Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure’. In: Annual Review of Law and
Social Science 8.1 (2012), pp. 31–68; James R. Martel. Textual Conspiracies. Walter Ben-
jamin, Idolatry, and Political Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011; Martel,
Divine Violence; Joseph Jenkins. ‘Inheritence Law as Constellation in Lieu of Redress: a
Detour Through Exceptional Terrain’. In: Cardozo Law Review 24.3 (2003), pp. 1043–1065;
Joseph Jenkins. ‘Heavy Law/Light Law: Walter Benjamin, Friedrich Nietzsche, Robert Bork,
Duncan Kennedy’. In: Law and Literature 17.2 (2005), pp. 249–268; Andrew E. Benjamin.
Working with Walter Benjamin. Recovering a Political Philosphy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2013.
16On the different strategies of Benjamin’s readers to deal with the unfinished character, see
Anthony Auerbach. ‘Imagine no Metaphors: the Dialectical Image of Walter Benjamin’. In:
Image & Narrative 16 (2007), n.a.
17Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 458 (N1,10).
18Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 476 (N11,3).
19Bettine Menke. ‘Das Nach-Leben im Zitat. Benjamins Gedächtnis der Texte’. In: Gedächt-
niskunst. Ed. by Anselm Haverkamp and Renate Lachmann. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1991, pp. 74–110; See also Anselm Haverkamp. ‘Notes on the Dialectical Image
(How Deconstructive Is It?)’ In: Diacritics 22.3/4 (1992), pp. 69–80, p. 71.
20Menke, ‘Nach-Leben im Zitat’, p. 74 (my translation).
The Industrialist Trials as a Historical Object 114
Menke’s text emphasises the double movement inherent to the act of citation.
The citation is ‘read-out of’ its context and ‘cited into’ a new one.21 In order to
become manageable, the citation needs to be torn out of its con-text, the old
text disrupted. This destructive gesture that accompanies the citation is simul-
taneously the condition for its preservation – for the text to be remembered, or
in the words of Benjamin, rescued.
The dialectical image as a form of historiographical presentation can be
understood as a citation of the past. It becomes historical only in the very
moment in which it is actualised, that is, cited by the present and into
the present. ‘Actualisation’, not progress, is the ‘founding concept’ of the
dialectical image.22 Through this citation, the past becomes simultaneous
with the present con-text.23 Benjamin writes:
For the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a
particular time; it says, above all, that they attain to legibility only at a
particular time. . . . Every present day is determined by the images that
are synchronic with it: each ‘now’ is the now of a particular recognizabil-
ity.24
Put simply, the temporal nucleus that characterises the dialectical image
consists of the fact that the historical object which I see is already the result
of a particular constellation – namely the constellation formed between the
historical object and the moment from which I look at it. We cannot separate
the historical object from the constellations it forms with the time it is looked
at, for it only appears to us in this constellation.
From the discussion of the dialectical image as a historical citation, which I
will develop in more detail in the following, we can extract two directions of in-
quiry. The first concerns the way we look at and construct the historical object
– in our case, the Industrialist Trials. The second relates to the relationship
between the historical object and the moment in the present from which we
look at it.25 I will expand on both aspects in turn.
developing the image
In a note titled ‘The Dialectical Image’, Benjamin again compares history to
the structure of a text. He writes:
21Menke, ‘Nach-Leben im Zitat’, p. 89.
22Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 460 (N 2, 2).
23Menke, ‘Nach-Leben im Zitat’, p. 90.
24Benjamin, Arcades Project, 463 (N3, 1).
25Sami Khatib, in a similar vein, suggests to read the temporal nucleus at the heart of the
dialectical image as pointing towards two complementary directions of inquiry. Sami R.
Khatib. ‘Walter Benjamin and the Subject of Historical Cognition’. In: Annals of Scholarship
21.1/2 (2014), pp. 23–42, p. 29.
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If one looks upon history as a text, then one can say of it what a recent
author has said of literary texts – namely that the past has left in them
images comparable to those registered by a light-sensitive plate.26
If the past contains images that are comparable to those captured by a photo-
graphic negative, the presentation of these images – their exhibition – demands
that they be developed. In the same quote, Benjamin suggests that it is the
task of the historian to ‘read that which was never written’.27 David Ferries
provides an insightful exploration of Benjamin’s threefold comparison between
history, literature and photography in this quote.28 He draws attention to a
line from Benjamin’s essay on The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Repro-
ducibility, in which Benjamin states that ‘from the photographic plate . . . a
multiplicity of prints is possible; the question of an authentic print has no
sense’.29 Ferris consequently observes that
[t]his definition privileges what is produced from the negative, since it
is the print that possesses the ability to exhibit what is present in the
negative – not with respect to what is depicted in the negative . . . , but with
respect to its purpose: to produce reproductions that have no priority in
relation to one another and therefore no claim to authenticity since each
is as authentic as the other.30
The representation of this image – the print – is, to borrow Menke’s words, a
‘«repetition», a «second present», the after-life of that which never existed as
such’.31 Or, to say it with the words of Ferris: ‘to exhibit historical significance
is, for Benjamin, to exhibit a relation to the past that is also a deviation from
that past’.32
That is, the historical meaning of a historical object is not related to its
adequate representation, to the similarity of the print to the negative, but
from the meaning the object acquires in relation to the present. This is why
Benjamin speaks of a dialectical image. Such a construction of the historical
object acquires meaning only in so far as it is endowed with something that
could not have been seen by those that presented the moment. This is also
why he emphasises that it is important to
26Walter Benjamin. Selected Writings. Volume 4, 1938-1940. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Belknap Press, 1996, p. 405.
27Benjamin, Selected Writings, p. 405.
28David S. Ferris. ‘The Shortness of History, or, Photography in Nuce: Benjamin’s Attenuation
of the Negative’. In: Walter Benjamin and History. Ed. by Andrew E. Benjamin. London and
New York: Continuum, 2005, pp. 19–37.
29Walter Benjamin. ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility’. In: The
Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media. Ed.
by Michael W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Belknap Press, 2008, pp. 19–55, pp. 24-25.
30Ferris, ‘Shortness of History’, p. 29.
31Menke, ‘Nach-Leben im Zitat’, p. 85 (my translation).
32Ferris, ‘Shortness of History’, p. 28.
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differentiate the construction of a historical state of affairs from what one
customarily calls its ‘reconstruction’. The ‘reconstruction’ in empathy is
one-dimensional. ‘Construction’ presupposes ‘destruction’.33
If Benjamin’s dialectical image repeats the logic of citation, it means that
we have to rip the historical object out of its context in order to make it
meaningful for the present. Rather than inserting the historical object into a
linear historical development that pretends to connect past and present, the
movement of history would need to be identified within the historical object
itself. With the words of Walter Benjamin:
The fore- and after-history of a historical phenomenon [Tatbestand] show
up in the phenomenon itself on the strength of its dialectical presenta-
tion. What is more: every dialectically presented historical circumstance
[Sachverhalt] polarizes itself and becomes a force field in which the con-
frontation between its fore-history and after-history is played out.34
Benjamin is clear about that which emerges to us as fore- and after-history
within the historical object depends on the moment from which we look at it.
He continues:
It [the past, H.F.] becomes such a field insofar as the present instant
interpenetrates it. . . . And thus the historical evidence polarizes into fore-
and after-history always anew, never in the same way.35
To look at a moment historically in these terms means to take the historical
object out of its context and search for the tensions and contradicting forces
as they manifest themselves in it. These forces might become recognisable
only years later. The dialectical image is an image developed with the help of
time.
When I look at the Industrialist Trials in the next section, I will be focusing
on the ‘force field’ that crystallises in the trials. For this purpose, I will be ex-
tracting the Industrialist Trials from that narrative of corporate accountability
into which they have been inserted through the logic of precedent, focusing
instead on the
historical confrontation that makes up the interior (and, as it were, the
bowels) of the historical object, and into which all the forces and interests
of history enter on a reduced scale.36
thesis, antithesis, awakening
Above I indicated two directions of research that can be associated with the
dialectical image as a historiographical method. The first concerned the
33Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 470 (N7,6).
34Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 470 (N7a,1).
35Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 470 (N7a,1); Similarly Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 471
(N7a,8): ‘It is the present that polarizes the event into fore- and after-history.’
36Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 475 (N10,3).
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construction of the historical object as a dialectical image. The historical
object, this citation of history, acquires its meaning only in constellation with
the text of the present. This citation into the present context is the second
movement associated with the reading of history as dialectical image: ‘The
true method of making things present is to represent them in our space (not
to represent ourselves in their space)’.37
As we have seen in the previous chapter as well as at the beginning of this
section, Benjamin is interested in the disruptive potential of historiography.
The task he sets the historiographer in the Theses is to grasp a particular
constellation between past and present that is ‘saturated with tensions’. In
the Arcades Project, Benjamin compares this critical effect of the citation to
the moment of awakening, in which the experience of the dream – still present
but about to float away – alters our perception of the present:
The utilisation [Verwertung, H.F.] of dream elements in the course of wak-
ing up is the canon of dialectics. It is paradigmatic for the thinker and
binding for the historian.38
It is the notion of awaking that substitutes the one of synthesis in Benjamin’s
dialectics. The dialectical presentation of history does not lead to any insights
about the movement of history, but can only aim to achieve an experience
similar to the one of the moment of awakening, in which the images of the
past – similar to dream images – alter our understanding of the present.39
Because in the dialectical images past and present are not connected through
continuous historical time, but rather through a temporal constellation, he
speaks of them as a ‘dialectics at a standstill’.40 Against the backdrop of this
second aspect of the dialectical image, to look at the Industrialist Trials as a
historical citation requires us to pay attention to the tensions, differences and
alterations that emerge between the historical object and the present. In other
words, it means to conceive of the historical object as a source of critique.
The text ‘written with invisible ink’ into which I wish to cite the Industrialist
Trials is given by the primary concern of this thesis, namely my critique of
ICL as a concept of historical justice, and the way in which it addresses
economic dimensions of state crime. In Chapter Two, I showed that ICL
jurisprudence is indebted to political liberalism in so far as it pretends that the
choice for liberal democracy is politically neutral. Such a perspective claims
that liberal democratic institutions only constitute the framework in which
deliberation concerning the right societal order can take place. Contesting
this statement, I argued that political liberalism is not only political (that is,
concerning only the institutions of the state), but already political in that it
presupposes a particular relationship between the state and the economy. It
37Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 206 (H2,3).
38Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 464 (N4,4) (translation amended).
39Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 464 (N4,4).
40Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 462 (N2a,3).
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makes a statement regarding what is considered to belong to the realm of
the political.41 I furthermore indicated that recent attempts to include the
economic in the picture are circumscribed by this very separation. That is,
both economic dimensions of state crime and the way they should be addressed
in the process of transition are not discussed as a problem of democracy.
Viewed from this perspective, the tension that emerges between the historical
moment of the industrialist trials and contemporary corporate accountability
discourse is precisely the (lack of) awareness of the contested nature of the
notion of democracy, and the role the relationship between the state and the
economy plays in guaranteeing a democratic future.
4.2 Mapping the Force Field
In line with the methodological reflections just set out, this section introduces
the Industrialist Trials. The fore-history that materialised in the trials, I will
suggest, is the Allies’ unanimous conviction that World War II would not have
been possible without the support of German industry and that an ‘economic’
case before the IMT was necessary to demonstrate the devastating effects
that German state-sponsored capitalism had had on people’s lives throughout
Europe.
This fore-history to the Industrialist Trials contrasts with the after-history
that is reflected in the way the trials eventually came into existence. In accor-
dance with the general reorientation of a strategy of dismantling the German
industry towards one supporting its reconstruction, the plan to prosecute eco-
nomic actors also started to lose support and came to halt in 1947.42 What
we know as the Industrialist Trials today is the eventual manifestation of the
tensions between the conviction that the responsibility of the German economy
for the crimes committed during World War II needed to be addressed and the
fear that, against the backdrop of the emerging competition between East and
West, any prosecution of economic actors could be perceived as anti-capitalist.
the economic case at the International Military Tribunal (IMT)
Towards the end of the war, as Kim Priemel highlights,
there was consensus that German economic might had allowed the Nazi
regime to wage an all-out war of aggression thanks to the active partici-
pation of big business in the so-called master plan to dominate Europe,
from whose implementation industry and finance had hoped to benefit.43
41See Chapter Two, subsections starting p. 53 and p. 64.
42Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 67.
43Priemel, ‘“A Story of Betrayal”’, p. 91; see also Kim Christian Priemel. The Betrayal. The
Nuremberg Trials and German Divergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Chapter
Six; Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, p. 1107; Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 3.
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The economic dimension of the war and the role played by cartels in organising
the economy was a central aspect in conceiving the political measures to be
adopted in a defeated Germany. In this vein, the so-called Potsdam Agreement
adopted by the three heads of government of the USSR, USA, and UK at the
beginning of August 1945 established among the ‘principles to govern the treat-
ment of Germany in the initial control period’ a general de-industrialisation, in
particular with respect to war-related production and de-concentration of the
German industry:
At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentral-
ized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of
economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts
and other monopolistic arrangements.44
Equally as part of the Postdam Agreemen, the three governments reaffirmed
‘their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice’ with the first
list of defendants to ‘be published before 1st September’.45 The intention to
bring the major war criminals before a court had been already discussed during
the war, and a few days after the Potsdam Conference the Allies adopted the
‘Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis’ in London. Leo Drachsler, one of the US American
prosecutors, presented the inner nexus between the policies adopted by the
allied forces as follows:
German industry has been condemned by the flat declaration in the Pots-
dam Agreemnet, providing for total dismemberment of the cartel system.
The Decartelization Division at OMGUS [Office of Military Government,
United States, H.F.] is the agency executing this political judgment. It
remains for us to complete this picture by establishing in judicial pro-
ceedings the guilt of representative German economic institutions.46
In line with the conviction that German big business had been responsible
for the rise of Hitler and his ability to wage war, it was decided that the IMT
should also deal with the responsibility of economic actors.47 Justice Robert
H. Jackson, head of the US prosecution office, had already written about the
topic to the President in June 1945, a month after his appointment as Chief of
Counsel:
[w]e will accuse a large number of individuals and officials who were in
authority in the government, in the military establishment, including the
44‘Potsdam Conference. Protocol of Proceedings Approved at Berlin (Potsdam) August 2, 1945’.
In: Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949.
Ed. by Charles I. Bevans. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1971,
pp. 1206–1237, p. 1212.
45Bevans, ‘Potsdam Conference’, p. 1212.
46Quoted in Priemel and Stiller, NMT , p. 106.
47For a discussion on the Industrialist Trials as part of the general political and economic pro-
gramme of the Allies for post-war Germany, see Wiesen, West German Industry, especially
Chapter Two and Chapter Seven.
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General Staff, and in the financial, industrial, and economic life of Ger-
many who by all civilized standards are provable to be common crimi-
nals.48
A first list of defendants included only Walter Funk (Reich Minister for
Economic Affairs), Albert Speer (Minister of Armaments and War Production),
and Hjalmar Schacht (President of the Reichsbank).49 Later, the Allies added
Gustav Krupp to the list of defendants to be tried at Nuremberg, agreeing
that the IMT would be incomplete if no individual businessmen were to be
accused.50 Gustav Krupp was director of the Krupp conglomerate which had
come to stand for the support of the war by German big business. As the
judges gave way to the motion of the defense council that Gustav Krupp was
not healthy enough to stand trial, the allied prosecutors asked to include his
son Alfried Krupp. This demand was rejected by the IMT, so that the trial took
place without any businessmen in the dock.51 Although Gustav Krupp was
finally not indicted, charges against him were still read out in indictment on
day four of the IMT.52
Given the failure to include the economic case at the IMT, the Allies discussed
the possibility to have a second IMT that would focus on the responsibility
of the industrialists.53 However, the idea of a second IMT was soon rejected
by the British Foreign Office that feared that ‘the trial may well deteriorate
into a wrangle between the capitalist and communist ideologies’54 and that it
could be anti-capitalistic in appearance.55 Jackson, in his last report, favored
individual trials, writing that
[t]he quickest and most satisfactory results will be obtained, in my opin-
ion, from immediate commencement of our own cases according to plans
which General Taylor has worked out in the event that such is your deci-
sion.56
By July 1946, it became clear that there would be no second international
tribunal but that the occupying powers would instead conduct individual trials
in the respective zones based on Control Council Law N° 10, already mentioned
above.57
48Robert H. Jackson. Report to the President on Atrocities and War Crimes. United States
Department of State Bulletin. Washington, 1945.
49Matthew Lippman. ‘War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The “Other Schindlers”’. In:
Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 9.2 (1995), pp. 173–267, p. 176.
50Priemel and Stiller, NMT , p. 95.
51There is disagreement in the scholarship as to whether the inclusion of the elder Krupp was
due to a misunderstanding between the Allies or a conscious decision, see Wiesen, West
German Industry, p. 69; Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, pp. 1111-1112.
52Baars, ‘Capitalism’s Victors Justice’, p. 172.
53Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, p. 1110.
54Quoted after Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 69.
55Priemel and Stiller, NMT , p. 95; Baars, ‘Capitalism’s Victors Justice’, p. 178.
56Robert H. Jackson. ‘Final Report to the President Concerning the Nurnberg war Crimes
Trial’. In: Temple Law Quaterly 20 (1946), pp. 338–344, p. 341.
57For a detailed reconstruction of the decision-making process based on memos, see Bush,
‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, pp. 1115-1118 and pp. 1123-1128.
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subsequent trials
To write about how the ‘economic case’ was taken up in the subsequent trials
presupposes a decision about which cases can be considered to touch upon
the economic dimension of World War II. As stated above, it was the intention
of the Allies to give a legal voice to their conviction, that Hitler could only have
waged war thanks to the financial support of German big business, which
was accused of having profited from cartelisation practices, spoliation in the
occupied territories and the use of forced labour. For the Allies, the problem
thus was not only the responsibility of individual businessmen for crimes
committed under Nazi rule, but also the economic policies adopted by the
government and the role of the state in fostering monopolist structures. The
link between economic practices, the state and state-backed violence was at
stake.
From this perspective, it would make sense to include trials investigating the
responsibility of state officials that were in charge of planning the economic
policies and structure of the Reich into the group of subsequent trials that
take up the ‘economic case’ from the IMT. Here, however, I will focus on the
trials against private actors. The reason for this is that I am interested in
the process of translation needed in order to link the business activity of the
economic actors to systematic crimes carried out with the help of the state
apparatus.
The best-known trials against German industrialists are those conducted
by the US American prosecutorial team. When it became evident that no
second international tribunal would take place, Taylor and his team started to
work on the preparation for individual trials against German industrialists. A
document which was circulated by the prosecution team in August 1946 listed
the names of almost 5000 industrialists that could possibly be charged with
war crimes.58 However, at no point did the US intend to carry out a large-scale
and long-term trial programme, and the idea seems to have been that most of
the industrialists should be dealt with by German denazification courts.59
Once the plan for a second international tribunal was discarded, the deci-
sions as to who should be prosecuted were made on two grounds. The first
one, as Priemel and Stiller point out, was pragmatism. The team working on
the indictment chose those cases on which some work had already been done.
A second criterion, the authors add, was ‘the paradigmatic and explanatory
potential of the tableau of defendants’.60 At that stage, in addition to outstand-
ing industrialists, the prosecutorial team was still investigating individuals
linked to the Dresdner Bank, Reichswerke Hermann Göring and Vereinigte
Stahlwerke AG (United Steelworks of Germany). In the end, due to time pres-
58Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, p. 1132.
59Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, pp. 1133-1134.
60Priemel and Stiller, NMT , p. 97.
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sure and a reduced budget, there were cases against individuals from three
enterprises – the so-called Flick, Krupp and IG-Farben cases. Furthermore,
Karl Rasche from the Dresdner Bank was prosecuted as part of the so-called
Ministries case.61
The first trial to take place was the one against Friedrich Flick and five other
leading officials of the Flick combine. It was opened on 19th April 1947. All
six defendants were indicted on the counts ‘war crimes and crimes against
humanity, as defined by Article II of Control Council Law N° 10’.62 More
specifically, they were accused of the use of slave labour (count one) and the
plunder of public and private property and spoliation (count two).63 Just over
eight months after the indictment, on 22nd December 1947, the tribunal read
out its judgment. Three of the defendants were found guilty and sentenced to
seven (Friedrich Flick), five (Otto Steinbrinck) and two-and-a-half (Bernhard
Weiss) years of prison. The other defendants (Odilo Burkart, Konrad Kaletsch
and Hermann Terberger) were acquitted.64
The second of the US-led trials investigated the responsibility of 24 leading
officials of the Interessensgemeinschaft Farbenindustrie AG (IG Farben). On
3rd May 1947 Taylor filed the indictment with the military office responsible
for the trials. Just as in the Flick Case, the defendants were accused of crimes
against humanity and war crimes. In addition, under count one the defendants
were indicted with having
through the instrumentality of Farben and otherwise . . . participated in
planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression and
invasions of other countries.65
That is, the tribunal was not only fathoming the responsibility of the indus-
trialists for business activities during the war, but for bringing about the war.
What was at stake was the economic rationale of World War II. As we will see
in the next subsection, the challenge the prosecution faced was to link the
activities of the businessmen to the planning and initiation of a war, a decision
that was predominantly associated with the NS Party. The tribunal did not
follow the argument of the prosecution and found the defendants not guilty
of waging aggressive war. Still, thirteen of them were sentenced for having
61Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, p. 1173.
62Nuernberg Military Tribunals N.M.T. Trials of War Crimes before the Nuernberg Military Tri-
bunals Under Control Council Law Nr. 10. October 1946 - April 1949. The Flick Case. Vol. VI.
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952, p. 13.
63Hermann Terberger was the only defendant not accused of plunder and spoliation. N.M.T.,
NMT vol. VI, p. 13.
64N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 1223; On the Flick case Axel Drecoll. ‘Der Auftakt der Industriellen-
Prozesse: Der Fall 5 gegen die Manager des Flick-Konzerns’. In: NMT. ed. by Kim Christian
Priemel and Alexa Stiller. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013, pp. 376–404.
65Nuernberg Military Tribunals N.M.T. Trials of War Crimes before the Nuernberg Military Tri-
bunals Under Control Council Law Nr. 10. October 1946 - April 1949. IG Farben. Vol. VII.
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952, p. 14.
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participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity and received prison
sentences ranging from one-and-a-half to eight years.
The third case that explicitly dealt with the responsibility of the German
industrialists was United States vs. Alfried Krupp, et.al. The hearings started
on 17th November 1947. The twelve defendants were charged with Crimes
Against Peace, War Crimes (Plunder and Spoilation), Crimes Against Humanity
(Slave Labour), Membership in a Criminal Organisation as well as Conspiracy.
Eleven of them received prison sentences between six and twelve years for War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, while Karl Pfirsch was acquitted. Fur-
thermore, the tribunal ordered the confiscation of both the real and personal
property of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.66
The fact that only three trials of industrialists were listed under the subject
‘economic’ in the official publication of the materials of the ‘Trials of War
Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals’ has resulted in the trial
against Karl Rasche, member of the board of the Dresdner Bank since 1935
and chief executive officer from 1942 onwards, often being forgotten.67 The
Dresdner Bank had been at the centre of the investigations carried out by
the OMGUS, and it was initially planned that it would get its own case.68
However, as official support for the punitive approach towards Germany –
and the ‘economic case’ in particular – started to ebb away, the prosecutors
adopted a mix and match strategy for the last tribunal, usually called the
‘Ministries case’. The case brought together four former ministers as well
as undersecretaries of state from the German Foreign Office and the Home
Office. Furthermore, it dealt with the responsibility of five representatives of
the public and private economy – Rasche is one of them – as well as of two
high-ranking SS officials.69 Rasche was found guilty of War Crimes as well as
membership in a criminal organisation (he had been a member of the SS) and
sentenced to seven years in prison.
The US was not the only occupying power that tried industrialists. Following
the decision not to hold a second international military tribunal, the French
military government demanded the extradition of Hermann Röchling to bring
him and other directors of the Röchling enterprises before the General Tri-
bunal. The General Tribunal was the highest of the military courts in the
66Nuernberg Military Tribunals. Trials of War Crimes before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals
Under Control Council Law Nr. 10. October 1946 - April 1949. The Krupp Case. Vol. IX.
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952, p. 1450.
67Ralf Ahrens. ‘Die nationalsozialistische Raubwirtschaft im Wilhelmstraßen-Prozess’. In:
NMT. ed. by Kim Christian Priemel and Alexa Stiller. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013,
pp. 353–375, p. 357.
68United States Office of Military Government for Germany. Ermittlungen gegen die Dresdner
Bank, 1946. Frankfurt a.M.: Zweitausendeins, 1986.
69On the ‘economic case’ within the Ministries case, see Ralf Ahrens. ‘Der Exempelkandidat.
Die Dresdner Bank und der Nürnberger Prozes gegen Karl Rasche’. In: Vierteljahrshefte
für Zeitgeschichte 52 (2004), pp. 637–670; Ahrens, ‘Nationalsozialistische Raubwirtschaft’;
For a general overview on the Ministries Case, see Dirk Pöppmann. ‘Im Schatten Weizsäck-
ers? Auswärtiges Amt und SS im Wilhelmstraßen-Prozess’. In: NMT. ed. by Kim Christian
Priemel and Alexa Stiller. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013, pp. 320–352.
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French Zone of Occupation – in Rastatt.70 Hermann Röchling, the head of the
firm, joined the NSDAP in 1935 and was a board member of most German
ironworks during Nazi rule. As of 1940, he was also the commissioner gen-
eral (Generalbeauftragter) in charge of the administration of all ironworks in
Alsace-Lorraine (Départements Morselle and Meurthe-et-Morselle).71
The French had already convicted Hermann Röchling and his brother, Robert
Röchling, in 1919 for spoliation and willful damage to property during World
War I, but the appeals court had repealed the decision on formal grounds.72
Following World War II, Hermann Röchling and five other managers were
accused of having ‘encouraged and contributed to the preparation and con-
duct of the wars of aggression’, having ‘helped to bring about the economic
enslavement of the occupied countries’ as well as of having participated ‘in
systematic pillaging of public and private property’.73 They were also indicted
for having ‘employed under compulsion nationals from the countries then
occupied, prisoners of war, and deported persons, who were subjected to
ill-treatment at his orders or with his consent’.74 Ernst and Hermann Röchling
were both found guilty of Crimes Against Peace and War Crimes, with Hermann
Röchling furthermore being convicted of Crimes Against Humanity, as were
two other managers.75 Prison sentences ranged from three to ten years. Ernst
and Hermann Röchling were additionally deprived of their property.76
Although a substantial part of the coal and steel manufacturing industry
was located within the British Zone of Occupation, the British did not, contrary
to the French and the US, conduct any trials against industrialists after the
idea of a second international tribunal was discarded in 1946. However, in
October and November 1945, the British had already arrested 83 industrialists
in the Upper Rhine and Ruhr regions and brought them to Düsseldorf central
jail, from where they moved on to other internment camps.77 This mass arrest
was coordinated with the other allied forces and formed part of the plan to
denazify the industry, which was agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference.
The denazification measures were still carried out under the impression that
German industrialists bore responsibility for the Aggressive War and War
Crimes and thus needed to be hold to account. By January 1946, ‘over a
70Françoise Berger and Joly Hervé. ‘»Fall 13«: Das Rastatter Röchling-Verfahren’. In: NMT. ed.
by Kim Christian Priemel and Alexa Stiller. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013, pp. 464–
490, p. 470.
71Claudia Moisel. ‘Résistance und Repressalien. Die Kriegsverbrecherprozesse in der franzö-
sischen Zone und in Frankreich’. In: Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik. Ed. by Norbert
Frei. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006, pp. 247–282, p. 269.
72Berger and Hervé, ‘»Fall 13«’, pp. 465-466.
73For the individual responsibilities as indicted by the prosecution, see Nuernberg Military
Tribunals N.M.T. Trials of War Crimes before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control
Council Law Nr. 10. October 1946 - April 1949. The Ministries Case. Vol. XIV. Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 1952, pp. 1072-1074.
74N.M.T., NMT vol. XIV , pp. 1072-1074.
75N.M.T., NMT vol. XIV , pp. 1095-1096.
76Cf. tabular summary of sentences in Priemel and Stiller, NMT , p. 790.
77Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 53.
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thousand high-level officials had been removed from their positions’ in the coal
industry.78 The denazification trials of German industrialists in the British
Zone were conducted mainly by German courts. The arrested industrialists
went through the denazification procedures rather smoothly and left the
detention camps shortly after their arrest.79
Also in the period immediately after the war, in May 1946, the British
presented a case against Bruno Tesch, owner of a firm called Tesch & Stabenow
(Testa), and two other high-ranking officers in the firm, Karl Weinbacher and
Joachim Dosihn, ‘of having supplied poison gas used for killing allied nationals
interned in concentration camps, knowing that it was so to be used’.80 Because
of the name of the poison gas, this case is often referred to as the ‘Zyklon B’
case. After a swift trial in Hamburg that lasted 8 days, Tesch and Weinbacher
were found guilty of war crimes and sentenced to death, while Dosihn was
acquitted.81 Both Tesch and Weinbacher were hanged.
The heavy sentence of this early trial, and the fact that the sentence was
carried out at all, stands in stark contrast to the sentences rendered by the
US and French tribunals. Not only were the sentences rather lenient when
compared with the death sentence of the British tribunal, but also very few
of the industrialists convicted by the Americans and the French ever finished
their sentence at all. John McCloy, US High Commissioner from 1949 onwards,
created an ‘Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals’ which was to re-
consider the sentences dictated by the US American tribunals. Eventually,
Krupp and Flick were amnestied and their property restituted.82
McCloy’s push for amnesties for the imprisoned industrialists can be linked,
according to Jonathan Wiesen, to two factors that are indicative of the changing
political circumstances. First, the fact that most West Germans supported the
Schuman Plan was taken by the Americans as ‘a hopeful sign that German
industry was now committed to peaceful competition and cooperation with
its neighbors’.83 Second, Wiesen highlights, the Korea War increased the
demand for coal and steel and allowed German industry to present itself as a
necessary ally in the fight against communism.84 Against the backdrop of the
Paris Treaty and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the
French released Röchling in 1951 and restored his property rights in 1956.85
In addition to these wider political circumstances, German industry was quick
78Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 67.
79Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, p. 1134.
80United Nations War Crimes Crimes Commision, ed. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals.
London, 1947, p. 93.
81United Nations War Crimes Crimes Commision, Law Reports I, p. 102.
82Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 214.
83The Schuman Plan proposed to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under
one common High Authority and lead, in April 1951, to the creation of the European Coal
and Steel Community. See Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 209.
84Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 212.
85Berger and Hervé, ‘»Fall 13«’, p. 488.
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to reorganise itself to the point of financing an office that would coordinate the
lobbying work on behalf of the industrialists that faced legal action.86
small-scale history
In the first section of this chapter I suggested that with Benjamin, to look at
the Industrialist Trials as a historical object requires one to zoom in on the
small-scale history as it crystallises in the trials themselves. In line with this
proposal, this section introduced the Industrialist Trials by focusing on the
diverging historical forces and interests that enter the trials on a reduced scale.
The trials, I argued, speak to their ‘fore-history’ in so far as they owe their very
existence to the conviction that World War II and the crimes committed by the
German state would not have been possible without the active participation of
German big business.
However, the fact that after the exclusion of Krupp from the dock at the IMT
the Allies decided against a second international tribunal reflects the changing
political situation: the perceived threat of communism started to acquired more
importance than worries about the violence of capitalism. As tensions with the
Soviet Union grew, the Western Allies feared that the trials against German
industrialists could be understood as anti-capitalistic at a time in which they
needed to rescue capitalism’s reputation. In hindsight, the lenient sentences,
the amnesties and the restitution of property appear as the first signs of the
after-history of Western Germany: the so-called social market economy, or
Soziale Marktwirtschaft. This societal order was to demonstrate that capitalism
is not a threat to, but a pre-condition for a stable and functioning democratic
society.
The after-history becomes even more apparent once we turn to the legal
reasoning at work in the trials. I conceive of the legal arguments presented by
the prosecution and put forward by the judges to justify their decision as the
‘bowels’ of the Industrialist Trials. If dissected, they allow us to see the mirrors
that make up the kaleidoscope of the politico-legal order that constructs the
image of the past. These mirrors, as I will argue in the following section,
organise the representation of the events as well as the responsibility of the
accused according to liberal ontological assumptions about the state and the
economy, thereby constructing the Nazi state as a negative reference for the
post-war order.
4.3 The ‘bowels’: dissecting the legal arguments
In the previous chapter, I argued that the moment of judgment in a criminal
trial encompasses two movements. It joins the construction of the events or
actions that are under consideration with a statement concerning their legal
86Wiesen, West German Industry, pp. 205-207.
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nature and the legal responsibility of the accused. This drawing of a line is a
performative act that ‘masquerades’ as a constative, in so far as it claims to
merely implement a distinction which it in fact brings about in the moment of
adjudication.87 The first sentence of the opening statement given by Telford
Taylor, head of prosecution in the Flick case, is an excellent example of this
move:
The responsibility of opening the first trial of industrialists for capital
transgressions of the law of nations imposes on the prosecution, above
all things, the obligation of clarity. The defendants owned and exploited
enormous natural and man-made resources and became very wealthy,
but these things are not declared as crimes by the law under which this
Tribunal renders judgment. The law of nations does not say that it is
criminal to be rich, or contemptible to be poor. . . . The defendants were
powerful and wealthy men of industry, but that is not their crime. We do
not seek here to reform the economic structure of the world or to raise the
standard of living. We seek, rather, to confirm and revitalize the ordinary
standards of human behavior embodied in the law of nations.88
What Taylor refers to as confirming and revitalizing the ‘ordinary standards
of human behavior embodied in the law of nations’ must be read as: the
tribunal creates the standards in deciding which aspect of the behaviour of
the industrialists is considered to be a violation of the law of nations. Or, to
re-phrase Kirchheimer’s expression already invoked in the introduction: the
tribunal introduces a distinction between those business practices that reflect
the ‘ordinary standards of human behavior embodied in the law of nations’ on
the one hand, and those that need to be considered criminal on the other.
corrupted capitalism
Contrary to what Taylor claims in the opening statement, in this section I
will argue that the trials are involved in the ‘reform the economic structure’
in so far as they, in deciding the legal responsibility of the accused actors,
produce an image of the past which comes to serve as a negative reference for
the German post-war order. At the end of the previous chapter, I contended
that the political function of such a negative reference constructed in criminal
trials is that it clouds the foundational violence of the post-war order. That is,
it clouds the contingent nature of the institutional arrangements by positing
them as the necessary lesson to be learned from the violence experienced in
the past.89
This image of the past constructed in the Industrialist Trials, as we will see
in more detail below, presents the involvement of the German industrialists in
87For a rendering of political trials as sovereign performatives, see Chapters Two and Three in
Ertür, ‘Spectacles and Spectres. Political Trials, Performativity and Scenes of Sovereignty’.
88N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 31.
89See discussion on pp.100–103
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the crimes committed as the manifestation of a ‘capitalism gone wrong’.90 This
wrong form of capitalism was specified as a monopoly capitalism, exemplified
by cartels and syndicates that characterised the Nazi economy which was
created with the aim of a self-sufficient industry for war. Monopoly capitalism
and the consequent influence of the industrialists was, in the eyes of the
judges, not so much the result of the logic of capital as such, but of a particular
interaction and arrangement between the state and the economy.91
The idea of a capitalism gone wrong – namely a state-fostered monopoly
capitalism – manifested itself in the legal strategy of the prosecutorial team
that sought to establish the individual responsibility for crimes against peace
by focusing on the manifestations of the association between the state and
the economy: cartels, syndicates and self-governmental organisations of entire
industry sectors. The American attitude towards German business following
World War II, Priemel highlights, needs to be understood first and foremost
against the backdrop of the anti-trust debate in the US and the Sherman Act
of 1890. He writes:
The debate on cartels and monopolies . . . assumed a morally and polit-
ically charged character, not by questioning capitalism but by differen-
tiating between good and bad variants. Indeed, part of the rationale be-
hind the attack on cartels was to defend the private-business/free-market
model against attacks from leftist quarters.92
Such a reading of the Nazi rule had important implications for the discus-
sions regarding the economic and political organisation of the new German
state. If cartels were problematic because a ‘totalizing economy’ served a ‘total
state’, only a ‘self-regulating economy’, it was suggested, could be in agreement
with democratic principles.93 Importantly, the image of the ‘totalizing economy’
could be used to discredit the Nazi war economy as well as any centrally
planned economy advocated by the left.
We will encounter similar arguments regarding the market as an organising
mechanism for the economy – and its compatibility with democracy – again
in a debate which is not revisited by Priemel, namely the ordoliberal studies
of the Nazi state. As Foucault highlights in his analysis of the ordo-liberal
renderings of World War II, it is the analytical distinction between the logic
of capital on the one hand, and historical manifestations of capitalism on
the other, that allowed a German state to be envisioned that was democratic
and capitalist despite the supporting role of the industrialists in the Third
Reich and World War II.94 I will turn to these studies and their relevance for
the foundation of the West German political and economic order in the next
90I take this expression from Priemel, ‘“A Story of Betrayal”’, p. 94.
91For a detailed development of this argument, see Priemel, ‘“A Story of Betrayal”’.
92Priemel, ‘“A Story of Betrayal”’, pp. 76-77.
93Priemel, ‘“A Story of Betrayal”’, pp. 76,79.
94See Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 165. See also discussion below, p. 144.
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section. Together with the analysis of the legal arguments in this section, they
show that what was at stake in the industrialist trials was the authorisation of
a new juridico-political order.
aggressive war
The historian Elizabeth Borgwardt expressed her fascination about the fact
that what ‘Nuremberg’ has come to stand for in the contemporary debate on
corporate complicity ‘would have been all but unrecognizable to our historical
actors in real time’.95 Rather than being primarily interested in holding to
account individuals for human rights violations, the central concern of the
prosecution was to outlaw aggressive war.
In this spirit, the prosecution charged the defendants in both IG Farben
and Krupp with the ‘planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of
aggression and invasions of other countries’.96 The charge of the individual
commission of the crime against peace was complemented with a conspiracy
charge. The defendants were accused of having
participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices in the
formulation and execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or
which involved the commission of, crimes against peace.97
The prosecution thus needed to create a narrative that would be able to
convince the tribunal, as well as the German and international public, of the
responsibility of private individuals for bringing about the war. Josiah Dubois,
who at the beginning of 1947 joined the prosecution team to spearhead the
case against Farben, recalls a conversation he had with Mickey Marcus, a
colonel from the War Crimes Division of the War Department, before travelling
to Nuremberg. In this conversation, Dubois had suggested that in order to
make their case, the prosecution would not necessarily have to show that
the industrialists ‘enjoyed pushing pins around on a map’.98 ‘Suppose’, he
continued, ‘we could show that they had power far greater than any general in
the field’.99 According to Dubois, Marcus’ objected to the War Crimes charge
for industrialists, stating that
[m]aybe the Farben leaders were masters of economic warfare, but if I
were a judge, I would want to know how you blame a war on men who
weren’t even in the Army or the Foreign Office.100
95Elizabeth Borgwardt. ‘Bernath Lecture. Commerce and Complicity: Corporate Responsibility
for Human Rights Abuses as a Legacy of Nuremberg’. In: Diplomatic History 34.4 (2010),
pp. 627–640, p. 630.
96For IG Farben, see N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 14; for Krupp, see Nuernberg Military Tribunals,
NMT vol. IX , p. 10.
97For IG Farben, see N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 59; for Krupp, see Nuernberg Military Tribunals,
NMT vol. IX , p. 35.
98Josiah E. DuBois. The Devil’s Chemists. 24 Conspirators of the International Farben Cartel
who Manufacture Wars. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952, p. 20.
99DuBois, Devil’s Chemists, p. 20.
100DuBois, Devil’s Chemists, p. 20.
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With this statement, Dubois’ interlocutor named a central challenge the prose-
cution faced with the aggressive war charges: how to link the industrialists
to a decision and actions usually associated with the state and its military
institutions?
Since the beginning of the preparation of the ‘economic case’ at Nuremberg,
the prosecutors struggled to find a legal theory that could capture the political
responsibility of the industrialists for waging war and translate it into some
form of legal responsibility.101 German cartels – that is, the institutionalised
cooperation between state and economy – did eventually provide the lens
through which the prosecution tried to link the individual industrialists to the
decision of waging war.
Taylor, head of prosecution, instructed his team to adopt the so-called
‘institutional approach’ which had been elaborated by team member Leo
Drachsler, in order to conceive the responsibility of the accused. According to
Drachsler the industrialists could be treated as a single organisation, a third
pillar of power within the Nazi state next to the party and the military.102 If
one was able to establish the complicity of the industry as organisation in
the conspiracy to wage war, he argued, then one only would have to link the
individual defendant to this third pillar. As Drachsler writes in a memorandum:
When the industrialists appear in the dock they will appear in their rep-
resentative capacity, as officers of the leading German economic institu-
tions, as corporate officials of their own organizations, and as individuals.
They should be tried and convicted, not as representing merely ‘German
industry’ or the ‘German economic system’, but in these three specific
capacities.103
Many commentators highlighted the influence of Franz Neumann’s thoughts
regarding this formulation of strategy for the US prosecution. Franz Neumann
had left Germany following the victory of the Nazi Party in 1933 – first to the
UK and then to the United States, where he worked with Max Horkheimer
and others at the exiled Frankfurt Institute for Social Research until 1942.104
In 1943, Neumann started working for the US government, namely in the
Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, where he
prepared reports on Nazi Germany. Neumann had finished his Bethemoth in
1942, and this study of the Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-
1944 – as the subtitle reads – was widely circulated among his colleagues.105
101For a detailed account of the discussions within the prosecution, see Bush, ‘The Prehistory
of Corporations’.
102Quoted in Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, p. 1158.
103Drachsler, quoted in Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, p. 1159.
104See the introduction by Peter Hayes in Franz L. Neumann. Behemoth. Struktur und Praxis
des Nationalsozialismus 1933-1944. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1994
(1942), pp. ix-x.
105Neumann, Behemoth.
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Neumann’s central thesis was that the nature of National Socialism could
not be captured by the usual idea of the state as one centralised political
power, such as Hobbes’ Leviathan.
Socialist constitutional theory . . . clearly admits that it is not the state
which unifies political power but that there are three (in our view, four) co-
existent political powers, the unification of which is not institutionalized
but only personalized.106
According to Neumann, these co-existent powers were the party, the Wehrma-
cht, the bureaucracy and the monopoly economy which each functioned
according to their own laws. Since National Socialism lacks any unification of
political power, which in Neumann’s view was necessary when speaking of a
state, the Reich could only be defined as a non-state, the Behemoth.
Out of the various commentaries on the relationship between Neumann’s
analysis of National Socialism and the prosecutorial strategy at the industri-
alist trials, the work of Doreen Lustig stands out. She not only brings how
Neumann’s analysis of National Socialism coined the prosecutorial strategy
into relief, but she also takes Neumann’s idea of the non-state seriously.
She shows that neither the prosecution nor the judges followed Neumann’s
analysis right to the end. Neumann’s ‘leadership principle’ was adopted and
translated by the prosecution into the ‘institutional approach’. The latter delin-
eated the independent blocks of power before identifying the individuals that
linked them. The prosecution did not, however, give up on the idea of a state
as a centralised institution. It held on to the idea that the political institutions
exercised the monopoly of force and constituted the locus of decision-making.
Consequently, it needed to prove the influence of the economic actors on the
party’s decision-making if it wanted to argue their responsibility for aggressive
war.
In Farben, the prosecution focused on a meeting that took place in February
1933 between Hitler and German industry representatives. In the opening
statement, Dubois quotes from Hitler’s speech:
Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of democracy; it is con-
ceivable only if the people have a sound idea of authority and personality.
. . . It is not by chance that one person accomplishes more than the other.
The principle of private ownership which has slowly gone into general con-
ception of justice and has become a complicated process of economic life
is rooted in this fact. . . . It is, however, not enough to say we do not want
communism in our economy.107
Hitler’s speech, Dubois continues, was followed by an appeal for funds for the
Nazi party. He links the defendant Von Schnitzler, IG Farben’s representative
at the meeting, to the Nazi’s rise to power. Von Schnitzler, Dubois holds,
106Neumann, Behemoth, p. 469.
107N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 122.
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went back and reported what he had heard to the other Farben officials.
Farben contributed 400,000 marks for Hitler’s campaign – the largest sin-
gle contribution by any of the firms represented at the meeting. The pay-
ment was made on 27 February 1933. The next day the Reichstag build-
ing was set on fire, and on the same day Hitler and his Cabinet, utilizing
the fire as a pretext, promulgated a decree suspending the constitutional
guarantees of freedom.108
The subtext of the strategy in Farben is one of converging interests of
National Socialism and industrialists, and the conviction that Hitler could not
have come to power without their financial support. They painted the image of
one conspiracy to wage war: defendant Krauch, who had been ‘put in charge of
research and development in Goering’s newly created Office for German Raw
Materials and Synthetics’ was seen as the link between the central planning of
the war industry and IG Farben production.109
In Krupp, the prosecution created a different conspiracy narrative. It de-
scribed two different conspiracies to wage war, one ‘Krupp’ and one ‘Nazi’
conspiracy that eventually converged.110 Lustig summarises the difference
between both prosecution strategies as follows:
In the Farben indictment, the defendants were depicted as part of the
war machine, complicit in the grand scheme of war initiated by the Nazi
government. In the Krupp indictment, the defendants resembled a group
of conspiring pirates, . . . a bunch of organized gangsters conspiring to
achieve their aims by unlawful means.111
In both cases, the prosecution failed to convince the Tribunals. The judges
declared the defendants not guilty of aggressive war because in their view,
the prosecution failed to prove that the defendants had any influence on
policy-making. In line with the IMT judgment, both Tribunals argued that
rearmament as such was not a crime and that only ‘principals’ could be
held accountable for crimes against peace, but not ‘followers’.112 The Farben
Tribunal sustained that
The evidence does not show that any of them know the extent to which
general rearmament had been planned, or how far it had progressed at
any given time.113
In Krupp, the Tribunal found that
108N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 124.
109For a description of the conspiracy, see the indictment N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, pp. 22,18-38; cf.
summary in Lustig, Doing Business, pp. 990-993.
110Kim Christian Priemel. ‘Der Sonderweg vor Gericht. Angewandte Geschichte im Nürnberger
Krupp-Prozess’. In: Historische Zeitschrift 294.2 (2012), pp. 391–426, p. 408.
111Lustig, Doing Business, p. 1000.
112Lustig, Doing Business, pp. 996-997.
113Nuernberg Military Tribunals. Trials of War Crimes before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals
Under Control Council Law Nr. 10. October 1946 - April 1949. IG Farben Case. Vol. VIII.
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1952, p. 1119.
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the defendants were private citizens and noncombatants . . . . None of
them had any voice in the policies which led their nation into aggressive
war; nor were any of them privies to that policy. None had any control
over the conduct of the war or over any of the armed forces.114
While the verdicts thus did not follow the indictments, in both cases the pros-
ecution and judges presuppose – as Lustig highlights – the state’s monopoly
over violence ‘through the insistence that only a close link to the policy-making
realm can provide grounds for criminal responsibility’.115 For her, however,
‘the notion of the state as a monolithic power that monopolizes violence is
often a default-position in the theory of international legal responsibility’ with-
out necessarily reflecting the actual ability of the bureaucratic apparatus to
exercise power.116
In line with the theoretical framework set out in the previous chapter, I
wish to take the perceived mismatch between the images of the past brought
up by the trials and the way in which they are organised by legal forms of
responsibility as a point of entry for a critique of ICL. It is there where the
confrontation with the past exposes the constructed nature of the concepts of
legal responsibility; where these concepts, the mirrors of the kaleidoscope, are
most visible.
One of these concepts that is starting to emerge is the state. It is construed
by the prosecution and the judges in its Weberian definition, according to
which the central quality of the modern state is its ability to ‘successfully’
claim ‘the monopoly of legitimate force for itself’.117 Industrialists are, by
definition, relegated to the private sphere. This ex-ante assumption of the
separate realm of the state apparatus and the economy will become even more
clear in the legal arguments which concern the industrialists’ responsibility
for Slave Labour as well as Plunder and Spoliation.
slave labour: necessity and moral choice
In November 1946, Drexel A. Sprecher, member of the US prosecution team
and top deputy to Telfor Taylor, proposed to have a separate ‘slave labour’
case. This case was to take place in addition to the Flick, Krupp and Farben
cases so that the dependency of the Nazi economy on forced labour would be
demonstrated. Sprecher envisioned a case that, as Bush puts it,
crossed company boundaries and public-private lines, and would presum-
ably need some theory to support the joinder of the defendants in a com-
mon case.118
114Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. IX , p. 449.
115Lustig, Doing Business, p. 1001.
116Lustig, Doing Business, p. 968; Similarly Ahrens, ‘Nationalsozialistische Raubwirtschaft’,
p. 375.
117Max Weber. ‘Politics as Vocation’. In: Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and
Political Vocations. Ed. by John Dreijmanis. New York: Algora, 2008, pp. 155–208, p. 156.
118Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, p. 1170.
The ‘bowels’: dissecting the legal arguments 134
However, together with other plans for more trials addressing the economic
dimensions of World War II, Sprecher’s proposal got truncated when the US
government signaled that it wanted the military tribunals to be finished as
soon as possible.119 Still, in all three industrialist trials the defendants were
charged with slave labour.
In the following brief account of the legal findings concerning the slave labour
charge, I will focus on the grounds on which the judges invoke the defense
of necessity in order to justify their verdicts. With the defense of necessity,
the question regarding the extent to which the defendants had been able to
decide freely when deploying slave labour was put on the table. In this context,
as we will see, the ex-ante assumption about the state’s monopoly of force
is operative again in the process of defining the legal responsibility of the
accused.
The Flick tribunal was the first to decide on the individual responsibility
of the defendants for the use of slave labour. They had been charged for the
deportation of workers and for ‘deaths, inhuman treatment, and suffering of
the workers while employed in enterprises under their control’.120 Contrary
to the IMT judgment, the Flick tribunal accepted the ‘necessity’ defense as an
excuse for the employment of slave labour if certain criteria were met.121 The
judges argued that only where the prosecution could prove that the defendants
had taken initiative themselves, criminal responsibility for slave labour could
be assumed. In line with this argument, two of the defendants, Weiss and
Flick, were found guilty because they actively solicited Russian prisoners of
war in order to be able to meet a self-set production quota for freight cars.
Similarly, the Farben tribunal, reviewing the legal reasoning in Flick and
Röchling, agreed that
the defense of necessity is not available where the party seeking to invoke
it was, himself, responsible for the existence or execution of such order or
decree, or where his participation went beyond the requirements thereof,
or was the result of his own initiative.122
The Flick and Farben Tribunals thus both identified circumstances under
which the defense of necessity was not available to a defendant. These circum-
stances, however, turned out to be the exceptions that confirmed the rule. In
most cases the Flick Tribunal held, the defendants had not been able to act
freely and therefore lacked the possibility of moral choice on which criminal
responsibility rests:
The Reich, through its hordes of enforcement officials and secret police,
was always ‘present,’ ready to go into instant action and to mete out sav-
119Bush, ‘The Prehistory of Corporations’, pp. 1170-1171.
120N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, pp. 54-55, quote at p. 55.
121On this change in the jurisprudence on the necessity defense, see Baars, ‘Capitalism’s Vic-
tors Justice’, p. 179.
122Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. VIII, p. 1179.
The ‘bowels’: dissecting the legal arguments 135
age and immediate punishment against anyone doing anything that could
be construed as obstructing or hindering the carrying out of governmental
regulations or decrees.123
Similarly, in Farben, the judges stated explicitly that it was the task of the
prosecution to prove the ‘initiative of a character to deprive [the defendant]
of the defense of necessity which has otherwise been established’.124 Out of
the 25 defendants, five were found guilty according to this requirement. The
tribunal found that the defendants Dürrfeld, Ambros, Bütefisch, Krauch and
Ter Meer bore criminal responsibility for the use of slave labour at the plants
at Auschwitz and Fürstengrube, as
these were wholly private projects operated by Farben, with considerable
freedom and opportunity for initiative on the part of Farben officials con-
nected therewith.125
Given the victory of the ‘necessity’ defense in Flick and Farben, the defen-
dants in Krupp expected the charges of slave labour to be equally dismissed by
their tribunal. They erred. In Krupp, the judges emphasised that the defense
of necessity could not be established on a general basis, but warranted an
evaluation of the proportionality between the suffering the defendant might
have had to endure if he had opposed the orders and the suffering that was
actually endured by the workers:
If we may assume that as a result of opposition to Reich policies, Krupp
would have lost control of his plant and the officials their positions, it is
difficult to conclude that the law of necessity justified a choice favorable
to themselves and against the unfortunate victims who had no choice at
all in the matter. Or, in the language of the rule, that the remedy was not
disproportionate to the evil.126
There is, thus, no unanimous jurisprudence concerning the defense of neces-
sity in relation to the slave labour charges.127
What the legal findings in all three cases have in common, however, is
that the judges assume the state’s monopoly of force through which it was
able to implement the slave labour programme also against the will of the
businessmen.128 In doing so, they project the liberal distinction of the public
123N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 1201.
124Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. VIII, p. 1195.
125Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. VIII, p. 1186.
126Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. IX , p. 1445.
127For the Nuremberg trials’ jurisprudence on the defense of necessity, see also Kevin Jon Heller.
The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law. Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 302-305.
128See also the discussion in Doreen Lustig. ‘The Nature of the Nazi State and the Questions of
International Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials at Nuremberg. Revisiting Franz
Neumann’s concept of Behemoth at the industrialist trials’. In: New York University Journal
of International Law and Politics 43 (2011), pp. 965–1044, pp. 1026-1040 (emphasising the
disaggregated responsibility that follows from a lack of understanding of the structure of
the corporation).
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and the private sphere onto the past. It is a distinction which comes to
justify the tribunal’s decisions regarding the (lack of) legal responsibility of the
accused. Legal responsibility, the argument goes, presupposes moral choice –
that is, the ability to act and decide freely.
The defense of necessity, as invoked in Flick and Farben, suggests that
this freedom and the derived responsibility ceases to exist in the moment the
state impinges upon the private sphere, namely upon decisions concerning
production as well as the relation between capital owners and the labour
force. Economic actors, it is suggested, can only be held to account for their
actions if this realm of freedom is warranted by the state. The legal arguments
concerning the count of slave labour suggest that with the set production quota
and prescribed forced labour, National Socialism violated and thus canceled
the condition under which legal responsibility can be assumed.
What exposes these decisions as liberal, is not the fact that economic actors
(as opposed to the military personnel) were granted the defense of necessity,
but the way in which these decisions were justified. In the judgments, the
totalitarian state is defined as totalitarian not merely because it violated the
physical integrity of millions of people, but because it violated the independence
of the economic sphere. The state’s infringement of the private sphere was
assumed to be the rule against the backdrop of which the exceptions had to
be proved. The role of this assumption that introduces the political as the
realm of the monopoly of force, and the economy as the realm of voluntary
interactions in delimiting the responsibility of the economic actors, becomes
even more apparent in relation to the count of plunder and spoliation.
business as usual
In all three cases, the US prosecution charged defendants with plunder and
spoliation in the occupied territories. The judges did not follow the indictments
completely in any of the cases. Rather, they introduced a distinction between
business transactions and the seizure of property that fulfilled the count of
plunder and spoliation, and those that did not. The criteria introduced by the
three tribunals to justify this distinction shed further light on the underlying
assumptions about the nature of the Nazi state and the way in which it shaped
the Tribunals’ legal findings.129 As we shall see, it is again the relationship
between the public and the private sphere which served as the basis for the
decisions on the defendants’ legal responsibility.
The count of plunder and spoliation had already been negotiated at the IMT.
There, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the territories occupied by
Germany
129The following analysis benefits immensely from Doreen Lustig’s work, although I do not
agree with her in all of the claims she makes. See Lustig, Doing Business, pp. 1008-1026.
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were exploited for the German war effort in the most ruthless way, without
consideration of the local economy, and in consequence of a deliberate
design and policy.130
But it was only in Flick that a tribunal had to decide on the criminal liability
of a private individual for these property offenses for the first time. These
concerned, as the Tribunal specified,
[Otto] Steinbrinck’s activities directing the production of coal and steel
in the western territories, the Flick administration of the Rombach plant
and the occupation and use of the Vairogs and Dnjepr Stahl plants in the
East.131
The central question the Tribunal had to decide upon with regard to the
count of plunder and spoliation was under which circumstances business
transactions during war were lawful under international law. The central piece
of relevant international legislation on plunder was the Hague Convention
from 1907. According to the judges, the purpose of Articles 45 to 56 of the
‘Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land’ was to protect
private property and the economy of the occupied country.132 A violation of
these articles was only to be found where the local economy was effectively
damaged beyond the exceptions provided by the Hague Convention.
With respect to the accusations against Otto Steinbrinck in his capacity
‘as Commissioner for Steel (Luxembourg, Belgium and northern France) from
May 1941 until July 1942 and as Bekowest (Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and northern France with the exception of Lorraine) from March 1942 until
September 1944’, the judges couldn’t find any ‘intentional discrimination
against local economy.’133 The Tribunal substantiates the finding, arguing that
[i]n his administration he endeavored to disturb as little as possible the
peacetime flow of coal and steel between industries in these countries. Of
course the German economy benefited but not by confiscation or ruth-
less exploitation attributable to Steinbrinck. . . . The different companies
were paid for their shipments in some cases at better prices than in peace-
time.134
The prosecution in Farben construed Plunder and Spoliation of private
property as a double offense. It was, first, an attack against the private
property of the respective owners, and second, a crime against the economy of
the occupied country. From this perspective, even where business transaction
had been agreed upon by the parties on a voluntary basis, such a transaction
130Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Proceedings Vol-
umes (The Blue Set).
131N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 1203.
132N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, pp. 1203-1204.
133‘BeKo-West’ (Beauftragter für Kohle - West) was the acronym for the Plenipotentiary for Coal
in the Occupied Western Territories. N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, pp. 1210,1212.
134N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 1211.
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could still be considered a crime against the local economy and thus was to be
considered plunder.
The judges, however, disagreed with the view put forward by the prosecution.
The Farben judgment offers a detailed summary of the crimes of Plunder
and Spoliation as defined by the Hague Conventions before evaluating the
individual responsibility of each of the defendants. It is worth quoting the
summary at some length, for it clearly exposes the operative distinctions
on which the Tribunal bases its decisions: free choice as criterion for the
validity of business transactions and the presence of the occupying state forces
(‘coercion’) as indicator for the lack of such freedom of choice. The judgment
reads:
We look in vain for any provision in the Hague Regulations which would
justify the broad assertion that private citizens of the nation of the military
occupant may not enter into agreements respecting property in occupied
territories when consent of the owner is, in fact, freely given. This becomes
important to the evaluation of the evidence as applied to individual action
under the concept that guilt is personal and individual. If, in fact, there is
no coercion present in an agreement relating to the purchase of industrial
enterprises or interests equivalent thereto, even during time of military oc-
cupancy, and if, in fact, the owner’s consent is voluntarily given, we do not
find such action to be violation of the Hague Regulations. . . . On the other
hand, when action by the owner is not voluntary because his consent is
obtained by threats, intimidation, pressure, or by exploiting the position
and power of the military occupant under circumstances indicating that
the owner is being induced to part with his property against his will, it is
clearly a violation of the Hague Regulations.135
With regard to the question of how to identify whether an agreement was
made by free choice, the Tribunal states:
The mere presence of the military occupant is not the exclusive indica-
tion of the assertion of pressure. Certainly where the action of private
individuals, including juristic persons, is involved, the evidence must go
further and must establish that a transaction, otherwise apparently legal
in form, was not voluntarily entered into because of the employment of
pressure. Furthermore, there must be a causal connection between the
illegal means employed and the result brought about by employing such
intimidation.136
As indicated above, the Farben Tribunal argued with respect to the charge of
slave labour that the presence of the state triggered the defense of necessity un-
less individual initiative was proven. The effects of the supposed omnipresence
of the Nazi state on property transactions were, however, judged differently.
According to the tribunal, in each case it was necessary to individually scruti-
nise whether the presence of the occupied forces allowed one to deduce that
135Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. VIII, pp. 1135-1136 (my italics).
136Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. VIII, pp. 1134-1136.
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consent (by the French or Belgian business partners) was not freely given. It
concluded that in most cases in which
Farben dealt directly with the private owners, there was the everpresent
threat of forceful seizure of the property by the Reich or other similar
measures.137
However, with regard to charges of spoliation in the Rhone-Poulenc region, the
tribunal found that no threat of force was involved and that thus the ‘transfer
of property constituted normal business transactions’.138
Again, the judges based their argument on the ex-ante assumption, that
the Nazi state held the effective monopoly of force, and that, in principle,
a private sphere existed in which individuals were still able to act freely.
According to this logic – and contrary to the assumptions underlying the
findings concerning the count of slave labour – the general qualification of
the Nazi state as a totalitarian state applied only to the political sphere. The
private sphere was affected by the totalitarian state in instances where the
state tried to intervene in the economy by compelling business transactions
with the threat of physical violence. As Lustig aptly puts it, invoking Ernst
Fraenkel’s analysis of the Nazi state as a ‘Dual State’:139
The prerogative, and thus unlawful, behaviour of the state, was identified
with its unlawful influence on the private sphere, rather than the absence
of a rule of law in the occupied areas.140
totalizing and dialectical images
At the beginning of this section, I quoted Taylor’s words from the opening
statement in Flick, with which he suggested that the only task of the tribunal
was to ‘confirm and revitalize the ordinary standards of human behavior
embodied in the law of nations’. What, then, are these ‘ordinary standards of
human behavior’ that emerge from the analysis of the bowels of the industrialist
trials? As my reading of the legal arguments concerning the responsibility of
the industrialists for Aggressive War, Slave Labour and Plunder and Spoliation
in this section indicates, a central criterion for determining the (il-)legality
of the behaviour of businessmen, was the general relationship between the
Nazi state and its economy. In order to justify the legal findings concerning
the criminal responsibility of the accused, the judges projected the liberal
separation of the state and the economy as normative standard onto the
past, finding illegal behaviour there where the Nazi state disregards this very
separation.
137Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. VIII, p. 1140.
138Nuernberg Military Tribunals, NMT vol. VIII, see p. 1150.
139Ernst Fraenkel. The Dual State. A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1941.
140Lustig, ‘The Nature of the Nazi State’, p. 1042.
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In this vein, the indictments and judgments concerning the Aggressive War
count insinuate that the ‘leadership principle’, according to which individuals
simultaneously occupy public and private positions, and the organisation of
the economy at the service of the state, were the main problem. Accordingly,
it was not the logic of capital, but the disregard for economic principles that
had lead to monopoly capitalism, which, in turn, had made the war possible.
The fact that industrialists took advantage of this particular arrangement of
the political economy made them less honorable businessmen, but was not
considered a legal problem. As the tribunal in Flick stated unmistakably: ‘To
covet is a sin under the Decalogue but not a violation of the Hague Regulations
nor a war crime’.141
Also with regard to the counts of Slave Labour and Plunder and Spoliation,
the tribunals suggest that the economic rationale of the crimes is to be found
where the state tries to impose its own interest, namely to increase resources
for the war, on the economic sphere. It was the threat of physical force that
converted the property transactions in occupied territories into a war crime.
This very presence of the threat of physical force was at the same time reason
enough to consider the defense of necessity for the accused.
In her study on the industrialist trials, Grietje Baars concludes that the
trials of German industrialists ‘spirited away’ the ‘economic dimension’ of
World War II.142 Because they expel the economic from the logic of state crime,
she writes, the industrialist trials need to be qualified as ‘capitalism’s victor
justice’. I agree with Baars that the industrialist trials can rightly be taken
as ‘capitalism’s victors justice’ in so far as they – now quoting Kim Priemel –
‘salvage capitalism’s reputation from the moral ruins of German business’s
complicity in Nazi crimes’.143 However, this was not achieved by writing the
economic out of the picture. Rather, as the discussion of the legal arguments
in this section showed, the trials of German industrialists created an image
of the past in which the economic rationale and causes of World War II were
linked to a particular, ‘baleful’ relationship of the state and the economy.
That, in the context of state crime, the judgments on the (un-)lawfulness of
individual behaviour necessarily imply a judgment on its institutional context
has been shown by Gerry Simpson. As already referred to in the introduction,
he reveals ICL ‘at its origins as a composite of collective and individual no-
tions of responsibility’.144 Thus, while the trials probably do not ‘reform the
economic structure of the world’, they participate in the definition of those
interactions between the state and the economy which are considered legiti-
mate and those that are not. The analysis of the bowels of the industrialist
trials reveals ICL as a liberal concept, because it projects the liberal order,
141N.M.T., NMT vol. VI, p. 1210.
142Baars, ‘Capitalism’s Victors Justice’, p. 164.
143Priemel, ‘“A Story of Betrayal”’, p. 70.
144Simpson, War Crimes, p. 71.
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and that is a particular relationship between the state and the economy, as
normative standard onto the past. In doing so, it simultaneously posits the
liberal political-economic order as the just answer to the violence of the past.
Whether the image of the past constructed by the tribunals is successful
in coming to operate as a negative reference, I argued in the introduction
and the previous chapter, depends on whether it manages to appear as, once
again quoting the words of Otto Kirchheimer, a ‘truthful replica of reality’. In
the case of the industrialist trials, the judges failed to live up to the ‘duty of
clarity’ demanded by Taylor in his opening statement. Rather than offering a
clear-cut image of the alleged responsibility of the German industrialists for
the crimes committed under National Socialism, the tribunals in Flick, Krupp
and Farben expose the problem facing the judges to link the economic actors to
the state-backed violence. As Doreen Lustig puts it in her analysis of the indus-
trialist trials: ‘The industrialists’ involvement in the war brought the historical
contingency of the state’s monopoly over violence to the courtroom’.145
In the first chapter of this thesis, I advanced my argument that the trials
dealing with the responsibility of economic actors are particularly critical to
ICL as they expose the political implications of one of the concepts at the heart
of ICL: the modern state. It is precisely because the question regarding the
economic actors’ responsibility for state crimes challenges the assumptions
of the state’s monopoly over violence that the trials shed light on the implicit
theory of the state at work in ICL.
4.4 Founding the German State
The legal strategies adopted by the prosecution and the judges are often
explained with reference to either the international context or the US anti-trust
debate. Kim Priemel, for example, argues that through the Industrialist Trials,
the US sought to construct a
dichotomous relationship between a Western, and especially an American,
model of good governance – both corporate and political – and its flawed
German rival.146
In this section, I want to look at a different debate in order to further sub-
stantiate the argument made in the last section, namely that what is at stake
in the Industrialist Trials is not merely the individual responsibility of the
defendants, but the authorisation of a particular juridico-political order. As a
space in which economic causes of World War II and the criminal responsibili-
ties of German big business representatives are negotiated and defined, the
Industrialist Trials coincide with a wider societal debate about the lessons to
145Lustig, ‘The Nature of the Nazi State’, p. 985.
146Priemel, ‘“A Story of Betrayal”’, p. 70.
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be learned from the role of the German Wirtschaft147 in National Socialism for
a new German Gesellschaftsordnung.148
Apart from the German nationals working for the OSS, such as Franz Neu-
mann, Germans had, of course, little influence on the Industrialist Trials. We
cannot therefore take the trials as a straightforward attempt at sovereign foun-
dation by the German state. The link I wish to establish between the trials and
the German context is a different one. On the one hand, the trials constituted
a point of reference in the German debate. For example, and as mentioned
before, several industrialists and German banks paid the defense council in
Krupp and Flick and also funded an office in order to support the case of the
industrialists at Nuremberg.149 They also prepared pamphlets in response to
the trials in which they presented themselves as apolitical businessmen who
had suffered from the intervention of the totalitarian state.150 Rather than
being identified as profiteers, capitalists and societal parasites, they actively
tried to regenerate a new image as innovators.151 As Wiesen summarises:
For West German industry the trials in Nuremberg represented at once
the worst publicity disaster imaginable and, paradoxically, the chance for
an aggressive attempt at professional regeneration.152
Thus, the argument could be made that the Industrialist Trials are important
for the German debate in so far as they allow the actors to position themselves.
Indeed, I suggest that with the Industrialist Trials, certain positions regard-
ing what was to be learned from the alliance between German big business and
National Socialism were backed while others were not. In order to illuminate
and expand on what is at stake in the legal arguments which were extracted
in the last section, it is helpful to turn to the German debate.
In doing so, I wish to substantiate two claims advanced in the introduction
to this chapter. The first is that criminal trials in response to state crime do
not break with the principle of sovereignty, but form part of the sovereign
foundation of a new political order. The second is that in the case of the
Industrialist Trials, the image constructed in the trials seeks to authorise a
juridico-political order that places the market as a guarantor of democracy.
This observation is important for a critique of contemporary corporate ac-
countability discourse – as I will be arguing in more detail in the last section
147As Wiesen notes, the German word Wirtschaft denotes both the ‘economy’ as well as ‘eco-
nomic actors’, see Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 7.
148See Ralf Ptak. Vom Ordoliberalismus zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Stationen des Neoliberalis-
mus in Deutschland. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2004, pp. 155-156. See also the discussion
of the Laender constitutions below, p. 150.
149Ahrens, ‘Der Exempelkandidat. Die Dresdner Bank und der Nürnberger Prozes gegen Karl
Rasche’, p. 656; Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 72.
150Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 658.
151Jan-Otmar Hesse. ‘»Der Staat unter der Aufsicht des Marktes« - Michel Foucaults Lektüren
des Ordoliberalismus’. In: Michel Foucaults »Geschichte der Gouvernementalität« in den
Sozialwissenschaften. Internationale Beiträge. Ed. by Susanne Krasmann and Michael
Volkmer. Bielefeld: transcript, 2007, pp. 213–238, p. 230.
152Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 70.
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– because it questions the historical accounts that present the Industrialist
Trials as a critique of the violence of capitalism. Furthermore, it reminds us
that the notion of democracy was essentially contested and that the aim of
liberal democracy posited by ICL and transitional justice is not neutral, but
implies a particular economic order.
neue soziale marktwirtschaft and ordoliberalism
Despite the apparent continuities within the political and economic elites,
Western Germany has sought to draw its legitimation by establishing a break
between post-war Germany and National Socialism.153 In the immediate
aftermath of World War II, an important aspect of this work of creating a
distance to and difference from Nazi Germany concerned the organisation of
the economy.
The experience of the destructive forces of capitalism that dominated the
immediate aftermath of World War II and which had motivated the Allies to
trial German businessmen, was also reflected in the political positions that
were voiced by the German political parties as they were reorganising after the
end of World War II. The official position of the Christian Democratic Union of
Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU), the party that
in 1949 came to win the first general elections in West Germany, as formulated
in the Ahlen Programme from 1947 reads as follows:
The capitalist economic system has served neither the state’s nor the Ger-
man people’s vital interests. After the terrible political, economic, and
social collapse that resulted from criminal power politics, a new order is
required, and it must be built from the ground up. The content and goal
of this new social and economic order can no longer be the capitalistic
pursuit of power and profit; it must lie in the welfare of our people.154
However, the anti-capitalist sentiments within the CDU did not last for long.
In 1949, the party abandoned the vision of a new German economy formulated
in the Ahlen Programme and expressed its conviction that only the market can
handle and solve the problems that post-war Germany was encountering. In
the ‘Düsseldorf Guidelines for Economic, Agricultural and Social Policies and
Housing’ of July 1949, the party introduced for the first time the notion of the
Soziale Marktwirtschaft – or social market economy – as guiding principle for
the structuring of the economy and design of related public policies. By means
of introduction, the pamphlet stated:
After the war, the economic and social life of the German people moved
closer and closer to a state of utter dissolution.
153On German ‘Vergangenheitspolitik’, see Norbert Frei. Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der
Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit. München: Beck, 1996, p. 7.
154For the English translation, see CDU Zone Committee in the British Occupation Zone. The
Ahlen Programme. 1947. URL: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/
Parties%20WZ%205%20Eng.pdf (visited on 04/11/2013).
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The turnaround came on June 20, 1948. The currency reform alone
did not bring it about, but it did create the proper technical precondi-
tions. The most essential impulse came from the implementation of mar-
ket economic principles. On June 20, 1948, the ‘social market economy’
espoused by the CDU made these principles the foundation of German
economic policy.155
June 20th, the date referred to in the guidelines, was the day of the currency
reform, the first measures to reduce price controls towards a liberalisation of
the market. For the CDU, as we read, it was not the currency reform itself
that initiated the change from a social crisis towards economic growth. Rather,
the political measure of the currency reform only enabled the ‘implementation
of market economic principles’ which were the ‘most essential impulse’ for
the turnaround. The currency reform was right, the paragraph suggests, not
because of the economic growth that followed, but because it was directed at
creating a functioning market.
The social market economy advocated by the CDU does not merely describe
a programme for economic policy. Rather, it is to function as the ‘founda-
tion of the envisioned economy and social order’.156 Within this order, the
state’s main function is to enable market forces to operate by securing compe-
tition (Leistungswettbewerb) and by preventing the formation of monopolies
(Monopolkontrolle).157 Competition and the control of monopolies become the
cornerstones for a ‘social and economic democracy’ that in turn was consid-
ered necessary to ‘fulfill and secure’ political democracy.158 When Ludwig
Erhard became Minister of Economic Affairs in 1949, the phrase ‘social market
economy’ became both the legitimation for the economic programme as well as
an explanatory narrative for the German ‘economic miracle’.
Those familiar with German economic theory will easily recognise the lan-
guage and concepts of the economists usually grouped under the label of
ordoliberalism in the Düsseldorf Guidelines.159 The importance of ordoliberal
thinking for the legitimation of the German state following World War II was first
highlighted by Michel Foucault in his lectures on the Birth of Bio-Politics.160
155For the English translation, see CDU. Düsseldorf Guidelines for Economic Policy, Agricultural
Policy, Social Policy, and Housing. (July, 15th). 1949. URL: http://germanhistorydocs.
ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Parties%20WZ%206_Eng.pdf, p. 1.
156CDU, Düsseldorf Guidelines, p. 3, translation amended.
157CDU, Düsseldorf Guidelines, p. 1.
158CDU, Düsseldorf Guidelines, p. 3.
159On the influence of these scholars on the design of the economic policy, see Stefan Scholl. Be-
grenzte Abhängigkeit. Wirtschaft und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus-
Verlag, 2015, p. 231.
160Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics; Later historiographical research has shown that Foucault’s
representation of the different ordoliberal groups is not completely accurate, however, this
does not have any implications for his central argument concerning the logic of governance
at work in their theory. See Hesse, ‘»Der Staat unter der Aufsicht des Marktes« - Michel
Foucaults Lektüren des Ordoliberalismus’.
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While the ordo-liberal economists were by no means as homogenous a group
as the name suggests, there were important common threads.161
Ordoliberal theory initially was formulated in response to the economic
problems during the Weimar Republic, and during the war would already
dedicate itself to the analysis of the political economy of the Third Reich. This
is also why they were able to effectively influence the political and economic
discourse in the immediate aftermath of the war while other social forces were
still trying to organise themselves.162
In his lectures, Foucault is interested in the new liberalism made in Germany,
for it marks an important shift in liberal thinking. The central argument he
develops in his lectures is that by making it the central task of the state to
enable the market, the ordoliberals radicalise economic liberalism. This is
because, in ordoliberal theory, the market comes to function as organisational
principle not merely for the economy, but also for the state. With the social
market economy, Foucault argues,
[t]he state rediscovers its law, its juridical law, and its real foundation in
the existence and practice of economic freedom. History had said no to
the German state, but now the economy will allow it to assert itself.163
Foucault’s analysis emphasises the shift that occurs in liberal thinking with
respect to the legitimation of the political order. What he mentions only in
passing is that this shift in theory is systematised and gains its impact on
Germany policy-making in opposition to the ‘collectivism’ which, according to
the ordoliberals, characterised the Nazi state and its economy.164
If, to adapt Foucault’s phrasing, in the wake of World War II the economy
allowed the German state to assert itself, the envisioned relationship between
the economy and the state drew, in turn, its legitimation from National Social-
ism as a negative reference. According to the ordoliberal economists, history
had not only said ‘no’ to the totalitarian state which was in violation of the rule
of law, but also to a totalitarian state that had violated the rules of the market.
In their view, the concentration of economic power in the form of cartels and
monopolies was the direct consequence of a state that had failed to fulfil its
central task: to guarantee the functioning of the market.
I wish to illustrate how ordoliberal theory and the political positions derived
from its analysis were framed as ‘lessons learned’ from the Nazi economy by
expanding on two concepts that are central to ordoliberal thinking. This is,
first, the identification of all evil as ‘collectivism’, and second, the proposed
solution to this problem, namely to secure competition.
161For a detailed account of the differences, see Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus.
162Ralf Ptak. ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft und Neoliberalismus: ein deutscher Sonderweg’. In:
Neoliberalismus: Analysen und Alternativen. Ed. by Claus Butterwegge, Bettina Lösch, and
Ralf Ptak. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008, pp. 69–89, p. 71.
163Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 85,86.
164See for example Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 81-82,116.
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collectivism vs. competition
Already in 1942, Wilhelm Röpke, a prominent exponent of ordoliberal theory,
had defined the task of the ordoliberals in opposition to the phenomenon of
collectivism. In his book The Social Crisis of our Time, he wrote:
The struggle against collectivism . . . will only have tangible prospects of
success if we manage to reactivate the liberal principle in a manner that of-
fers satisfactory solutions to all of the evident damages, failure symptoms
and mistakes of liberalism and capitalism without consequently question-
ing neither the inner structure of the market’s competition system nor the
functionality of our economy.165
According to Röpke, ‘collectivism’ encompassed the social welfare state,
as well as the coordinated economy in its communist or national socialist
variant.166 In Röpke’s work, war and collectivism become inevitable twins, and
only liberalism would be able to provide a convincing answer to the controlled
economy under National Socialism.167 For the ordoliberal economists, liberal
theory was not only a theory that attempted to identify or explain the law’s of
the market (as classical economic liberalism would), but importantly it posited
itself as a social theory related to the economic and political order. As such, it
predicted two alternatives for a German future: on the one hand there was the
prospect of liberty, consumption and democracy, and on the other there was a
lack of liberty and goods in addition to totalitarian socialism.
Now, as Röpke himself foresaw, to convince the public that only the market
could guarantee economic and political freedom, it was necessary to show that
the ‘new’ liberalism they were championing had learned from the failures of
classical liberalism. The ordoliberals had formulated their critique of classical
liberalism in response to the global economic crisis of the 1930s. When
European liberals met in 1938 in Paris, both Röpke and Alexander Rüstow
suggested that classical liberalism had failed to take into account the social
embedding of the economy. Competition, which they considered a precondition
for political and economic freedom, could not establish itself automatically.
Rather, the state needed to secure the conditions.168 Foucault summarises the
reasoning of ordoliberal theory as follows:
. . . [S]ocial intervention, the Gesellschaftspolitik, legal interventionism, the
definition of a new institutional framework of the economy protected by
a strictly formal legislation like that of the Rechtsstaat or the Rule of
Law, will make it possible to nullify and absorb the centralizing tenden-
165Wilhelm Röpke. The Social Crisis of our Time. London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow: Hodge,
1950; quoted in Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus, p. 167 (my translation).
166See in detail Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus, p. 157ff.
167Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus, p. 159.
168Cf. Hesse, ‘»Der Staat unter der Aufsicht des Marktes« - Michel Foucaults Lektüren des
Ordoliberalismus’, p. 217.
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cies which are in fact immanent to capitalist society and not to the logic
of capital.169
Just as the judgments in the Industrialist Trials, ordoliberalism positioned mo-
nopolies and the centralisation of economic power at the centre of its critique.
Using the Nazi political economy as a negative reference, the central concept
of their theory became the importance of competition for the functioning of the
market (as opposed to consumption or exchange in classical liberalism).170 A
strong state was needed in order to secure competition and thus the function-
ing market economy, but it was not to intervene into the market, as the Nazis
had done.
In the literature, the ordoliberal position is often presented as a compromised
liberalism that, in reaction to the economic crisis, sought to strengthen the role
of the state vis-a-vis the market. Foucault, on the contrary, sees in this move an
expansion of the liberal rationale in so far as the political order is also measured
against its economic performance.171 As Ralf Ptak observes, what was new
about this liberalism was not the assumption regarding the functioning and
the effects of the logic of the market, but rather that this functioning was not
explained with reference to natural laws. Instead, a functioning market was
conceived of as the result of a political decision regarding the organisation of
the juridico-political order.172
In Chapter Two, I contended that liberal theory is never free from contra-
dictions, and even less so when it comes to the translation of the economic
principles into actual economic policies. In fact, as Ptak shows in his detailed
study of the works of the ordoliberal thinkers, the awareness of inner contra-
dictions constituted a substantial element of the development of ordoliberal
theory.173 One of this contradictions concerned the problem that ordoliberal
theory could only be proven right if it was possible to create a tabula rasa-like
scenario in which all market participants had the same starting positions.
Now, post-World War II Germany by no means presented a blank slate,
especially not with regard to the concentration of economic power. Despite
the initial attempts of the allies to dismantle the industry and work towards
its deconcentrisation, the economic elite was still organised enough to lobby
the Allies.174 Faced with a de facto impossibility to create a situation for
the perfect market, the ordoliberal economists conceived of ‘competition’ no
longer as a pre-condition for economic and consequently political democracy,
but instead converted it into an ideal intended to orient political decisions.
169Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 178–179.
170On this shift in focus see Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 166.
171For a comparison between Foucault’s analysis of ordoliberal thinking and accounts from
within German economics, see Hesse, ‘»Der Staat unter der Aufsicht des Marktes« - Michel
Foucaults Lektüren des Ordoliberalismus’.
172Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus, p. 172.
173See in detail Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus, pp. 174-189.
174Wiesen, West German Industry, p. 55.
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Accordingly, state interventions were to be measured against their ability
to realise competition.175 With the victory of the CDU in 1949, ‘competition’
indeed became the guiding principle for the economic policies adopted under
the Minister of Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard.
The notion of the social market economy continues to figure prominently in
German debates on economic policies.176 While there is no ‘true’ meaning of
the phrase ‘Social Market Economy’, it is important to remember the political
rationale that it introduced in post-World War II Germany. The CDU called
the economic order they sought to realise social market economy not because
they saw the necessity to counter the negative effects of capitalism through a
welfare state. ‘We call it “social market economy”’, the Düsseldorfer guiding
principles summarise, because only the economic order based on competition
and the control of monopolies leads to a ‘true economic democracy’.177 In
short, the ‘social’ in the social market economy envisioned by the ordoliberal
thinkers and the first German government refers to the claim that the market
should be foundational for both the economic and the political organisation of
a democratic society.178
Foucault’s analysis of the ordoliberal argument and its influence on public
political discourse leads him to the conclusion that ‘[i]n contemporary Ger-
many, the economy, economic development and economic growth, produces
sovereignty’.179 It ‘produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor’, that
is, it ‘creates public law’ and brings ‘a juridical structure or legal legitimization
to a German state that history had just debarred’.180 The performance of the
German economy is not only taken as sign of good economic governance, but
is
the way in which the founding consensus of a state – which history, defeat,
or the decision of the victors had just outlawed – is constantly manifested
and reinforced. . . . History had said no to the German state, but now the
economy will allow it to assert itself.181
The ‘forgetting of history’, Foucault suggests in this context, is crucial to
the freedom promised by the juridico-political order of the social market
economy.182
However, as the brief discussion of ordoliberal theory in this section showed,
it was not so much the ‘forgetting of history’, but a particular explanation of
175On the identification of the problem, and the subsequent shift in the discourse, see Ptak,
Vom Ordoliberalismus, pp. 182-187.
176On the transformation of the concept of the social market economy in German politics, see
Ptak, ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’.
177CDU, Düsseldorf Guidelines, p. 3 (translation amended).
178See also Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 116: ‘Lets ask the market economy itself to be
the principle, not of the state’s limitation, but of its internal regulation from start to finish
of its existence and action.’
179Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 84.
180Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 84.
181Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, pp. 85-86.
182Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 86.
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what had gone wrong in Nazi Germany that was central to the foundation of
the post-war German political and economic order. If the West German state
founded its sovereign claim in relation to the market, as Foucault suggests,
this move was rendered plausible through a reading of World War II that
presented the violence as the consequence of a ‘collectivist’ and ‘monopolist’
state-corporate nexus.
Just as in the Industrialist Trials, in the political debates concerning the
post-war political, social and economic order, the past came to operate as a
negative reference for the authorisation of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft. The
latter was put forward as the ‘lessons learned’ from the violence experienced in
the past, as the only juridico-economic order that could prevent history from
repeating itself.
What the legal arguments rehearsed in the trials and the ordoliberals have
in common is that they locate the causes of ‘evil’ in the violation of the liberal
principle that demands that the state does not restrict the freedom that
is supposed to govern the economic sphere. The reference to ordoliberal
theory and its critics brings into relief that the legal arguments put forward
in the Industrialist Trials concern not merely the individual responsibility
of the defendants. They also echo theoretical assumptions and introduce
normative standards that concern the societal ‘management and organization
of the conditions in which one can be free’.183 Importantly, these conditions
concern not merely the juridico-political institutions (such as the legislative,
the judiciary and the government), but the very relation between the state and
the economy.
economic democracy
It is one of the central differences between contemporary ICL jurisprudence
and literature on the one hand and the discussion that surrounded the Indus-
trialist Trials on the other, that the political implications of these institutional
arrangements were made explicit. In the discussion of contemporary academic
literature on transitional justice and ICL in Chapter Two, I showed that it begs
the question of liberalisation. That is, it posits liberal democracy as the aim
of transition without, however, justifying why this particular political arrange-
ment should be considered desirable. I argued that this move can be explained
with the assumption prevalent in political liberalism that conceives of the
liberal rule of law as a politically neutral order. That is, it thinks of the rule of
law as a framework within which political debates about the organisation of
society can take place.184
Challenging these assumptions, I referred to existing critiques of political
liberalism that point out that the very decision of what belongs to the political
183Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 63.
184See above section 2.2, p. 52
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realm, and thus can be subjected to public debate and decision, already
constitutes a political decision. In this context, I highlighted that the economic
enters transitional justice discourse as a depoliticised, technical issue.185 That
is, in contemporary discussions about the economic dimensions of state crime
and how they should be addressed, these questions are not related to the
problem of a just social and political order.
If we look at the Industrialist Trials merely as a legal precedent for corporate
accountability, we miss the traces they bear from the wider debates at that time
that discussed democracy as a problem of the economy’s organisation. While
the social market economy eventually became the economic order of post-World
War Germany, this was not the only vision in relation to the past that was
expressed, nor was liberal democracy considered the only form of democracy.
Susan Marks reminds us in her book The Riddle of all Constitutions that while
after World War II human rights entered the realm of international law, the
decision not to include a democratic norm in international treaties was owed
to the contested meanings of democracy.186
The contested nature of the notion of democracy within Germany can be
illustrated with regard to disputes about the legal determination of the German
political and economic order. Parallel to the two discussions we have already
looked at – the Industrialist Trials as well as the ordoliberals – were various
German politicians debating and adopting the Länder constitutions. Some
of them were adopted before the German constitution (Grundgesetz) came
into force. Those Länder constitutions adopted before the division into East
and West Germany contained provisions that allowed for187 or ordered188the
socialisation of private property. Many of the Länder constitutions also en-
compassed regulations for broad employee participation in the remaining
private enterprises’ decision-making bodies.189 These decisions lead German
constitutionalist Wolfgang Abendroth to the conclusion that
The Länder constitutions in the Western occupation zone, thus, under-
stood the social mandate of the modern constitutional democracy not
merely as obligation to provide a minimum of wealth through social and
political measures by the ruling body government, but as a problem of
democratic reorganisation of the economic society . . . .190
185See also Olarte Olarte, ‘Constitutionalism, Economy and the Evacuation of the Political:
Transitional Justice and Biopolitics in the Colombian Case’.
186Marks, Constitutions, pp. 31-32.
187Art. 160 in Bavaria, Art. 98 in Württemberg-Hohenzollern.
188Art. 61 in Rhineland-Palatinate; Art. 45 in Baden; Art. 28 Württemberg-Baden; Art. 39ff
Hesse; Art. 42ff in Bremen; Art. 52 Saarland.
189Wolfgang Abendroth. Das Grundgesetz. Eine Einführung in seine politischen Probleme.
Pfullingen: Neske, 1973, p. 28.
190Abendroth, Grundgesetz, p. 28, my translation; On the work of Wolfgang Abendroth see
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Joachim Perels, and Thilo Scholle. Der Staat der Klassenge-
sellschaft. Recht- und Sozialstaatlichkeit bei Wolfgang Abendroth. Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2012.
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The question of whether the ‘social and democratic order’ mentioned in
the Basic Law entrusted the German state with the mandate to realise a
socialisation of the German economy, as Abendroth suggested, became the
centre of a polarising debate with his colleague, the constitutional lawyer
Ernst Forsthoff.191 This debate was not confined to the realms of academia.
Several businessmen filed a complaint with the German Constitutional Court
arguing that the Investitionshilfe Act was unconstitutional because, among
other things, it allegedly violated the principles of the market. In its decision
published in July 1954, the court responded that the German Basic Law did
not protect the market economy itself, and that the ‘the present economic and
social order, while in accordance with the Basic Law, is by no means the only
possible one permitted by the Basic Law’.192
4.5 Awakening
I began this chapter discussing the methodological implications that result
from an approach to the Industrialist Trials as dialectical image, understood
as a historical citation of a moment in the past by the present. The concept
of the dialectical image, I suggested, invites us to look at the Industrialist
Trials as the crystallisation of the force field as it emerges between its fore- and
after-history – or, in the language of dialectics, thesis and anti-thesis. This
force field was described throughout the chapter as revealing itself between
the condemnation of capitalism for its role in bringing about the war and state
violence on the one hand (the fore-history), and the rescue of capitalism as
the guarantor of individual freedom and a democratic order on the other (the
after-history).
The founding concept of Benjamin’s ‘dialectics at a standstill’, as we have
seen in the previous chapter, ‘is not progress but actualization’.193 That is,
the tension between fore- and after-history, thesis and anti-thesis, does not
resolve into some sort of synthesis. Rather, the dialectical construction of a
historical event emerges through a constellation with the present which brings
the latter into a critical state. Benjamin, as we have seen, compared this form
of historical recognition to the moment of ‘awakening’ in which the images of
the past allow us to perceive the present differently. In Benjamin’s dialectics,
the synthesis does not aim at reconciling tensions. Instead, it can only be
thought of as the disruption of the present.
By means of conclusion, I will summarise the argument presented in this
chapter and point out how it destabilises present assumptions about the
Industrialist Trials and their relevance for a critique of ICL as a concept of
historical justice.
191On the so-called Forsthoff-Abendroth debate, see Joachim Perels. ‘Der soziale Rechtsstaat
im Widerstreit’. In: Kritische Justiz 39.3 (2006), pp. 295–302.
192Investitionshilfe. 4, 7. BVerfG. 1954-07-20, (my translation).
193Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 460 (N 2, 2).
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foundational violence
In this chapter, I looked at the Industrialist Trials in the context of the re-
foundation of the German post-war order. Following World War II, Germany
did not exist as a sovereign state. The founding of the new societal order
was accompanied by a controversial debate among the Allies and within the
German population. The still-looming experience of the Nazi rule and the war
were turned into a negative reference for the new order to be created. For the
ordoliberal economists, a new democratic state needed to ensure competition.
The CDU took up these arguments and adopted the phrase of the Social Market
Economy to advocate for a social order in which the market would become the
place where citizens would interact as free individuals.
A different understanding of ‘economic democracy’, I pointed out, was coined
by SPD jurist Wolfgang Abendroth. Against the backdrop of the experience
of National Socialism and the role of German big business, he advocated a
democratisation of the economy – that is, the socialisation of the companies
and the participation of workers in their administration. This vision of an
economic democracy consequently was inscribed into many of the early Länder
constitutions. With reference to the judgement of the German Constitutional
Court, I argued that in 1952, the German Basic Law was still considered to be
indeterminate regarding the organisation of the economy.
The rather simple point I want to emphasise here is that the crucial difference
between the political context of the IMT and the Industrialist Trials on the
one hand, and the context of the resurgence of ICL following the end of the
Cold War on the other, is that the notion of democracy – and in particular of
economic democracy – was contested back then, but not in the 1990s. That
in transitional justice literature, ‘transition to democracy’ is automatically
understood as transition to liberal democracy and market economy reflects
the fact that a particular understanding of democracy has become hegemonic
in certain academic and political circles. This, then, is the first destabilisation:
that the notion of democracy in the academic literature on ICL and transitional
justice is neither obvious nor politically neutral, but already presupposes
the normative superiority of a particular arrangement of the state and the
economy.
law-repeating violence
The sentences against German industrialists, I furthermore argued in this
chapter, depict an image of the economic dimension of Nazi dictatorship
that ties in with the ordo-liberal analysis of Nazi rule. Despite sitting over
individuals, the industrialist trials were not concerned only (or maybe not even
primarily) with the individual responsibility of the accused, but rather with
determining the economic rationale of World War II. This economic rationale
was theorised through the anti-trust discourse, according to which trusts
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had inherently anti-democratic tendencies. The decision concerning the legal
responsibility of the defendants drew on pre-existing assumptions about the
nature of the state and the way it (should) relate to the economy. As I have
shown, the sentences communicated that the overall economic rationale of
state violence was to be found in the merger of a political and an economic
logic, or, in other cases, the undue influence of the state onto the private
economic sphere.
In pre-supposing the existence of a state with a monopoly of force, and the
existence of a free economic sphere, the judges (and here I borrow Foucault’s
words for my own purposes) turned the ‘distinction between state and civil
society into an historical universal enabling us to examine every concrete
system’ as opposed to seeing ‘in it a form of schematization peculiar to a
particular technology of government’.194 The judging legal order organises –
like Benjamin’s kaleidoscope – the past according to its own categories. As
a consequence, it creates an image of the past that only depicts the violence
recognised as such by the judging juridico-political order. Because this image
of the past, as negative reference, comes to cloud and thereby repeats the
foundational violence of the German post-war order, the Industrialist Trials can
be understood as law-repeating violence. When the contemporary academic
debate on corporate accountability invokes the Industrialist Trials as legal
precedent to counter the most extreme forms of violence inflicted under current
manifestations of capitalism, it is important to remember that these trials were
part of a wider effort not to counter, but to rescue the reputation of capitalism
following World War II.
Perhaps it is the irony of history that while the ordoliberal economist sought
to rescue the market as the guarantor of democracy following World War II, it
is precisely this heralding of the market as guarantor of democratic stability
that served as justification for the Argentine junta to suspend the rule of
law in the name of the National Reorganisation Process (Proceso Nacional de
Reorganisación) – as the junta euphemistically called the authoritarian regime
instituted with the coup in 1976. The next two chapters will look in detail at
two trials that attempt to address the economic dimension of the last Argentine
dictatorship. Through the reading of these trials, I will take up the issues that
emerged in this chapter for a critique of ICL as a liberal concept of historical
justice. In particular, we will return to the underlying notion of the state
at work in ICL and the way it sets bounds to both the construction of the
legal responsibility of private actors and to the interpretation of the economic
dimensions of state-backed violence.
194Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 319.
5 | Plata Dulce / Sweet Cash
This chapter borrows its title from an Argentine tragi-comedy directed by
Fernando Ayala, released during the last year of the Argentine National Reor-
ganisation Process (Proceso).1 Plata Dulce tells the story of two friends, Carlos
Bonifatti and Ruben Molinuevo, who own a furniture factory in Buenos Aires.
The business struggles to survive as the economic policies adopted by the
Minister of Economic Affairs appointed by the junta open the national economy
for cheap imports. When Bonifatti is offered a job in a financial firm by an old
acquaintance named Arteche, he sells his share in the factory to Molinuevo
and starts working as a manager for the bank.
The life of luxury and new wealth that immediately follows comes to an
end as suddenly as it started: during a weekend trip with his mistress, he is
informed that the bank has gone bankrupt. As Bonifatti returns to Buenos
Aires to sort things out, he discovers that Arteche had only used him as a
straw man to sign loan agreements with made-up firms. While Arteche escapes
to the US just in time, Bonifatti is arrested by the police, accused of fraud.
Under the eye of his family, he is taken to prison.
The movie coined the phrase ‘era of the sweet cash’, denoting the period
which began with the economic reforms of the Proceso, when the liberalisation
of the financial markets in combination with a state guarantee for deposits
made financial speculation highly profitable – until the system started to crash
in 1980. The case that is at the centre of this chapter can only be understood
against the backdrop of the ‘era of the sweet cash’. It originates in a legal
investigation of several businessmen who, in 1978, were accused of ‘economic
subversion’.2 Just like Bonifatti, the businessmen at the centre of the case
discussed in this chapter ended up in prison.
However, unlike Bonifatti, they were abducted without a judicial order by the
police or military forces and taken to Campo de Mayo, a clandestine detention
centre outside Buenos Aires. At the camp they were interrogated, sometimes
under torture, questioned about their businesses and in some cases forced to
sell the shares of the joint stock companies that they owned. Importantly, some
of the detainees later reported that in addition to the military personell, staff
1Fernando Ayala. Plata Dulce. 1982.
2This term was used to refer to a set of economic crimes – which, for now, can be summarised
under the notion of fraud – that were penalised by the National Security Act.
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from the National Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional de Valores, CNV)
were present at Campo de Mayo to assist with the interrogations. It was the
head of the CNV that had tipped off the military about the alleged irregularities
at the firms. This is why the case investigates the legal responsibility of not
only three military officers, but also of Juan Afredo Etchebarne, former head
of the CNV.
All of the victims were, at some point, transferred from the clandestine
detention centre to an ordinary prison, and the materials obtained during the
military ‘summary trial’ were integrated into the file opened by the ordinary ju-
diciary. It is this detour via the repressive state apparatus which distinguishes
the crimes investigated in the case discussed in this chapter from Bonifatti’s
imprisonment in Plata Dulce. The fact that these businessmen passed through
the system of clandestine detention centres means that the detentions and
torture they suffered are now beeing investigated as part of the systematic
plan of repression that characterised the Proceso.
In 1994, a national court had decided that by that time, the crimes had
fallen under the statute of limitations. However, following the decision of
the constitutional court that crimes against humanity do not fall under the
statute of limitations, the legal investigations of three military officers and
Etchebarne were reopened nearly twenty years later. In 2013, the judge in
charge, Daniel Rafecas, concluded the pre-trial stage of the case by passing the
indictment (auto de procesamiento) that ordered the opening of a public trial.
On 428 pages, Rafecas tries to make plausible, why one should understand
the persecution and prosecution of businessmen as belonging to the repressive
logic of the Proceso. This chapter offers a critical reading of the way in which
the document constructs the economic dimension of state-backed violence in
the Argentine case.
In line with the perspective set out in Chapter Three, I look at the legal
proceedings as a site of competing politics of time. In the indictment, the
Proceso is invoked as a negative reference against which the juridico-political
order that sits in judgment over the past seeks to claim its own authority.
However, as we will see, it does not succeed in offering a clear-cut image of the
economic dimensions of the Proceso. Instead, the indictment also produces
images of the past that cannot be accounted for by its own interpretative
framework and that therefore expose the contingency of the latter. If read,
these images destabilise the very periodisation attempted by the trial.
The first section situates the trial of Etchebarne within the re-foundational
project that was introduced by Nestor Kirchner following the Argentinian
financial, economic, political and social crisis which began in 2001. Taking
up the notion of the negative reference from Chapter Three, I contend that the
trials that address the economic dimension of the Proceso create a link between
the temporality of debt and the temporality of guilt. Kirchner conceived of
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the debt crisis of 2001 as the long-term result of the neoliberal policies first
introduced with the help of the dictatorial state. In addressing the link between
the human rights violations committed during the Proceso and its neoliberal
economic project in the trials, the new government sought to establish itself
as the political project that finally broke with the dictatorial past as well as
with its economic legacy (5.1).
This interpretation of the Proceso as a political and economic project directed
against societal demands for social justice also provides the framework through
which the indictment construes the legal responsibility of the three military
actors and Etchebarne for the abduction and disappearance of 27 businessmen.
Section Two provides an overview of the case (5.2). I will then start to trace the
ways in which the judge links the prosecution of businessmen for economic
crimes to the systematic plan of repression. I will argue that because the
judge associates the Proceso with the violent implementation of a societal and
economic project that oppressed the working class, he has troubles linking
the prosecution of businessmen for economic crimes to the economic rationale
of the Proceso. Instead, and against his intention, he ends up separating the
prosecution and persecution of businessmen from the logic of the repressive
state by presenting the abduction and torture of the businessmen as the
capture of the state apparatus by private interests. Similarly to what we
witnessed in the last chapter with regard to the Industrialist Trials, such a
reading of the economic dimensions of state crime adopts the separation of
the political and the economic as a norm which is projected onto the past. The
violation of this norm, namely the capture of the state by private interests,
becomes the explanation of the crimes under investigation (5.3).
The framework which the judge adopts for his analysis of the economic
dimension of the Proceso is, at the same time, challenged by quotes, documents
and information that are included in the text. The second part of the chapter
focuses on what with Benjamin we can conceive of as dialectal images that
expose the kaleidoscope through which the pre-trail decision makes sense
of the past. In the fourth section, I will be attending to quotes that the
judge cites from the economic subversion cases. Through these materials,
the prosecution and persecution of businessmen can indeed be connected
to the overall rationale of the Proceso: they show that in the eyes of the new
regime, those threatening the stability of the financial system by not acting
as responsible consumers constituted a threat to national security and the
newly implemented model. Understood in this manner, the prosecution of
businessmen by the military directs us towards the tensions and contradictions
of neoliberalism, namely the responsibility of the state to account for the failure
of the market (5.4).
The fifth section concludes the chapter by picking up on a quote included
in the pre-trial decision that suggests that the crimes under investigation can
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be understood as instances of primitive accumulation. This interpretation
makes the use of force in the property transactions a central category that
distinguishes the violent past from what is suggested to be a non-violent
present. I will draw on Marx’s account of primitive accumulation as well as
Benjamin’s fragment Capitalism as Religion to challenge this periodisation.3
5.1 Debt – Guilt
In the fragment Capitalism as Religion, Walter Benjamin suggests that ‘[c]api-
talism is probably the first cult that produces debt/guilt (Schuld) rather than
atonement’.4 It bases its promise of a better future on the systematisation
of deficit: economic growth (profit) is generated through debt (investment).
According to Benjamin, ‘[c]apitalism is entirely without precedent, in that it is a
religion which offers not the reform of existence but its complete destruction’.5
Benjamin’s generalising description of capitalism applies astonishingly well
to the Argentinian context. In December 2001, Argentina declared default
on its foreign debts. This debt crisis was both preceded and followed by an
economic, social and political crisis.6 Over a couple of years, the state had
avoided defaulting by taking on new loans from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) that were tied to the usual conditions of structural adjustment
policies, also known as the ‘Washington Consensus’.7 Since the beginning of
2000, political protest against austerity policies started to grow and it gained
intensity when bank accounts were frozen at the beginning of December 2001.8
In the face of massive protest, elected president Fernando de la Rúa fled the
government. Between December 2001 and January 2002, the country was
led by four successive presidents, one stepping down after the other. The
protest slogan ‘Qué se vayan todos!’ (Go home all!) epitomised the population’s
frustration with what was considered to be a corrupted political system.
With the crisis of 2001, the failure of the neoliberal economic programme to
deliver on its promises of a prosperous future had become manifest. The public
debt, inherited from both the authoritarian regime as well as its constitutional
successors, led to the ‘downfall of a monstrous movement’ which left large
parts of the population in poverty.9 In the wake of the crisis, unemployment
affected at least 20 per cent of the working population (30 per cent if one
includes underemployment), and real income decreased by 30 per cent in
3Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’.
4Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’, p. 288.
5Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’, p. 289.
6See Mónica Peralta Ramos. La economía política argentina: poder y clases sociales (1930-
2006). Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007, pp. 345-378.
7Christian Kellermann. Die Organisation des Washington Consensus. Der Internationale
Währungsfonds und seine Rolle in der internationalen Finanzarchitektur. Bielefeld: tran-
script, 2006.
8Miguel Teubal. ‘La crisis del 2001-2002 y el colapso del neoliberalismo en la Argentina’. In:
Realidad Económica 40.261 (2011), pp. 58–85.
9Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’, p. 259.
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2002. Large sectors of the former middle class suddenly found themselves in
situations of poverty.10
The profound impact on the living conditions of large sections of the Argen-
tine population unleashed a debate on the causes and origins of the crises.11
The histories of the public debt that emerged were, at the same time, histories
of guilt. To look at the causes and origins of the debt crisis meant also to
identify those policies and policymakers that had initiated the cycle of pub-
lic debt and that were thus considered to be guilty of having brought about
the social crisis. The trials addressing economic dimensions of the Proceso
can be understood as part of the attempt of Peronism under Néstor Kirchner
(2003-2007) and Christina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-2015) to position its
political movement as the one which would finally break not only with the
Proceso, but also with the economic model implemented by the regime that
was held responsible for the breakdown of the country in 2001.
state affair
It was a central claim of the governments of both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner that it was only under Néstor Kirchner that the gov-
ernment made the prosecution of crimes against humanity into public policy.
Indeed, it was not until Néstor Kirchner assumed office in 2003 that the Consti-
tutional Court declared the amnesty laws to be unconstitutional. However, the
emphasis on Néstor Kircher’s role tends to downplay previous efforts driven
by civil society to push for trials that would investigate the human rights
violations committed during the Proceso. There is a fair amount of literature
discussing these efforts in detail, so I will not provide a complete overview.
Instead, I will only mention key moments.12
The end of Proceso was initiated not through internal resistance, but through
defeat in the Falklands War in June 1982. The victory of Great Britain over
the Argentine military led the middle class to withdraw their support for the
military junta, and the media took an increasingly critical stance towards the
Proceso.13 In April 1983, the junta published the Final Document of the Military
10Eduardo Basualdo. ‘Evolución de la economía argentina en el marco de las transformaciones
de la economía internacional de las últimas décadas’. In: Los condicionantes de la crisis
en América Latina. Ed. by Enrique Arceo and Eduardo Basualdo. Buenos Aires: CLACSO,
2009, pp. 321–382, p. 358.
11Alfredo Raúl Pucciarelli. ‘Introducción’. In: Empresarios, tecnócratas y militares. La trama
corporativa de la última dictadura. Ed. by Alfredo Raúl Pucciarelli. Buenos Aires: siglo
veintiuno editores, 2004, pp. 7–23, p. 7.
12For more detailed accounts, see Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, ed. Hacer justicia:
nuevos debates sobre el juzgamiento de crímenes de lesa humanidad en Argentina. Buenos
Aires: siglo veintiuno editores, 2011; Francesca Lessa. Memory and Transitional Justice
in Argentina and Uruguay. Against Impunity. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013;
Wolfgang Kaleck. Kampf gegen die Straflosigkeit. Argentiniens Militärs vor Gericht. Berlin:
Wagenbach, 2010.
13Carlos H. Acuña. ‘Transitional Justice in Argentina and Chile. A Never Ending Story?’ In:
Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy. Ed. by Jon Elster. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 206–238, p. 209.
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Junta on the War Against Subversion and Terrorism, in which it emphasised
that it had acted on behalf of the elected government. In September of the same
year, it decreed the ‘National Pacification Law’, an amnesty law for the military
which was, however, revoked by the first elected Parliament in December
1983.14
Also in December 1983, the elected president, Raúl Alfonsín, responded to
the demands of local human rights organisations and initiated an investigation
into the forced disappearances that took place during the Proceso. The final
report, Nunca Más, which we already encountered in Chapter One, gives an
account of the systematic practice of forced disappearance. It sheds light on
the administration of the clandestine detention centres and the hierarchies
within the military apparatus. Nunca Más tends to portray the disappeared as
non-political, random victims of human rights violations that were committed
by the authoritarian state.15 They are victims of what the prologue to Nunca
Más construes as a war-like situation. ‘During the decade of the seventies’, it
reads there, ‘Argentina was shaken by a terrorism that came both from the
right and the extreme left’.16
The interpretation of the dictatorship as a conflict between the military and
the guerrilla groups has been called the theory of the ‘two daemons’.17 This
understanding, according to which the Proceso was the result of a circle of
left- and right-wing violence, is also reflected in the decision to prosecute not
only members of the military, but also seven former leaders of the guerrillas.
Eventually, though, the trial against the members of the three military juntas,
which took place in 1985, received much more media attention than did the
trials against the guerrilla leaders.18
According to Alfonsin, the National Commission on Forced Disappearance
(Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, CONADEP) as well as
the trial against the members of the junta served as necessary conditions
for a new foundation of Argentine democracy. As the title of the CONADEP
report, Nunca Más, suggests, this new foundational project was initially defined
through that which it was not. It positioned itself as the opposite of a system
that employed and accepted the prevalence of violence. The ‘never again’
promised by the title of the CONADEP report and the junta trial was that
14Ley Nr. 22.924. Ley de Pacificación Nacional. Presidente de la Nación Argentina. 1983-
09-22. URL: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-
74999/73271/norma.htm (visited on 02/14/2016).
15Crenzel, Historia política, pp. 44-48.
16CONADEP, Nunca Más, p. 5.
17Marina Franco. ‘La teoría de los dos demonios: consideraciones en torno a un imaginario
histórico y las memorias de la violencia en la sociedad argentina acutal’. In: Vielstimmige
Vergangenheiten - Geschichtspolitik in Lateinamerika. Ed. by David Mayer and Berthold
Molden. Münster: LIT, 2009, pp. 267–285.
18Emilio Crenzel. ‘From Judicial Truth to Historical Knowledge: The Disappearance of Persons
in Argentina’. In: African Yearbook of Rhetoric 3.2 (2012), pp. 53–64, p. 53.
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there would never again be political violence and systematic human rights
violations.19
Against the intention that the trial of the juntas might serve as exemplary,
it turned out to be an incentive for many relatives of the disappeared to file
criminal complaints with the judiciary. With the intention of stopping the
wave of newly initiated proceedings, in December 1986 Parliament passed
the so-called ‘Full Stop Law’.20 It determined that the statute of limitations
applied to those crimes committed between 24th March 1976 and 26th March
1983, unless the accused had been indicted or would be indicted within 60
days. Again, this measure failed to produce the intended outcome. Public
prosecutors immediately started to pass an increasing number of indictments
of military actors.21
Following increasing pressure from the military apparatus, six months later
Parliament passed the so-called ‘Law of Due Obedience’, which declared that
all military actors below the ranks of the junta had only carried out orders and
thus lacked legal responsibility.22 It further demanded an end to all ongoing
legal proceedings. In June 1987, the Supreme Court confirmed that both laws
were in accordance with the constitution, a decision to only be revoked by the
same institution in 2005.23
Alfonsin’s time in office was accompanied by a major debt crisis, and before
the end of his term he handed over the government to Carlos Meném. Meném
issued an amnesty for about fifty individuals who had been indicted but had
not yet stood trial, as well as for the convicted members of the junta.24 The
human rights legacy of the Proceso was not a central issue for Meném, who
had won the election with his promise to stabilise the economy. During his
time in office, he implemented wide-ranging neoliberal economic reforms as
well as the currency board that tied the Argentine peso to the US dollar.25
While these policies had devastating effects on large parts of the population,
they produced minimal social unrest as the labour movement and social
organisations had not yet recovered from the severe repression they had
suffered during the Proceso.26 It is against this backdrop that Argentine
19Crenzel, Historia política.
20Ley Nr. 23.492 (Punto Final).
21Parenti, ‘Jurisprudencia Argentina’, p. 85.
22Ley 23.521 (Obedencia Debida).
23Causa incoada en virtud del decreto 280/84 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional s/ recurso extraor-
dinario. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación. 1987-06-22; Simón.
24Decree 1002/89. Indulto. Guerra antisubversiva. Personal militar comprendido en determi-
nadas causas. 1989-10-06.
25Enrique Arceo and Eduardo Basualdo, eds. Los condicionantes de la crisis en América Latina.
Inserción internacional y modalidades de acumulación. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2009;
Eduardo Basualdo. Estudios de historia económica Argentina. Desde mediados del siglo
XX a la actualidad. Buenos Aires: siglo veintiuno editores, 2010.
26Alfredo Raúl Pucciarelli. ‘La patria contratista. El nuevo discurso liberal de la dictadura
encubre una vieja práctica corporativa’. In: Empresarios, tecnócratas y militares. La trama
corporativa de la última dictadura. Ed. by Alfredo Raúl Pucciarelli. Buenos Aires: siglo
veintiuno editores, 2004, pp. 99–171, p. 156.
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scholar Ana Tedesco claims that, after the Proceso, ‘[p]olitical inclusion was
established simultaneously with the imposition of domination by economic
and social exclusion’.27 The effective transformation of the social forces during
the Proceso as well as the continuity of the neoliberal economic project in
post-dictatorship Argentina is what Hugo Vezzetti describes as the core of a
left memory that established itself during the 1990s.28
Néstor Kirchner made this reading, according to which the transition to
democracy was characterised by a continuity of the economic project initiated
under the Proceso, his own when he became president in 2003.29 In the new
prologue to the thirtieth anniversary edition of the Nunca Más, for example,
the government made clear that it understood a true ‘Never Again’ to rest on
two pillars: first, the memory and prosecution of the human rights violations
committed in the name of the state during the Proceso; and second, the
reversal of the situation of social injustice which he understood to be the
consequence of the neoliberal policies that were first implemented during the
National Reorganisation Process and which had eventually led to the social
crisis of December 2001.
During the first years of the Kirchner government, these two pillars seemed
to translate into different policy fields. On the one hand, Kirchner explicitly
supported the abrogation of the amnesty laws and, once the trials were re-
opened, assigned extra funds to enable the widespread prosecution of the
crimes committed during the Proceso. The aim of social justice, on the other
hand, was to informe economic policies and social security programmes, but
initially was not connected to a legal investigation of the economic dimensions
of the Proceso. However, this distinction between a reversal of a situation
of impunity and a reversal of the situation of economic violence and social
injustice collapsed with the case of Papel Prensa S.A., which entered the
political arena in 2010.
‘crimes against humanity committed for economic reasons’
In an move against powerful newspapers sympathising with the opposition,
president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007 – 2015) pointed out that
the three biggest newspapers in the country owed their position to the fact
that, during the dictatorship, they had bought shares in the paper factory
‘Papel Prensa S.A.’ from the Graiver brothers. They had been forced to sell
27Laura Tedesco. Democracy in Argentina. Hope and Disillusion. London: Frank Cass, 1999,
p. xiii; see also Pilar Calveiro. ‘Formas y sentidos de lo represivo entre dictadura y democra-
cia’. In: Hacer justicia: nuevos debates sobre el juzgamiento de crímenes de lesa humanidad
en Argentina. Ed. by Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales. Buenos Aires: siglo veintiuno
editores, 2011, pp. 111–142, p. 124.
28Hugo Vezzetti. Pasado y presente. Guerra, dictadura y sociedad en la Argentina. Buenos
Aires: siglo veintiuno editores, 2002, p. 208.
29See in detail Emilio Crenzel. ‘El estigma sobre la militancia todavía tiene vigencia. Entrevista
por Alejandra Dandan’. In: Página/12 (2011-07-31). URL: http://www.pagina12.com.
ar/diario/elpais/1-173435-2011-07-31.html (visited on 08/07/2011).
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their shares while detained in a clandestine detention centre. In 2010, the
presidency launched an official investigation into the issue and the Ministry
of Justice, Security and Human Rights filed a criminal complaint, demanding
the investigation of the illegal appropriation of Papel Prensa S.A.30 According
to the complaint, the owners of Clarín, La Nación and La Razón had been
enabled to buy the shares through a criminal enterprise involving ‘extortion
and abduction’ by state forces.31
Papel Prensa consequently became synonymous with the long-term eco-
nomic consequences of the dictatorship, and the case put the spotlight on
those who had profited from the violence inflicted by the authoritarian regime.
The fact that the state now took on the topic of corporate complicity also
worked as a catalyst for other legal investigations concerning the economic
dimensions of the Proceso which had not moved forward in previous years.
With the case of Papel Prensa S.A., the notion of ‘crimes against humanity
committed for economic reasons’ entered official rhetoric and soon became in-
stitutionalised in a commission dedicated to the investigation of these crimes.32
Although one might infer so from the phrase, it does not in fact refer to the
complicity of corporations in the abduction and disappearance of their work-
ers.33 Instead, it denotes the transferral of shares during the dictatorship with
the help of the repressive state apparatus. The newspapers that had profited
from the Papel Prensa S.A. deal were suspicious of what they considered to be
a ‘new’ and purely politically motivated reinterpretation of ‘crimes against hu-
manity’ which, in their eyes, was not warranted by the respective international
treaties.34
Some of the circumstances surrounding the transfer of Papel Prensa S.A.
have been well known before, and have given rise to an array of conspiracy
theories.35 However, official investigations into the issue only date back to
2010. In various trials that were investigating crimes against humanity, victims
30Papel Prensa. La Verdad. 2010. URL: http://www.mecon.gov.ar/basehome/pdf/papel_
prensa_informe_final.pdf (visited on 05/13/2013); Ministerio de Justicia, Seguridad
y Derechos Humanos. Papel Prensa - Querella presentada por la secretaría de Derechos
Humanos con el patrocino de la Procuración del Tesoro de la Nación en el Juzgado Criminal y
Correccional Federal Nr. 3 de la Ciudad de La Plata. 2010. URL: http://www.ambito.com/
diario/aw_documentos/archivospdf/2005/id_doc_5557.pdf (visited on 01/30/2013).
31Ministerio de Justicia, Seguridad y Derechos Humanos, Papel Prensa - Querella presentada
por la secretaría de Derechos Humanos con el patrocino de la Procuración del Tesoro de la
Nación en el Juzgado Criminal y Correccional Federal Nr. 3 de la Ciudad de La Plata. P. 201.
32Créase la Unidad Especial de Investigación de los Delitos de Lesa Humanidad Cometidos
con Motivación Económica. Nr. 3216/2010. Ministerio de Justicia, Seguridad y Derechos
Humanos. 2010-11-19. URL: http://legislacion.elderecho.com.ar/index.php?
accion=8&record=7157 (visited on 08/07/2011).
33I will look at one of trials that investigates the responsibility of businessmen for the illegal
detention of their workers in the next chapter.
34See e.g. ‘Vamos por todo. Una consigna kirchnerista descubre otra peligrosa metodología
basada en persecuciones ideológicas’. In: La Nación (2011-03-24). URL: http://www.
lanacion.com.ar/1359900-vamos-por-todo (visited on 08/07/2011).
35See e.g. Irene Capdevila. El Caso Graiver. Lo que ocultan Kirchner y Clarín sobre Papel Prensa.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Agora, 2010.
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reported that they had been forced to sell their property. In order to confirm
that the alleged property transactions had taken place, judges started to
request the relevant documents from the CNV.36 Confronted with an increased
number of requests for information from the courts, the then director of the
institution, Alejandro Vanoli, decided to create an ‘Office for Human Rights,
Memory, Truth and Justice’ to deal with the requests, conduct an independent
investigation, and to train staff in current human rights issues related to the
stock exchange.37 The final report of the investigation was published in March
2013.38 In the report, the team at the Human Rights Office identified 250
cases in which forced property transaction took place under the eye of the CNV
during the Proceso.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the then head of the
CNV, Juan Alfredo Etchebarne, is now being investigated together with three
military officers for his role in the abduction of 23 individuals. Etchebarne’s
indictment is of particular interest in the context of this thesis, as it forces the
prosecution and the judge to offer an explanation for the CNV’s cooperation
with the repressive forces.
5.2 N° 8405/2010: The History of a Case
D’Alessandri, Francisco Obdulio y otros s/ privación ilegal de la libertad is the
judicial document that concludes the pre-trial stage of the criminal investi-
gation against three former military officers, Francisco Obdulio D’Alessandri,
Raúl Antonio Guglielminetti and Víctor Enrique Rei, as well as the former
head of the CNV, Etchebarne, accused of having abducted and tortured 23
individuals.39 All defendants are awaiting the opening of the public trial in
pre-trial custody.40 As I mentioned in Chapter One, so far no case dealing
explicitly with the economic dimensions of the Proceso has been concluded.
36The main purpose of the CNV was (and is) to ensure the transparency of Argentina’s secu-
rities markets, to watch over the market price formation process and to protect investors.
It supervises those corporations which are authorised to issue securities to the public, the
secondary markets where these securities are traded, and all persons and corporations
involved in any capacity in the public offering and trading of these securities. CNV. URL:
http://www.cnv.gov.ar/ (visited on 02/06/2016).
37Hannah Franzki. Interview with María Celeste Perosino, Bruno R. Napoli and Walter A. Bosisio
(Office for Human Rights Memory Truth and Justice, Comisión Nacional de Valores). Buenos
Aires, 18/03/2013.
38CNV. Economía política y sistema financiero. 2013. URL: http://www.cnv.gob.ar/
Publicaciones/InformeDDHH/INFORME_ECONOMIA_POLITICA_Y_SISTEM_FINANCIERO-
DDHH.pdf (visited on ); The report was later expanded and published as a book: María
Celeste Perosino, Walter Bosisio, and Bruno Nápoli. La dictadura del capital financiero. El
golpe militar corporativo y la trama bursátil. Colección Autonomía. Buenos Aires: Ediciones
Contenente, 2014.
39D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 380.
40As per February 2016. There was a back and forth regarding the pre-trial custody of
Etchebarne. His appeal against the decision had first been granted but was later denied.
See ‘Rechazan planteos del ex titular de la Comisión Nacional de Valores durante la dic-
tadura’. In: Radio Nacional (2015-11-10). URL: http://www.radionacional.com.ar/?p=
83783 (visited on 02/13/2016).
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Still, the indictment of Etchebarne and the three military officials documents
on 428 pages the evidence gathered during the pre-trial and advances the legal
framework through which the judge casts the legal responsibility of the four
defendants. As such, it allows us to get a glimpse of the way in which the
present juridico-political order defines what it understands to be the economic
dimensions of the Proceso. In my reading of the document, I will focus on the
responsibility attributed to Etchebarne, whose activity, to the court, consti-
tutes a crucial piece of evidence in the link between the economic project of
the Proceso and the repressive state apparatus.
Etchebarne was appointed by Jorge Rafael Videla, head of the first military
junta, and José Martínez de Hoz, Minister of Economic Affairs under Videla, on
9th June 1976.41 As stated above, the institution’s purpose is to ensure that
the stock market functions. In 1978, Etchebarne reported alleged irregularities
in relation to three economic groups – ‘Graiver’, ‘Chavanne’ and ‘Industrias
Siderúrgicas Grassi S.A.’ (Grassi) – to both the judiciary and the military.
Between 14th September and 8th November 1978, 23 individuals linked to
these economic groups were abducted. All 23 of them eventually arrived at the
clandestine detention centre Campo de Mayo, where they were interrogated
under torture about the companies they owned and worked for. Because
the military personelle working at Campo de Mayo did not have the expertise
needed to conduct interrogations concerning economic crimes, they asked
for support from the CNV. Etchebarne agreed, and for several months, four
members of the CNV had their office at Campo de Mayo, where they assisted
in the interrogation of those accused of ‘economic subversion’. Later, the
detainees were handed over to the ordinary judiciary and transferred to a
normal prison. The civil and military investigations were united into a single
case handled by a civil judge.42
Because he was the one who referred the case to the military, and because
he provided staff to help with the interrogations, Etchebarne is now indicted
as a ‘necessary participant’ in the abduction of the individuals. Most of the
evidence presented by the judge comes not from testimonies, but from legal
documents, products of the investigations that Etchebarne himself initiated in
1978. The case was filed as N° 40.528.
case n° 40.528
On 31st August 1978, Etchebarne reported irregularities relating to financial
transactions carried out by the metal works ‘Industrias Siderúrgicas Grassi
S.A.’ (Grassi S.A.) to the civil court.43 The complaint identified four issues to
be investigated. It highlighted, first, irregularities with respect to exchange of
cheques; second, the transfer of money to another firm, ‘Industrias Celulósicas
41He stayed in office until 4th June 1983.
42D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010).
43D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 60.
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Regionales S.A.’; third, financial operations alien to the social purpose of the
joint stock company; and fourth, irregularities regarding credit which Grassi
S.A. had granted Chavanne in order to buy part of the Hurlingham Bank
(Banco de Hurlingham).44 Etchebarne reported these observations as possible
violations of the the National Security Act, which, as I will discuss in more
detail below, contained one article relating to economic offences.45 About two
weeks later, on 13th September, Etchebarne furthermore reported the observed
irregularities to the military.46
As a consequence, the financial transactions between owners of Grassi S.A.
and Banco de Hurlingham were subject to two parallel investigations: one civil
and one military. It was not until December 1978 that the civil judge realised
that both the civil and the military judiciary were investigating the same facts
and sent a request to the military to hand over the material they had gathered
so far. The civil judge integrated both investigations, including all documents
obtained by the military from house searches and the information resulting
from interrogations at Campo de Mayo. The case was filed under N° 40.528.
Based on this ‘evidence’, on 19th January the judge ordered that the accused
be held in pre-trial custody. He thereby legalised – ex post – the situation of
the detainees who, by that time, had been detained for four months without
any judicial order.47
Between 1980 and 1982, as the investigation continued, several judges de-
cided that insufficient evidence had been presented to justify the imprisonment
of some of the accused.48 In 1983 – after the military junta handed over the
government to the first elected president Raúl Alfonsín – four of the defendants
were still in prison.49
In December 1984, yet another judge declared that all legal action which
had taken place thus far was void and furthermore ruled that the detention
suffered by the accused had been illegal.50 This decision was confirmed by the
appeals court on 11th February 1986.51
The trajectory of case N° 40.528 over the course of almost 10 years evidences
the change of jurisprudence in accordance with the regime change. What
started as two parallel investigations for alleged crimes amounting to economic
subversion during the Proceso was eventually dismissed as juridical farce by
the courts following the transition.
44D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 117.
45Ley Nr. 20.840 (Seguridad Nacional).
46Act 21.460 decreed by the military junta established that those crimes defined by the Na-
tional Security Act can also be investigated by a military summary trial Ley Nr. 21.460.
Seguridad Nacional. Junta Militar. 1976-11-18. URL: http://www.infojus.gob.ar/
legislacion/ley-nacional-21460-seguridad_nacional.htm (visited on 02/06/2016).
47D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 58.
48D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 59.
49These were: Luis Arnoldo Grassi, Luis Constanzo Pignatoro, Edgardo Humberto Cardona
and Aristodemo Raúl Alberici. D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 60.
50D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 67.
51D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 69.
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case n° 41.712
Also following the regime change in 1983, Marcelo Augusto Chavanne, who had
been arrested in October 1978, filed a criminal complaint against Etchebarne
for his participation in the crimes that had been carried out by military
actors. After seven years of gathering testimonies, on 21st December 1990,
the judge conducting the investigations during the pre-trial stage ordered
Etchebarne be taken into custody. There was, he declared, prima facie enough
evidence to assume that Etchebarne had been a necessary participant in
five cases of abduction, as defined by Article 142 of the Criminal Act.52 The
evidence gathered indicated that Etchebarne filed the complaint with the
military knowing that this would likely lead to the abduction of the individuals.
Furthermore, several witnesses reported that Etchebarne had been present
during abductions, house searches and interrogations at Campo de Mayo.53 It
was also Etchebarne who had signed the document agreeing to the four CNV
officers being sent to assist the military during the investigation. However, the
pre-trial investigations never led to a public trial itself. In April 1994, the case
was discontinued as the statute of limitations was applied.54
5.3 Economic Subversion
I suggested that the present case against the three military officials and
Etchebarne (N° 8405/2010) stands out from the hundreds of criminal inves-
tigations currently ongoing because it forces the tribunal to engage with the
economic dimensions of the Proceso. In making sense of the persecution and
prosecution of the businessmen, and having to determine Etchebarne’s re-
sponsibility in the crimes, it participates in defining the economic dimensions
of the Proceso.
The judge at pre-trial stage, Daniel Rafecas, was aware of this particularity.
The fact that the victims arrived at the clandestine detention centre Campo
de Mayo following accusations of economic subversion – rather than political
subversion – constitutes, in the judge’s eyes, the singularity of the case which
distinguished the latter from other cases the tribunal had dealt with to that
point.55 He writes:
All victims, as already indicated, were related to the economic groups
‘Chavanne’ - ‘Insturias Sierúrgicas Grassi S.A.’, and some of them were
related to operations concerning the transfer of the Hurlingham Bank.
Their belonging to these companies and the suspected prosecution of
52D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 276.
53D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), pp. 387, 392, 395.
54The crimes to which the statute of limitations was applied are not part of the present case
D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), pp. 277, 381.
55D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 20 (all translations from the document are mine).
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crimes qualifying as ‘economic subversion’ were the alleged motives for
their illegal abduction.56
These circumstances, he contends, demand that the ‘civil-military character’
and ‘politico-economic dimension’ of the Proceso be made visible even though
‘it might not enter the terrain of the justiciable’.57
According to the judge, the economic project of the Proceso shows itself
firstly in the violent repression of all those groups and individuals that had
been fighting for distributive justice, and secondly, in the shift of a production-
based economy into one based on finance. However, because he identifies the
working class and distributive claims as targets of the repression, the judge
has trouble explaining why the repressive state would abduct and torture a
group of businessmen accused of economic crimes. He eventually suggests
that their persecution can be explained as the ‘subjection of the public to
the private’: once the repressive structure that had been put in place was no
longer used for the repression of political opponents, he argues, it could be
used to extract money for private purposes. Against his own intentions, as we
will see, the ‘economic’ dimension is written out of the repressive apparatus
and linked to private interests.
‘the subordination of public to the private’
The economic dimension of the Proceso has been subject to a number of
recent scholarly and journalistic publications, many of which are quoted in
the pre-trial decision that was elaborated by Rafecas. In the document, the at
times contradictory interpretations of how the economic project is linked to
the repressive state are thereby woven into one single yet incoherent narrative.
The judge starts elaborating on what he calls the ‘civil-military character
of the coup d’état ’ by quoting the work of Paula Canelo.58 Canelo contends
that the military had its own institutional logic, values and interests which
at points coincided with those of the economic elite, thereby giving rise to
strategic alliances. The text then specifies, now referring to Vicente Muleiro’s
El Golpe Civil, how this links to the ‘iconic’ figure of de Hoz and his role as
minister of economic affairs.59 In the quotes that follow, the economic policy
implemented by the regime (the shift from a production-based economy to one
centred around financial capital) and violent repression are presented as two
different strategies intended to reach the same goal, namely the weakening of
the political force of the working class and their distributional demands. In
56D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 382.
57D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 21.
58D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 21; Paula Canelo. ‘La política contra la economía:
los elencos militares frente al plan económico de Martínez de Hoz durante el Proceso de
Reorganización Nacional (1976-1981)’. In: Empresarios, tecnócratas y militares. La trama
corporativa de la última dictadura. Ed. by Alfredo Raúl Pucciarelli. Buenos Aires: siglo
veintiuno editores, 2004, pp. 219–312.
59D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 22; Muleiro, Golpe civil.
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this context, the physical violence and persecution carried out by the military
is described as a means that was necessary to introduce the economic reforms
against the resistance of wide parts of the population. That is, the implemen-
tation of the new economic project is presented as the central rationale of the
Proceso.60 In sum, describing at times a strategic alliance between military
institution and economic elite, at other times a capture of the state appara-
tus by the economic elite, the first subsection of the document establishes
the working class, with its re-distributional demands, as the target of the
repression.
The document then goes on to describe the weakening of the labour move-
ment by military, political, legal and economic means: unions and workers
were persecuted, unions intervened in by the military, labour rights abolished
and the importance of industry weakened.61 Here, the economic project fig-
ures not so much as a rationale for the physical oppression. Rather, the
economic reforms adopted by the regime and the repression are presented as
two strategies aiming at destabilising the workers’ movement. This alliance
was possible, it is argued, due to a shared understanding by economic and
military actors about the origins of the social chaos that in their eyes made
the coup necessary: the unresolved class struggle.
The figure of the subversive, the judge continues to argue, functioned as an
empty signifier which automatically disqualified political opposition.62 If the
notion of subversion or the subversive generally functioned as the common
denominator for every person identified as putting into danger the national
interest, the document argues, economic subversion specifically described
those acts that were identified as attacks on the economic order put into place
by the Proceso.
Having reconstructed the notion of ‘economic subversion’ as understood
by the Proceso in these terms, the judge then struggles to accommodate the
prosecution and abduction of businessmen within this framework. How could
the economic offences of which the victims were accused be understood by the
state as attacks on, or challenges to, the economic order which it sought to
implement? How can economic offences be qualified as ‘economic subversion’
if the latter has been defined specifically in terms of a challenge to the state’s
politics from the political left?
The indictment does not provide an answer to this question. Rather than
arguing why the acts that the defendants were accused of – such as fraud
and illegal lending practices – constituted a threat to the economic order, the
document jumps straight to describing the means by which the junta fought
‘economic subversion’.
60D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), pp. 22-23.
61D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), pp. 23-26.
62D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), pp. 26-27.
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On the use of the repressive state apparatus in the fight against economic
subversion, the document highlights that it was only as of 1978, two years
after the coup, that the military began to go after economic actors. This is
explained as follows:
The fact that the fight against the ‘subversion’ had been in large part ac-
complished left a repressive structure of both repressers as well as institu-
tions free to be used for other purposes. This implies not only repressive
tasks such as abductions in order to fight ‘economic subversion’, but also
‘private activities’ by organised gangs within the repressive structure that
under the pretext of this ‘fight’ would carry out abductions.63
The alleged necessity to fight against ‘economic subversion’ became, the indict-
ment suggests, ‘cause and excuse’ in order to generate funds for the regime or
for private purposes.64
What starts to emerge from the judge’s reasoning is an explanation of
the repression of businessmen in terms of a ‘subordination of the public to
the private’, a phrase which appears on various occasions throughout the
document. According to this explanation, the capture of the state apparatus
for private interests results in the fight against economic subversion. The
judge adopts this description of the events from the report that was published
by the Human Rights Office of the CNV in 2013.65 In the pre-trial decision,
Judge Rafecas quotes extensively arguments presented by the prosecutor. He
concurs with the prosecutor when the latter affirms that:
The superior interests of the nation, the threat against a western and
Christian lifestyle were, maybe, the repercussions of history’s mud – class
struggle, the dispute over models of accumulation and distribution – whereas
a certain number of opportunists took over the institutions and, in the name
of the public, favoured the private; or, to avoid the description making it
sound elegant, their own pockets.66
The imprecise legal definitions that characterised the National Security Act, it
is argued, led to a ‘repressive schizophrenia’ which enabled private interests to
hide behind and act in the name of the state.67
At a closer look, what is called the ‘subordination of the public to the
private’ on various occasions in the document are, in fact, different ways
of defining the relationship between the economy and the state during the
Proceso. At the beginning, the ‘private’ is defined as the particular interest of
a determined group of economic actors that captured the state apparatus, in
order to implement an economic programme for its own benefit.
63D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 48.
64D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 47.
65CNV, Economía Política.
66D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 42 (my italics).
67D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 42.
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But as used in the document, the private also refers to personal initiatives
of individuals that took advantage of the existing state structure which was
originally established for the fight against communism. From this point of view,
the fight against ‘economic subversion’ with the help of the military apparatus
appears not so much as part of the rationale of the Proceso, but as the result
of individual initiatives with the aim of personal enrichment.
‘domination of the act’
This reading is also reflected in the adjudication concerning the legal responsi-
bility of Etchebarne. Let us recall that the crimes that are being investigated
in the trial of Etchebarne and the three military officials are the abduction and
torture of 23 individuals. The judge proposed that the three accused military
actors be tried as co-authors, while Etchebarne’s role in the commission of
the crimes was defined as ‘necessary participant’. He justifies the distinction
between authorship and participation based on the link each of the accused
had with the repressive state apparatus:
[T]he role of the cited officials, with the exception of Etchebarne, is di-
rectly linked to the incidents proper to the systematic plan of illegal re-
pression insofar as they were either intelligence officials – D´Alessandri
and Guglielminetti – or head of a structure defined as illegal such as the
Comando de Subzona – the case of Rei.68
Even though Etchebarne was also a state employee, he is not considered
to be directly linked to the repressive state apparatus, probably because he
was in charge of a state institution directed at the economy. Underlying this
distinction is a vision of the Proceso that is similar to Ernst Fraenkel’s descrip-
tion of National Socialism as a dual state, referred to in the last chapter.69
On the one hand, the judge identifies the illegal repressive apparatus that
belongs to the prerogative state; on the other hand, he assumes the existence
of a normative state that continues, among other things, to ensure that the
economy functions.
Etchebarne is accused as a necessary participant because he set the repres-
sive state apparatus in motion.70 He must have known, the judge holds, that
in reporting the alleged economic crimes to the military (and not only to the
civil judiciary), the accused would enter the repressive apparatus ‘with which
he later came to collaborate’.71 The document continues by highlighting this
later collaboration as ‘material contribution’ to the crime:
The circumstances pointed out before link the defendant to several events
of the repressive state apparatus, but it is without any doubt the interven-
tion of the task force of the CNV . . . that allows us to qualify the presence
68D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 405 (my italics).
69Fraenkel, Dual State.
70D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 397.
71D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 414.
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of the CNV at Campo de Mayo as material contribution to an enterprise
over which he lacked control (dominio de hecho) because it was under the
control of the military perpetrators.72
That is, according to judge Rafecas, Etchebarne, as head of the CNV, cannot
be charged as author of the crime because he was not part of the repressive
state apparatus and thus did not have control over it. Still, the fact that
Etchebarne reported the alleged crimes of economic subversion to the military
and that he provided staff to assist with the interrogations at Campo de Mayo
makes him, in the eye of the judge, a necessary participant in the abduction
and torture of the businessmen.
At the beginning of this section, I highlighted the judge’s awareness that the
particularity of this case is that it forces the people concerned with it to engage
with the economic dimension of the Proceso. According to him,
[t]he question to debate is whether the activities of the directorate of the
CNV imply that the latter installed itself on top of the dictatorial structure
in order to go after and dismantle certain agents, financiers and business-
men or whether its activities formed part of a larger strategic plan, the
self-proclaimed National Reorganisation Process.73
As we saw in this section, the document sets out to construct an image of the
past that places an economic rational at the centre of the Proceso. According to
this image, the repression of the labour movement served the implementation
of a new, neoliberal economic programme that once and for all would break the
class alliance between workers and petty bourgoisie. However, the way in which
Judge Rafecas eventually makes sense of the fight of economic subversion as
well as of the individual responsibility of Etchebarne does exactly the opposite:
he inadvertently separates the persecution of businessmen during the Proceso
from both the rationale of the repressive state policies as well as the economic
reforms implemented by Martínez de Hoz.
To be more concise: because the judge defines the ‘strategic plan’ of the
National Reorganisation Process only in terms of the violent repression of
distributive demands, the disappearance of economic actors belonging to the
financial sector can only be explained with the capture of the state apparatus
for private interests. A framework that defines Peronism as the sole opponent
to neoliberalism is unable to accommodate the prosecution of businessmen
within the strategic plan of the Proceso. The only way the judge manages to
make sense of the abductions, torture and forced property transactions is by
locating the reason for the persecution of businessmen in the undue capture
of the existing repressive structure by private interests, the ‘subordination of
the public to the private’.
72D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 392.
73D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 43.
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In the following section, I will be drawing on quotes from the economic sub-
version case (case N° 40.528 introduced above) cited by the pre-trial decision in
order to offer a different explanation for the persecution and prosecution of the
businessmen accused of economic subversion. The citations disrupt the text of
the pre-trial decision insofar as they indicate that the ‘irresponsible’ business
practices of those accused of economic subversion constituted a problem for
the Proceso not because they challenged the economic logic of the free market
by making redistributive demands, but because they exposed the market’s
susceptibility to failure. Thus understood, the prosecution of businessmen for
allegedly endangering the national economy is not at odds with a free market
economy – as the indictment at one point suggests.74 Rather, it is a way to
account for the failure of the market without questioning the suitability of the
latter as an organising principle of the economy.
Such a reading shifts the focus from the violation of liberal principles, such
as the capture of the state for private purposes, to the contradictions at the
heart of economic liberalism. As such, I will be arguing in the last section, it
complicates the clear-cut distinction between the authoritarian past and a
present governed by the rule of law that is introduced by the pre-trial decision.
5.4 Liberal Contradictions
In order to substantiate this argument, I first want to look at the crimes
relating to economic offences as they are defined in the National Security Act
before turning to the manner in which the act was enforced with the help of a
repressive state apparatus.
redefining economic subversion
These economic offenses are often referred to as ‘economic subversion’ even
though this term cannot be found in the National Security Act itself. The
act was decreed by Isabel Martínez de Perón in 1974 – two years before the
coup.75 Against a backdrop where national guerilla groups were operating all
over the country, it was intended to enable the state to fight ‘subversion in
all its manifestations’ in the supposed interest of national security. Article
1 criminalises all acts that, ‘in order to attain their ideological postulation,
intend or proclaim by any means to change or oppress the constitutional order
or the social peace of the nation’.76 Articles 2 to 5 penalise different forms of
74Rafecas writes that ‘despite the liberal discourse, paradoxically, it was necessary to exercise
unrestricted state control’ in order to carry out the National Reorganisation Process. See
D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 28.
75Ley Nr. 20.840 (Seguridad Nacional), The criminalisation of economic offences as a matter
of national security in Argentina dates back to the Onganía dictatorship which lasted from
1967 to 1973.
76Ley Nr. 20.840 (Seguridad Nacional), Art. 1.
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participation in the crimes defined by Article 1. Article 6 then defines economic
offences amounting to a threat to national security. It reads:
Article 6 – Those who improperly alienate, destroy, damage, produce the
disappearance, hide, or fraudulently diminish the value of raw materials,
products of any kind, machines, equipment or other capital assets, or
unjustifiably compromise its patrimony, for profitmaking or maliciously,
under risk of affecting the normal development of an establishment or
commercial, industrial, agricultural or mining exploitation or services’ es-
tablishments, shall be punished with two to six years’ detention and ten
thousand to one million pesos’ fine, if it does not result into a more severe
crime. Penalties shall aggravate one third: a) if the act affects the normal
supply or provision of goods or services of public use, b) if it leads to the
closure, liquidation or bankruptcy of the establishment or commercial ex-
ploitation. Penalties shall increase one half: a) if the act cause prejudices
to the national economy, b) if it puts at risk the security of the state.77
As we can see, most of Article 6 of the National Security Act criminalises
activities that are usually regulated by criminal law relating to economic
offences. The increase of the penalty for criminalised economic behaviour
that damages the national economy or that puts in danger the security of the
state is the culmination of a logic found in criminal law relating to economic
offences more generally. The last two lines, I would like to suggest, only
explicate a rationale which serves as justification for the criminalisation of
certain economic behaviours in general, namely the protection of the economic
system.
In Argentina, criminal law relating to economic offences is usually considered
an area of law distinct from criminal law proper.78 This is justified with regard
to the passive subject of criminal offences. While criminal law is usually
justified with regards to a national normative order that is considered to be
under attack whenever an individual right is violated (such as the right to
property, physical integrity, etc.), criminal law relating to economic offences,
it is argued, does not protect individual rights but a supra-individual good,
namely the economic order.79 In this vein, the Argentine legal scholar Ventura
Gonzáles defines economic crime as follows:
We speak of economic crime when an act violates the state’s interest in
the integrity and conservation of its economic system. So-called economic
crimes are those acts that are declared illegal and which affect the eco-
nomic structure of a country.80
77Ley Nr. 20.840 (Seguridad Nacional).
78See e.g. Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, Alejandro Alagia, and Alejandro Slokar. Derecho Penal.
Parte General. 2nd ed. Buenos Aires: EDIAR, 2002, pp. 214-215.
79Ventura González. Nociones generales sobre el derecho penal económico. Mendonza: Edi-
ciones Jurídicas Cuyo, 1998, p. 24 (my translation).
80González, Nociones generales, p. 22.
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For González, the Sherman Act constitutes the origin of criminal law concern-
ing economic offences worldwide.81 We encountered this piece of US American
anti-trust legislation in the last chapter.82 There, I highlighted the importance
of the anti-trust debate for the prosecutorial strategy in the Industrialists
Trials. The moral condemnation of trusts by the US prosecution, I argued, tied
in with the ordoliberal reading of the causes of World War II, namely the lack
of competition. This reading, I suggested, became the reverse blueprint for the
new German social order which saw competition as a precondition for a stable
democracy, thus making it the function of the state to create the conditions
necessary for the market to operate.
The justification of criminal law as it relates to economic offences found
in Gonzáles’ text echoes the basic ordoliberal assumptions about political
economy. The ‘economic law’ is the law of the ‘organised economy’, an organ-
isation which is necessary to secure the ‘public economic order’.83 In light
of this, criminal law relating to economic offences is presented as the ‘penal
projection’ of state intervention which is necessary to ensure the markets
functions without affecting the market’s regulatory forces.84 If criminal law
relating to economic offences is legitimised with reference to the protection
of the economy in general, then linking it explicitly to the protection of na-
tional security, as done by the National Security Act, does not introduce a
new rationale characteristic of authoritarianism. Rather, it can be read as a
blunt statement on the rationale underlying criminal law relating to economic
offences in general.
prosecuting economic subversion
The pre-trial decision reproduces verbatim entire sections from the sentences
on economic subversion – 10 pages in total – and thereby unearths textual
material produced by the juridico-political order of the Proceso that is now on
trial. As we will see, the explanations given by the judges in order to justify
their verdicts on economic subversion echo the ordoliberal justifications of
state intervention, exposing the fight against economic subversion as being
inherently linked to the economic project of the Proceso.
In the January 1979 decision to convert the abductions carried out by the
military into official pre-trial detention (case N° 40.528, see above), the judge
in charge describes in detail the financial operations which he considers to
fall within the law of economic subversion. The crimes of which the business-
men were accused all related to illegal financial transactions. In the case of
Grassi, the court held that the profit which the firm had made from financial
transactions was higher than that made from the industrial production of
81González, Nociones generales, p. 19.
82See above, p. 128
83González, Nociones generales, p. 27.
84González, Nociones generales, pp. 45–46.
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steel – the registered social purpose of the firm. The court acknowledged
that compared to the previous six months production had decreased by 57.39
per cent between January and June 1978. However, given that the credits
issued by the firm were conceded to one single beneficiary, without having
checked the entity’s creditworthiness, it could not be argued that the financial
business was intended to compensate for the risks that resulted from reduced
production.85 In a similar vein, the judge accuses the owners of Hurlingham
Bank of having endangered the stability of the bank by offering unsecured
credits, thereby putting the shareholders and the nation at risk.86
According to the judge acting in the economic subversion cases, instances
of economic subversion can be linked to political subversion, but they do not
necessarily have to.87 Economic subversion, he holds, endangers the national
interest and security of the Argentine community in and of itself. In the case of
the Hurlingham Bank, for example, the judge identifies the threat to national
security in the potential collapse of the bank due to its irresponsible lending
practices:
It is necessary to highlight the important and disastrous consequences
that result from bank breakdowns for state assets, public trust, legal and
commercial security – ultimately for the Argentine economy; therefore,
the reckless management of the loan portfolio beyond a careful and rea-
sonable tolerance, in putting into danger the assets of the Hurlingham
Bank, violates the protected legal goods . . . and needs to be described as
‘economic subversion’.88
The judge then offers his view on the rationale behind the legal regulation
of financial activity, linking the law on economic subversion to the economic
policies introduced by the Proceso. It is worth quoting the explanations at
some length, as they clearly show the argumentative link established between
the discourse on economic freedom and the necessity of state control:
It is clear that under the current organisation of the Argentine state,
banks and financial entities have a singular significance for the modern
national economy, insofar as they are holders of public credit that permits
the confidence of the inspector or depositor . . .
Hence the necessity of the state to intervene in order to supervise, regu-
late and establish precise norms that guarantee the respective operations.
This is why the Bank Act (Ley de Bancos), the Financial Entities Act (Ley
de Entidades Financieras) and related legislation were passed; this is why
the Argentine Central Bank was given the power to audit the operations of
these entities. In the moment in which the premises of a state guarantee
[for deposits, H.F.] are based on credits managed by banks and financial
entities, this guarantee is defrauded by irregular activities and fraudulent
85D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), pp. 158-159.
86D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), pp. 110, 162.
87D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 58.
88D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 163.
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behaviour of the management . . . , and there exists subversion insofar as
an entire judicial economic-financial system, established in favour of the
people that believe in its institutions, is ruined, destroyed, violated and
disrupted.89
It is possible to make sense of these accusations when they are looked at
against the backdrop of the tensions at the heart of the liberalisation of the
Argentine economy pursued by de Hoz, namely the active role attributed to the
state in guaranteeing the market’s functioning. As we saw in the last chapter,
the innovation of the new liberalism in the wake of World War II proposed
by ordoliberal thinkers was that the market was no longer conceived of as a
natural given. Instead, it had to be created and secured by the state. In the
case of Germany, I argued in my discussion of the ordoliberal economists, this
new theory was developed based on the diagnosis of the failure of a particular
capitalist society – the Third Reich. Against monopolist tendencies, they held,
the state had to work towards the creation of a competitive market.
For the case of Argentina, Ana Lucía Grondona has argued that liberal theory
carried out the same trick, linking a diagnosis of the past with a programming
of future economic policies. In the local translation of the ordoliberal argument,
she claims, Argentine liberals suggested that the interventionist Keynesian
policies adopted by Juan de Perón would lead to their ‘totalitarian’ deformations
– such as the ‘developmentalism’ that informed the economic policies adopted
by Argentine president Arturo Frondizi (in office from 1958 to 1962), in line
with the economic programme developed by the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL).90
De Hoz suggested that because the population had become used to years of
state intervention in the economy, it needed to be ‘taught’ how to act as free
individuals on the market.91 This is why according to him, in order to make
the public trust the new economic and financial order, the liberalisation of the
financial market had to be accompanied by a state guarantee of deposits.92
The liberalisation of the financial markets in combination with the full
guarantee of deposits, many economists have highlighted, led to the rapid
growth of the financial market followed by its breakdown in 1980. Reflecting
on the causes of the crisis in 1981, de Hoz writes:
The reform of 1977 implied the introduction of market freedom and com-
petition for deposits as the basis of the system. This required a responsi-
bility that was presupposed but which did not exist in all cases. A certain
fraction of financial firms did not have the necessary maturity to use this
89D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 172; For a brief overview of the financial reforms initi-
ated by de Hoz, see Fridman, ‘New Mentality’, p. 288.
90On the reception of ordoliberal thinking in Argentina, see Ana Lucía Grondona. ‘Las voces
del desierto. Aportes para una genealogía del neoliberalismo como racionalidad de gobierno
en la Argentina (1955-1975)’. In: La revista del CCC 5.13 (2011).
91Fridman, ‘New Mentality’, p. 280.
92Fridman, ‘New Mentality’, p. 294.
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freedom with responsibility, which resulted in abnormal credit practices
and offers of interest rates significantly higher than the market average
in order to attract deposits, and thus, the abuse of the guarantee of de-
posits.93
While de Hoz at first had been ambivalent about introducing the guarantee
of deposits by the Central Bank, he recognised that it was necessary in order
to make the consumer trust the market. When this system started to fail, the
failure was presented as evidence of the fact that the Argentine consumer had
not learned to use their newfound freedom responsibly.94
The alleged failure of the individual to act responsibly reappears in a court
decision from January 1979 concerning the proceeding status of the defen-
dants that were investigated for economic subversion. It conceives of the
National Security Law’s criminalisation of economic offences as a necessary
corollary to the new freedoms:
It is obvious that the intention of the legislator was both harmonious and
coherent: a regime with more liberties in the financial sphere needed to
be matched by an increased responsibility in the management of the firm.
Consequently it was necessary to repress more severely those criminal
conducts susceptible to impede, because of their corrupting and subver-
sive effect, the full enjoyment of those liberties.95
In attributing the collapse of the banks to the behaviour of individuals,
attention is distracted from the fact that the overall setup, with the state’s
guarantee of deposits and the high interest rates, offered significant incentives
for the ‘rational’ market actor to engage in financial speculation. The wish to
make profit is identified as the reason for the malfunction of the economic and
financial system insofar as the actors involved took irresponsible risks.96 Still,
the judge is keen to clarify, the law does not want to repress ‘private activity
motivated by the natural motor of commercial activities’.97 It does not punish
the wish to make profit as such, but only where this wish implies a risk to
the stability of the national economy.98 With this argument, the judge tries to
mediate the contradiction that arose from placing the rational entrepreneur
at the core of the new Argentine economy: the entrepreneur, if acting too
rationally, puts the entire system at risk.
In this section, I focused on fragments from the economic subversion cases
from the 1970s that are cited by and into the pre-trial decision concerning the
legal responsibility of Etchebarne and three military officials for the abductions
and torture of several businessmen. These citations cannot be contained by
the explanatory framework offered by judge Rafecas in the pre-trial decision.
93Martínez de Hoz, Bases, p. 82; translation taken from Fridman, ‘New Mentality’, p. 295.
94Fridman, ‘New Mentality’, pp. 294-295.
95D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 164.
96D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 165.
97D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 172.
98D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 172.
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This framework, as we saw, defines economic subversion as a threat to the
economic project of the Proceso by the left and consequently explains the
abductions of businessmen in terms of the capture of the state by private
interests. Instead, I suggested in this section, the citations refer us to the
ambivalent role that the state comes to play in the neoliberal imaginary as
the guarantor of economic freedom. From this perspective, the prosecution of
businessmen does not contradict the neoliberal logic, but is perhaps its logic
carried to the extreme.
5.5 Remembering Primitive Accumulation
In the first section of this chapter, I situated the trials that address the
economic dimensions of the Proceso within the re-foundational project under
the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Christina Fernández de Kirchner.
Following the financial, economic and social crisis in 2001, the new regime
under Néstor Kirchner not only presented itself as the opposite of the Proceso,
but, in finally dealing with the human rights legacies and by introducing
a change in the political economy, it also claimed superiority over what it
denounced as the pseudo-democratic regime which had been in place until
2001.99 The trial of Etchebarne has to be understood in this context.
fabricated legality
In Chapter Three I introduced a perspective that conceives trials as a site of
a competing politics of time. I invoked the notion of periodisation in order
to describe a specific temporalisaiton of history in trials. Trials in response
to state-backed violence, I argued there, participate in the periodisation of
history in that they construct an image of the past which is then, by means of
the judgement, turned into a negative reference against which the new order
claims its own legitimacy. The account of the past produced, I furthermore
established, is framed by the kaleidoscope of the juridico-political order that
sits in judgment over the past. That is, the line that the judgment draws
between ‘atrocity beyond the pale’ and ‘legitimate state policies’ of the previous
regime is informed by the laws of the political order of the present.
In the case against Etchebarne much of the document is dedicated to
the economic project of the Proceso and its negative impacts on the living
conditions of the population. However the violence that is recognised as
such by the indictment is the violence that results from the absence of the
rule of law. The fact that much of the evidence presented by Judge Rafecas
consists of documents produced by the Proceso’s ordinary judiciary forces him
to distinguish the legal system of the Proceso from the rule of law for which he
99On the change in economic policies under Kirchner, see Christopher Wylde. ‘¿Continuidad o
cambio? Política económica argentina posterior a la crisis y el gobierno de Néstor Kirchner,
2003-2007’. In: íconos 16.2 (2012), pp. 109–133.
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speaks. This work is done by the concept of the ‘normalidad fraguada ’, which
can be translated as ‘made-up legality’ or ‘fabricated legality’. According to this
concept, the Proceso has to be understood as a mere legal state rather than a
truly constitutional order.100 The (lack of) the rule of law comes to serve as the
criterion that distinguishes the violent past from the supposedly non-violent
present.
Insofar as the pre-trial decision focuses on the appropriation of wealth
via the use of state violence as well as on the forceful implementation of an
economic project that resulted in the redistribution of income and the release of
capital for financial investment, it construes the Proceso as a form of ‘primitive
accumulation’.101 The category of ‘primitive accumulation’, which I claim is
central to understanding the periodisation at work in the pre-trial decision,
can be taken from the document itself. Judge Rafecas, in support of his own
argument, cites a paragraph from a document that had been submitted by the
prosecution during pre-trial proceedings:
The fact is that, in cases like the present one, ‘for purely economic reasons
a repressive machine started to move which was then whitewashed with
the help of judicial records. This is because, . . . as is well known, in a
capitalist context property is protected with much actuarial and notarial
zeal (do not dare to remember the primitive accumulation!), it is necessary
to create the titles, certificates and property rights which otherwise would
have appeared as arbitrary appropriation by the stronger; that is, it is
necessary to regulate the exception’.102
According to this citation, and in line with the general reading of the crimes
put forward by Rafecas, the businessmen were abducted and tortured with the
aim of appropriating their properties. The quote refers to the legalisation of
the detainees’ situation – their transfer from the clandestine detention centre
Campo de Mayo to an ordinary prison – as the ‘legalisation of the exception’
and describes these activities as the attempt to cover the moment of coercion
in the economic transactions. Legal titles for the transactions that took place
at Campo de Mayo were to convert a transaction resulting from threat into one
that had been voluntarily agreed upon by all parties involved.
‘Do not dare to remember the primitive accumulation!’, Rafecas quotes the
prosecutor’s submission. What happens if we dare to remember the crimes
under investigation as instances of primitive accumulation? (This is, after all,
what the text wants us to do.)
100D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 18; while the pre-trial decision itself does not make
this connection, it could be argued that the concept of the ‘legal state’ as it appears in
the document corresponds with Ernst Fraenkel’s normative state as developed in Fraenkel,
Dual State.
101On the release of capital as a result of the economic policies adopted by Martínez de Hoz, see
Jorge Schvarzer. Martínez de Hoz: La lógica política de la política económica. Buenos Aires:
CISEA, 1983, p. 23.
102D’Alessandri y otros (8405/2010), p. 42.
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forms of violence
One of the most prominent accounts of primitive accumulation is given by
Karl Marx in the chapter titled ‘The Secret of Primitive Accumulation’ near
the end of The Capital.103 ‘[P]rimitive accumulation’, Marx writes, ‘plays
approximately the same role in political economy as original sin does in
theology’.104 This parallel drawn by Marx alludes to the function that both
ideas fulfill in explaining the coming about of the present state of the world.
Just as the figure of ‘original sin’ in Christian teaching explains the existence
of sin and evil in the world, the tale of primitive accumulation in political
economy explains the coming about of the division of the worker from the
means of production that is central to capitalist accumulation.105 As Marx
observes in the opening of his chapter on primitive accumulation:
The whole movement [of capitalist accumulation, H.F.]. . . seems to turn
around in a never-ending circle, which we can only get out of by assum-
ing a primitive accumulation (the ‘previous accumulation’ of Adam Smith)
which precedes capitalist accumulation; an accumulation which is not the
result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure.106
The concept of primitive (or ‘previous’) accumulation was not Marx’s inven-
tion, but was already developed in those works that constitute the object of his
critique, with one important difference: Marx highlights the extra-economic
violence and the role of the state in the process of primitive accumulation.107
According to Marx, primitive accumulation was enabled by the forceful ex-
pulsion of the peasantry from their land, colonial rule, the contraction of
public debt, the implementation of a tax system and the rise of international
financial markets.108 With the emphasis on the element of force in primitive
accumulation, he contests what he calls the ‘tender annals of political econ-
omy’ that he accuses of presenting the division of labour from the means of
production as the result of there being two sorts of people: one hardworking,
‘diligent and intelligent’, the other ‘lazy rascals, spending their substance. . . in
riotous living’.109 While according to orthodox political economy ‘[r]ight and
“labour” were from the beginning of time the sole means of enrichment’, Marx
103Karl Marx. Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. London: Penguin, 1990.
104Marx, Capital, p. 873.
105On the development of early teachings of the original sin as theodicy, and its systematisation
through Augustine, see Ian Alexander McFarland. In Adam’s Fall. A Meditation on the
Christian Doctrine of Original Sin. Maldon, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 29-45.
106Marx, Capital, p. 873.
107Adam Smith’s work indeed manifests a strong theological influence, but from Stoic thinking.
That is, in Smith’s political economy, the separation of work force and capital is not por-
trayed as original sin, but as part of God’s plan in which human beings – each working for
its own profit – together create a harmonious nature. On the Stoic influence in the work of
Adam Smith, see Hans Christoph Binswanger. ‘Die Glaubensgemeinschaft der Ökonomen’.
In: Die Glaubensgemeinschaft der Ökonomen. Essays zur Kultur der Wirtschaft. Ed. by
Hans Christoph Binswanger. Hamburg: Murmann, 2011, pp. 11–32.
108Marx, Capital, pp. 874-875.
109Marx, Capital, p. 873.
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emphasises that the history of the ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ is ‘written
in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire’.110
There is disagreement about the adequacy of Marx’s historical descriptions of
the process that he summarises under the heading of primitive accumulation,
as well as concerning the temporal demarcation of primitive accumulation
as a distinct historical phase which precedes the capitalist mode of accu-
mulation.111Before entering these debates, I wish to highlight the analytical
distinction between both forms of accumulation according to the kind of vi-
olence in their respective processes. Primitive accumulation is described by
Marx as being tied to open, physical violence and coercion. What he defines as
capitalist accumulation, in turn, rests on the differentiation of the moments of
appropriation and coercion, and as such is closely linked to the emergence of
the modern state with its monopolisation of physical violence.112 In this vein,
Marxist and neo-Marxist state theory made a point in arguing that the modern
state is a capitalist state not because it directly serves the interest of capital
owners. Instead, it is capitalist because with its claimed monopoly of violence
it is constitutive of the supposedly free economic sphere in which the owner of
capital and the owner of labour force meet:
If we are to understand the unique development of capitalism, then, we
must understand how property and class relations, as well as the func-
tions of surplus-appropriation and distribution, so to speak liberate them-
selves from – and yet are served by – the coercive institutions that consti-
tute the state . . ..113
Contrary to liberal economic theory that conceives of both the labour market
and the market for goods as a sphere in which individuals freely enter into
contract, economic theory in the Marxist tradition revealed – in the words of
Rosa Luxemburg – how
the right of ownership changes in the course of accumulation into appro-
priation of other people’s property, how commodity exchange turns into
exploitation and equality becomes class-rule.114
While liberal economic theory usually presents capitalist accumulation as
being non-violent and constituting the fulfilment of individual liberty, critical
theories of the state have emphasised both the role of state force in upholding
110Marx, Capital, p. 874,875.
111I will turn to this point in more detail below.
112Max Weber. Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1978; Joachim Hirsch. Materialistische Staatstheorie. Transformation-
sprozesse des kapitalistischen Staatensystems. Hamburg: VSA, 2005, p. 19.
113Ellen Meiksins Wood. ‘The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism’. In:
New Left Review 127 (1981), pp. 66–95, p. 84; Similarly, Guillermo O’Donnell. ‘Apuntes
para una teoría del Estado’. In: Revista Mexicana de Sociología 40.4 (1978), pp. 1157–1199,
pp. 1162-1165; Winter, ‘Beyond Blood and Coercion: A Study of Violence in Machiavelli
and Marx’, pp. 299-300.
114Rosa Luxemburg. The Accumulation of Capital. London and New York: Routledge, 2003,
p. 432; see also Marx, Capital, p. 899.
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the supposedly free economic sphere as well as the structural violence that
governs the economic sphere.
temporalisations
Liberal economic theory and, it could be argued, even Marx himself, treat both
forms of accumulation as separated historical phases. In Capital, for example,
primitive accumulation appears to be for the most part a development which
antedates the capitalist mode of production and which will, eventually, be re-
placed by the latter. However, various (Marxist and non-Marxist) scholars have
taken issue with this claim, arguing that primitive accumulation continues
to exist parallel to a purely economic process of accumulation and that the
capitalist economy depends on it for its own reproduction.115 Luxemburg was
one of the first to criticise Marx for confining the phenomenon of primitive
accumulation to a pre-capitalist historical phase; she argues that it is, in fact,
a recurring phenomenon that belongs to capitalist accumulation ‘as an actual
historical process’.116 More recently, David Harvey prominently introduced
the notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ to describe contemporary forms
of extra-economic accumulation that play a considerable role in shaping the
neoliberal capitalist mode of production.117
As far as primitive accumulation is a necessary condition for capitalist
accumulation, extra-economic force is present and repeated in the everyday
interactions between buyers and sellers, owners of capital and owners of the
labour force. Or, as Gavin Walter puts it:
the process of primitive accumulation (which is not a period, but a cycli-
cally reproduced logical moment) describes the installation of ‘real ab-
straction’ into history, and the fact that this moment is repeating every-
day shows us the paradoxical nature of the historical temporality that
characterizes capitalist society.118
This ‘paradoxical nature of the historical temporality’ characteristic of cap-
italist societies, I would like to suggest, consists in the fact that primitive
accumulation, understood as a necessary condition to enable capitalist ac-
cumulation, is treated as belonging to the past while being repeated within
it. It is repeated within capitalist accumulation for the latter would not have
come into existence without it – what Walker calls the ‘installation of “real
abstraction” into history’ – but also because extra-economic accumulation
continues to take place in capitalist societies.
115For a brief summary of this debate, see Jim Glassman. ‘Primitive Accumulation, Accumula-
tion by Dispossession, Accumulation by ’Extra-Economic’ Means’. In: Progress in Human
Geography 30.5 (2006), pp. 608–625, pp. 615-616.
116Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, p. 432.
117David Harvey. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 144-152.
118Gavin Walker. ‘Primitime Accumulation and the State-Form: National Debt as an Apparatus
of Capture’. In: Viewpoint Magazine 4 (2014), my italics.
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I suggested above that primitive accumulation and original sin can be taken
as two figures through which the reference to a previous state, which is claimed
to be radically different, is inscribed into the present condition of the world.
Thus, Werner Hamacher emphasises that guilt is not merely a category of moral
relations, but more importantly one of provenance.119 Capitalist accumulation,
despite being different from primitive accumulation, is structurally indebted to
it. Writing not about Argentina, but about primitive accumulation and state
debt in the context of the 2008 financial crisis, Walker states:
The original sin at the beginning of the capital-relation might as well be
understood as an ‘original debt’, an historical appearance of something
given, a gift. . . . If at the beginning, there is a debt or gift, capital cannot
ever truly ‘begin’.120
What can it mean, against the backdrop of these elaborations, to remem-
ber the Proceso as primitive accumulation? Marx’s interest in revealing ‘the
secret of primitive accumulation’ was to expose the physical violence that was
necessary to bring about the division of labour and capital required for the
development of the capitalist form of accumulation. In this vein, Matthias
Fritsch also understands Marx’s chapter on primitive accumulation as an
exercise in remembrance.121 It is the memory of the physical violence that was
the necessary condition for the capitalist economy.
With this in mind, one might say that to remember the persecution of
economic actors as instances of primitive accumulation draws attention to the
fact that the property relations of the present were partly brought about by the
application of physical violence. It would mean recognising the present as a
present that is indebted to the physical violence of the past. Furthermore, the
reference to Marx’s The Capital invites us to recognise the silent compulsion
and planned misery inflicted by capitalist forms of accumulation also in the
context of formal democratic regimes. As Pilar Calveiro points out for the Latin
American context:
The end of the dictatorships and the return to democracy did not imply,
neither in Argentina nor elsewhere, the end of domination but rather its
organisation under different parameters that implied new forms of organ-
ising politics, the economy, subjectivity, and, consequently, new modali-
ties of an repressive practice.122
The pre-trial decision, however, recalls the instances of primitive accu-
mulation in order to convert them into a negative reference for the present
juridico-political order. It does so, I would like to suggest, by converting the
analytical distinction between primitive and capitalist accumulation to a nor-
mative and a temporal one. In focusing on the illegality of the abductions
119Hamacher, ‘Guilt History’, pp. 83-85.
120Walker, ‘Primitive Accumulation’.
121Fritsch, Promise of Memory.
122Calveiro, ‘Formas y sentidos’, p. 124 (italics in the original).
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and the force applied to initiate the property transactions, what is converted
into a negative reference are not the economic policies implemented during
the Proceso or their effects on the population (which constituted the focus
of the judge at the beginning of the document), but the fact that they were
implemented with the help of uncontrolled state violence. In making the rule of
law the criteria of distinction, the judging juridico-political order casts itself as
an order that respects not only the rule of law, but also the laws of capitalist
accumulation. There is thus a danger that in implementing this distinction,
the trials addressing the economic dimensions of state crime render forms of
silent compulsion invisible at best and permissive at worst.
***
The next chapter looks in detail at a second trial which deals with the eco-
nomic dimensions of the Proceso. Here, businessmen appear not as victims of
state violence, but as accomplices. They are accused of having collaborated
with the military regime in the disappearance of their unionised workers. I
will focus on the strategies adopted by the prosecution and joint plaintiffs to
connect individual responsibility to structural explanations of state-backed
violence. As we will see, the attempt to translate the relationship between
structure and agency into a language of legal responsibility provokes ruptures
in the account of historical and legal duties constructed throughout the pro-
ceedings. The fissures that emerge on the surface of the legal narrative shed
light on an underlying ontological conflict about the nature of the state and the
place that the economic holds in relation to it. The detailed reconstructions
of the cooperation between the military, state officials and businessmen chal-
lenge the classical liberal separation of the state and the economy. However,
this distinction reemerges when the judges subsume the actions under the
available norms and forms of individual responsibility. It is in the labyrinth of
legal theories on commission and participation that we see precisely how the
law structures the definition of economic responsibility through its underlying
concepts of the state.
6 | The Ledesma Trial
In his reading of Franz Kafka’s novel The Trial, Peter Fitzpatrick observes
that, ‘[w]ith “The Trial”, the work of negative formation begins with the title.
There is no trial.’1 This remark also holds true for the trial that stands at
the centre of this chapter. What the title of the chapter announces as the
Ledesma trial is no trial, and has little prospect of ever becoming one. Still,
the legal proceedings that could have resulted in a public trial present us with
questions and insights concerning the concept of historical justice underlying
International Criminal Law (ICL). The trial’s suspended nature, I will argue in
this chapter, presents us – just like Kafka’s story – with a law in which we do
not cease to place our hope, despite the continuous experience of its failure.
What I am calling the ‘Ledesma trial’ for the purposes of this chapter are the
proceedings concerning the legal responsibility of Carlos Pedro Tadeo Blaquier
and Alberto Enrique Lemos for crimes against humanity committed during the
National Reorganisation Process (Proceso de Reorganisación Nacional, here-
after Proceso).2 Blaquier was the director of the Ledesma company from 1970
until 2013, when his two sons took over the management. Founded in 1912 as
a sugar mill in Argentine’s most northern province of Jujuy, the family-owned
company has grown into an important agro-industrial complex.3 Alberto Lemos
was the company’s manager (administrador general) during the time of the
Proceso. Both defendants are accused of having provided company vehicles
to the local police that were used in the abductions of several individuals
which took place during the first months following the coup. More specifically,
Blaquier and Lemos are indicted as participants in the illegal detention of three
representatives of the ‘Union of the Sugar Workers at Ledesma’ (Sindicato de
1Peter Fitzpatrick. ‘Political Agonism and the (Im)possibility of Law. Kafka’s Solution’. In:
Teoria e critica della regolazione sociale 2 (2016), pp. 97–115, p. 102.
2Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, (all translations from the document are mine).
3Between 1908 and 1912, the French settlers Henri Wollman y Charles Delcasse bought the
Ledesma farm and, with the help of foreign capital used to buy machines, they funded the
‘Ledesma Sugar Estates and Refining Company Limited’. Ana A. Teruel, Marcelo Lagos, and
Leonor Peirotti. ‘Los valles orientales subtropicales: Frontera, modernización azucarera y
crisis’. In: Jujuy en la Historia. Ed. by Ana A. Teruel and Marcelo Lagos. Jujuy: EdiUnju,
2006, pp. 437–464, p. 448; Today, 90.4% of the company’s capital is owned by the family.
Juan Manuel Compte and Andrea del Rio. ‘Hablan los Blaquier: “Algún día, quien gane
dinero será bien visto en la Argentina”’. In: Apertura (2015-06-08). URL: http://www.
apertura.com/clase/Hablan-los-Blaquier-Algun-dia-quien-gane-dinero-sera-
bien-visto-en-la-Argentina-20150618-0005.html (visited on 12/05/2016).
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Obreros del Azúcar del Ingenio Ledesma) on 24th March 1976 – the day of the
coup – and of twenty-six individuals from three neighbouring villages during
power cuts in July 1976 – commonly remembered as La Noche Del Apagón
(the night of the blackout).4
After many years in the labyrinth of the Argentine judiciary, the pre-trial
proceedings investigating the legal responsibility of Blaquier and Lemos only
started to advance in 2012. The case was formally reopened in 2003 after
the first Argentine court declared that the amnesty laws were in violation of
Argentina’s obligation, under international law, to investigate crimes against
humanity. However, the investigating judge assigned to the case did not
proceed with the committal proceedings.5 As national newspapers started to
report on the delay, pressure from politicians and human rights organisation
beyond the borders of the province of Jujuy started to increase. On 24th
March 2012, the anniversary of the coup d’état, local social and human rights
organisations took to the streets, demanding that investigations be advanced.
They were supported by people from all over the country. In total approximately
seventy thousand people marched that day. Four days later the responsible
judge resigned, and the interim judge assigned to the case initiated the pre-trial
inquiry.
In November of the same year, the judge published the indictment (auto de
procesamiento) of Blaquier and Lemos, which subsequently was appealed by
the defendants. It was not until March 2015 that the National Chamber of
Criminal Appeals in Cassation pronounced on the case. It granted the appeal
arguing that, so far, insufficient evidence had been presented to show that the
accused knew what the vehicles would be used for.6 A decision on the legal
responsibility of Blaquier and Lemos for the abduction of the former Ledesma
workers was thereby postponed.
The eternal postponement of a decision is not the only parallel that can
be drawn between Kafka’s The Trial and the Ledesma trial. As we will see
throughout this chapter, many elements of the Ledesma trial could be taken
from Kafka’s representation of the law in The Trial in general, and in the
parable Before the Law in particular.7 They epitomise the dystopian law that
4The judge found prima facie enough to indict the accused for the participation in the abduc-
tions of Luis Ramón Aredez, Omar Claudio Gainza and Carlos Alberto Melián. He rejected
the prosecutor’s accusations in the cases of Ramón Luis Bueno and Antonio Filiu, arguing
that while they had been detained in the same context and on the same day, not enough
evidence was provided to proved the use of Ledesma’s vehicles Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros,
pp. 1-15, 149.
5Alejandra Dandan. ‘La carta de Blaquier para su querido Joe’. In: Página/12 (2012-03-22).
URL: https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-188062-2012-02-22.html.
6Blaquier, Carlos Pedro Tadeo y otro s/recurso de casación. Casación. Cámara Federal de
Casación Penal. 2015-03-13.
7Benjamin observes that ‘it looks as if the novel were nothing but the unfolding of the parable’.
Walter Benjamin. ‘Franz Kafka. On the Tenth Anniversary of his Death’. In: Illuminations.
Ed. by Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968, pp. 111–140, p. 122;
On the relationship between both texts, se also Gunther Teubner. ‘The Law Before its
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many recognise in Kafka’s texts: its absurd formations, its evasiveness, its
violence.
While in The Trial it is the accused K. who suffers the evasiveness of the
law, in the case of the Ledesma trial it is the former political prisoners and
the relatives of the disappeared who are waiting for a legal judgment. Many of
the victims who fought for over twenty years to see Blaquier and Lemos in the
dock, who made their way from small villages in the mountain region to the
court in San Salvador de Jujuy, not unlike Kafka’s man from the countryside,
feel that they waited in vain before the law.
Read in this way, to tell the story of the Ledesma trial would mean to tell a
story of the failure of the law to deliver on its promise of justice by failing to
produce a sentence. It would tell a story of the entanglement of local elites and
the informal influences leading to a sentence. It would be the story of a law
unduly influenced by power politics.
There is another story that can be told about the Ledesma trial, equally
inspired by its parallels with Kafka’s representation of the law in The Trial.
Such a story could draw on those interpretations that read the irresolution
in Kafka’s representation of the law as a description of the law’s necessary
condition.8 In this vein, Gunter Teubner invites us to imagine that in Before the
Law ‘it is the decisionmaking practice of the legal process, in all the confusion
of life, that stands before its own law and has no idea what it is doing’.9 Such
a reading might understand the hopes placed in the proceedings as indicative
of law’s reliance on its claim to justice. And it would read the failure to live up
to that hope as a structural aspect of the law. Such a reading brings us back
to the question posed at the very beginning of this thesis, about the promise of
justice that trials in response to state crime hold for those who became the
victims of state violence.
My reading of the Ledesma trial in this chapter bears traces from both
accounts, even though it privileges the second one. Bringing the theoretical
argument set out in Chapter Three to bear on the Ledesma trial, my reading
focuses on the politics of time at work in the trial. That is, it looks at the way
the temporalisation of history in the trial participates in the grounding and
ungrounding of political authority. As with the trial of Juan Alfredo Etchebarne
discussed in the previous chapter, the Ledesma trial can be situated within the
Peronist re-foundational project, which sought to authorise itself in opposition
to both the human rights violations and the economic project of the Proceso.
Even though the coming about of the Ledesma trial was the result of years of
Law: Franz Kafka on the (Im–)Possibility of Law’s Self–Reflection’. In: Ancilla Iuris (2012),
pp. 176–203, p. 188.
8Jacques Derrida. ‘Before the Law’. In: Acts of Literature. Ed. by Derek Attridge. New
York: Routledge, 1992, pp. 181–220, See for example; Fitzpatrick, ‘Kafka’s Solution’; Teub-
ner, ‘The Law Before its Law’; Andreas Fischer-Lescano. ‘Franz Kafka’s Critique of Legal
Violence’. In: Revista Brasileira de Sociologia do Direito 3.1 (2016), pp. 9–51.
9Teubner, ‘The Law Before its Law’, p. 172.
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political and legal struggle which preceded the governments of Néstor Kirchner
and Christina Fernandez de Kirchner, the fact that the legal proceedings even-
tually gathered momentum can be linked to the explicit commitment of the
government to investigate the economic dimensions of the Proceso. In line with
countrywide practice, it appointed an ad-hoc prosecutor who came to support
the ordinary prosecutor in cases investigating crimes against humanity com-
mitted during the Proceso. Furthermore, the Chief Public Prosecutor created
an office to coordinate the prosecutorial strategies for trials investigating the
legal responsibility of economic actors.10
Kirchnerism, I argued in the last chapter, sought to posit itself as the non-
violent answer to the authoritarian state, as well as to the violence inflicted
by the neoliberal adjustment policies of the government of Carlos Menem
(1989-1990). Similar to the investigations of Etchebarne in the last chapter,
the legal investigation of the responsibility of Blaquier and Lemos links both
aspects, insofar as it forces the public to engage with the economic dimensions
of the Proceso. I will argue in this chapter that the indictment constructs the
participation of the two businessmen in the crimes as a negative reference,
against which the present claims its own superiority. At the same time, the
testimonies and evidence unearthed during the committal proceedings produce
what, in Chapter Three, I conceptualised as dialectical images. That is, they
produce images of the past that cannot be accommodated by the concepts of
legal responsibility on which the judge draws in order to make sense of the
violence of the past. As such, these images expose the contingency of the legal
kaleidoscope of the juridico-political order that sits in judgment over the past
and sheds light on its ‘rotten’ foundations.11 They provide evidence that there
is something ‘before’ the law, something on which the latter rests but for which
it cannot account.12
I will expose this double movement of opening and closure, which enables
the critique of criminal law as a concept of historical justice, in relation to
two issues arising from the indictment. In the first section I will pick up the
indictment’s discussion of the relationship between the company and the state.
In line with my critique of ICL as a liberal project, developed in the preceding
chapters, I will argue that the conceptions of individual responsibility are
defined by a liberal imaginary of the state.
To recap: in my analysis of the Industrialist Trials, I argued that the liberal
imaginary of the state informs the judgments, in that the judgments presume
both the state’s monopoly on violence and the existence of an economic sphere
of the free individual. In the last chapter, I showed how the indictment of
10Hannah Franzki. Interview with Lisando Pellegrini (Ministerio Público Fiscal, Secretaría Gen-
eral de Coordinación Institucional). Buenos Aires, 6/07/2012.
11This is a reference to Walter Benjamin’s statement that in the coincidence of law-positing
and law-preserving violence ‘something rotten in law is revealed’. See discussion in Chapter
Three, p. 92.
12Fitzpatrick, ‘Kafka’s Solution’, p. 109.
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Etchebarne reproduces the liberal presumption of these separated spheres
when it analyses the prosecution of businessmen in terms of the illegitimate
appropriation of the state for private purposes. In the case presented against
Blaquier and Lemos, these limits become evident when the evidence produced
throughout the pre-trial stage challenges the imaginary of the Weberian bu-
reaucratic state that is projected onto the past in order to make sense of the
interaction between state forces and business actors (6.1).
The second section picks up another thread from the discussion in the
previous chapter, namely the judge’s focus on the lack of the rule of law during
the Proceso, which then became the criterion which distinguished between
the violent past and the allegedly non-violent present. In my reading of the
indictment of Etchebarne, I dwelt on the notion of primitive accumulation
that was introduced by the prosecutor as a way of making sense of the forced
property transactions. I suggested that this description can be read in two
ways. On the one hand, it unmasks the self-description of capitalism according
to which capitalism relies solely on economic forms of accumulation. From
this perspective, the subsequent legalisation of the property transaction that
took place at Campo de Mayo constituted an attempt to render invisible the
element of force in the moment of appropriation.
On the other hand, I highlighted that, in condemning the use of physical
violence in the property transaction, the judge introduced the distinction
between primitive and capitalist accumulation as a periodisation: he opposed
the violence of the primitive accumulation, associated with the Proceso, to the
allegedly non-violent rule of law. I suggested that this particular periodisation
has two effects on the present: first, the part of Marx’s analysis that aims at
revealing the violence operative in economic forms of accumulation is thereby
elided; second, instances of non-capitalist forms of accumulation are relegated
to a pre-democratic past.
The second part of this chapter continues the discussion of the periodisation
that follows from the focus on the lack of the rule of law. It does so by
contrasting two different narratives which explain the absence of the body
of Jorge Weisz, a union activist at Ledesma who was arrested in 1974 and
disappeared in 1976. In the indictment, his absence, as with that of the other
victims, is explained with reference to the systematic practice of disappearance
carried out with the help of the clandestine state machinery. As such, he
becomes a ‘desaparecido’, a figure closely associated with the suspension
of the rule of law during the Proceso. Testimonies reveal that Weisz’s co-
workers assumed that he had been fed to the Familiar, a vicegerent of the devil.
The legend of the Familiar, as we will see, inscribes the disappearance into
a continuous experience of the violence of capitalist accumulation, thereby
challenging the periodisation introduced by the indictment (6.2).
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6.1 The State of Ledesma
The committal for trial order in the case ‘Fiscal Federal n° 1 Solicita Acumu-
lación (Aredez, Luis Ramón y Otros)’ has 155 pages. The first fifty pages of
the document summarise the prosecutor’s accusations and the contestation
presented by the defendants, followed by an overview of the relevant evidence
that was gathered during the committal proceedings.13 The document then
proceeds to evaluate the merit of the evidence. It first emphasises that the
crimes under investigation constitute ‘crimes against humanity’ and therefore,
where applicable, the relevant international norms need to be applied. Quot-
ing verbatim from the judgment in the trial of Miguel Etchecolatz – the first
judgment to be issued following the abrogation of the amnesty laws in 2005 –
it affirms that
the nature of crimes against humanity produces a fundamental effect on
the process of the knowledge of the incidents, as a consequence of which
one cannot understand the crime that is treated in an isolated or frag-
mented way – individually –, without keeping in mind its consideration as
a collective phenomenon that is inserted within a plan or a system.14
According to the judge, the context is not only important in order to appre-
ciate the quality of the crimes as crimes that violate ‘the most fundamental
norms of humankind’, but it furthermore acquires a evidentiary function.15
In line with the Argentine jurisprudence on crimes against humanity, he em-
phasises that, because the crimes were carried out by a clandestine state
apparatus and because most of the victims remain disappeared, it is in the na-
ture of the crimes under investigation that there is hardly any direct evidence.
Against this backdrop, ‘circumstantial’, ‘presumptive’, ‘indicative’ and ‘indirect’
evidence is considered an important and valid means with which to establish
the responsibility of the accused.16
These clarifications are then followed by an extensive elaboration on the
‘historical context of the crimes under investigation’, deemed necessary by
the judge as ‘this would allow us to understand what happened in its true
dimension’.17 This statement echoes what I identified in Chapter Three as the
first dimension of the latent theory of historical justice underlying ICL. ICL
jurisprudence, I argued, seeks to legitimise trials in response to state crime by
claiming that they have an ‘historiographical function’. The trials’ ability to
contribute towards establishing the truth about the crimes under investigation
thereby seems to become a procedural aim; the adequate representation of the
past becomes a requirement of justice.18
13Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, pp. 1-54.
14Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 59.
15Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 59.
16Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, pp. 60-61.
17Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 72.
18See section 3.2 (Historical Truth as Justice) starting on p. 79
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The historical context is also relevant to the second dimension of the latent
theory of historical justice, namely: the judgment of those found responsible
of having committed international crimes (in the present case, crimes against
humanity). On the legal relevance of the historical context – albeit in relation
to inheritance law – Joseph Jenkins writes:
Obligation pre-supposes relation, and so the far-from-evident decision as
to just what constitutes historical ‘context’ (i.e., the with-text, the related-
text) is the first moment of judgment concerning obligation. In a kind of
summary judgment motion, the reader/writer of history brings texts to
bear – or doesn’t.19
As we will see in the following reading of the indictment, the evidence
produced during committal proceedings as well as the historical context can be
read as a ‘first moment of judgment’ which creates obligations. The obligations
that are invoked by the ‘rags’ of history unearthed by the proceedings produce
tensions with those obligations which are put on the accused by the concepts
of legal responsibility. As the judge tries to translate the carefully constructed
historical context into doctrines of individual responsibility, the limits of the
concepts of individual responsibility come into relief. This process therefore
exposes the way in which current forms of constructing criminal responsibility
privilege certain relations established by ‘circumstantial’ and ‘indirect’ evidence
over others.
The ‘clear-cut image’ of the events and the related responsibility which the
indictment seeks to present is thus interrupted by what can be conceived of
as ‘dialectical images’. These are instances that are critical to the present
juridico-political order because they cannot be accommodated by the ways
in which it seeks to turn the past into a negative reference. As we will see
in the analysis that follows, these ruptures emerge, again, where the trial
attempts to decide upon the economic dimensions of the violence inflicted by
state terrorism.
the state within the state
The narrative axis constructed in the indictment centres around the physical
violence exercised against the labour movement in the seventies, framing it as
an instance of the permanent struggle between labour and capital. The repres-
sion of the labour movement passes from constituting merely one dimension
of the Proceso to holding a central explanatory force. The union activism of the
(captured, tortured, disappeared) workers is invoked in order to explain why it
was they who were deprived of their liberty, tortured and in some cases dis-
appeared. Moreover, as in the pre-trial decision concerning the responsibility
of Etchebarne, discussed in the previous chapter, the redistributive demands
for which they stand come to explain the Proceso as a collective, political and
19Jenkins, ‘Inheritence Law’, p. 1046.
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economic project.20 In this sense, the judge closes the section on the historical
context by concluding that:
the purpose of the imprisonments, tortures, assassinations and disap-
pearances carried out by security forces during the last civil-military dic-
tatorship was not only the preservation of a certain ideology, but an ille-
gal repression aimed in addition at establishing and defending a economy
with neoliberal characteristics free from threats such as demands and
claims from the trade unions.21
This general interpretative outlook concerning the rationale of the Proceso,
mostly based on historiographical publications, also frames the discussion
of the local situation in Jujuy where the crimes took place. The indictment
describes the particular social place occupied by Ledesma with reference to
the labour struggles in 1973 and 1974, which demanded the construction
of adequate housing.22 1973 was the year in which the military dictatorship
that had been initiated with the coup of 1966 came to an end, and in which
Peronist candidate Hector Cámpora won the national election. The labour
union of the workers at Ledesma asked the company to comply with a law
which, although passed in 1947, had not been put into practice. It obliged
companies with more than two hundred workers to build housing, primary
schools and hospitals. Following several strikes, the local government signed
a bill which forced the company to build five thousand houses with the help of
credit provided by state banks.
The indictment traces the connection between this conflict and the detentions
and disappearances that took place in 1976: the demand for housing, the
judge holds, was one of the important labour conflicts that took place before
the coup d’état and which threatened the profit of the company. In 1975 the
local police had already detained several union leaders who, following the coup,
were transferred to a clandestine detention centre. They remain disappeared.
The discussion that evolves around the housing issue in the indictment
is noteworthy because it gives rise to several statements on the relationship
between the company and the state that challenge the way in which the judge
later seeks to frame the responsibility of the defendants. In giving account of
different views on the topic, the judge cites a passage from a statement made
by Blaquier, who had pointed out that:
Ledesma exceeded its role as a company and took on functions similar to
those of a state in its role as provider of social assistance and development,
such as the building of housing, urbanisation, and economic contribution
to sanitary and educational institutions.23
20Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, pp. 73-92.
21Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 92.
22Cf. Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, pp. 88-95.
23Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, pp. 19-20.
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The document also quotes from a statement submitted by Lemos. He declared,
in a similar vein:
We enabled thousands of families who used to live in rural areas to build
their own house through the provision of very accessible loans. The im-
portant donations of hectares [of land] for the construction of housing,
sports facilities and the preservation of the environment, as well as the
construction and maintenance of hospitals in the area of Ledesma and El
Talar, required a substantial economic effort which we assumed because
we were aiming at modernisation and social corporate responsibility.24
Reacting to this self-representation of the ‘corporation-state’, the judge then
puts forward a different reading of the situation. He emphasises the power
and control which Ledesma had over the local population as a result of its
dominant position in the region. The judge states:
Thus the company exercised a dominant control through the employer-
employee relationship over most of the inhabitants in these localities,
which without any doubt must have made very difficult any opposition
against or complaints about the employer that could have endangered its
economic interests.25
Both Blaquier’s and Lemos’ declarations and the conclusions drawn by the
judge, challenge the presumption of a strict division between state and private
institutions. In both narratives, the corporation is the place in which economic
and political power converge.26
ledesma’s police station
The line between state and company also becomes blurred when the document
examines the evidence for the abductions carried out on 24th March and in
July 1976. Both operations were carried out by joint forces (that is, police and
military personel) who – according to the indictment – used vehicles and drivers
from Ledesma. Those deprived of their liberty on 24th March were known union
leaders and doctors from the company’s medical facility. The operations in
July were carried out during electricity cuts in the surrounding villages and
were aimed at unionised workers, family members and individuals linked to
local protest movements. In total, about 400 individuals were detained and
transferred to local detention centers. While some were soon released, others
were sent to clandestine detention centers all over the country, some of whom
remain disappeared. The indictment discusses the role of the vehicles sourced
from Ledesma and the relationship between the corporation and the local
security forces.
24Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 16.
25Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 88.
26The figure of the ‘state within a state’ was also invoked by the prosecution in the Krupp case
to describe the organisation and de facto power of the Krupp Company. Nuernberg Military
Tribunals, NMT vol. IX , p. 129.
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In the story told by the (ex-)workers, Ledesma appears inscribed into the
scene of the abductions not only through the vehicles, but also through the
way in which the workers speak about the security forces. In the reproduction
of their testimonies, we learn that:
[Carlos Hector] Brandan states that he was deprived of his liberty during
the night of 20th July 1976 in Calilegua; tied and blindfolded, he was
brought to the police station in Calilegua where they gave him number
nineteen and from there he was transferred to Ledesma’s police station,
later to Guerrero, to the detention center and to La Plata . . . .27
The defence lawyers picked up the notion of ‘Ledesma’s police station’. They
explained that the phrasing was a confusion produced by the way that the
village life is organised around the factory:
The confusion evoked by the fact that the notions ‘Ledesma’ and ‘sugar
company’ are used to designate interchangeably the company, the village,
the police station or the neighborhood that bears the company’s name,
does not mean that there exist dependencies of the security forces within
the private property of the firm.28
The court took this controversy as an opportunity to investigate the nature
of the ‘confusion’. It collected and compared documents and testimonies,
and in this context came across decree 2.379, passed in 1966, according
to which the national government installed the ‘dependency Ledesma of the
National Gendarmerie’ within the premises of the corporation.29 The judge
then evaluates the information. He states:
According to the documentary and testimonial evidence accumulated through-
out the proceedings, the branch ‘Ledesma’ of the gendarmerie was created
in order to control the security zone along the border, taking advantage
of the buildings provided by the company regardless of the fact that it is
located outside the border territory, that is, more than 160 km away from
the border with Bolivia. . . . In this context, right from its beginnings the
new police section did not rely on its own infrastructure, and even less so
its own vehicles, which would be supplied by the company in exchange
for security services which included, among other things, the control and
suppression of union activities.30
In light of this interpretation, the alleged ‘confusion’ becomes a ‘relation’.
The decree mentioned above produced an exchange between company and
policemen in a territory declared a ‘border zone’. In another part of the
document, the judge explains what he means when he speaks of a ‘border
zone’. ‘According to the military’, he writes, ‘promoting the development of
27‘Gendarmería del Ingenio Ledesma’ Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, 79, my italics.
28Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 22.
29Sección Ledesma de Gendarmería Nacional
30Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, pp. 133-134.
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Ledesma would allow for the strengthening of the border area, something
considered fundamental in their fight against communism’.31
This ‘collaboration’ between security force and company was officially re-
newed in 1979, with an agreement between the then director of the national
gendamerie and general of the divisions I and III, Antonio Domingo Bussi and
Blaquier. The document, included in the body of evidence, indicates the goods
and properties that Ledesma already had transferred and was still to transfer
to the police in exchange for security services. Ledesma also committed itself
to provide one thousand litres of fuel per month to secure the functioning of
the unit.32 The testimonies of the victims, which speak of ‘Ledesma’s police
station’, can be read as the (perceived) unification of economic power and
physical force.
from state to accomplice
At the beginning of the section on the legal responsibility of the accused, the
judge summarises the historical context by attributing the motivation for the
human rights violations committed during the Proceso to economic interests.
He reiterates that ‘security services of the local gendarmerie in fact served the
aim of restraining local union demands that were expressed with increasing
organisation and strength’.33 A few lines later, he concludes that:
the symbiotic relation constructed between the company and the security
forces which participated in the state repression was able to keep in line
those individuals adverse to its plan of economic growth.34
When it comes to the translation of this historical account into the individual
responsibility of the accused, however, several fissures appear in the narrative.
In the process of defining legal responsibilities, the judge dissolves this ‘symbi-
otic relation’, constructed throughout the document, into one of ‘author’ and
‘participant’ in the crimes.
As pointed out in Chapter One, Argentine courts investigating the systematic
human rights violations committed during the Proceso adopt the principle of
‘double subsumption’: the individual crimes are first contextualised within a
systematic plan and subsumed under the count of ‘crimes against humanity’,
as defined by ICL, in order to argue that they do not fall under the statute
of limitations and that the state has a duty to prosecute the human rights
violations. In order to define and decide upon the criminal responsibility the
incidents are then subsumed under Argentinian criminal law.
In the present case, Blaquier and Lemos are indicted as participants in the
crime of deprivation of liberty by civil and military state officials as defined in
31Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 77.
32Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, pp. 44-45.
33Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 133.
34Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 133.
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Article 144 b (1) of the National Criminal Act.35 It follows from this decision
that the author of the crime by definition needs to belong to the state apparatus.
This is why, even though the indictment strictly speaking only concerns the
responsibility of Blaquier and Lemos, the judge nonetheless refers to General
Luciano Benjamín Menéndez who, according to him, has to be considered the
indirect author of the crimes, since he was the ‘highest responsible in the
military chain of command that concerned the area’.36
Menéndez’s responsibility for the illegal detentions under investigation in
this case, as well as the responsibility of four other military officials, was
investigated in the first public trial in Jujuy, which began in July 2012 and
that, at the time of issuing the indictment against Blaquier and Lemos, was
still ongoing. So, while he was not indicted in this case, Menéndez had been
indicted as an indirect author of the crimes under investigation in a different
case. In the indictment of Blaquier and Lemos, the judge briefly summarises
the arguments according to which Menéndez should be considered the indirect
author, on the basis of Claus Roxin’s theory of perpetration of a crime through
an organised power structure.37 Blaquier’s and Lemos’ responsibility is con-
sequently cast as merely participation, through the supplying of vehicles, in
crimes that were orchestrated by the state :
Thus, with the company’s provision of the vehicles there is a relation
of ‘co-casuality’ between the action taken by the accused, Blaquier and
Lemos, and the result of the act of the author (illegal deprivation of lib-
erty of the victims), according to the application of the theory of objective
imputation.38
While the historical analysis included in the indictment alludes to a struc-
tural understanding of power when it describes the effective control of Ledesma
over the population and the economic dependency of the local police stations
on the corporation, the definition of legal responsibility (the attribution of
authorship), relies on the assumption that control of the action is exercised via
a bureaucratic state or military apparatus. The economic dimension of these
crimes is thereby written out of the rationale of the Proceso and located in the
‘cooperative conduct’ by Blaquier and Lemos ‘in the actions of others through
the furnishing of means of transport’.39
structure and agency
The difficulty that criminal law faces when translating structural relationships
of power into forms of individual responsibility is, as pointed out in Chapter
35Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 114.
36Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 127.
37Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 127; on Roxin’s thoery see Claus Roxin. ‘Crimes as Part
of Organized Power Structures’. In: Journal of International Criminal Justice 9.1 (2011),
pp. 193–205.
38Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 135.
39Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 132.
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Three, a recurrent subject in the literature interested in the historiographical
function of trials in response to state crime.40 As I argued there, the analysis of
the writing of history in trials is often truncated with an argument discussing
the (in)ability of trials to contribute towards historical truth, with truth being
(implicitly) defined as the adequate representation of the past. That is, in order
to assess whether trials can make a contribution to the writing of history,
most contributions to the scholarly debate ask whether ICL has the means
to represent the complexities of state crime adequately. Faced with the gap
that opens between the historical ‘reality’ of state-backed violence and the
attribution of individual responsibility, scholars either call for giving up on
the historiographical function of ICL or, instead, demand that more adequate
concepts of legal responsibility be developed, in order to be able to grasp the
complex interactions that are at the core of the crimes outlawed by ICL.
In the following, I emphasise the gap which opens up precisely where the
historical context constructed in the pre-trial decision is translated into forms
of legal responsibility. However, this is not in order to make an argument
about the (in)adequacy of legal concepts of responsibility. Rather, in line
with the theoretical perspective set out in Chapter Three, I wish to explore
how the histories of the role of Ledesma during the Proceso destabilise and
thereby expose the contingency of the way in which ICL constructs individual
responsibility.
In adopting such a perspective, I join those scholars who take the gap
that emerges between the complex interactions of systematic state-backed
violence and concepts of individual responsibility not as indicative of a need
to reform ICL, but instead as an invitation to analyse the structure of ICL.
Martti Koskenniemi, for example, explains the gap that opens up by means of
a paradox that is at the heart of ICL.41 The crimes defined by ICL all have a
‘context element’, which requires that the individual crime under investigation
be part of a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic practice’. It is this context that qualifies
a crime as an international crime, understood as defined in Chapter Two,
namely a crime that is considered to affect the international community as
such.42 At the same time, the court needs to link the crime to an individual
and prove their criminal intent.
This ‘awkward task’, to ‘prove a personal guilt without ignoring the broader
context in which crimes take place’ and the ‘perpetual tension between the
collective and the individual’ at the heart of ICL more generally, has also been
thoroughly analysed by Gerry Simpson.43 Simpson shows how ICL jurispru-
dence attempted to solve these tensions through novel doctrines of individual
responsibility and collective conspiracy which, however, never manage to to-
40See above, p. 82
41Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity’, p. 16.
42See discussion on p. 46
43Simpson, War Crimes, pp. 58, 71.
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tally disguise the fictional element which is contained in the assumption of
individual responsibility.44 In pointing out that, even where responsibility is
attributed to an individual, courts tend to invoke the collective, he contests
that which George Fletcher has identified as the ‘liberal bias’ of ICL, namely
the primacy of agency over structure.45
Expanding on Simpson’s critique, I want to suggest that, while ICL has a
liberal bias, this bias does not manifest itself in the primacy of agency over
structure. Rather, what I call ICL’s liberal bias consists in the way it links the
individual to the structure, that is, how it links the crime under investigation
in a case to the widespread and systematic practice. Once again we will
encounter the imaginary of the Weberian state as an organising principle of the
way in which ICL imagines state crime and related legal responsibilities. This
time, as we will see, this imaginary structures the legal doctrines that seek
to overcome the distance between crime scene and accused, with the aim of
holding to account those who are considered to bear the ‘actual’ responsibility.
the laws of causation
ICL jurisprudence developed a wide range of doctrines with which to grasp in-
dividual responsibility in the context of state crime. Conspiracy, joint criminal
enterprise and command responsibility serve as legal constructs which bridge
the physical distance between the accused and the scene of crime.46 Elies van
Sliedregt distinguishes these doctrines according to two rationales, namely the
naturalistic and the normative model.47 The first, she holds, focuses on the
causes of the actus reus, the second on the moral responsibility of the accused.
According to the naturalistic model, the principal perpetrator is the person
who physically committed the crime, while the normative model focuses on the
intellectual perpetrator. The first model constructs the crime from the bottom
up, while the second adopts a top-down approach. Van Sliedregt argues that,
while both can be found in ICL, jurisprudence increasingly resorts to the
normative model.
In Tadic, for example, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia famously read joint criminal enterprise as a
44Simpson, War Crimes, pp. 66-78; The problem of anchoring ‘responsibility for causation in
individuals in the context of causal sequences that predate and postdate individual agency’
is, of course, characteristic of criminal law in general. See Alan W. Norrie. Crime, Reason
and History. A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law. London: Butterworths, 2001, p. 135.
45George P. Fletcher. ‘Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’. In: The
Yale Law Journal 111 (2002), pp. 1499–1573.
46See contributions in Gideon Boas, James L. Bischoff, and Natalie L. Reid. Forms of Responsi-
bility in International Criminal Law. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007; Tracy Lynn Isaacs and Richard Vernon, eds. Accountability for Collective Wrong Doing.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
47Elies van Sliedregt. Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012, pp. 71-73.
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form of commission into article 7 (1) of the statute.48 Subsequently, liability
as per joint criminal enterprise entered the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia
tribunal.49 Article 7(1) establishes individual responsibility for ‘a person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime’.50 In the opinion of the Appeals
Chamber, the article should be read as follows:
Although only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the
criminal act (murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, etc.), the participation and contribution of the other members
of the group is often vital in facilitating the commission of the offense in
question. It follows that the moral gravity of such participation is often no
less – or indeed no different – from that of those actually carrying out the
acts in question.51
In the next paragraph, the judges add that to hold those who made the crime
possible liable ‘only as aiders and abettors might understate the degree of their
criminal responsibility’.52
In line with the Tadic judgment, van Sliedregt justifies the shift towards a
normative model as follows:
[S]tigmatization through the principal status is important bearing in mind
the expressive value of prosecuting and punishing international crimes
and the denunciatory and educational function of punishment. Making
clear who masterminded crimes by referring to him/her as the ‘principal’
who ‘commits’ crimes is important in communicating to victims and the
international community as a whole, who was the ‘real’ culprit.53
What is at stake in the normative model, then, is linking the causation of a
crime to a judgment about the blameworthiness of individual behaviour. The
‘principal’ or perpetrator is no longer the person who held the weapon, but
rather the person who is found to be most ‘responsible’ for the commission of
the act. However, that which sounds like a natural category in Tadic as well
as in van Sliedegt’s account is in fact a highly contingent decision. Who is
identified as the most responsible person for bringing about a certain situation
depends on non-legal concepts, analyses and ontological assumptions for
which criminal doctrine alone cannot account.
The highly dynamic development of doctrines of individual responsibility
in ICL follows a movement of circular reasoning which renders invisible the
48Prosecutor v. Tadic. IT-94-I-A. Judgement (Appeals Chamber). International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia. 1999-07-15.
49In fact, the tribunal developed three different forms of joint criminal enterprise. For more
detail, see Allison M. Danner and Jenny S. Martinez. ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’.
In: California Law Review 93 (2005), pp. 75–169.
50International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Statute. 2009 (updated). URL:
http://www.icty.org/sid/135 (visited on 04/14/2013).
51Tadic, ¶191.
52Tadic, ¶192.
53van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility, p. 80.
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pre-legal conceptions of responsibility on which the legal doctrines draw in
the first place. New doctrines are introduced and developed in line with the
argument that they are needed in order to represent the ‘actual’ responsibility
of the accused. However, it is not made explicit on which grounds this ‘actual’
responsibility’ or the ‘actual’ perpetrator are identified. Once these doctrines
have become accepted, they serve as frameworks through which to establish
legal guilt. At this point the verdict on the individual responsibility of the
accused is presented as an objective finding of responsibility. The politics
of individual responsibility for mass crimes can be seen in the way that ICL
naturalises the line it draws between legally relevant forms of contributions to
a crime and those not taken into account.
organised power structure
The destabilising dimension of the Ledesma trial consists in its exposure of
the underlying assumptions that inform Roxin’s theory of the perpetration
of a crime through an ‘organised power structure’. This theory has become
central to definitions of individual responsibility for state crime in Argentina.
In line with the move towards normative theories of individual responsibility,
Roxin’s theory fosters the distinction between perpetrator and accessory in
relation to a supposed moral blameworthiness of their respective contributions.
It establishes legal responsibility on the basis of the assumption that the
author has control of an act through organised power structures typical of the
bureaucratic state.54 That is, power – understood as the ability to influence
the actions of others – is found to be exercised only through hierarchical
structures and (military) authority.
As already mentioned above, the application of Roxin’s theory results in
Menéndez being indicted as the indirect author of the crimes under inves-
tigation. As commander in chief, responsible for the northern provinces of
the country, Menéndez is identified as the perpetrator behind the perpetrator,
controlling the acts through an organised power structure. The figure of the
‘organised power structure’ by now has become accepted to such an extent
that reference to the position of Menéndez is enough to indict him as indirect
author; no further evidence concerning his knowledge of the particular crimes
or his criminal intent is needed.
Having established authorship thus, Blaquier and Lemos are indicted prima
facie as participants in a crime orchestrated by the state. The economic
dimension of the crimes is thereby written out of the rationale of the Proceso
and allocated to the private sphere. All the evidence that speaks of the powerful
position of the company in the region, with the entanglement of local police
and local business, cannot be translated into a notion of influence that is
construed exclusively in terms of organised hierarchy.
54Roxin, ‘Organized Power Structures’.
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As we have seen in the course of this thesis, the conceptual separation of
the state (the public sphere and the structure) and the economy (the private
sphere) is characteristic of the dominant approach to corporate responsibility.
The latter assumes ex-ante the existence of the state which holds the monopoly
on force when, as Raymond J. Michalowski points out,
treating government as organizationally distinct from economic institu-
tions and civil society is more a statement of how free-market societies are
supposed to operate than a description of how they actually operate.55
In the Ledesma trial, the testimonies and evidence that were gathered and
unearthed during the pre-trial proceedings expose the mirrors through which
the legal kaleidoscope frames the responsibility for the disappearance of the
former workers from Ledesma. The ‘circumstantial’ evidence and the historical
context presented in the indictment suggested a symbiotic relation between the
state and the company. The legal framing of responsibility, however, mirrors
the ontological separation of the state and the economy that is proper to
liberalism; a separation which is projected onto the past in order to make sense
of the economic dimensions of state crime. Against the apparent intentions of
the judge, the ‘economic’ is written out of the logic of the Proceso and identified
solely with the economic actors. In sum, rather than offering a clear-cut
image that might appear to be a truthful replica of Ledesma’s role in the
disappearances of their workers, the indictment exposes the lines along which
legal responsibility is constructed.
6.2 States of Exception
I now want to turn to the second issue that is brought up by the Ledesma trial,
which, as I will argue, exposes the mirrors of the kaleidoscope through which
the current juridico-political order frames the violence of the Proceso. Again,
this glimpse of the particularity of the legal concepts under consideration is
enabled by the double movement of opening and closure: the investigations of
the crimes experienced by the workers of Ledesma during the Proceso produce
evidence that cannot then be accommodated by the legal concepts. In this
section, I will not focus on the concepts of responsibility, but on the kind of
violence that is recognised as such.
desaparecidos
The violence that is recognised and condemned by the indictment is the violence
of the state of exception. Blaquier and Lemos are indicted as participants in
the crimes of unlawful deprivation of liberty, aggravated by the use of threat
and aggression in the context of a systematic plan.56 This plan is described
55Michalowski, ‘State Crime Studies’, p. 14.
56As defined by art. 144 bis inc. 1° and art. 142 inc. 1 of the Argentine Criminal Act Aredez,
Luis Ramón y otros, p. 131.
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as the widespread and organised practice of illegal detentions and forced
disappearances carried out with the help of the state apparatus.
In the discussion of the collage ‘Martínez de Hoz and Boots’ in Chapter One,
I alluded to the double structure of the state apparatus during the Proceso.
On the one hand, it claimed to stand on legal grounds. On the other hand,
it established a system of clandestine detention centres in which the rule of
law was suspended.57 Those who were brought to one of these centres were
exposed to arbitrary violence, torture, death.
As systematic as the violence inflicted by this system was, so too was the
negation of its existence by official state institutions. Consequently, the
existence of those caught in the circle of clandestine detention centres was
also negated. Most of those sucked into the clandestine state machinery were
never seen again. This systematic and institutionalised practice of detaining
political opponents while simultaneously negating their detention has become
known as the practice of ‘disappearance’.58 It creates a space in which no law
applies, in which the human body is exposed to uncontrolled violence in the
name of the state. It is the violence enabled by the suspension of the rule of
law in the name of the rule of law.59
The notion of the ‘disappeared’ furthermore emphasises the continuing
absence of a body. Many people have written on the long-lasting effect that
this continuing absence has on family members as well as on a society.60 Not to
know what has happened to loved ones after they were abducted is described
as barrier to both individual and collective closure. The categorisation of
an absent body as desaparecido is usually followed by a demand that the
circumstances of the disappearance be investigated, that the circulation of
the body through clandestine detention centres be traced, until these traces
lead us to the depths of the Rio de la Plata or to some anonymous mass grave.
Maybe it is because the disappeared body constitutes the beginning of a legal
problem (where there is no harmed body, there is no crime), that it is linked to
the demand for a judicial truth: where, when, who?61
However, the indictment also refers us to a different way of making sense
of the disappearances of the unionised workers from Ledesma, namely, to
the legend of the Familiar. Taking up an argument made by literary scholar
Kirsten Mahlke, I hold that this tale offers a different way of making sense of
57On the role of law and legal institutions during the Proceso, see Crespo, ‘Legalidad y dic-
tadura’; see also the contributions in Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, ed. ¿Usted también doctor?
Complicidad de funcionarios judiciales y abogados durante la dictadura. Buenos Aires: siglo
veintiuno editores, 2015.
58Pilar Calveiro. Desapariciones. Memoria y desmemoria de los campos de concentración ar-
gentinos. México D.F.: Taurus, 2002.
59Giorgio Agamben. State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
60Daniel Feierstein. El genocidio como práctica social. Entre el nazismo y la experiencia ar-
gentina. Hacia un análisis del aniquilamiento como reorgnozador de las relaciones sociales.
Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007.
61See in detail Crenzel, ‘Judicial Truth’.
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the disappearance of human bodies.62 It links the disappearance of people
not primarily to the (Schmittian) state of exception but rather to the condition
which with Benjamin I called the ‘state of exception that is the rule’ – namely
the violence of the capitalist rule of law.
el familiar
In the body of evidence that was gathered to establish the responsibility of
Blaquier and Lemos, we repeatedly find the name of Jorge Osvaldo Weisz.
Weisz started working at Ledesma in 1970 and soon after his arrival engaged
in union activism. In 1974, Jorge Weisz and his wife, María Dora Revechi
de Weisz, were arrested for alleged subversive activities on the basis of the
emergency laws enacted by Isabel Peron in the same year.63 While Dora was
released several years later, Jorge remains disappeared.
The abduction and subsequent disappearance of Jorge Weisz is not part
of the accusations made against Blaquier and Lemos. However, evidence
concerning his detention was included by the judge in order to point out the
close relationship between the security forces and the company. Among the
materials that were confiscated during the searches of the Ledesma office
in 2012, the judiciary found the personnel file on Weisz. It gives evidence
of the supervision and control of union activities that had been ordered by
the company.64 According to the testimony of Dora Weisz, her husband’s
disappearance was explained by his fellow workers at the sugar plantation
with reference to the Familiar.65
The legend of the Familiar, which has roamed the sugar plantations of the
Argentine northwest since the 1880s, also tells a story of the disappearance
of bodies.66 There are different versions of this story, which have been was
passed on from generation to generation. However, as Mahlke highlights,
despite being an oral tradition, its core has remained remarkably stable over
the years.67 It is summarised by Mahlke as follows:
A black, huge, evil dog with sharp claws and luminous red eyes resides
in the basement of the sugar factories. He is called ‘el Familiar ’, meaning
‘the Relative’, and is the representative of the devil with whom the owner
of the sugar factory made a pact. According to this pact, the owner of the
62Kirsten Mahlke. ‘El capital del diablo: desapariciones y economías fantásticas en el mito
argentino de El Familiar ’. In: Narrativas del terror y la desaparición en América Latina. Ed.
by Liliana Ruth Feierstein and Lior Zylberman. Sáenz Peña: EDUNTREF, 2016, pp. 13–33,
pp. 16-18.
63Ley Nr. 20.840 (Seguridad Nacional).
64Aredez, Luis Ramón y otros, p. 137.
65See interview with Weisz in Fernando Krichmar. Diablo, Familia y Propiedad. 1999.
66Gastón Gordillo. ‘The Breath of the Devils: Memories and Places of an Experience of Terror’.
In: American Ethnologist 29.1 (2002), pp. 33–57; Mahlke, ‘El capital del diablo’; Kirsten
Mahlke. ‘El mito de El Familiar. Memoria social de la cultura del terror en los ingencios
azucareros del Noroeste argentino’. In: (Des)memorias. Ed. by Adriana Lopez Labourdette,
Silvia Spitta, and Valeria Wagner. Barcelona: Linkgua, 2016.
67Mahlke, ‘El capital del diablo’, pp. 19-21.
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plantation is guaranteed immense wealth while the Familiar, in return, is
regularly fed a worker. This usually happens during harvest when the
working conditions are particularly hard and many migrant workers are
present at the plantation. The chosen reaper is called into the basement
on the pretext that it needs cleaning, from where he usually does not
return. In this case, his colleagues and relatives know that it was the
Familiar who ate him, and that there is no point in looking for the remains
as the Familiar eats men completely.68
The legend of the Familiar was told by both the foremen and the workers.
This can be explained, according to Argentine anthropologist Gastón Gordillo,
with reference to two dimensions of the tale.69 On the one hand, it entails a
threatening, disciplinary function. It signals to the workers that he should not
raise his voice or else he might be the next to be eaten by the Familiar. On the
other hand, the tale has a critical function, which explains why it is also told
by the workers over generations.
Mahlke emphasises this critical function when she reads the legend of the
Familiar as a form of cultural knowledge that condenses the experience of
systematic exploitation that accompanied the implementation of capitalist
forms of production in the northwest. The wealth of the owner of the sugar
company is literally bought with the body and blood of the worker. It is a
business sanctioned by the treaty that was agreed between the devil and the
owner of the sugar mill and which has been signed in blood.70 Unlike many
other devil’s pacts, it is not only the soul that is sold, but also the body. And,
more importantly, the signatory does not offer his own soul or body, but that
of his workers.
progress as catastrophe
The legend of the Familiar is a cultural rendering of Marx’s analysis of the
capitalist mode of production and the violence it inflicts on those who do not
have anything to sell but their labour. It tells the experience of the mostly
indigenous migrant workers who, during harvest time, left their territories
to work on the sugar plantations. In this vein, Mahlke warns us not read
the legend of the Familiar as a mere anecdote.71 That it was continuously
retold over many years can only be explained with the fact that it grasps an
actual experience: it is the experience of the continuous disappearance of
bodies which went hand in hand with the formation of the Argentine nation
68Kirsten Mahlke. El Familiar. Bestie, Bürokrat, Diener der Inquisition. 2014. URL: https:
//www.exzellenzcluster.uni-konstanz.de/mahlke-familiar-inquisition.html
(visited on 11/17/2016), (my translation.)
69Gordillo, ‘The Breath of the Devils: Memories and Places of an Experience of Terror’, p. 44.
70Mahlke, ‘El capital del diablo’, p. 16.
71Mahlke, ‘El mito de El Familiar. Memoria social de la cultura del terror en los ingencios
azucareros del Noroeste argentino’, p. 2.
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and its integration into the global economy.72 As such, it speaks to Benjamin’s
philosophy of history which, as we saw in Chapter Three, demands that the
‘concept of progress must be grounded in the idea of catastrophe’.73
The absent body of Jorge Weisz, then, can be explained with reference to two
different states of exception. As a desaparecido, Weisz is, in the first place, a
victim of the military state apparatus that is characterised by the absence of
the rule of law. As someone who was devoured by the Familiar, the violence he
experienced is not merely that of the state of exception with which the junta
justified the suspension of the rule of law. Rather, the violence he suffered
is that of a state of exception that is the rule under the laws of capitalist
accumulation. This second state of exception, as I argued with reference to
Benjamin in Chapter Three, is the one rendered permissive by the liberal rule
of law. That is, it refers to a violence that is not recognised as such by the
liberal rule of law.
At various points in this thesis I have showed that, according to liberal
theories of the rule of law, the monopolisation of physical violence by the state
corresponds with the constitution of the economy as a realm that is claimed
to be governed not by coercion but by voluntarily agreed contracts. This
justification of the state’s monopoly on violence, along with the constitution of
the economy as the realm of freedom, have been challenged by various authors,
including by Marx. With Ives Winter, we can summarise Marx’s critique as
follows:
[T]he constitution of the modern political state occurs not only through
the doubling of the human in bourgeois and citoyen, but also through the
distinction of the kind of violence that is avowed (rebranded as ‘force’) and
the kind of violence that is disavowed because it takes place outside the
institutional setting and because it does not correspond to the juridical
grammar of subjective violence.74
The juridical grammar of subjective violence that Winter identifies is one that
privileges visible, spectacular forms of violence that moreover can be attributed
to an individual.75 It is the very grammar on which the narrative of the
desaparecidos rests.
The legend of the Familiar, evoked by the figure of Jorge Weisz, renders visible
the selectivity and the periodisation at work in the indictment. As opposed to
the legal rendering of the role of Ledesma in the illegal detentions, it links the
disappearance of the workers to an economic rationale: the disappearance of
72On the history of Jujuy and the development of the local sugar industry, see contributions in
Ana A. Teruel and Marcelo Lagos, eds. Jujuy en la Historia. De la Colonia al Siglo XX. Jujuy:
EdiUnju, 2006; For an English introduction into the history of Jujuy, see Ian Rutledge.
‘Agrarian Change and Integration in an Interior Province of Argentina: a Sociological and
Historical Study of Jujuy, c.1550-1960’. PhD thesis. Cambridge: University of Cambridge,
1973.
73Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 472 (N9a,1).
74Winter, ‘Beyond Blood and Coercion: A Study of Violence in Machiavelli and Marx’, p. 297.
75Yves Winter. ‘Violence and Visibility’. In: New Political Science 34.2 (2012), pp. 195–202.
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his body appears as intimately linked to the wealth of Ledesma.76 Contrary
to criminal law, which focuses on perpetrator and victim, the legend of the
Familiar thinks repression in relation to the beneficiaries of violence.
Furthermore, the Familiar challenges the assumption that the experience
of the disappearance of people is confined to the time of the Proceso, that is,
to the absence of the rule of law. The fact that the figure of the Familiar was
invoked again to make sense of the disappearances of unionised workers at
the sugar plantations in the northwest of Argentina, suggests that for a part of
the Argentine population the violence inflicted by the Proceso was perceived
not as something qualitatively new, but as a variation on a theme.
6.3 Conclusion
In the introduction to this chapter, I drew a parallel between the Ledesma trial
and the representations of law found in Kafka’s The Trial, and in particular
in the parable Before the Law. I suggested that the suspended nature of the
trial allows for two different readings, each drawing on a different strand
of interpretation of Kafka’s text. The first focuses on the relation between
the individual and law, the second on a movement within law. By means
of conclusion, I want to highlight the implications of both readings for the
question of what the promise of the Ledesma trial might be for those whose
struggles were violently repressed during the Proceso.
lack of imagination
The first line of interpretation focuses on the hopes placed in the law, despite
its exclusive character and its tendency to produce decisions that, in the eyes
of laypeople, would be described as ‘kafkaesque’. These hopes are reflected
in the long-lasting struggle of former political prisoners and relatives of dis-
appeared workers to gain legal recognition that Ledesma, and not only the
local armed forces, participated in the disappearances.77 The vehemence with
which human rights organisations insisted on the company’s role in the crimes
was matched by the company’s insistence that they had had no involvement.78
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the defense lawyers appealed
the pre-trial decision and won.
Given that the actus reus, that is, the provision of vehicles by the company,
was the contested element on which both prosecution and defense focused
during pre-trial proceedings, the grounds on which the Appeals Chamber
76Mahlke, ‘El capital del diablo’, p. 30.
77See for example the testimonies collected in Ricardo Nelli. La injusticia cojuda. Testimonios
de los trabajadores del azúcar del Ingenio Ledesma. Buenos Aires: Puntosur editores, 1988.
78In addition to letters to the public, the official account of the company is exposed in the
company history published on the occasion of its 100th anniversary. See Ledesma S.A.A.I.
Ledesma. Una Empresa Argentina Centenaria. 1908 - 2008. Buenos Aires: Fundación
CEPPA, 2008, p. 109; La Verdad sobre Ledesma. Buenos Aires, 10.07.2012. URL: http:
//www.ledesma.com.ar/archivos/art_archivo/128.pdf.
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granted the appeal came as a surprise to many. The Chamber confirmed
without much ado the objective participation of the accused, namely the
provision of the vehicles for the abduction of Ledesma’s workers. However, the
judges argued that this fact did not prove the criminal intent of the accused
and that there was therefore not enough evidence to open the main trial:
We do not discuss here whether the accused were powerful or influential.
Even if this was the case, we cannot deduce any indication from it able to
corroborate the hypothesis that the accused imagined that they were con-
tributing to somebody’s conduct who knowingly deprived other persons of
their liberty. . . . That is, the fact that it was verified that the detentions
took place in April using Ledesma’s vehicles does not prove the criminal
intent of the participants in any of the cases.79
Consequently, the Chamber of Appeals concludes that:
at this stage of the investigation there is not enough evidence to allow us
to assume that the accused Blaquier and Lemos imagined that they were
contributing to a crime carried out by the armed forces.80
During a press conference given a few days after the Appeals Chamber
decision became public, Federico Gatti, the current manager of the company,
declared that Ledesma received the news with satisfaction. ‘What this sentence
does’, he stated, ‘is to re-affirm what we have been saying from the beginning:
that neither the company nor its management had anything to do with the
dictatorship’.81 In a similar vein, the defense lawyer claimed that ‘the Chamber
of Appeals was clear that the the company’s participation was not proved and
did not exist’.82 These affirmations contain an important slip: to sustain that
something was not proved is not to say that it did not exist. In theory, new
evidence can be submitted in the future.
The case of Ledesma is one the of few cases in which the responsibility of
businessmen for the disappearance of their employees has been dealt with by
the courts.83 It was the hope of those who spent years working towards the
opening of the case – former political prisoners as well as family members of
the disappeared, lawyers, journalists and human rights activists – that the
Ledesma trial would be the first to confirm the participation of economic actors
79Blaquier, Carlos Pedro Tadeo y otro s/recurso de casación, p. 29.
80Blaquier, Carlos Pedro Tadeo y otro s/recurso de casación.
81‘Caso Blaquier: familiares rechazaron la sentencia’. In: Todo Jujuy (2015-03-17). URL:
http://www.todojujuy.com/todojujuy/caso-blaquier-familiares-rechazaron-
la-sentencia_32255 (visited on 02/05/2016).
82‘Caso Blaquier: familiares rechazaron la sentencia’.
83On the systematic repression of the labour movement during the Argentine Proceso, see
Dirección Nacional del Sistema Argentino de Información Jurídica, Responsabilidad empre-
sarial I; Dirección Nacional del Sistema Argentino de Información Jurídica, ed. Respons-
abilidad empresarial en delitos de lesa humanidad. Represión a trabajadores durante el
terrorismo de Estado. Vol. 2. Buenos Aires: Editorial Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos
Humanos de la Nación, 2015; For the legal investigations of businessmen, see Horacio
Verbitsky and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, eds. The Economic Accomplices to the Argentine
Dictatorship. Outstanding Debts. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
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in the crimes committed during the Proceso. Now, they fear that the Appeals
Chamber’s decision might set a legal precedent for other cases investigating
the responsibility of economic actors.
However, it is hard to imagine what kind of evidence would satisfy the
judge’s criteria for the mens rea of the accused. Against the backdrop of the
evidence produced by the trial, to argue that Blaquier and Lemos could not
have imagined what was going to be done with the vehicles speaks to a lack
of imagination of the judges who constitute the Appeals Chamber. The legal
framing of guilt in the absence of a mens rea, as the central problem of criminal
trials in response to state crime, has been famously discussed by Hannah
Arendt, in her report on the Eichmann Trial. Her phrase the ‘banality of evil’
does not denote the psychological condition of Eichmann, so much as it poses
the question of how to legally capture the guilt of an individual within a system
built around systematic crime.84
But maybe the problem is much simpler. Maybe, it is not located at the
level of legal arguments. In June 2015, following the decision of the Appeals
Chamber, I attended a meeting at the University of Jujuy, at which lawyers
working on cases investigating the responsibility of economic actors all over
the country, journalists and social researchers came together, in order to
discuss what kind of evidence and legal arguments were required to win the
next cases.85 It was the prosecutor who had acted in the Ledesma trial who
suggested that the prosecution had falsely relied on their arguments, when
perhaps it would have been more useful to be present on the floors of Co-
modoro Py.86 This argument seems like a lesson drawn from The Trial, where,
as Fitzpatrick observes, ‘[o]fficialdom can only be approached unofficially –
through “influence” or “connections”’.87 Blaquier’s lawyers, it seems, have
the right connections. One of them was the first federal judge to which the
case had been assigned. A second lawyer of Blaquier’s was the secretary of
the court where the dossiers of the case were initially processed. Against this
backdrop, the absence of a judgment in the Ledesma trial might be read as
evidence of a law that, in the end, is still the law of the powerful.
suspensions
I indicated that there is a second way of reading Kafak’s representations of the
law, which suggests that The Trial and Before the Law might be read not as
reflecting on the relationship between the individual and the law, but as reveal-
84Arendt, Eichmann; See further discussion in Felman, Juridical Unconscious, pp. 107-108;
and David Luban. Hannah Arendt as a Theorist of International Criminal Law. 2011. (Visited
on 10/23/2011), pp. 2-3.
85The meeting on ‘Responsabilidad empresaria en delitos de lesa humanidad’ was convened by
Gabriela Alejandra Karasik and Elizabeth L. Gomez at the Universidad Nacional de Jujuy
on 5and 6 June 2015
86Avenida Comodoro Py is the street in which most of the courts in Buenos Aires are located,
among them the Federal Criminal Court with the Chamber of Appeals.
87Fitzpatrick, ‘Kafka’s Solution’, p. 103.
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ing a fundamental tension at the heart of the law itself. In this vein, Fitzpatrick
finds in Kafka a law that is both determinate and illimitable.88 A similar
tension is cast by Teubner, when he reads Before the Law as a reflection on
the relationship between Law (Recht) and law (Gesetz).89 According to Andreas
Fischer-Lescano, correspondingly, every gesture of Kafka’s that unmasks the
violent and alienating character of law is followed by an indication that there
is still hope that one might experience a non-violent law.90
In Chapter Three, I read Benjamin’s philosophy of history together with his
critique of legal violence, thereby advocating a perspective on trials as sites of
competing politics of time. Such a perspective, I argued, allows us to perceive
the violence inherent to the trials, without taking our eyes off law’s claim to
justice. On the one hand, I suggested that trials should be understood as a
manifestation of law-preserving violence. They invoke the violence of the past
as a negative reference which clouds the foundational violence and thereby
also the contingency of the juridico-political order of which they are part. This
contingency, the possibility of being otherwise, concerns – among other things
– the relationship between the state and the economy, as well as the line
between sanctioned and non-sanctioned forms of violence.
As occurs in the readings of The Trial and Before the Law alluded to above,
I then considered the possibility that there might still be a gesture towards
justice to be found in the trials in response to state crime. This possibility can
be linked to what Benjamin identified as the ‘real’ state of exception that we
need to bring about. The ‘real’ state of exception envisioned by Benjamin, as
discussed in Chapter Three, does not denote some determinate future, but a
moment of the suspension or the Entsetzung of law. Werner Hamacher named
this moment the ‘afformative’.91 It parallels the generation of meaning proper
to the collage, which, in Chapter One, was described as depositing without
positing. In sum, I argued that with Benjamin, the promise of justice in trials
could not be found in those instances in which, with the help of the law,
we wish to expose the violence of the past in order to authorise the present
juridico-political order. Instead, it might found only at the point where the past
is invoked in a way that exposes the violence of both the past and the present.
My reading of the Ledesma trial in this chapter focused on two instances in
which the ‘rags’ of history unearthed during the legal proceedings expose the
foundational violence of the juridico-political order which they seek to preserve.
The first focused on the construction of legal responsibility for state-backed
violence, the second on the violence that is identified as such and condemned
by the present juridico-political order as it looks at the past. In both instances,
the order in the name of which the judgment was made was shown to construct
88Fitzpatrick, ‘Kafka’s Solution’, pp. 100-101.
89Teubner, ‘The Law Before its Law’.
90Fischer-Lescano, ‘Franz Kafka’s Critique of Legal Violence’, pp. 25-26.
91Hamacher, ‘Afformative, Strike’.
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the image of the past through a liberal kaleidoscope. ‘Liberal’, in this context
and as pointed out in Chapter Two, refers not merely to a position that is
interested in the individual, but to a particular way of linking the state to the
economy, the public to the private.92
In the first section of this chapter, I showed that, despite the intention of
the judge to emphasise the economic rationale of the Proceso, the economic
dimensions were eventually located in the private sphere. While ‘circumstantial’
evidence is accepted as connecting the individual and the structure, only
the evidence that can be accommodated within the idea of the bureaucratic
state is taken into account. In the second part of the chapter, I showed
that the indictment explains the illegal detentions of which Blaquier and
Lemos are accused, with reference to the state of exception that is epitomised
by the clandestine detention centres and the systematic practice of forced
disappearance. I then turned to the legend of the Familiar, arguing that it
offers a narrative according to which the disappearance of bodies is not the
exception but the rule. In connecting the experiences of (economic) exploitation
and (physical) repression, I suggested, the tale exposes the violence rendered
permissive by constitutional regimes.
To remember the repression of the workers at Ledesma merely as belonging
to the dictatorial state of exception opens the possibility of locating it in the
past and conceiving it as merely an ‘object of contemplation’.93 Describing this
effect in the Argentine context, Claudio Martyniuk observed that
what is present is a past that is encapsulated and crystallised, which is
assumed to belong to the past, without projecting it into debates about
public security, the exercise of exceptional authority of executive power
and the treatment of the marginalised and of minorities, those imprisoned
without sentence and under torture.94
That a critique of this violence is necessary today can be hinted at by return-
ing to Ledesma. On the morning of 28th July 2011, 700 families living on land
officially belonging to Ledesma were evicted. During the police intervention,
four individuals died (three adolescents and one police officer) and 63 were
injured.95 The police intervened after a local judge granted the request for
eviction which had been filed by Ledesma. Several witnesses mentioned that
Ledesma’s private security force participated in the eviction too. If it had
not been for what was presented in the news as an excess of violence which
resulted in the deaths and injuries, the eviction in itself would probably not
92See discussion on p. 53.
93See discussion on p. 103
94Claudio Martyniuk. ‘Desapariciones, Bicentenario y Pobreza: Humillación’. In: Herramienta
15.46 (2011).
95‘Cuatro muertos por un desalojo pedido por el Ingenio Ledesma’. In: Tiempo Argentino
(2011-07-29). URL: http://tiempo.infonews.com/notas/cuatro-muertos-desalojo-
pedido-ingenio-ledesma (visited on 06/07/2014); ‘Tierra arrasada en los dominios de
la familia Blaquier’. In: Página/12 (2011-07-29). URL: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/
diario/elpais/1-173325-2011-07-29.html.
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have caused a stir. Because the rule of law protects private property, the
occupation of the land, and not the eviction, was perceived as an infringement
of individual rights.
Postlude
In this thesis, I contrasted the latent philosophy of history at work in In-
ternational Criminal Law (ICL) with Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history
and his critique of law. In doing so, I wanted to bring into relief the political
implications of the latent theory of historical justice that is at work in ICL.
Furthermore, I wanted to offer an alternative perspective on the role of history
in trials that address state-sponsored violence.
I argued that ICL seeks to draw its own legitimacy from the alleged ability of
trials to shed light on the violence inflicted by a previous regime as well as from
its alleged contribution towards a liberalising change. The promise of justice
that is attached to the representation of past violence is therefore linked to
the authorisation of a pre-conceived juridico-political order, namely the rule
of law. As a consequence, I suggested, the foundation of political authority in
and through trials is no longer subject to scrutiny, but has instead become a
central concern underpinning the study of trials.
I challenged this latent theory of historical justice on both ontological and
political grounds by drawing on the writings of Walter Benjamin. The claim
that trials are able to offer a truthful image of the past conceals that this
representation is shaped by the concepts of the juridico-political order of which
the trials form a part. The politically problematic aspect that arises when the
trials’ promise of justice is attached to the adequate representation of past, is
that historical truth thus understood authorises the distribution of power of
the present. It can only recognize those contributions to a crime that can be
captured by the definitions of legal responsibility provided by the current law;
and it can only recognize the forms of violence that are defined as such.
In the context of my discussion of Benjamin’s philosophy of history, I referred
to the image of the kaleidoscope to illustrate this problem. I suggested that the
elements of crime and theories of individual responsibility that make up the
field of ICL can be compared to the mirrors of a kaleidoscope through which
the material produced by a trial is structured and organized. In my reading of
the trials I focused on those instances in which the images of the past that are
brought up by the trials cannot be accommodated by legal concepts. I argued
that they allow us to perceive the patterns according to which the ‘mirrors’ of
the legal kaleidoscope structure and make sense of the economic dimensions
of state-sponsored violence.
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Based on the study of the trials addressing the economic dimensions of
state crime in post-World War II Germany and contemporary Argentina, these
mirrors can be described as representing a liberal order. Throughout the
analyses I showed that this does not merely mean that the trials prosecuting
international crimes such as crimes against humanity or war crimes respond
to the violation of individual rights, focus on individual responsibly or seek to
foster the liberal rule of law. ICL is liberal, I argued, because it reproduces two
conceptual assumptions that are at the core of liberalism. The first of these
assumptions is the strict juxtaposition of the public and the private, the state
and the economy, force and freedom. The second concerns the classification
of violence according to its sanctioned and its non-sanctioned manifestations.
They delimit the way in which the courts relate economic actors to the state,
and to the violence that is applied in its name.
In the prelude to the thesis I asked: if criminal law as a concept of historical
justice is historically indebted to a liberal project, in so far as it seeks to endow
liberalising social change with a claim to justice, what promise does it hold for
those whose suffering is not redeemed by the couple of liberal rule of law and
market economy?
My answer to this question is at the same time a reflection on the method-
ology underlying this thesis: the trials’ potential to expose and denounce not
only the violence of the past, but, also that of the present juridico-political
order, might be the only promise of justice these trials have to offer. It is
the weak promise to produce images that do not serve as previsions of a just
future, but that are provisions for opening the present anew for contestation.
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